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THE FAR EAST
A POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC
HISTORY

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
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
THE FAR EAST

A Political and Diplomatic History

BY

PAYSON J. TREAT, PH.D.

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN
STANFORD UNIVERSITY



HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS
NEW YORK AND LONDON

1928

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EDITORIAL FOREWORD

The world for the past ten years has centered its interest on revolutionary Russia. Until the recent turmoil in China, in itself not an unusual thing in the long history of China, the Western World has been but dimly conscious that a greater and perhaps more significant change is in progress in the Far East. This revolution or rather evolution in the Far East is the maturing result of the impact of the West and its institutions upon the ancient culture, institutions and peoples of the Orient. Beginning tentatively and far away with the first travelers, traders and missionaries, this invasion has in our day become the last and most portentous phase of the expansion of Europe and the first and most fascinating century of an awakening Asia. Western national imperialism and modern industrialism and commerce have tremendously widened the breach in the walls raised by the Orient in the days of its long isolation. New problems within and without the boundaries of China and Japan, new courses to be charted by them and by the nations of Europe, America and Australia in relation to this changing Orient are pressing for consideration.

Everywhere interest is awakening in the history of the Far East. The one conditioning factor of major importance in all the present confusion is a knowledge of what is and how it became, a knowledge now woefully lacking of what has been happening in the Far East, especially in the last century. Organized courses in colleges and universities and public inquiry for reading matter testify to the interest and the need for an account that is both competent and comprehensible.

This volume comes from the pen of a scholar and teacher who for many years has made the history of the Far East his special interest. As a scholar he has sought to know the peoples he writes about and to master the sources made available in increasing volume recently, for the diplomatic history of the Pacific powers, our own nation among them. As a teacher he has tested in his own classroom the presentation he

now makes available to other teachers, students and the general public.

The general reader or student who uses this volume is more fortunate than I have been, if he has found within the same compass any other equally scholarly and clarifying summary of recent history and politics in the Far East.

GUY STANTON FORD

P R E F A C E

THE purpose of this survey of the political and diplomatic history of the Far East is to furnish a text-book for students and a reference work for general readers in a field which is rapidly assuming more importance and merits greater consideration. It seemed advisable, therefore, to include as much of the historical and cultural background as would be essential for the understanding of more recent events, and also to include some consideration of the regions adjacent to China and Japan if conditions or developments there have affected the history of the two principal nations. The policy and conduct of Japan in Korea, for example, can be better understood if the policy and conduct of France in Indo-China is taken into consideration. If this text contains any features of value it is because it capitalizes the experience gained from giving a course of this kind for twenty years at Stanford and other American universities. When, in the autumn of 1907, I first presumed to offer such a course, the final lecture dealt with the Portsmouth Treaty. In the intervening years events of the greatest significance, undreamed of at that time, have been recorded, appraisals then deemed adequate have been greatly modified, and new light has been shed on matters in dispute. I have sought to rest the statements which follow upon the most recent research, and I trust that the interpretation of accepted facts will be considered as objective and as free from racial, national, and personal bias as can reasonably be expected.

PAYSON J. TREAT

Stanford University
November 12, 1927

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PART ONE

CHINA TO 1895

THE FAR EAST

CHAPTER I

CHINA: THE PHYSICAL BACKGROUND

Asia.—The study of the history of a people properly begins with some understanding of the physical environment which has played so large a part in its development. The Western student, especially, must subject his stock of opinions to a new valuation when he approaches the study of any Asiatic people. So far as modern research has explored the dim vestiges of the past there is a very general agreement that somewhere in western Asia the human family first appeared. Races, defined by certain physical characteristics, gradually emerged. The origin of these races, and the way in which they spread over the globe, have been a fascinating study. Various attempts have been made at classification. The easiest and earliest groupings were based upon color, and various shades, ranging from the sixteen enumerated by Desmoulins to the three (white, yellow, and black) of Cuvier, have been used as color classifications. But with the development of the science of anthropology new classifications, based upon the more permanent anatomical structure of the skeleton and the skull, have supplanted the older color groupings, and scientists have measured hundreds of thousands of skulls, of living and dead human beings, in order to study the breadth and length of the skull, the height and width of the orbital and nasal cavities, and other anatomical details. In addition, the structure of the hair, whether it is frizzy, wavy, or straight, oval, flat, or round, has been taken into consideration. At the present time the available data have not permitted the universal acceptance of any of the theories advanced either as to the origin or the movements of the several races. But the student can at

least be on his guard against any sweeping deductions based upon so uncertain an element as color. Some of the supposedly white groups are primarily derived from other stocks, and among the colored people are those who possess a considerable number of the physical characteristics which we commonly associate with the white or Caucasian race. In any event, it is safe to assume, until further investigations lead us to discard the assumption, that the human family first appeared near the western borders of Asia, the largest of the continental areas.

Asia, the Home of Early Civilization.—Once again the spades of the excavators are making it possible for us to enlarge our views of the antiquity of human culture, but so far as we are now aware it was in western Asia, near and in the valley of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, that human beings first learned how to do things in ways so much better than their savage ancestors that a real civilization began to develop. Further to the east, and probably at a later time, in the river valleys of the Indus and the Ganges, the great civilization of India took form. And still further east, in the valleys of the Hwang-ho and the Yangtze-kiang, the mighty civilization of China emerged, while in the valley of the Nile arose the Egyptian civilization. The interaction of these early civilizations and their influence upon the distinctive culture which found its origin in the eastern Mediterranean, are problems which modern scholarship has attacked with increasing vigor. But we are at present justified in assuming that human civilization first developed in the vast continent of Asia. And of the three great living civilizations of modern times two are the products of Asiatic genius, the Indian civilization, whose influence extended along the coast of southern Asia and into the outlying islands, and that of China, which profoundly affected the culture of all the surrounding peoples, including the Japanese. Our own civilization, which is sometimes spoken of as the Mediterranean civilization, owes much, far more, perhaps, than we have yet realized, to the earlier cultures of the Asiatic mainland. If racial differences account in part for the rise of these different cultures, then physical

barriers largely explain their persistence, only slightly influenced by the great civilizations which arose in some cases only a few hundred miles away. With the breaking down of these isolation factors, and the spread of information among all the peoples of the world, there has been a steady, but slow, assimilation of "ways of doing things" which may in the future lead to a world civilization in place of the present regional ones.

Asia, the Home of Great Religions.—Mankind has always tried to find some way of dealing with the supreme forces which he believed controlled his destiny. Out of this conscious effort to placate or appease the forces of nature, or the gods, the religious systems of the family, the tribe, the nation, have arisen. All the great religions of to-day were formulated within the confines of Asia. The teachings of these saints and sages rule the hearts and minds of men in all parts of the world. Hinduism, the dominant religion of India, is the outgrowth of the ancient faith of her early Aryan conquerors. Buddhism, born within India, has won converts throughout all the farther East. Confucianism, the ethical teachings of a great Chinese sage and his disciples, may be considered a form of religion. Other ancient cults were Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Taoism, and Shinto. Among the newer faiths are Christianity and Mohammedanism, which vie with each other as the two great missionary religions of the age, and both owe much to the early Jewish faith. Just as cultural differences have tended to break down when intercourse supplanted isolation, so the study of comparative religions has tended to modify the fierce antipathies which so recently prevailed.

Asia: Physical Factors.—Asia is the largest of the continents. So poorly defined, in fact, are the physical boundaries between Asia and Europe that some geographers more properly speak of Eurasia as one huge land mass, and the boundaries of modern Russian states at times cross over the continental divide without loss of administrative efficiency. With an estimated area of 17,206,000 square miles, Asia contains almost one-third of the land area of the globe, which may be estimated at 57,255,200 square miles. In such a vast land mass

we would expect to find that nature has wrought on the grandest scale—the highest mountains, the most extensive plateaus, mighty river systems, and great lakes. And here man has struggled against natural forces far more terrible than those which have opposed him in the smaller regions of the West—earthquake, flood, and tempest, and greater climatic changes than any other region knows. That these natural phenomena should have influenced the mental development of Asiatic peoples is not unreasonable. Passivity and a calm trust in fate might well arise from an age-long contemplation of the pettiness of human strength when pitted against such overmastering forces.

Asia: Physical Divisions.—Asia may be divided into the following physical regions: western Asia, including Turkey, Arabia and Persia; central Asia, divided politically into Russian, Chinese and Afghan Turkestan; India, from the Himalayas to the sea, a land of mountains and river plains; Indo-China, with its great rivers flowing south from eastern Tibet; Siberia, the region drained by streams flowing north into the Arctic Ocean; and China, which in turn comprises three distinct regions, the coastal area, the lofty plateau of Tibet, and the plains and deserts of Mongolia. The outlying islands include the East Indies and the wide-flung isles of Japan, from Formosa to Kamchatka.


China.—Of these regions we are primarily concerned with China, Indo-China, eastern Siberia, Japan, and the Philippine Islands. The Republic of China consists of China proper, or the eighteen provinces, and the outlying regions of Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet. On the northeast lies Manchuria, now bounded by Korea and Russia, but formerly far more extensive, a region drained by two important rivers, the Sungari and the Liao, flowing to the north and south. Aside from these river valleys, the surface is hilly or in parts mountainous, the soil amazingly rich, while forests and minerals complete its natural resources. There is small wonder that the control of this rich territory should have occasioned the most acute international rivalries in the Far East in the past three decades.

To the north of China proper lies Mongolia, almost half the size of the United States, a vast plateau rising from 2,000 to 8,000 feet, where much good grazing and agricultural land may be found in regions long known as deserts. Here was the home of the Mongol hordes which carried their conquests from the Pacific Ocean to the heart of Europe. To the extreme west lies Sinkiang, the "New Territory," or Chinese Turkestan, a region of plateau and desert where the population is concentrated along the western rivers. Here may be found such ancient trading marts as Kashgar, Yarkand, and Khotan, and in these centers, as well as in cities long buried in the sand, took place that interchange of Eastern and Western goods and ideas which influenced in so many ways the civilizations of widely separated lands. Tibet, on the west, is a vast and lofty table-land, ranging from 10,000 to 17,000 feet, marked off from India, to the south, by the mighty ramparts of the Himalayas. Here, at best, China's political control was always weak. These sparsely peopled outlying dependencies, with their inclement table-lands and their vast deserts, served to surround China proper with physical barriers which permitted the more cultured Chinese to perfect their civilization and maintain it free from stronger cultural influences. Invasion from Mongolia and Manchuria was not too difficult, for a weakly defended Great Wall could hardly check the conqueror's advance. But no people of equal or superior culture from the south or west could invade China by land in the days when her peculiar civilization was taking form.

China Proper.—The very heart of China is found in the region of the eighteen provinces, often spoken of as China proper. Here, in somewhat more than one-third of the whole domain, dwell more than eight-ninths of the people of the Chinese Republic. Including almost the entire coast line, and extending inland for some fourteen hundred miles, China proper is a region well adapted to the development of a prosperous and self-contained people. With the exception of the southern fringe of territory the whole area lies within the temperate zone. Great amounts of extremely fertile land are found, especially in the valleys of the Yellow River (Hwang-

ho), the Yangtze-kiang, and the West River (Si-kiang). The rainfall is abundant in the south, and in the north the seasonal rains fall in the summer when they are most useful. While mountain ranges are found in every province, it is only in the far west that they reach great heights. The prevailing course of these ranges is from west to east, and the great rivers all follow this general direction. Thus the physical features have tended to divide China along east-and-west lines, the most important one, economically and politically, being that of the Yangtze. In the north the Yellow River, rising in Tibet and making a great northward bend out of China proper, returns on a southern course and then strikes northeast to the Gulf of Chihli. This mighty stream, flowing in its lower course through low lands of deep alluvial silt, has frequently broken loose from its channel to flood great areas and earn the name of "China's sorrow." For only a short distance from its mouth is it navigable, but higher up it may be used in smooth stretches by small craft. Far different is the course of the great Yangtze-kiang, one of the largest and without doubt the most useful of the rivers of the world. Also rising in Tibet, it soon takes an eastern course and flows through the very heart of China. On its banks some of the most populous provinces are situated. In its valley a vast acreage is available for intensive husbandry. On its waters moves the great inland commerce of China. Ocean vessels of considerable draught can proceed to Nanking, where, 200 miles from the coast, tidewater is still found. Smaller ocean steamers, and even armored cruisers, may continue on to Hankow, 600 miles inland, when the spring freshets begin, for the Yangtze is in flood after the snow begins to melt on the far-western mountains. Beyond this point river steamers ply through the famous gorges beyond Ichang to Chungking, almost 1,400 miles from the sea, and river junks can continue on for 300 miles. No river in the world affords such transportation facilities for so vast a population.

In the coastal plains south of the Yangtze frequent water-courses and canals provide an intricate network of water



highways. Beyond these waterways human power is used to transport goods for long stages. In the north animals are used to haul clumsy carts or to carry heavy loads. Again, in the south the prevalent food crop is rice; in the north, wheat and cereals. These economic differences, reinforced by climatic and to some extent racial differences, have served to divide China into two great regions along the line of the Yangtze River.

It is, of course, very desirable to know the location of the Chinese provinces before one proceeds to a study of the history of that land. Fortunately, the Chinese have frequently combined landmarks with the points of the compass in order to form their provincial names, and if the meaning of a few Chinese characters or words is understood the location of most of the provinces may be easily remembered. These words are:

Ho.....River	Peh.....North
Kiang.....River	Tung.....East
Hu.....Lake	Nan.....South
Shan.....Mountain	Si.....West

Then if provinces are grouped in some simple order the task of locating them is again simplified.

On the northern boundary:

<i>Province</i>	<i>Capital</i>	<i>Translation of name of province</i>
Kansu	Lanchow	Sweet Sedate (derived from the two principal cities Kanchow, Suchow).
Shensi ✓	Sian	West of the Pass (the Tungkwan Pass).
Shansi	Taiyuan	Mountain West.

On the coast: ^

Chihli	Tientsin	Directly ruled (here Peking is located).
Shantung	Tsinan	Mountain East.
Kiangsu	Nanking	River (and) Su (from Kiangning [Nanking] and Soochow).
Chekiang	Hangchow	Crooked River (because of the famous tidal bore of the Tsientangkiang).

Fukien	Foochow	Happy Establishment (from Foo-chow and Kienning).
Kwangtung	Canton	Kwang East (part of the old Annamite kingdom of Kwangnan).

On the southern boundary:

Kwangsi	Nanning	Kwang West.
Yunnan	Yunnan	Cloud South (south of the clouds of Szechwan).

On the western boundary:

Szechwan	Chengtu	Four Streams.
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Interior provinces:

Honan	Kaifeng	River South (the Hwang-ho).
Hupei	Wuchang	Lake North (the Tungting lake).
Hunan	Changsha	Lake South.
Kiangsi	Nanchang	River West (but really south of the Yangtze-kiang).
Anhwei	Anking	Peace Glory (from Anking and Hweichow).
Kweichow	Kweiyang	Noble Tract.

A brief study of the meaning of these provincial names will enable us to visualize Kwangtung and Kwangsi as the eastern and western parts of a former southern kingdom; Hupei and Hunan as north and south of a great central lake; Shantung and Shansi as east and west of an intervening mountain range; Honan as south of the Hwang-ho; and Kiangsu and Kiangsi as located in the lower Yangtze-kiang Valley. The combination of parts of the names of cities to form provincial designations was also employed in the case of provinces to designate the old vicerealties. Thus, Shenkan and Yunkwei may be easily identified. Lianghu or Hukwang, Liangkwan, and Liangkiang mean the two Hu, two Kwang, and two Kiang provinces, although, with not unusual indifference to the facts in the case, Anhwei was included with Kiangsu and Kiangsi to form the two Kiangs. A little more difficult to fathom is the meaning of Minche, applied to the vicerealty containing Fukien and Chekiang, until one remembers that the principal

river of Fukien is the Min, and then the combination seems reasonable enough.

The following table will warn us that in dealing with China we are concerned with large areas and vast populations. Szechwan is larger than any European state except Russia, while New York, the most populous of the American states, is surpassed in numbers by fifteen of the Chinese provinces.

	<i>Square miles</i>	<i>Population (Post-office estimate, 1923)</i>
China Proper....	1,532,800	411,491,940
Manchuria... ..	363,700	22,083,434
Mongolia	1,367,953	(2,000,000)
Sinkiang.....	550,579	2,519,579
Tibet.....	463,320	(3,000,000)
<hr/>		<hr/>
Total.....	4,278,352	441,094,953
Anhwei.....	54,826	19,832,665
Chekiang.....	36,680	22,043,300
Chihli.....	115,830	34,186,711
Fukien.....	46,332	13,157,791
Honan.....	67,954	30,831,909
Hunan.....	83,398	28,443,279
Hupei.....	71,428	27,167,244
Kansu.....	125,483	5,927,997
Kiangsi.....	69,498	24,466,800
Kiangsu.....	38,610	33,786,064
Kwangsi.....	77,220	12,258,335
Kwangtung.....	100,000	37,167,701
Kweichow.....	67,182	11,114,951
Shansi.....	81,853	11,080,827
Shantung.....	55,984	30,803,245
Shensi.....	75,290	9,465,558
Szechwan.....	218,533	49,782,810
Yunnan.....	146,714	9,839,180

These statistics will also indicate, as might be expected, that while some of the provinces are densely peopled, such as Kiangsu, with an estimated population of 875 to the square

mile, there are others, such as Kansu and Yunnan, where the figures drop to 47 and 67. In spite of an average population of 238 to the square mile, the agricultural resources of the country have by no means been exploited to their limit.

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(The reading lists appended to each chapter contain the titles of works where additional information may be obtained, the complete titles of which may be found in the general bibliography. For the modern period, on which many works of a controversial nature have been written, an attempt has been made to suggest titles which present both points of view.)

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CHAPTER II

AN OUTLINE OF CHINESE HISTORY

The Chinese.—The population of China is by no means homogeneous. Marked physical differences exist between the people of the north and northeast, and those of the south and southwest. But the bulk of the people may be considered members of the Mongoloid race. In addition, remnants of aboriginal, non-Chinese stocks are found in the southern mountains. It is yet too soon to speak with confidence concerning the origin of the Chinese people and the racial stocks persisting in the vast region under their control. The Chinese seem to have entered their present home from the northwest, first settling along the Yellow River in the present province of Shensi. From there they slowly but steadily extended their domain to the Yellow Sea on the east and the Yangtze on the south. But it was not until about the first century of the Christian era that they brought the greater part of what is now China proper under their control. By means of conquest and peaceful penetration the lands of the Middle Kingdom and the outlying dependencies were consolidated under their rule.

Mythological or Legendary Period, to 2205 B.C.—The Chinese historians have evolved a misty mythological narrative, which may contain some elements of reality by the time when the age of the Five Sovereigns, but really nine, begins about 2852 B.C. The first three of these are known as the Three August Ones, and to them is ascribed the art of agriculture, the medicinal use of herbs, the construction of carts and vessels, the raising of the silkworm, and the making of garments. Of their successors, Yao, Shun, and Yu are in turn spoken of as the Three Great Emperors, and the last of these founded the first hereditary dynasty, the Hsia.

Historical Sources.—The preservation of historical records has been developed to a high degree in China. Confucius edited the *Book of History* (*Shu King*) covering the period from the twenty-fourth to the eighth century, B.C., and com-

piled the *Spring and Autumn Annals* (*Chun Chiu*), which details the principal events of his native state of Lu from 722 to 484 B.C. Ssu-ma Chien, the father of Chinese history, wrote the *Historical Record* (*Shih Chi*) covering the period from the earliest times to 122 B.C., or more than 3,000 years. This is considered the first of the dynastic histories, of which there are twenty-four, each compiled after the fall of the dynasty from such records as have been preserved. The last of the series is that of the Ming dynasty, begun in 1679, thirty-six years after the fall of the house but not completed until 1742. A modern reprint of these histories contains 711 volumes, and in them may be found much material, such as documents, records of the censors, and biographies of famous men, from which the great histories of the future will be critically prepared.

The Three Great Periods.—A simple division of this long range of Chinese history would be:

I. 2852—206 B.C. The period of the gradual extension and consolidation of the Empire.


II. 206 B.C.—A.D. 1644. The period of the struggles with the northern Tartars.

III. 1644 to the present time. The period of the reshaping of the old civilization through intercourse with Western nations.¹

The Twenty-two Dynasties.—The Chinese historians usually enumerate twenty-two dynasties which ruled from the Hsia, in 2205 B.C., to the Manchu, ending in 1912. But this classification omits minor dynasties which ruled over various parts of the Empire in days when the main dynasty was weak, and it also ignores many of the non-Chinese dynasties—Hsiung-nu, Tungusic, Tibetan, and Tartar—which ruled in the north during the division of China proper between the northern invaders and the Chinese. This rise and fall of dynasties in China is in sharp contrast to conditions in Japan, where only one imperial house has held the throne from the very dawn of history. Of these dynasties only six, in the strictly historical

¹ F. L. Hawks Pott in Morse, *The Trade and Administration of the Chinese Empire*, p. 2.

ROUGH SKETCH MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE ETHNOLOGY OF CHINA AND THE CHINESE EXPANSION



(From E. H. Parker's *China, Her History, Diplomacy and Commercial Relations*. By permission of the publishers, John Murray, London, Eng., and E. P. Dutton Co., New York.)

period, remained in power for more than a hundred years, although the first three—the Hsia, the Shang or Yin, and the Chow—were reputed to have reigned for 439, 844, and 874 years, respectively.

The Rise and Fall of Dynasties.—With few exceptions, a general statement may be made concerning the rise and fall of these Chinese dynasties. An able general would seize power; if he and his successors possessed administrative skill as well, the power would reside for some generations in his descendants until misrule in the capital or uncontrolled tyranny among provincial officials occasioned such popular discontent that some general or governor would lead the forces of rebellion. If the dynasty failed to hold its place it simply had forfeited the "mandate of Heaven," and the successful leader was free to seat himself upon the dragon throne and establish his own dynasty, which in turn would follow an almost identical course. The invasion of more virile peoples from the north and west might, and frequently did, force a dynasty from its capital, but only on two occasions, and within the last 750 years, did northern conquerors gain possession of the whole Empire and establish their own dynasties.

The Seven Great Dynasties.—For the purposes of this study only a brief survey of Chinese history need be attempted, and seven great dynasties will be found to stand out preëminent.

<i>Dynasty</i>	<i>No. of rulers</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>Capital</i>
Chow.....	34	1122–255 B.C.	Changning (Shensi)
Tsin (1122–221 B.C.)	22	221–206 B.C.	until 770, then Loyang (Honan)
Han.....	28	206 B.C.–A.D. 220	Changning until 25 A.D., then Loyang
Tang.....	20	618–907	Changning
Sung.....	18	960–1280	Kaifeng (Honan)
			until 1127, then Hangchow (Chekiang)
Yuan.....	10	1280–1368	Peking
Ming.....	16	1368–1644	Nanking until 1421, then Peking
Tsing.....	10	1644–1912	Peking

During the Chow period China was organized on a feudal basis, and it was the rise of one of these states to supreme power which brought both the dynasty and the feudal system to an end. In this period lived Confucius, the great sage, 551-479 B.C., and Mencius, 372-290 B.C., his great commentator. The Tsin dynasty, which followed, 221-206 B.C., while one of the short-lived dynasties, should be remembered for its unification of the empire, for the completion of the Great Wall against the barbarians of the north and northwest, and for the attempt to destroy all the records of the past save those which related to agriculture, medicine, astrology, and divination. This was the dynasty from which the western name of China was derived.

Under the Han the struggle with the northern barbarians became acute. The imperial domain was greatly extended and now controlled, although in parts nominally, the greater part of what is now China proper. It was a period of great "literary, artistic, commercial, and military activity," and a new religion, Buddhism, soon to have profound influence, arrived from India.

Then followed a period of internal disorder and successful raids from the north. Between 420 and 589 the Empire was divided, and Tartar and Tibetan dynasties held varying realms north of the Yangtze. But under the Tang, union was restored and a new period of progress and prosperity, of military and cultural achievement, began. At this time came Christianity in the unorthodox, Nestorian, form. Weakness and petty dynasties marked the next fifty-three years, until a new dynasty, the Sung, reunited the Empire and the arts of peace again flourished.

But soon the invaders were established in the north. First the Kitan Tartars and then the Kin (or Nuchens), and the Sung were forced to retire south of the Yangtze, fixing their capital at Nanking (the southern capital) and finally at Hangchow.

Then came the Mongols, the "scourge of the Lord." Invited in to help the Chinese against the Kin, they united with the Kitans and finally held all the country north of the great

river. Kublai Khan then invaded south China and in 1280 a Mongol (Yuan) dynasty was seated on the dragon throne. Of his conquests and administration we learn much from the wonderful *Book of Marco Polo*. Although China was conquered politically by the ruder northerners, she was soon able to conquer them by her culture, and when weak descendants ascended the throne so well held by Kublai, rebellion arose in the far south, and a Buddhist priest, turned soldier and rebel, was able to restore a Chinese dynasty, the Ming. Its capital was first at Nanking, but in 1421 it was removed to the great city of Peking where Kublai had reigned.

During the Ming period Europeans first came to China by sea, and the Christian faith, twice introduced earlier, was finally planted in the land. But the threat from the north was only scotched with the expulsion of the Mongols. On the northeast the tribesmen had been united under able leaders and had taken the name of Manchus. There they disputed the possession of the region beyond the Great Wall and, invited within to help a loyal general against a rebel in Peking, they took the capital and refused to surrender it. A long war carried their arms throughout the south, and once again an alien clan held the imperial throne.

The Early Flowering of Chinese Civilization.—For the student of recent Chinese history a few general observations may prove more helpful than any outline of dynastic records. First of all, the early flowering of Chinese culture should be noted. By the time of Confucius, about 500 B.C., the Chinese had already reached a high state of civilization. They possessed a religious system in Taoism, the work of the "Old Philosopher" Lao-tze, b. 604; a workable code of ethics in the teachings of Confucius; works of pure literature, history, and philosophy had been produced; the science of government had been expounded; the pictorial and plastic arts had flourished. The foundations of a great civilization had been laid in those early years. Under the great dynasties, when peace prevailed, these cultural attainments were brought, in part, to higher perfection. But, with these exceptions, it may be said,

broadly, that Chinese civilization remained much the same for the next 2400 years.

The Persistence of Chinese Civilization: Physical Isolation.—While the earlier or contemporary civilizations of western Asia and Egypt live to-day only in their influence upon other cultures, the civilization of China, like that of India, is a great living force. This persistence may be explained in several ways, but three of these are of special significance. First we must remember that China proper, where the distinctively Chinese civilization arose, enjoyed the advantage of physical isolation. † Barriers of mountain, lofty plateau, and desert guarded her from the well-developed civilizations of the west and south. Invasion was only easy from the north and north-west, and the many Tartar peoples who might conquer parts or all of China soon succumbed to the superior culture of their vanquished subjects. From the south and west no conquering legions brought their civilization into China. Few travelers passed between China and India, and these were usually Buddhist priests or pilgrims. Chinese armies penetrated as far as the Caspian Sea, and Chinese traders were found in the great marts of central and southern Asia. Some ideas as well as commodities were certainly exchanged there, but not enough to influence to any marked degree, so far as we are now aware, the ancient culture of the Middle Kingdom.

Confucian Teachings.—Protected from alien cultural influences by physical barriers, the ancient culture was handed down from generation to generation largely through the writings and sayings of the great sage Confucius. In his lifetime his professed disciples numbered up to 3,000, and his later commentators were legion. Confucius was by nature conservative. Living in a time of feudal anarchy, he found examples of right conduct on the part of princes and people in the records of the remote past. He was a conservator of ancient culture and he taught his disciples to look to the past for guidance. His teachings soon held sway over the minds and hearts of his people, so that we may consider that this ancient sage has influenced the lives of more human beings than any

other mortal, except his Indian contemporary, Gautama the Buddha.

Examination System.—The profound influence of the Confucian canon was safeguarded from century to century through a system of national civil-service examinations, in the preparation for which the standard texts were those written or compiled by Confucius and his disciples or commentators. Hence all educated men studied the same books and the curriculum was to an amazing degree standardized. These examinations were used under the Chow and Han dynasties, but it was not until the Tang, about 630, that control of the examinations was vested in the Board of Rites, while appointments based upon them were conferred by the Board of Civil Service. The effect of this standardized curriculum was much the same as would be the case if every educated European and American, down into the twentieth century, studied nothing but the literature, philosophy, history, and ethics of Greek scholars, written in the days when Athens was in her prime. Thus we may think of the Chinese as advancing into the modern age with their faces turned toward the past, and a great readjustment of their entire life was necessary when they came into contact with the forward-looking peoples of the West. The Chinese scholars, thus wedded to the past, became the great obstacles to new ideas and progress. Instead of supporting a proposition by citing the latest and most effective practice, it was the custom to resort to extracts from these ancient books, and the older the opinion the more weight it possessed. The uniform curriculum did give China a single written language, although the characters were pronounced differently in various parts of the Empire. This common written language and the common culture tended to bind the people together, whereas the actual physical, economic, and racial differences would have disrupted the nation.

Feudalism.—For many centuries, under the first dynasties, China was divided into feudal states and all the evils incident to feudal rivalries prevailed. During the Chow the states, great and small, numbered almost 150, and in the *Spring and Autumn Annals* Confucius enumerated thirteen states of note.

But centralization was achieved under the Tsin, about 220 B.C., and although at later times the Empire was divided into several minor states and powerful governors acted much as feudal lords, the old system was never restored. This is in marked contrast to conditions in Europe, where feudalism persisted through the Middle Ages, and in Japan, where it flowered as late as the seventeenth century and lasted down until 1871.

Alien Domination.—The modern conception of China as a vast country composed of China proper and the outlying dependencies should not cause us to forget that during the long period of struggle with the northern Tartars, from 220 B.C., large portions of the region north of the Yangtze passed under the control of different tribes, in some cases for considerable periods. Twice the entire region north of the river passed out of Chinese control—between 420 and 589 and between 1127 and 1280. And twice the entire Empire was ruled by conquerors—the Mongols, between 1280 and 1368, and the Manchus, between 1644 and 1912. Thus, during 800 years, the Chinese only held the northern provinces during the 276 years of the Ming dynasty, 1368-1644. The one thing which held the Chinese together during these evil years was a common culture. The presence of alien rulers throughout so many centuries has not been without influence. The antipathy between northern and southern Chinese has historical roots as well as racial and economic bases, and the division of the Empire along the line of the Yangtze has frequently been the case. During 317-590, 1127-1280, and 1368-1421 the capital of the Chinese dynasty was south of the river, at Nanking or, through most of the last period, at Hangchow. Peking became the imperial capital first under the Mongols, in 1280, and then was occupied by the Mings in 1421, and by their successors the Manchus.

Wars and Rebellions.—Contrary to the prevailing opinion, the history of China is replete with the narratives of wars and internal strife. The feudal struggles, the wars of conquest which brought the present domains within the Empire and still place China among the "imperialistic powers," the age-

long struggles with the northerners, the invasions which at different times carried the Chinese arms into central Asia, into Burma, Annam, the frontiers of India, and some of the islands off the southern coast, and the frequently recurring rebellions, all testify that the profession of arms was by no means neglected in spite of the pacific teachings of Confucius and the Buddha. Even in comparatively recent times the punitive power of the Empire was felt, as when in 1790 the Gurkhas, of Nepal, were chastised by the army of Kienlung, while the suppression of the terrible Taiping rebellion, 1850-64, and the Yunnan, Kansu, and Kashgar revolts a few years later, involved vast armies and ruthless destruction of life. During the Manchu period few Chinese of position or ability would serve in the imperial forces, but the long years of external peace could not eliminate the soldierly qualities which were earlier manifested, and in modern times Chinese have demonstrated unquestioned courage and readiness to face any danger when the cause seemed to them good and the leadership competent.

Tolerance.—Finally, it should be observed that, although the Chinese scholars stoutly opposed the influence of alien cultures, they viewed with indifference or tolerance religious ideas which entered the country from abroad. Buddhism, which eventually became the most popular of faiths, was, according to tradition, introduced from India in A.D. 67. In spite of indifference and at times active persecution, it finally rivaled the indigenous Taoism as the dominant religious faith. Perhaps this tolerance was due to the general indifference of Confucius to matters of religion. Under the Tang dynasty, about 636, Christianity in the Nestorian form reached China, and for many years was not merely tolerated but actively aided by imperial decree. Mohammedanism appeared a little later, and for a thousand years a small colony of Jews persisted in Kaifeng (Honan). A Mohammedan observatory was erected in Peking in 1272, and many of the western sciences and arts were brought to China by these skillful traders, either by the land routes or by sea to Canton. The first Roman Catholic missionary reached Peking, overland, in 1292, and

a body of believers existed there until the expulsion of the Mongol protectors. In every case persecution occurred, but a safe generalization would be that these persecutions were due primarily to political reasons, to some interference, real or imagined, on the part of the new cult with the recognized religious or political system of the time. Religious ideas, as such, have rarely led to hostile actions; tolerance, or at worst indifference, has been the traditional attitude of the Chinese.

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CHAPTER III

EDUCATION AND RELIGION

Culture and Religion.—As we proceed to trace the contacts between Western and Eastern peoples in modern times we will find that these have taken place primarily in the realms of commerce, religion, and culture. Where commerce has been mutually beneficial, where religious beliefs have met with tolerance or acceptance on both sides, and where new ideas have been welcomed, little occasion for misunderstanding or the resort to force will be found. But where friction arises and conflict results we must know something about the fundamental differences which give rise to these disturbances. Rarely in human controversies will the fault be found to lie wholly on one side.

The Chinese Educational System.—No educational system has so profoundly affected a vast population as that of China. "It is education that has imparted a uniform stamp to the Chinese under every variety of physical condition."¹ In ancient China the schools were under state guidance and control, but soon the weakness of later dynasties caused private tutoring and private schools to be the agencies employed in education. Private tutors were provided in the homes of the well-to-do or for the children of several families. Free schools were maintained by the rich and benevolent and these good works were encouraged by the magistrates and rewarded by the emperor. But under such a system only a small fraction of the youths enjoyed the advantages of the most elementary education, and rarely did girls receive any formal instruction at all. At the end of the Manchu régime (1912) it is doubtful if three per cent of the people were literate, but in this small group resided the political power of the land.

The Curriculum.—School work was hard and disagreeable. The appallingly intricate Chinese characters had to be learned by heart. Then came the committing to memory of extracts

¹ Martin, *The Lore of Cathay*, p. 283.

from the simpler texts, and finally the ability to read and understand the more difficult works and to prepare essays in the approved form and poems in accordance with rigid standards of composition. After the simpler texts had been mastered, such as the *Trimetrical Classic*, the *Odes for Children*, the *Canon of Filial Piety*, and the *Juvenile Instructor*, the student progressed to the study of the Four Books and the Five Classics. The former included the *Analects of Confucius*, the *Book of Mencius*, the *Great Learning*, and the *Doctrine of the Mean*. These may be briefly described as the sayings of Confucius and his more distinguished disciples, including his grandson Tse-sze, and Mencius, his ablest commentator. In addition, the Five Classics were thoroughly mastered and large portions committed to memory. These were the *Book of Records*, the *Book of Poetry*, the *Book of Changes*, the *Book of Rites*, and the *Spring and Autumn Annals*. The first and second of these were compiled, as generally believed, by Confucius, the third and fourth were ancient works in his time, while the last, which narrated the recent history of his state of Lu, he claimed as his own work. In addition to the Four Books and the Five Classics there were 198 other works which were studied by candidates for the civil-service examinations, but none compared in importance with the nine texts which furnished most of the mental equipment of the educated Chinese. Such a course of study emphasized history, philosophy, ethics, politics, and poetry, but there was little of what might be termed science. The antiquity of the texts and their later standardization strengthened the force of authority and gave little play for critical investigation or what, in the West, has been termed the scientific spirit.

The Civil-service Examinations.—Such a curriculum as has been outlined, when followed in private educational institutions, would have permitted wide divergence in the emphasis which was placed upon the different branches of learning were it not for the introduction of a remarkable system of national civil-service examinations which served to standardize the whole process of education. By these examinations the diligence and capacity of the pupils were tested and a shining

reward was held before them in the form of appointment to high public office. Official position, therefore, was based upon scholarship. Education was "the path to aristocracy," and outside of the imperial family and the descendants of Confucius and Mencius there was no real hereditary nobility. While a form of public examination existed under the Chow and Han dynasties, it was not until the Tang, about 630, that the system which lasted until 1905 was perfected. From that time the prime object of the students was to succeed in the several examinations, and, the general requirements having been standardized, the educational processes throughout the entire empire were molded in a common form. The written language and the standard text-books existed before the examination system, but it was the latter which standardized instruction and gave to all the scholars a common store of knowledge.

The District Examinations.—The first of the four series of examinations was held in the district and prefectural cities, twice in every three years. The most rigorous test took place in the district, where only about two per cent might pass, and those who attained this distinction were spoken of as "having a name in the village." A month later the successful ones, and others who had qualified in the past, took two examinations in the prefectural town, and here perhaps half or two-thirds would pass. These men, in turn, possessed "a name in the prefecture," they were admitted to the district college (which really meant that they were qualified to proceed to the severe provincial examinations), and, if they advanced no further in the examinations, they were eligible to minor official posts. But all Chinese were not eligible to take these examinations. Nine categories of permanently disfranchised subjects were enumerated, including servants, private soldiers, undertakers, prostitutes, actors, beggars, boatmen, and convicts. Unless official favor was shown, the disqualification lasted for four generations. The convicts alone did not pass on their taint. It has been estimated that, roughly, about 573,000 candidates would qualify in these examinations every three years.

The "Eight-legged Essay."—It was in the district examination that the first use of the famous "eight-legged essay" was made. The term "leg" was applied to a paragraph, and the composition was divided into eight paragraphs, two of them consisting of sentences arranged in poetic couplets. The whole essay must be more than 360 and less than 720 words long. For the "eight-legged essay" the subjects were taken from the Four Books or the Five Classics. Much depended, therefore, upon accurate and apt quotations, upon the choice of words, and upon calligraphy.

The Provincial Examinations.—These took place every three years in the provincial capitals, where great examination halls, designed to permit a candidate to work and sleep in his individual cell, were erected. At Nanking 14,000 candidates might be examined at a single time, and provincial examination halls accommodating 10,000 were not infrequent. These examinations covered three periods of three days each, and between each series the students were allowed to depart for a single night. It was no easy matter to police these halls so that the students might not bring in assistance or obtain it within the inclosure. In addition to the thousands of students who qualified in the district examination (and the tests might be taken time and again by the unsuccessful, so that three generations of scholars might struggle side by side), there were a few others who, in various ways, were permitted to take part in the provincial tests. In the first examination three essays were required—one from the *Analects*, one from the *Doctrine of the Mean*, and one from the *Book of Mencius*—and a poem of eight couplets; in the second test, five essays from each of the Five Classics; and in the third, five essays on the government. During the last 300 years the total who could be passed in this series of examinations was fixed at 1,810, which roughly amounted to less than one per cent of the candidates. In addition, 254 degrees were assigned to bannermen. The successful candidates now received a degree, "Ku-jin," promoted men. Flag staves were erected before their homes and they became persons of importance in their communities. The whole province delighted to do them honor,

and their expenses were paid to Peking, where the third series of examinations was held.

The Metropolitan Examinations.—Every three years, with occasional modifications, the great examinations were held in the hall at Peking. Again the new graduates from the provinces, as well as those who had tried before and aspired to attempt the ordeal again, toiled away at the “eight-legged essays” and the single poem in the three different sessions. Seldom did less than 4,000 participate, and the average number to pass was 234, or about six per cent. Success in these examinations assured the candidate an appointment as a third-class secretary in a department or as a magistrate. The second degree, “Tsin-sz,” entered scholars, was now conferred.

The Palace Examination.—A month after the Metropolitan Examination the candidates assembled in the palace in the presence of the emperor, who nominally set the subject of the examination. A single essay on a current political problem was written, and the minimum length was fixed at 1,000 words. The highest three candidates were placed in the first class, and their names were heralded throughout the realm. About one-fourth were grouped in the second class, and these with the highest scholars were appointed to the Academy of Letters (Hanlin) as editors or compilers. All the rest received official posts, for this examination was not eliminative, but rather designed to classify the candidates who had passed the Metropolitan tests.

Some Results of the Examination System.—As we have seen, such a system of national examinations standardized the education of all the scholars. All educated men studied the same texts, and the emphasis was strongly placed upon the Four Books and the Five Classics. A common written character was employed even though different pronunciations were used. In a greatly decentralized monarchy these examinations provided the strongest centralizing agency, and under them thousands of provincials came up to Peking every three years, although only a few hundred might win the prize. Scholarship was held in the highest esteem. The scholars, not the merchants or the soldiers, were the natural leaders of the people.

and no youth who might win civil appointment through the hard path of education ever turned aside to accept military preferment. From the point of view of administration the system failed to provide adequately trained officials for the higher posts. Specialization in preparation was not a prerequisite for public service. And when these classically trained officials came into contact with the modern world they were pathetically unable to meet the problems which confronted them. The term "literati" has been employed to designate all the scholars, both the successful and the disappointed ones. These scholars were literally steeped in the ancient classics. They were convinced of the absolute superiority of Chinese culture. Their positions and their hopes of advancement depended upon their knowledge of these ancient subjects and upon the maintenance of this examination system. Thus they were naturally opposed to new ideas which would, as it were, spoil the market for their wares. The scholars, therefore, were opposed to Western learning and modern innovations, and as they were the recognized leaders of the people they blocked the encroachment of new ideas. In Annam and in Korea, where the Chinese system of examinations was followed, a similar situation prevailed when these lands came into contact with the West. But in Japan, where the Chinese classics were studied by every educated man, but where the examination system did not prevail, the leaders, in the middle of the nineteenth century, welcomed the new ideas and brought the masses to accept them.

Religions.—The Chinese are not a religious people, but they are very superstitious. No powerful priesthood has developed there, nor has religion, as in India, divided the people into countless castes. Their attitude toward the gods has been well summed up by their great sage:

To give oneself earnestly to the duties due to men, and, while respecting spiritual beings, to keep aloof from them—that may be called wisdom.

So the masses have adopted a very human relationship toward the gods—make use of them for your advantage, call

upon them for help, but do not hesitate to deceive them if you can. The most striking feature of their religious system is ancestor worship, a world-wide human belief, which was stressed in the indigenous religion of the Chinese and flowered with the Confucian teachings. Their tolerance of all religions as such has already been mentioned, although interference with the political order or the Confucian tenets has resulted in fierce waves of persecution against Taoists, Buddhists, Nestorians, Mohammedans, and Christians. And this tolerance is shown by the mingling of Taoist, Confucian, and Buddhist teachings in the belief of the masses. The ancestral rites in the home were usually Confucian, but for certain needs the Taoist priest, and for others the Buddhist clergy, might be appealed to.

Taoism.—The ancient religion of the Chinese was interpreted and formulated by the “Old Philosopher” Laotze. Born about 604 B.C., he summed up his teachings in the word *tao*, or path, which meant the right way or path of moral conduct. Originally a pure philosophy, it later degenerated to the practice of necromancy and demon-worship. Yet Laotze, long before the Christ walked near Galilee, laid down this principle of conduct, “Requite evil with kindness.” The influence of his teachings has been dimmed by the later evil growths, but we are told

The impassiveness, stoicism, democratic feeling, contempt for profuse luxury and vulgar show, patience, humility, calmness, deliberation, aversion from imperial puffery, boastfulness, and military glory which characterize the best Chinese minds are Shinto-Taoist rather than Confucian in spirit.¹

In later years the Taoist priests were the leading practitioners of the *feng shui* (wind and water) system of geomancy. According to this the fortunes of individuals and of communities were determined by the natural objects which surrounded their abode—

The shape of hills, the presence or absence of water, the position of trees, the height of buildings, and so forth, are all matters of

¹ Parker, *China and Religion*, p. 11.

deep consideration to the professors of the geomantic art, who thrive on the ignorance of superstitious clients.²

Thus, a happy site for a city should contain in the landscape a dragon and a tortoise—an amphitheater of mountains may be the dragon, a lower hill the tortoise. A temple should then be erected on the tortoise's head, and a pagoda on the dragon's tail. Believing firmly in the existence of spirits, good and evil, the Chinese officials and peasants viewed with alarm the devastating work of modern railroad-construction gangs which, with their cuts and fills and tunnels, would destroy the earth spirits, perhaps anger some hill dragon, and thus bring calamities upon a whole countryside.

Confucianism.—While distinctly not a religion, the Confucian teachings, with their emphasis upon the worship of the supreme and lesser gods, the holy men, sages and heroes of the past, as well as the ancestors of the family, served to meet, in part, the religious needs of the people. His teachings were concerned primarily with human conduct, and they may be summed up in the one word reciprocity, which is composed of the two characters “as heart.” He it was who laid down the “Silver Rule”—“what I do not wish men to do to me, I also wish not to do to men”—which is a negative version of the positive injunction of the Christian “Golden Rule.” In the Confucian canon, consisting of the Four Books and the Five Classics, the five constant virtues were emphasized. These are benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and fidelity, but each in turn covers a wider range of conduct than the simple English words would connote. Again, in his study of human conduct he stressed the five relations—prince to minister, parent to child, husband to wife, brother to brother, and friend to friend. Typical of his attitude toward the unseen powers was his omission of the relationship of God to man, but, as he replied to a questioner, “While you cannot serve men, how can you serve spirits?” and, “While you do not know life, what can you know about death?”

Confucian Precepts.—The sayings of Confucius formed the very corner stone of Chinese culture. The Four Books and the

² Giles, *The Civilization of China*, p. 67.

Five Classics were memorized in large part by all the scholars, and hundreds of pithy phrases adorned the ordinary speech of the unlettered masses. To us these precepts seem most sensible and at times even commonplace until we remember that they were uttered almost 500 years before the Christian era. Rarely of a religious nature, they are highly ethical and they inculcate a lofty code of human conduct. But just as every cultured Chinese could repeat these maxims as few westerners could recite the New Testament, there was the same wide gap between precept and practice on the part of the professed followers in both cases. A few extracts from the several classics will indicate the nature of these precepts:

When you know a thing, to hold that you know it, and when you do not know a thing, to acknowledge that you do not know it—this is knowledge.

What are the things which men consider right? Kindness in a father, filial piety in a son; gentleness in an elder brother, obedience in a younger; righteousness in a husband, submission in a wife; kindness in elders, deference in juniors; benevolence in a ruler, loyalty in a minister. These ten are things which men consider right. To speak the truth and work for harmony are what are called things advantageous to men. To quarrel, plunder, and murder are things disastrous to men.

The Duke of She asked about government. The Master said, 'Good government obtains when those who are near are made happy, and those who are far are attracted.'

To lead an uninstructed people to war is to throw them away.

If you mistrust a man, do not employ him; if you employ a man, do not mistrust him.

Buddhism.—The most important foreign influence before the nineteenth century was an alien religion, Buddhism, which first appeared in China about 250 B.C. and finally took root about 67 A.D. Gautama the Buddha was a contemporary of Confucius, *circa* 563-483 B.C., and in the valley of the Ganges he preached salvation through righteousness. Lofty moral principles were inculcated, and rewards for right conduct and punishment for evil deeds were clearly defined. The doctrine

of the reincarnation of the soul became a leading tenet of this faith. Buddhist saints might be appealed to as intercessors and, in time, a priestly hierarchy and imposing temples and impressive ceremonials were added. In China the faith was first preached by missionaries from India, but soon it was spread by Chinese converts. Although it was an alien faith, it was not propagated under alien control and so it rapidly found its way into the religious life of the people. Persecutions at times checked its course, but these arose from some political cause or because it was deemed inimical to Confucianism, the state religion. In time the priesthood degenerated and the pure faith of India became corrupted by baser excrescences. The literati looked down upon the priests and scoffed at the doctrine, but the masses accepted without discrimination both Taoist and Buddhist teachings, and the Buddhist priest was called upon in most cases to perform the burial ceremonies.

Other Faiths.—As we have already seen, Nestorian Christianity, Mohammedanism, Roman Christianity, and Judaism made their way to China, and at later times the Greek Christianity and Protestantism. So long as these faiths did not denounce the Confucian teachings they met with a tolerant and at times a friendly reception. But opposition to the ancestral rites or to the worship of Heaven placed the new faiths in a position of hostility to the state religion and would occasion punishment or, from their point of view, persecution. Bearing in mind the influence of the literati as the recognized leaders of the people, and remembering their stanch devotion to the Confucian teachings, it is evident that any alien faith which incurred their active hostility would have to tread a hard and stony path. For this reason we cannot trace the impact of Western ideas in China without knowing something of the religious systems with which Christianity came into contact. That an alien faith could be accepted and placed in a position of primacy among the real religions was demonstrated by the history of Buddhism. The very different course of Christian propaganda will be considered in the later chapters.

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CHAPTER IV

THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT DURING THE MANCHU RÉGIME

ALTHOUGH intercourse between the peoples of the West and those of China may be traced back to a very early period, important political relations did not develop until the first half of the nineteenth century, when the Manchu dynasty was well established upon the dragon throne. It will serve a useful purpose, therefore, to survey briefly the political organization of that period in order to understand with some degree of clearness the administrative units with which the foreigners had to deal and the scope of their respective authority. Many serious misunderstandings arose through ignorance of the Chinese political organization and through the assumption that conditions such as prevailed in the West also existed in China.

The Empire.—When the Manchu conquest was completed about the middle of the seventeenth century their domain included the Eighteen Provinces and the greater part of Mongolia, a conquest of the Mings. In addition, Manchuria was now a part of the empire and enjoyed a privileged status as the home of the ruling dynasty. Tibet, which had been conquered under the Tang but soon had regained independence, was finally brought under Chinese control between 1698 and 1703. Sinkiang, or Chinese Turkestan, which had also been conquered and lost several times, was finally subjugated by 1789. It became the custom, therefore, to speak of the empire as consisting of China proper and the four dependencies of Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet.

Vassal States.—Beyond the empire lay a fringe of vassal states which looked up to the great Middle Kingdom as their overlord and were in turn deemed "dutifully obedient." The number of these tributary states varied from time to time. When powerful dynasties reigned, outlying states would renew old observances or seek for the first time the protection of

Great China. As early as the Han, tribute came up from the states of eastern India, of Indo-China, and the East Indies. And as late as the Ming period occasional tribute missions were sent from Arabia, Malabar, Ceylon, and several of the island kingdoms. But during the Manchu régime the only island states to send up tribute were Loochoo and Sulu. In general, the obligations accepted by the vassal states were those of sending regular missions bearing gifts or tribute, and the investiture of new rulers by the Chinese emperor. Most of them asked and received permission to use the Chinese calendar, and to some degree followed the Chinese system of political organization. In Korea and Annam the Chinese system of civil-service examinations was used, with effects much like those in China itself. On the other hand, the Chinese attitude toward these tributary states was very different from that which grew up in the West. There the protector assumed control of the foreign relations of the vassal and by virtue of this accepted responsibility for its conduct. China, while claiming suzerainty, never assumed the responsibility which flowed from it. The intimacy of the relations of these states with China was determined in large measure by their propinquity, and was indicated by the frequency of the tribute-bearing missions. Thus Korea sent up a tribute mission every year; Loochoo every two years; Annam every four years; Nepal and Sulu every five years; Burma and Laos every ten years; and Siam sent occasional embassies, as on the founding of a new dynasty. When Western diplomatic missions visited Peking they were also deemed to be tribute bearers. The effect of these vassal relationships upon the Chinese point of view should be carefully noted. When the Western maritime powers sought treaty relations the Chinese officials could not think in terms of national equality. Was not China the great Middle Kingdom, surrounded by dutifully obedient vassal states? National equality and treaty-regulated relations could only come with a profound change in Chinese political theory and practice.

The Emperor.—At the head of the state was the emperor, who possessed theocratic, patriarchal, and autocratic powers.

He was the "Son of Heaven," and when he died he "mounted the dragon chariot to be a guest on high." He alone could perform certain sacrificial rites, at the temples of Heaven, of Earth, and of Agriculture, in Peking. He took upon himself responsibility for evils which befell his people, such as famine, flood, and plague, as due to his own sins. A most pathetic survival of this sense of responsibility before Heaven may be found in the penitential decree of the child emperor in October, 1911.¹ As patriarch he was the father of his people, and as autocrat he was in theory an absolute monarch, but in practice he was bound to conform, in large measure, with the customs and established precedents which had come down to his time. A strong emperor could assert his prerogatives, and in recent times the most daring was the old Empress Dowager who did not hesitate to defy the most cherished convictions of her people. Succession to the throne passed in the male line, but not necessarily to the eldest son. The emperor might pass over an older son and designate one whom he deemed better qualified, whether born of the empress or of a secondary consort or of a concubine. But when there was no heir in the main line the succession passed to a member of a collateral branch, but normally to a member of a younger generation. In 1875 this well-recognized rule was set aside by the Empress Dowager when a cousin of the deceased emperor was chosen to ascend the throne.

The Metropolitan Administration.—The government of China was to a large degree decentralized. Although a highly organized administration existed in Peking, as long as things went well in the provinces the local governments were rarely interfered with. The central government was mainly concerned with registering and checking up the action of the local authorities. Its duties were to criticize rather than to control. Memorials and reports came up from the provincial officials to the Grand Council and the respective boards, but direct administrative action was the exception rather than the rule. In the higher posts of the metropolitan administration the

¹ See *infra*, p. 430.

Manchu officials balanced the Chinese, but the final control lay with the Manchus.

The Supreme Council.—Commonly spoken of as the Grand Secretariat, this council, which had formerly been most important, became under the Manchus almost a titular body, membership in which was the greatest distinction which an official might gain. Composed of from four to six members, half Manchu and half Chinese, and all venerable and experienced officials, its advice might be sought by the emperor on matters of supreme importance.

The Grand Council.—This in turn was also known as the Council of State. Its members, rarely more than five, were usually presidents of boards, and as such formed a rudimentary cabinet. Established in 1732 as a military council, it soon outstripped the Supreme Council as an executive and advisory body. Daily, at dawn, its members met in council with the emperor, and under a weak ruler it assumed a position of great importance.

The Six Boards.—Until the very end of the Manchu period the principal administrative functions of the metropolitan government were vested in the Six Boards. Each consisted of a Manchu and a Chinese president, and two Manchu and two Chinese vice-presidents. The number of members varied. These Six Boards were the boards of Civil Office, which recommended officials to the emperor for appointment; Revenue, which controlled the receipt and expenditure of the revenues sent up from the provinces; Rites (Ceremonies), a very important body at an Asiatic court and under whose direction the civil-service examinations were conducted; War, which examined and recommended military officials for appointment and controlled the provincial, but not the Manchu, forces; Punishments, which reviewed the decisions of the provincial courts; and Works, which had charge of the construction and repair of imperial residences and metropolitan public buildings and the more important canals and dikes. The boards, in turn, were divided into bureaus, and these into departments, each staffed with an unwieldy number of officials. In general,

the whole officialdom of China was permeated with gross corruption. The sale of offices was in itself enough to break down any administrative efficiency. In addition, the acceptance of presents (bribes) for doing or not doing things which should be done eked out the wholly inadequate official salaries. Confucius lamented the corruption of his own times, and from that day to this, official corruption, as understood in the West, has been the rule rather than the exception in the Chinese administration. The highest tribute that could be paid to an official was to say that he was honest.

The Censorate.—Among the minor independent departments in Peking, of which there were several, including the Department of Territories and the Imperial Academy (Hanlin Yuan), none surpassed in interest the Court of Censors. This was the oldest administrative institution to come down from ancient times. It consisted of a central body, with Manchu and Chinese presidents and vice-presidents, and some twenty censors charged with the scrutiny of the conduct of metropolitan officials. In the provinces forty-four censors were distributed among twenty circuits. The duty of these officials was to criticize the conduct of officials, from the emperor himself to the lowest underling. They were known as the “eyes and ears” of the emperor, and as the “speech officials” because they could speak without fear or favor. Great courage was expected of them, and not infrequently they risked imperial favor by outspoken criticism. The Ming Emperor Tai Tsung, in 1627, defined their duties as follows:

The Censorate is a court of critics of the government. The censors are to criticize my negligence of duty, dismissal of the loyal and able, appointment of the unfit, promotion of the unserviceable, and demotion of the meritorious. If the princes and ministers neglect their work, indulge in wine and women, love pleasures, take property from the people without due compensation, show contempt in court ceremonies or carelessness in dress, or be absent from audience under pretense of sickness, the Censorate shall investigate and report. . . . If the six departments decide things wrongly, or falsely report the decision of an undecided affair, the censors shall make them known to me. If an appeal is made to the Censorate,

it shall decide whether it should be made known to me. It shall check its own members from receiving bribery.¹

Entirely removed from the administrative system, supported by public opinion when they dared to impeach corruption and wrong-doing in high places, the censors furnished some check upon the administrative decadence which marked the later years of the Manchu régime.

Provincial Administration.—The decentralization of the imperial government left great powers to the provincial administration. And the process was carried down still further to the districts, where the real work of government was substantially performed. In the provinces all the officials from the highest to the district magistrates were appointed, transferred, and dismissed by Peking. With few exceptions in the later period no civil official was appointed to his own province. This power of appointment maintained a proper state of discipline and brought about a sense of official centralization. It also permitted provincial autonomy to develop until it might reach a questionable degree, when the dismissal or the punishment of the daring official would produce the proper subordination. Provincial rights, however, came to be much like vested interests, and every attempt to introduce greater centralization met with stout, even if usually passive, opposition. In the provinces the great majority of the appointed officials were Chinese; perhaps one-fifth of the higher posts were held by Manchus. And all the community officials and almost all the clerks and minor servants were Chinese.

Provincial Officials.—At the head of the provincial administration was either a viceroy or a governor. In precedence he ranked below the Tartar general (if one was stationed in the province), but in practice he was the most powerful official. Three provinces, Shantung, Shansi, and Honan, were under a governor, Chihli and Szechwan were under viceroys. The others were grouped in pairs, except Kiangsu, Anhwei and Kiangsi, which were combined, under a viceroy. In these cases each province was under a governor also, who was considered to be the colleague of the supervising

¹ Quoted in Hsieh, *The Government of China, 1644-1911*, p. 91.

viceroy. Before the reforms of 1905 there were eight viceroys and fifteen governors in the Eighteen Provinces. Sinkiang received a governor in 1878, and was placed under the Shen-Kan (Shensi-Kansu) viceroy, and Manchuria was organized under a viceroy and three governors in 1907. Associated with the governor in the provincial administration was the treasurer, the judge (who passed upon appeals from the prefectural and district courts), the salt commissioner (who controlled the manufacture and sale of salt in the province), and, in twelve provinces, the grain commissioner (who received and paid out the taxes paid in grain or rice). A very important provincial official was the literary chancellor, who was sent down from Peking every three years to supervise the civil-service examinations in the province.

The Prefecture.—While the unit of administration was the district, from two to six districts would be grouped together to form a prefecture, or *fu*. Except in the frontier provinces and Manchuria, where the prefecture was really the district, the duty of the prefectural officials was merely to check up the conduct of the district magistrates. Similar in organization were a few “independent” *tings* and *chows*, which enjoyed the same relationship with the provincial officials as did the *fu*. Between the prefecture and the province an additional supervising officer was placed, the *taotai*, or intendent of the circuit (*tao*). Two or more prefectures were placed under the supervision of such an official, but the area was an administrative rather than a permanently defined geographical unit. *Taotais* were appointed with other duties when the region concerned was smaller than a province and larger than a *fu*. Thus matters concerning foreigners were frequently taken up in the first instance with the *taotai*.

The District.—The really vital unit of the Chinese political system was the district, or *hsien*. This comprised a walled city—in the larger cities half or even a third of a city—and the surrounding country with its townships and villages. At the head of the district was the magistrate, the “father and mother” official, who was responsible for the peace and contentment of his people. In him were vested judicial and

executive powers. He was a judge of first instance in civil and criminal cases, with appeals to the *fu* and to the provincial judge. He was responsible for the collection of the land tax, the grain tribute, and all other local revenues. The local government units functioned under his supervision, and he in turn was carefully supervised by the prefectural officials above him. Certain adjectives were applied to the districts—busy, troublesome, wearisome, and difficult—and more than one might be applied to an especially troublesome unit. A satisfactory performance of his duties would bring promotion to a better and richer district, or to a higher post in the provincial or metropolitan service, and a popular official would leave his charge with the blessings and rewards of his people, while equally convincing testimonials would be meted out to men who had been cruel or rapacious.

Local Government.—Below the district the townships and villages were governed by their own officials, nominated from the village elders and appointed by the district magistrate. The *tipao*, or land warden, was responsible for the good conduct of his people and for the collection of the local taxes. Governed by well-known and usually respected men of their own communities, the country people had few contacts with the hierarchy of officials appointed by Peking. But when evil officials ignored old custom and placed new and unusual burdens upon the people, passive resistance would first be resorted to and, if this failed, then open rebellion. Rarely could a magistrate excuse the shortcomings which drove his submissive people to open protest.

The Strength of the Political Organization.—In spite of this loosely organized form of government, with so much left to local initiative and with little interference from the higher administration, it persisted throughout the centuries in spite of many disruptive factors. In the main the government was well adapted to the needs of the people, and contentment prevailed unless some local irritation fanned the embers of discontent. Several reasons may be suggested to the Western student for the vitality of a system so decentralized that it corresponds to no government or political theory known to

him: (1) The appointment, promotion, and dismissal of all the higher officials by Peking. (2) The system of strict surveillance under which every official was in theory, and to a large extent in fact, under the watchful eye of his superiors. (3) The mutual responsibility of all classes, for every official must assume responsibility for the acts of his underlings and every community for the acts of its residents. (4) The family as a unit of society, which meant that the family in turn must accept responsibility for the conduct of any of its members. (5) The national educational system, which assured that all the officials possessed the same political ideas and served as a unifying influence through the tens of thousands of scholars who resorted to the provincial capitals and in smaller numbers to Peking. (6) And, finally, the attachment to ancient customs and the profound respect for authority, when reasonably exercised, which must be considered the product of the Confucian teachings. However adequate this form of government might have been for a China isolated from powerful neighbors and revered by all the surrounding petty states, it failed to meet the problems created when China came into contact with the highly organized Western states, able to use their strength effectively and insistent upon the strict performance of treaty obligations.

The Army.—The first line of defense against aggressive neighbors should be the military and naval forces of the state. Although Chinese history is replete with narratives of wars of conquest and internal strife, China, in the early nineteenth century, was quite unprepared to meet any strong military power. The Confucian philosophy and the Buddhist doctrines both inculcated peace, but in spite of them wars had been waged. The better-class Chinese looked down upon the profession of arms—"you do not take good iron for a nail, or a good man for a soldier," was a popular saying. A private soldier could not enter the civil-service examinations, and no scholar would accept a military post if civil preferment was attainable. Military officials were subordinate to civilians, although the Manchus did not hesitate to favor their banner-men. Although the Chinese had been conquered by the

Manchus, they were not held in subjection by force. The Manchu garrisons were few in number and widely scattered throughout the country. It was the association of the Chinese in the administration and the linking of their interests with the maintenance of the existing order which permitted the Manchus to hold the dragon throne so long. At any time, it is safe to say, the united Chinese could have driven the Manchus across the border, and the prompt success of the 1911 revolution is proof of this statement. Time and again Chinese officials and Chinese soldiers saved the dynasty when rebellion threatened to dislodge it.

The Bannermen.—The most reliable forces in the Manchu period were the bannermen, or the eight banners. These were composed of the descendants of the Manchus, Mongols, and Chinese who had taken part in the conquest of China. The eight banners were the variously colored flags under which they served. These fighting men were hereditary soldiers, and they and their families lived in idleness supported by a pension paid in rice. At most the bannermen numbered 200,000 to 220,000. Most of them were stationed in Manchuria and around Peking. In twelve of the provinces small garrisons were quartered at the capital or some strategic city, but in six of the provinces no banner troops were found. They were no doubt brave, but ill disciplined and commanded by officers untrained in any of the methods of modern warfare. Archery and horsemanship made up their principal exercises, while their weapons were matchlocks, jingals, and badly served smooth-bore cannon. The peaceable Chinese, however, feared them, and the government thought them invincible.

The Green Standards.—In every province a force of Chinese, known as the green standards, was recruited for ordinary peace preservation. Nominally, 20,000 to 30,000 men were enrolled in each province, but rarely could the number be mustered except for inspection when temporary recruits were enlisted for the day. They were distributed in small camps or garrisons in the principal towns, and as a fighting force were even more contemptible than the bannermen.

Irregulars, or "Braves."—Finally, in emergencies, able-bodied laborers or coolies would be mustered in large numbers. These were called "braves" because the character *yung* (brave) was inscribed on the fronts and backs of their blouses. They were supposed to frighten the foe into submission, but when, in 1894, thousands of these poor wretches were sent against the Japanese machine-guns in Manchuria, the confidence in the power of the written character was profoundly shaken.

Unpreparedness.—Thus during the long years of peace since the conquest, for peace generally prevailed in spite of occasional local insurrections, the Manchu military services not merely failed to keep pace with the improvements in the West, but actually deteriorated in comparison with the effectiveness shown in the seventeenth century. A rude awakening was in store when war junks tried to oppose ships of the line, and bannermen with bows and spears and matchlocks tried to defend walled cities against the well-trained and well-equipped regiments of a Western nation.

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CHAPTER V

EARLY EUROPEAN INTERCOURSE WITH CHINA

Overland Intercourse.—Between Europe and China intercourse began at a very early time, but for many centuries it was purely of a commercial nature. Silk was the unique product which China could offer the Western World, and from the earliest times the land of the silkworm was known as Seres. The Greeks knew of this choice textile; the Romans valued it at its weight in gold. In the trading cities of central Asia, some still extant and others buried in the sands of more recent deserts, the merchants of China, India, Asia Minor, and even of Greece and Rome exchanged their wares, and along with them cultural and religious ideas. From very early times the self-sufficiency of China was widely reported. Silk most of all, but also cotton fabrics, hides, and iron were exchanged for the precious stones and metals, glass, and the fine dyed stuffs of the Levant. In addition to the direct overland trade, so toilsome, dangerous, and time-consuming, the wares of China were brought around by sea by Chinese and Indian, and later Arab, merchants, and then sent on to the Mediterranean by way of the Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia or the longer and more dangerous route of the Red Sea. Peace in central Asia and along the caravan and sea routes meant an accelerated trade, while strife and confusion (and these prevailed too frequently and for long periods) checked and at times almost brought to a standstill the normal flow of traffic. No adequate commercial relations could develop as long as the dangerous overland route or the sea and land routes with their frequent transshipping of cargoes were the only ways in which the greatly desired wares of China could reach the Western markets.

Nestorian Missionaries.—Aside from certain Greek cultural influences which entered China from the Greek kingdoms of western Asia, the first ideas which we now associate with the West, although Asiatic in their origin and transmission, were

those of Christianity. As early as 635 A.D. Nestorian Christian missionaries, probably Syrians, were received at Sianfu, at that time the Tang capital. A remarkable inscription, dated 781, has come down to us describing their arrival and the imperial favor they received. A decree of 638, incorporated in this tablet, testifies to the broad tolerance which then prevailed:

Tao has no constant name, holiness no constant form; cults are established according to place, for the unobtrusive salvation of the masses. The Persian bonze Alopen has come from afar to submit to us at our capital his scriptural cult. Examining closely into the significance of that cult, we find it is transcendental and quiescent; that it represents and sets forth the most important principles of our being, just as much as it tends to the salvation and profit of mankind. It may well be carried over the Empire. The executive will therefore erect in the I-ning ward of this city a monastery, with twenty-one qualified priests.

Nestorius, a Syrian patriarch of Constantinople, was made anathema by the Council of Ephesus in 431 because he denied that the Virgin Mary was the mother of the God-Man, Jesus Christ. His followers separated themselves from the orthodox Christian Church, and for many centuries they were the largest Christian community in Asia. In China they at first enjoyed imperial favor; after 845 they faced displeasure and persecution, but as late as the fourteenth century their missions existed.

Medæval Envoys.—The terrifying conquests of the Mongols and their two invasions of eastern Europe, between 1220 and 1239, aroused the mingled fears and hopes of the Western World. Fears, because of the ruthless treatment of the conquered peoples; hopes, because of the possibility of enlisting their help against the Mohammedans, the inveterate foes of Christendom. Diplomatic missions, under the leadership of friars, were sent by the Pope and by Louis XI of France to gain exact information concerning the power and plans of the Mongols and, if possible, to arrange for their coöperation. The best known of these agents were Friar John de Plano Carpini, who, bearing a letter from Pope Innocent IV, arrived at Sira-

Ordo, the capital of the Grand Khan, in 1246, and Friar William de Rubruquis, or Rubruck, who was sent a few years later by Louis XI. Although these envoys failed to enter China proper but were received at the Mongol capital in Mongolia, near the present city of Urga, they did bring back to Europe a considerable amount of information concerning not only the Mongols, but the more cultured Chinese who were soon to fall before the onslaughts of Ghengis Khan and Kublai. By this time China was known as Cathay, a name derived from the Kitan Tartars who held most of the region north of the Yangtze.

Marco Polo.—Of far more importance in its contribution to the knowledge which the West possessed of China was the famous book which told of the adventures there of a young Venetian, Marco Polo. Two Venetian merchants, Nicolo and Maffeo Polo, had penetrated Asia until they reached the court of Kublai Khan at his summer residence north of Peking. There they were well received, and on their return they bore a message to the Pope to send to Kublai one hundred persons of the Christian faith, "men of intelligence, acquainted with the seven arts, and qualified to prove that idols were of the devil and that the law of Christ was better than the law he and his people knew." The ecclesiastical mission which should have answered this Macedonian call was not forthcoming, but in its stead the brothers returned, taking with them young Marco, Nicolo's son. Arriving at Kaipingfu in May, 1275, after a journey of almost three and a half years from Acre, they remained in China for seventeen years. Marco, especially, won the favor of Kublai Khan. His ability to observe accurately, to remember, and to report to his patron the unusual things he saw on his various journeys, procured for him positions of trust and responsibility. For three years he was governor of a city on the Yangtze, and at other times he accompanied Mongol armies and missions to Pegu and Cochin-China. When they were finally permitted to leave the court, in 1292, they made their way by sea from China to the head of the Persian Gulf and then overland to the Mediterranean, a journey of three years. The *Book of Marco Polo*, dictated

to a fellow prisoner when under confinement in Genoa, may be said to have "contributed more new facts toward a knowledge of the earth's surface than any book that had ever been written before." First circulated in manuscript, in the original French, it was translated and printed in all the important languages of Europe and it became the inspiration of the voyagers who sought Cathay in the great age of discovery. One incident is of especial significance. When the Polos prepared to leave China they converted the profits and rewards of their long sojourn into the one medium which might most safely be transported. Into the seams of their garments they sewed a quantity of precious stones—rubies, sapphires, carbuncles, diamonds, and emeralds. And although they arrived in Venice clothed in mean and threadbare garments, they soon were able to display a veritable treasure in precious stones. Only articles of great value and small bulk could stand the cost and the risk of direct trade between China and Europe in the days of the overland trade.

Catholic Missionaries.—Orthodox Christianity was brought to China by the Franciscan friar John of Montecorvino, who reached that country, by way of India, in 1292. Well received by the Grand Khan, he even believed that the monarch was on the point of baptism. In a letter from Peking, of 1305, he wrote that for eleven years he had been without news from the west, but two years earlier another friar had joined them. Together they had baptized, up to that time, almost 6,000 souls. This good report was rewarded by his consecration as Archbishop of Peking in 1307, and missionaries, bishops, and papal legates made the arduous journey by land and sea to China. A thriving Christian community arose there, with bishoprics in Fukien and in Ili (Mongolia). Archbishop John died in 1328, having converted, so we are told, "more than 30,000 infidels." But this body of Catholic believers, like the more numerous Nestorians, disappeared with the expulsion of the Mongols in 1368 and the restoration of Chinese sovereignty in Peking. More than two hundred years passed before the seed could again be sown.

The Discovery of the Sea Route.—As long as the old overland and land-and-sea trade routes were used there could be no great expansion in the exchange of commodities or ideas between West and East. A direct sea route would mean larger cargoes, cheaper freights, greater safety, and a vast saving in time. The direct route was not found by an Eastern people, not even by the Arabs, the great merchant navigators of the Eastern seas, but by the daring captains of one of the smaller European kingdoms, the Atlantic-washed state of Portugal. We may properly speak of "captains" because, although Vasco da Gama led the first fleet which reached the shores of India, he was but building upon the discoveries of his predecessors who for seventy years had been slowly extending the frontier of geographical knowledge down the African coast. The Cape of Good Hope was rounded in 1488, and India reached ten years later. After the Portuguese reached the Arab marts on the east coast of Africa they could make use of the accurate knowledge of the eastern shores and seas which these hardy pioneers had been accumulating for many centuries. From India the Portuguese ventured further into the East. The great mart of Malacca, on the Malay Peninsula, was seized in 1511. There Chinese junks were met with for the first time. Envoys were sent to Siam, Java, the kingdoms of Indo-China, and finally the Spice Islands were won. In 1514, probably, the Portuguese reached the shores of China. Rafael Perestrello, the first Portuguese visitor whose name has come down to us, reached Canton late in 1515 or early in the next year. He was well received, and the Portuguese at Malacca held high hopes of profitable trade. In 1517 the fleet conveyed Thomé Pires as an ambassador from the viceroy of India in the name of the king of Portugal. He also was hospitably welcomed and, after a long delay at Canton, sent overland to Peking, where he arrived four years later. But by this time news had reached the capital of the high-handed conduct of later Portuguese captains, and complaints had come also of their ruthless treatment of Mohammedans wherever they met with them, so Pires was looked upon as a spy rather than

an ambassador, and he was hurried back to Canton, where he was cast into prison.

The Portuguese at Macao.—It was the conduct of Simon de Andrade which first alienated the Chinese from the Franks, as the Portuguese were called. He tried to seize an island, erected fortifications, hanged one of his sailors on a gallows, and kidnapped some boys and girls. Attacked by the Chinese, he managed to escape with his booty. The conduct of other Portuguese captains and traders inflamed the Chinese. Unfortunately for them, their first contact with Eastern countries had been with the petty coastal states of India and the equally weak Malay kingdoms. They had easily demonstrated their superior power, but they erred when they tried to carry these high-handed tactics over to the shores of the great Middle Kingdom. A fundamental principle of the Portuguese was to wage a truceless war with their old foes, the Mohammedans, but the Chinese had welcomed Arab traders at their ports for centuries. They saw no reason why trade relations should be conducted according to religious beliefs. In 1545 the Portuguese trading colony near Ningpo was destroyed by the enraged Chinese, and in 1549 another near the present Amoy suffered the same fate. By 1557, however, the Portuguese were allowed to establish themselves on a little peninsula of an island in the delta of the West River, about eighty miles from Canton, where they built a trading city known as Macao. From that time until the establishment of the British at Hong Kong, in 1842, Macao was the center of European intercourse with China. The Portuguese paid an annual tribute or rent of 500 taels until 1848, but their sovereignty was not recognized until the treaty of 1887.

Christian Missionaries.—Under the protection of the Portuguese, Christian missionaries again entered China. Francis Xavier, the Apostle to the Indies, who founded the Church in Japan, died in 1552 off the Canton coast, unable to carry his message to the teeming millions of China. The mission at Peking was restored by an Italian Jesuit, Matteo Ricci, who, arriving in the south in 1583, slowly traveled northward until in 1601 he at last reached Peking. Ricci and his Jesuit

successors were well received, especially because of their scholarly attainments in the fields of mathematics and astronomy. Several of these fathers, even as late as 1837, became presidents of the Board of Astronomy in Peking. They corrected the calendar, taught the Chinese how to cast large cannon, and in 1756 prepared a map of China for Kienlung. With the arrival at a later date of Franciscan and Dominican missionaries by way of Manila, unfortunate differences of opinion arose. Although the Jesuits numbered men of many nations, they were especially indebted to the Portuguese under whose protection they came to the East. The other friars came over from the Philippines and belonged to orders whose headquarters were in Spain. Rivalries and jealousies arose on the part of the later comers. These differences culminated in the famous "rites" controversy. The Jesuits permitted their converts to perform the ancestral rites as civil and commemorative, and they used the Chinese character *Tien* (Heaven) as the equivalent of God. Their critics denounced the ancestral rites as idolatrous, and maintained that *Tien Chu* (Lord of Heaven) was the proper Chinese expression for God. The dispute waxed furious for a hundred years. Finally, the Manchu Emperor Kanghi, in 1700, supported his Jesuit friends by declaring that *tien* meant the true God and that the ancestral rites were political and not religious. The Pope, on the other hand, accepted the views of the rival churchmen. The emperor would allow no missionaries to preach who would not accept his decision—the Pope would permit none to go to China who obeyed. So, in 1724, all missionaries, except those retained for scientific purposes, were ordered out of the land. At that time the number of converts was estimated at 300,000. The Church, however, did not perish. The Chinese converts kept the faith and handed it down from generation to generation. Fearless missionaries entered the country at the risk of their lives and ministered to the faithful. The Roman Church had gathered strength through persecution and was ready to raise its head again when the faith was tolerated by imperial edict in 1844. But the forbidding of the ancestral rites to its converts rendered

its work among the scholars and officials less effective than in the early days of the Jesuit mission.

The Spaniards.—The Portuguese had reached China by way of the Cape of Good Hope, India, and the Straits of Malacca. The Spaniards, who soon afterward reached the East, sailed from the other direction, first through the Straits of Magellan, and then directly from Mexico, or New Spain. This was because when the Portuguese began their discoveries along the west coast of Africa the Pope had by decree or bull given to the king of Portugal the lands of the heathen which his servants might discover. When Columbus, under the flag of Spain, found the New World, it was necessary to define the respective regions which would be open to the conquest and colonization of these two Catholic powers. The line was first drawn, but vaguely, in 1493, in the Atlantic, off the coast of Africa. It was more carefully defined by treaty between the two powers the next year. This line of demarcation had great influence in determining the location of early European interests in non-Christian lands. At this time little need be said of the contacts of the Spaniards with China. The Philippine Islands were discovered by Magellan in 1521. After several unsuccessful attempts, and a heated controversy with the Portuguese, the islands were occupied and Manila founded in 1571. In Philippine waters the Spaniards first met with Chinese junks, and while the wealth of China appealed to the Spanish adventurers, the countless souls to be saved fired the zeal of the friars. Two of the latter visited China in 1575, and the controversy which their successors inaugurated has already been mentioned. The adventurers, on three occasions, appealed to the king of Spain for permission to conquer the vast empire of China. An excellent idea of the value of first getting the facts is found in these memorials. In 1574 they indicated that only sixty soldiers would be needed; two years later they asked for from four to six thousand; and in 1596 they estimated that ten to twelve thousand Spaniards, five or six thousand Japanese, and the same number of Filipinos would make an adequate expeditionary force! Due, however, to the line of demarcation, the trade of China was recognized

as belonging to the Portuguese, so no Spanish ships traded directly with Canton. But Chinese junks, in large numbers, made an annual voyage to Manila, bringing down most of the necessities and luxuries which made possible the maintenance of a Spanish outpost so far removed from its base in Mexico. From 1626 to 1642 the Spaniards maintained a fort in Formosa, chiefly as an outpost against the Dutch. The importance of Manila as a commercial center, almost down to the nineteenth century, was solely because Chinese goods might be obtained there, and silks made up the bulk of the annual shipments from Manila to Acapulco in Mexico. In the islands the Spaniards had to deal with a rapidly increasing Chinese population, and savage massacres in 1603 and 1662 proved to be one way of meeting this problem.

The Dutch.—It was not until the latter part of the sixteenth century that the claims of Portugal and Spain to the lands and commerce of Asia were threatened. The rising commercial nations of northern Europe, notably the English and the Dutch, were the first to challenge the claims of the declining colonial empires. Drake and Cavendish, under the flag of Britain, sailed around the world and proved the hollowness of the armed monopoly. English, Dutch, and French merchants sought direct trade with the East. Although the English East India Company, founded in 1600, preceded the United Dutch East India Company by two years, the latter had at its disposal at first more ships and men and capital than the English, and it plunged into the Eastern trade with greater energy. Both companies were at first primarily interested in the spice trade of the East Indies, but by 1623 the Dutch had forced out their English competitors, who retired to India, where they eventually won an empire for the British crown. With their headquarters at Batavia, in Java, the Dutch traded with China and Japan. At first, with some English assistance, they tried to expel the Portuguese from Macao, but without success. Then they established a base in the Pescadores Islands, between Formosa and the Fukien coast, but at the request of China removed to Formosa, which at that time was not under Chinese control. In Formosa

they held two forts from 1624 to 1662, having expelled the Spaniards in 1642. The Dutch traded at several ports along the Chinese coast until, as we shall see, all Western trade was confined to Canton. Missions were sent to Peking in 1655 and 1665 which served to strengthen the Chinese in their pretensions to world supremacy because the envoys performed the kotow before the emperor, the three times kneeling and three times knocking of the head on the pavement. The Dutch, being the representatives of a commercial organization, made no attempt to propagate the Christian religion, although as good Protestants, who had suffered much from religious persecution, they did not hesitate to warn both Chinese and Japanese against the political menace of Catholic Christianity.

The English.—It was not until 1637 that the English attempted to open commercial relations with China. The first ships, under Captain Weddell, belonged to Courten's Association, a dangerous rival of the chartered East India Company, but which at the time enjoyed the royal favor of Charles I. The Portuguese, who had already suffered much at the hands of the English in Indian waters, tried to turn the Chinese at Canton against them, with the result that they tried to repulse Weddell's ships at the Bogue forts, without success. Trade was then permitted. The East India Company did not follow up this opening until 1664, when peace with Portugal gave them entry to Macao. In 1670 they traded at Amoy and Formosa, still under an independent Chinese ruler. Occasional trading voyages were made until 1715, when the company was permitted to establish a factory (warehouse) at Canton, which they maintained until the end of their monopoly of British trade in 1834. Their attempts to secure treaty rights will be mentioned in the following chapter.

Other European Traders.—The French were among the first Europeans to adventure into the East, an expedition reaching Sumatra in 1529. But, because of internal conditions in that kingdom, although many companies were chartered and given a monopoly of the Eastern trade, it was not until 1699 that a French ship reached Canton. The trade of France was

intermittent and of small value until the nineteenth century. These statements also apply to the Prussians, Danes, and Swedes. Companies were chartered, but without result. In 1731 a Swedish ship, in 1753 a Prussian, and in 1782 a Danish, inaugurated trade between their countries and China. The arrival of the first Americans in 1784 will be narrated later.

The Russians.—Of an entirely different nature was the intercourse between Russia and China. The other Western nations approached China by sea, and it was eventually possible to confine their contacts to a single port, Canton. But with the expansion of Russia to the east she became the immediate neighbor of China and their common boundary became the longest land frontier in existence. Russian intercourse, therefore, was by land, and the Chinese looked upon them in quite a different light from the other Westerners. It should be remembered also that under the Mongols the greater part of European Russia was incorporated in their empire, and the liberation of this domain forms a thrilling epic in the history of modern Russia. Russian envoys visited Peking in 1567 and 1619, but as they bore no presents (tribute) they were not admitted to audience. A third envoy failed in 1655 because he refused to perform the *kotow*. A few years later Russian adventurers and Manchu troops clashed in the valley of the Amur, and the boundary dispute was for the time settled by the Treaty of Nerchinsk, 1689, which was the first treaty entered into by China with a Western power. During these negotiations the Chinese received most useful advice from two Jesuit missionaries who accompanied their envoys. Other treaties followed in the eighteenth century, which will be mentioned later.

Summary.—By the close of the eighteenth century China had entered into relations with the great commercial nations of Europe and America, as well as with her neighbors, the Russians. The Christian Church, in both the Roman Catholic and Greek forms, had been firmly planted in the Middle Kingdom. The studies of these churchmen, especially the Jesuit mission in Peking, had served to enlarge greatly the information brought back by Marco Polo, which had molded West-

ern opinion of China for four hundred years. As the books of the missionaries were published in Europe they were rapidly translated into all the principal languages, and many of them ran into many editions, which testifies to the interest in China which then prevailed. For the most part these observers were deeply impressed with the superior culture of the Chinese, with the greatness of the empire, the prosperity and peacefulness of the people, the effectiveness of the administration. There was much that Europe could learn from China, and Western philosophers delighted to use Chinese examples to point their lessons. It was not until the death of the last great Manchu emperor, Kienlung, in 1796, that the decay in the administration became apparent. But this deterioration progressed rapidly just when Western intercourse was expanding and these contacts were with states which were as rapidly increasing in strength, in wealth, and in efficiency. It was most unfortunate that this should have been the case. If China could have kept pace with the West, even though she failed to maintain the lead which she possessed in the earlier centuries, the story of her relations with the powers of Europe and America would have been very different from that which we shall record.

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
CHAPTER VI

PRE-TREATY TRADE WITH CHINA

The English East India Company.—Throughout the greater part of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the most important participant in the trade with China was the famous English East India Company. Granted a monopoly of English trade with the regions between the Cape of Good Hope and Cape Horn in 1600, it had steadily grown, in spite of political complications at home and wars and confusion in India, into a great commercial and political organization, with its headquarters and its first considerable territorial possessions in Bengal. After several attempts to trade at various Chinese ports it established a factory at Canton in 1715, and this remained the base of its Chinese operations until the company was compelled by British law to withdraw from China in 1834. In this period the only British merchants at Canton were the agents of this company, or British and Indian subjects who were allowed to trade there under the company's license. The vessels of the latter were known as "country ships," in distinction to the stately "East Indiamen" which plied between China and England. Because of the monopoly the company was free to develop costly and inefficient trading methods. The East Indiamen were stoutly built, so as to defend themselves against open foes and Eastern pirates. They were slow, unwieldy, and poor carriers. The overhead cost of operation was high and the indulgences granted to the captains cut into the profits which should have accrued to the company. It was the keen competition of American seamen which focused attention upon the clumsy methods of the old monopoly and hastened the opening of the China trade to all British merchants. At first the company's trade was a triangular one based upon India. Goods were sent to India and exchanged for silver, which passed on to China for tea and silk, which was carried back to England and sold there at a large profit. Some silver and

a small amount of goods were sent directly to China, but after the company enjoyed a territorial revenue in India it was easier to transmit silver from there. From a political point of view the company's operations in China are of great interest. Its agents (supercargoes), organized into a council with a select committee as its executive body, controlled the commercial relations of England with China. As the company was intent upon profits, the agents were eager to carry on their trade with as little friction as possible, and so they would accept restrictions and exactions which the British government, when it sent its accredited representatives to China, could not afford to tolerate.

American Merchants.—As long as the thirteen Colonies were subject to Great Britain the Colonists received their Eastern wares, notably tea and silk, by way of England. Some Eastern booty was brought back by daring American pirates who, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, cruised in Asiatic waters. But as soon as independence was gained American merchants desired to participate directly in the rich Eastern trade. The first ship, the *Empress of China*, sailed from New York City in 1784, and returned the next year with a modest cargo. A consul, to serve without pay, was appointed at Canton in 1786. This trade rapidly increased, although it suffered at the hands of the British during the War of 1812. America had few articles of commerce to offer the Chinese, ginseng, a medicinal root, being one of the most desired commodities. But when the demand of the Chinese for furs was realized, many American ships touched first at the northwest coast of America and exchanged trinkets for land and sea furs; these, in turn, were sold at a great profit in Canton. When the seal and sea-otter pelts were hard to obtain in quantities, other ships would put into the islands of the East Indies and obtain sandalwood and sea-slugs for the Chinese market. It has been estimated that the entire fur trade between the United States and Canton down to 1830 amounted to between \$15,000,000 and \$20,000,000. But in addition to these goods the American ships always had to carry out Spanish or Mexican silver dollars to help balance



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their accounts. These vessels were smaller than the East Indiamen, much faster, and worked by a smaller crew. The cost of operation was less and the profits on a voyage correspondingly greater. By 1820 the American commerce with China exceeded every nation except Great Britain. With the development of the "clipper" type of ship about 1840, the most beautiful sailing craft which ever ploughed the seven seas, the Americans were able to land their cargoes of tea in London or New York with such promptness that they enjoyed the premium which rewarded the first deliveries of the season's crop. A voyage of ninety days from Foochow to London testifies to the speed of these swift-sailing craft. In the 'fifties an additional profit might be obtained by carrying passengers and freights to California and then proceeding to the Chinese ports for cargo. Unfortunately, during the American Civil War the depredations of Confederate privateers caused many Northern merchants to ship their cargoes under the British flag, and the substitution of iron and steel for wooden ships gave the advantage to British shipyards. After the Civil War the American flag gradually was withdrawn from Eastern seas until the new birth of American commerce during the World War.

Other European Traders.—After the dislocation of European commerce during the Napoleonic wars, through which the American trade for a time greatly benefited, most of the maritime powers carried on direct trade with Canton. On the banks of the Pearl River, outside the city wall, each nation had a factory where its goods were stored and where commercial transactions were carried on. Before 1842 there were thirteen of these factories, known as the Dutch, English, Swedish, Imperial, American, French, Spanish, and Danish, as well as others, but they belonged to the Chinese (*hong*) merchants, and were not always occupied by the merchants of the country designated. In 1836 there were thirty-one British, eleven Parsee, nine American, and four European firms operating at Canton, and their staffs numbered 307 men.

The Articles of Commerce.—In order to understand the commercial relations which developed we must remember that

"China wanted very little that the West could supply," while she possessed many things which the Westerners greatly desired. In the sixteenth century her silks and silken goods, her cotton fabrics, metal-work, porcelains, lacquers, and leather goods provided rich cargoes. Later tea became a prime article of commerce. The West could offer some metals, ginseng, furs, and, best of all, coined silver, until the opium trade provided an article which for the first time almost balanced the exchange. It was not until the industrial revolution in Europe that cotton could be spun and woven by machinery to compete with the cheap hand looms of China and India. Even the overland trade of the Russians was largely confined to tea, compressed into the shape of Chinese bricks. For these reasons the Chinese merchants were in a very strong position in dealing with the Western traders, and the Chinese government very naturally assumed that their goods, and especially certain medicinal herbs like rhubarb, were absolutely indispensable to the outer barbarians.

Trade Regulations.—The Chinese did not seek intercourse with Western peoples. Their policy was one of seclusion rather than expansion. They considered their kingdom to be the greatest and the strongest in all the world. Their emperor was the Son of Heaven. They had never recognized any power to be on terms of equality, hence all relations with them had been considered those of a vassal with its overlord. They needed almost nothing which the Western merchants could bring to them, and the few articles they received were usually luxuries rather than necessities, or obtained to gratify an acquired taste. Their self-sufficiency, and their isolation due to physical barriers, strengthened their belief that they could fix their own terms in dealing with the foreigners. Trade regulations would be imposed according to the emperor's will, and not under the terms of formal treaties. If, under such Chinese regulations, the foreign merchants sought peaceful trade, all would be well, but if they tried to bring over to China the commercial procedure of Europe they would soon learn their mistake. For many years the foreigners accepted this point of view and abided, with some grum-

bling, by the Chinese regulations. But with the decline of the Manchu administration and the growing confidence in Western superiority these regulations so arbitrarily enforced grew irksome. The merchants began to insist that China accept the Western principle of treaty regulations. This issue was eventually left to the decision of arms and, as usual, the weaker power lost.

Trade Restricted to Canton.—As a result of certain unpleasant experiences with the foreign traders, the Chinese finally insisted upon two things. First, that all trade should be confined to Canton, where special administrative bodies were created to deal with it. This edict was issued in 1757 and brought to an end the foreign trade at Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and the Formosan ports. This was not a new idea in the East. The Koreans had long confined the Japanese traders to the port of Fusan, and when the Japanese entered upon their period of seclusion both Dutch and Chinese traders were restricted to the single port of Nagasaki. Secondly, all relations between the foreign merchants and the Chinese officials must pass through the hands of the *hong* merchants. This in itself testified to the low regard in which the imperial government held the "outer barbarians." Other regulations were enforced with a considerable degree of effectiveness, such as that foreign ships of war must not enter the Pearl River; that women must not be brought to the factories; that foreigners must not use sedan chairs or row on the river for pleasure; and that none should remain at Canton after the ships had laden and sailed away. As a matter of fact, while most of the merchants retired to Macao during the summer, two or three were allowed to remain in charge of the respective factories.

The Hoppo.—A special imperial officer was stationed at Canton to supervise the foreign trade. He was the administrator of the Canton customs, but the foreigners spoke of him as the Hoppo, a name derived from the Hu Pu, or Board of Revenue at Peking, to which he remitted his collections. The Hoppo was a very important personage, ranking with the viceroy of the two provinces. He not only regulated the im-

port and export duties, and could do so in such an arbitrary manner that the merchants could not foretell the sums which might be demanded, but also heavy tonnage dues and fees of various kinds were fixed by him. In addition to these regular, but arbitrary, duties, the trade was burdened with irregular gratuities and perquisites which had to be paid to the officials, great and small. The Chinese merchants who profited through the foreign trade were also required to make liberal gifts or "squeezes" to their greedy officials. From this it is easy to understand why the foreigners earnestly desired that the duties and fees should be regularized and the trade freed from the illicit burdens which oppressed it. A treaty-made tariff alone would provide the security which they deemed essential.

The Hong Merchants.—As early as 1702 a Chinese merchant was designated to handle all transactions with the foreigners. In fact, two "Emperor's Merchants" arrived from Peking, one appointed by the second, and one by the fourth, son of Kanghi. By 1720 the Chinese merchants at Canton had formed a guild, known as the Hong or Co-Hong, to fix their own prices on goods sold to the Europeans. In 1754 these merchants became known as "security merchants," and the next year all trade with foreigners was confined to their hands. As much as \$275,000 was at one time paid for membership in this guild. In addition, however, to enjoying a monopoly of the foreign trade, both inward and outward, the *hong* merchants stood as security for the foreigners, both for their good behavior and for the payment of the duties and fees. This was an example of the Chinese idea of responsibility. It was an easy thing for the civil officials and the Hoppo to handle the foreigners, for all that was necessary was to swoop down upon the *hong* merchant who was responsible for the individuals who had committed some breach of law or custom. And in the same way the *hong* members were "milked" of a good share of their profits by the many officials. In these days, however, the relations between the foreign and the Chinese merchants were usually both cordial and mutually beneficial. The *hong* merchants were, with rare exceptions, men of the

highest integrity, and many of the conventional ideas in the West concerning the high standards of business morality which prevail in China were gained during these years when a small group of Chinese merchants handled the entire trade of China and the West.

The Desire for Treaty Rights.—We have seen that the Europeans, soon after each country commenced relations with China, sought imperial guaranties for their trade. The Portuguese, Spaniards, Dutch, and English sent missions to Peking, but without success. Two of the more interesting missions were sent by the king of England, but in the interests and at the expense of the East India Company. In 1793 Lord Macartney visited the emperor at his summer residence at Jehol. He was well received and seems not to have performed the kotow, but he was unable to secure any recognition of national equality on the part of the Chinese or any modification in the burdensome regulations. In fact, the junks which bore him up the Pei-ho carried at their mastheads banners which read, "Tribute-bearers from the country of England." The famous letter of Kienlung to George III is indicative of the Chinese point of view:

As the requests made by your ambassador militate against the laws and usages of this our Empire, and are at the same time wholly useless for the end proposed, I cannot acquiesce in them. I again admonish you, O King, to act conformably to my instructions, that we may preserve peace and amity on each side, and thereby contribute to our reciprocal happiness.

Again, in 1816, Lord Amherst was sent to Peking. Once more his river boats carried the flags inscribed "tribute-bearers," but this time he was not even hospitably received. Summoned to audience in the summer palace immediately on his arrival, he refused to attend at that time, pleading fatigue and the absence of his court dress. For this insult, for such it was easily construed, he was ordered out of the capital immediately.

The Opium Trade.—In spite of regulations and exactions, the trade with China was so profitable, and the relations be-

tween the foreign and the *hong* merchants so friendly, that these conditions might have continued for years had it not been for the rapidly increasing importance of a new article of commerce—opium. We must now consider rather carefully the peculiar rôle played by opium in the commercial and diplomatic history of the Far East.

The Use of Opium.—Opium is the prepared juice extracted from the capsule at the base of the poppy flower.

The poppy has been known in China for at least twelve centuries, its medicinal use for nine centuries, and that the medicinal properties lay in the capsule for six centuries. Opium has been made in China for four centuries.¹

The eating of opium was an old vice, but largely practiced in India. The smoking of opium is comparatively recent, and is almost exclusively practiced by the Chinese. It is believed that this method originated after the use of tobacco was introduced from the Philippines, and the Dutch are considered to have been the first to demonstrate that opium could be mixed with tobacco and used in a pipe. This may have occurred about the middle of the seventeenth century. The development of a new method of preparation by which opium could be smoked by itself probably was in use about 1800. Opium, when properly used, is a valuable medicine. It is also a stimulant, like tea, coffee, tobacco, spirits, and various drugs. But like other drug habits, it may be easily acquired and then the victim can rarely free himself from its bondage. Because the use of opium seldom leads to acts of violence, like the abuse of strong spirits, it has been considered by some to be a fairly innocuous drug. But its excessive use undermines the nervous system and injures both health and character. Fortunately, we have to-day the verdict of the whole civilized world that the opium habit is one which should be eradicated at the earliest possible moment.

Attempts to Regulate the Opium Trade.—It was some fifty years after the imperial government learned of the use of opium along the coast around Amoy and in Formosa that it

¹ Morse, *Trade and Administration of the Chinese Empire*, p. 337.

tried to prohibit its sale and the opening of shops or divans where it might be smoked. This was in 1729. At that time the Portuguese were bringing to China about 200 chests a year from India. These chests each contained 133 1-3 pounds of opium, while the chests shipped by the British from Bengal at a later date contained 160 pounds. It was not until the end of the century that British merchants participated in this valuable trade. In 1773, after the East India Company had stood forth as the owners of the provinces of Bengal and Behar in India, where the best opium was produced, it created a monopoly of its manufacture. The product prepared in its establishments was of such superior quality that it soon commanded a premium in China. At first, licensed merchants carried the opium from Calcutta to Canton, and these were principally Parsees, but in 1780 the company began to participate directly in the carrying trade. By this time the quantity imported had greatly increased and the smoking of opium by the Chinese around Canton began to alarm the officials there. On their memorial the emperor, in 1796, renewed the old prohibitions against the sale of the drug, but official incapacity and corruption were unable to cope with an increasing popular demand.

Importation of Opium Prohibited.—In 1800 the Emperor Kiaking issued an edict prohibiting the importation of opium and the cultivation of the poppy in China. From this time, until 1858, the importation of opium was contraband, and all those who participated in the trade understood well that they were violating the laws of China. The East India Company, in order to escape interference with its rich silk and tea trade at Canton, promptly withdrew from the opium-carrying trade, but it continued to manufacture the choicest opium in Bengal and most of the drug which it sold at Calcutta passed on to China. Down to 1834 British and Indian merchants handled the drug under licenses granted by the company, and after 1830 opium from the west coast of India was shipped by Parsees through the company's port of Bombay. Occasionally American ships put into Calcutta for some of this valuable trade commodity, and they handled some opium from

Turkey, but most of their stock was obtained on consignment for English merchants in India. The Portuguese continued to bring opium from their Indian ports, and some was brought down the Persian Gulf from Persia. After 1800 the quantity imported increased with great rapidity. For the first time the foreign merchants controlled a commodity which, with raw cotton, almost balanced the cost of the Chinese goods they sought. The Chinese officials, knowing that silver was paid for the opium, believed that China was being drained of its visible wealth. As a matter of fact this silver, and more, was exchanged again for tea and silk. But the great flood of silver which from the earliest days had poured into China was greatly lessened after opium became the only foreign commodity which the Chinese really desired.

The Contraband Trade.—Thus developed an illegal commerce which became so intertwined with legitimate trade that any attempt to suppress it was bound to react unfavorably upon the regular commercial operations. A few merchants refused to participate in it, but many reputable foreign firms handled opium because it was a better medium of exchange than silver dollars. They salved their consciences, if that was necessary, by denouncing the inconsistency of the Chinese officials. The prohibition edict was rarely enforced. The officials, from the highest to the lowest, participated in the bribes which permitted this unlawful trade to be carried on with only the slightest attempt at concealment. A special type of sailing craft, the *lorcha*, was perfected, which could outsail the clumsy war junks which at times tried to prevent the disposal of the drug. These ships had foreign-style hulls, giving them greater speed, and Chinese sails, which could be handled by a native crew. The captain was a foreigner. The opium was brought from India to Macao or Whampoa, near Canton, or later to Lintin Island, and then transshipped to the *lorchas* or small Western craft which carried it to points along the coast. At the main depots or the coastal rendezvous the Chinese dealers received it, paying cash, and usually having taken the precaution to purchase protection from the ranking civil or naval official. Before 1820 the imports rarely ex-

ceeded 5,000 chests per annum; by 1830 the estimated amount reached 16,257. Of course no accurate or official figures exist of such an illegitimate trade. By 1839 the imports had reached 40,200 chests, and in that year, as we shall see, 20,291 chests of British-owned opium were surrendered to the Chinese from the ships lying at Canton. This would have amounted to about 3,000,000 pounds of opium, valued at more than \$11,000,000.

Summary.—There has been much confusion of thought respecting the contraband opium trade. Whether prohibition or regulation is the better way to meet a social evil has often been argued. Whether foreigners should respect a law which the national officials would not enforce has also been considered. Perhaps Westerners can think more clearly along these lines to-day when every country has tried, without complete success, to prohibit the smuggling of opium and other injurious drugs into their territory. And Americans have in recent years, in the case of the smuggling of spirits, come face to face with a problem in many respects similar to that which prevailed along the coast of China before 1858. But to-day no reputable merchant would engage in the smuggling of drugs or intoxicants. It was otherwise in China. One thing, however, is certain. The prohibition of opium was proclaimed in 1800. Irrespective of the corrupt conduct of the local officials, there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of the emperors in desiring the elimination of this unwholesome commerce. Whether the policy was a sound one or not, it was the law, and as such should have been obeyed. Whether the officials were corrupt or not, no foreigner could participate in this trade without sharing in their corruption. Although we may be warned against judging the conduct of men of the first half of the nineteenth century in the light of standards accepted in the twentieth, it is difficult to see how any justification can be urged for the conduct of the foreign merchants, British, Parsee, American, Portuguese, and others, who deliberately defied the laws of the empire to which they had resorted for trade. On the other hand, an even greater degree of blame accrues to the corrupt officials who, for private

profit, permitted this trade to assume such alarming proportions. Had they been honest and efficient in 1800, when the first prohibitory decree was issued, they could probably have stamped out this trade before the demand for the drug had become widespread. By pressure upon the company's merchants at Canton, and the Portuguese at Macao, they could have forced these two groups to stop the shipment of opium at the principal source, in India. Unhappily, the opium evil increased in pace with the degradation of the imperial administrative system. But that the evil could have been controlled is evident from the record of Japan. Her laws regulating the Dutch commerce at Nagasaki were rigorously enforced. No opium was permitted to be imported, and Japan was freed from the curse which has caused so much distress and harm in China. When, in 1839, the emperor of China determined to stamp out the opium trade, it had assumed such proportions that the result was bound to be disastrous.

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CHAPTER VII

THE FIRST TREATY SETTLEMENT

The British Desire Equality.—When, in 1839, the Chinese attempted, by drastic measures, to eliminate the opium trade, they were unable to make a clean-cut issue, and this is why so much confusion of thought has arisen respecting the clash of arms which soon followed between China and Great Britain. Already, in 1834, another question had arisen which, if not amicably settled, would as surely have resulted in war. This was occasioned by the arrival at Canton of three representatives of the British king who were to take the place of the supercargoes of the East India Company as controllers of British commerce and British subjects in China. By Act of Parliament in 1833 the East India Company had lost its monopoly of British trade with China, and on April 22, 1834, it withdrew from Canton. The company, as we have seen, had been able to control the conduct of all British subjects resorting to Canton, it had been strong enough to secure some commercial concessions from the Chinese, and it had been willing to put up with the arbitrary regulations and exactions in order to enjoy the rich trade. But eager as the British government was to maintain friendly relations with China, it was out of the question that the representatives of the king could for long be subjected to the high-handed treatment which British merchants had endured.

Lord Napier, Chief Superintendent.—In order to supervise and protect the British traders who were about to go to Canton, as soon as the company's monopoly expired the government sent out Lord William Napier as chief superintendent, and two associates. At the same time an Order in Council, based upon the Act of 1833, made provision for a British court of criminal and admiralty jurisdiction to be held at Canton or on board any British ship in that port, under the direction of the chief superintendent. The significance of this proceeding will be indicated later. Although the instructions

issued to these representatives cautioned them to "study by all practicable methods to maintain a good and friendly understanding," they very properly considered themselves to be political agents on a very different standing from the company's supercargoes. Thus they proceeded directly to Canton from Macao, without asking and receiving permission through the *hong* merchants. On his arrival at Canton, July 25th, Lord Napier tried to communicate directly with the Chinese officials, but his letter was rejected because it was styled a "letter" and not a "petition" and was not transmitted through the *hong* merchants. Napier had thus made an attempt to secure equality of treatment as the representative of a great power, but the Chinese would hear nothing of equality. He was ordered to leave the port and, at Macao, to request through the proper channels permission to return. When he refused to retire an edict was issued, on September 2nd, stopping all trade with the English. Two frigates were ordered up to protect the merchants and they forced their way past the Bogue forts. But seeing that the case was hopeless, Napier sent away the warships, and on the 21st retired to Macao, where he died on October 11th. In this first controversy over equality the Chinese had won. They were more certain than ever that they held the upper hand through their ability to stop the British trade whenever they saw fit. On the other hand, the British government was not prepared to follow up the suggestion of Napier that force should be used to place him in his proper position. It hoped that conciliation, rather than force, would bring about better commercial and political relations.

Chinese Criminal Jurisdiction.—In addition to the trade regulations which were described in a preceding chapter and which were causing increasing dissatisfaction among the foreign merchants, there developed after about 1800 a profound distrust of the Chinese criminal courts before which foreigners should ordinarily be brought for trial for offenses committed in Chinese territory. The Chinese people themselves had so little confidence in their courts that they rarely brought civil cases before them and dreaded to come before them on a crim-

inal charge. The foreigners had tried to evade the jurisdiction of the Chinese courts in many ways. Chinese procedure was by no means uniform—at times foreign offenders, real or alleged, were demanded for trial, at other times the case might be quashed by a money settlement. By 1800 the Portuguese at Macao had won practical freedom from Chinese jurisdiction in cases involving foreigners. The English at Canton had dared on several occasions to refuse to surrender their nationals, even East Indians, to the Chinese courts and had sent them to England or to India for trial. In 1773 an Englishman who had killed a Chinese at Macao was surrendered by the Portuguese, found guilty, and strangled. Again, in 1780, a French sailor killed a Portuguese seaman at Canton. He was surrendered by the French consul and after a trial which was considered by the Europeans to have been a farce he was convicted and strangled. In 1784 a Chinese was killed by a salute from a British ship. The gunner was finally surrendered, after a supercargo had been seized and held by the Chinese, and was promptly executed. In 1821 an Italian sailor on an American ship was charged with the murder of a Chinese woman. After a long dispute he was finally surrendered, tried, and executed. These cases and countless others in which Chinese were the victims had come to the attention of the foreigners and naturally strengthened their resolve never to allow a foreigner to pass into the hands of the Chinese if it could possibly be avoided. In the instructions to the Cathcart mission in 1787 and to Lord Macartney in 1792 the British government indicated its desire to retain jurisdiction over its own subjects. As early as 1807 the president of the select committee of the East India Company announced that

the Mandarins might be assured he would never be the means of exposing any number of unconvicted British Subjects to so dreadful a Trial or to any Chinese form of trial whatever, except such as the Mandarins might think proper to carry into execution within the European Factories.

The foreigners objected to the summary procedure in the

courts, to the use of torture to secure a confession, and to the fact that even homicide, in which no intent to kill was involved, was punishable by strangulation. In order, therefore, to see that justice was done in the case of British offenders, provision was made in 1834 for a British criminal and admiralty court to sit at Canton, although it did not actually function until 1839.

The Chinese Strike at the Opium Trade.—Lord Napier was succeeded in turn by his two associates, and in 1836 Captain Charles Elliot assumed the post of chief superintendent. He requested permission through the *hong* merchants to visit Canton. He was duly authorized to do so and, as superintendent, to control the merchants and seamen and to abide by the Chinese regulations. The assertion of equality was only kept in the background by the British; it was not abandoned. In the next few years the opium trade agitated the local and metropolitan officials. A proposal was made to legalize it, on a revenue basis, but this was definitely overruled by Peking. Instead, steps were taken to stop the traffic, but without any success until in December, 1838, Lin Tse-su, viceroy of Hunan and Hupeh, was appointed imperial high commissioner to “go, investigate, and act.” He arrived at Canton on March 10th, following. Eight days later he issued an order to the foreigners to deliver up all the opium on their storeships, and to give bond to import no more on penalty of death. The next day the Hoppo issued an order forbidding any foreigner to leave the factories, and armed men and Chinese gunboats surrounded them. All trade was cut off. When the foreigners realized that this new all-powerful official really meant what he proclaimed, Captain Elliot assumed responsibility for all British-owned opium which should be surrendered into his hands for delivery to the Chinese government. Finally 20,283 chests were surrendered, and eight were seized at Macao, making a total of 20,291 chests. The delivery was not completed until May 21st. To the amazement of the merchants, who had believed that this was but another form of official blackmail, it was entirely destroyed by being

mixed with salt, lime, and water and then poured into the sea.

New Complications.—The British merchants would not give the bond demanded by the high commissioner, and on May 22nd Captain Elliot ordered all British subjects to leave Canton, announcing that the right “of exacting effectual security, and full indemnity for every loss” would be left directly to the Queen. The Americans and other merchants agreed to sign a bond for each ship which arrived, so their trade was allowed to continue. The British first moved to Macao, but when a proclamation of August 15th ordered the closing of their food supplies there and the governor of Macao could no longer guarantee their safety, they proceeded to the Chinese island of Hong Kong. Already the British merchant ships had resorted to the fine harbor there, and on July 7th a Chinese was killed in a riot with some sailors, British and American, at Kowloon, on the mainland. Six sailors were tried by Captain Elliot and five were found guilty of rioting, but not of murder, and sentenced to fines and imprisonment. But Commissioner Lin demanded the surrender of the accused seamen. This dispute, in addition to their refusal to give bond and trade directly at Canton, explains the edict which forced them away from Macao. On November 3rd a fleet of twenty-nine war junks approached the two English warships at Hong Kong and demanded the surrender of the accused seamen. When they refused to withdraw, the British opened fire, and four war junks were destroyed. The immediate effect of this open clash was the commissioner’s decree of November 26th that after December 6th no British ship would be allowed to visit Canton. On February 12, 1840, an imperial edict confirmed this decree and brought all British trade to an end. On the other hand, the news of this naval engagement led to orders from London which set in motion the forces which brought about open warfare.

British Demands.—Thus in trying to destroy the opium trade Commissioner Lin had finally brought to an end all British commerce with China. The British were primarily involved because the opium came, for the most part, from

India and was owned by British subjects. But, in addition, the long dispute involving the question of equality had brought their representatives into the forefront in any move to secure an improvement in the treatment of foreign merchants in China. The British government sent out two dispatches, dated February 20th, to Admiral George Elliot and Captain Charles Elliot, who were to act as British plenipotentiaries. These demanded satisfaction for the indignities and ill treatment suffered by Her Majesty's superintendent and British subjects at Canton; indemnification for the "ransom" (in the shape of the surrendered opium) and the debts due British merchants by insolvent members of the *hong*; and security for the future, which called for the cession of one or more islands along the coast and a formal treaty. In negotiating the latter the Chinese envoys must treat on a British ship. In a second dispatch the cession of an island might be waived if a proper treaty, as outlined therein, could be obtained.

The Anglo-Chinese War.—The war which soon followed may be briefly summarized. A letter, setting forth the three demands already indicated, was delivered to Chinese officials on August 15th at the Pei-ho, but no satisfaction could be obtained. In the meantime the port of Canton was blockaded by a British squadron. Negotiations were begun at Canton in December, but the Chinese resolutely refused to pay for the opium, and Canton was bombarded in January, 1841. Negotiations were then resumed, and a draft treaty signed a few days later, but this was disavowed by both governments: by China because it granted too much, by Great Britain because it did not provide a sufficient indemnity, payment of the *hong* debts, or greater security of trade. Military operations were again renewed, to be suspended for six weeks from March 20th in order that the new crop of tea might be shipped. In May, Canton, which lay under the guns of the British fleet, was ransomed for \$6,000,000, of which the *hong* merchants were compelled to advance \$2,000,000. Commissioner Lin, whose patriotic efforts had brought on this troublesome war, was then removed and sentenced to exile in the remote dis-

trict of Ili. With sufficient troops at his disposal Sir Henry Pottinger, the British plenipotentiary, now moved northward, taking city after city. Amoy, Tinghai (on Chusan Island), Chinhai, and Ningpo were captured by October 13th, when the expeditionary force went into winter quarters. In the spring of 1842 the pressure was renewed. Chapu, Woosung, and Shanghai were taken in May and June, Chinkiang, on the Yangtze, in July, and on August 9th the fleet lay off the old southern capital, Nanking. The Chinese had suffered most humiliating defeats. A mere handful of trained troops, between 2,500 and 7,000 effectives, had crushed with small loss the brave but untrained Manchu bannermen who opposed them at Chapu and Chinkiang. The military prestige of the Middle Kingdom suffered a blow from which it has never recovered. Now, at Nanking, three imperial commissioners appeared, and on the deck of the British flag-ship the famous treaty which for the first time gave the British, and as a matter of fact all foreigners, rights in China was signed.

Treaty of Nanking.—The important terms of this epoch-making treaty are as follows:

(1) "There shall henceforward be peace and friendship" between the two sovereigns.

(2) The ports of Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai were to be opened to British trade and residence, and trade would be conducted under a well-understood tariff.

(3) The island of Hong Kong would be ceded to Great Britain.

(4) \$6,000,000 would be paid for the opium delivered up "as a ransom for the lives of Her Britannic Majesty's Superintendent and subjects who had been imprisoned and threatened with death by the Chinese high officers" in March, 1839.

(5) \$3,000,000 would be paid for debts due British merchants, and the *hong* merchants would be abolished.

(6) \$12,000,000 would be paid for the expenses of the expedition sent out "to obtain redress for the violent and unjust proceedings of the Chinese high authorities."

(7) A fair and regular tariff of export and import dues

should be promulgated, and an agreed transit tax should be imposed.

(8) The British High Officer should communicate with the Chinese High Officers, both at the capital and in the provinces, under the term "communication," subordinate officers should use the term "statement" if British, or "declaration" if Chinese, and merchants or other non-officials might use the term "representation."

Treaty Rights.—In these ways and under these terms the British secured their first *rights* in China. In place of one port, where they had traded under Chinese regulations, five ports were now to be opened under treaty provisions. In place of arbitrary duties and exactions a fair and regular tariff was to be provided, which might not be altered except with the consent of both parties. In place of the monopoly of the *hong* merchants, trade was permitted with any Chinese dealer. Official correspondence would now be conducted on terms of equality. The British obtained at Hong Kong a base from which they might carry on their intercourse with China under the protection of their own military and naval forces and the jurisdiction of their own laws. With the rise of Hong Kong, soon to become one of the great seaports of the world, the importance of Macao rapidly dwindled. But in demanding payment for the opium the British government and its plenipotentiary made a grievous mistake. Although they might consider it a "ransom," it was in itself a contraband article and never should have been used for such a purpose. For this reason the Chinese have never failed to consider that the sole cause of this war was opium, and in many quarters it is commonly spoken of as "The Opium War." But the British were fighting for far more than opium, and their demand for the recognition of national equality and commercial rights would have brought about a direct clash even if opium had not been present. At the time, the Chinese officials believed that the British should have controlled the conduct of their traders and thus stopped the opium traffic, but Sir Henry Pottinger, who signed the treaty of Nanking, reminded them that "England cannot interfere with the conduct of her farmers, the

Chinese must stop wanting the drug, the officials must be incorruptible." However, we shall see that in the twentieth century the Indian government was more inclined to coöperate with the Chinese, and the shipments of Indian opium were gradually reduced until the China trade was absolutely stopped.

Supplementary Treaty.—The terms of the treaty of Nanking were rounded out by an important treaty which was negotiated the next year. First a tariff and general trade regulations were drawn up and proclaimed at Nanking on July 22, 1843. These contained a crude extraterritorial provision. By this we mean the extension of a country's jurisdiction into the territory of another. Under its terms British criminals would be punished according to British laws, enforced by the consul, and Chinese offenders against the British would be tried and punished according to their own laws. On this point correspondence had been exchanged after the conclusion of the Nanking treaty, but the first clear statement of this great privilege of extraterritoriality is found in the Tariff and General Regulations of 1843. These in turn were annexed to the treaty of 1843, which defined more carefully the basic rights granted in 1842. A very important clause inserted in 1843 was one which granted to the British the privileges of the most-favored nation:

It is agreed, that should the Emperor hereafter, from any cause whatever, be pleased to grant additional privileges or immunities to any of the subjects or citizens of such foreign countries, the same privileges and immunities will be extended to, and enjoyed by, British subjects; but it is to be understood that demands or requests are not on this plea to be unnecessarily brought forward.

The significance of this clause lies in the fact that after China granted treaty rights to other nations and permitted the incorporation therein of a similar clause, the rights enjoyed by any foreigner could not be ascertained merely by consulting the terms of his country's treaty, but all treaties must be examined, for all foreigners of the treaty powers enjoyed the most-favored rights which were extended to the na-

nationals of any country. We shall see that the nationals of countries which did not resort to war with China enjoyed all the privileges of the nationals of the countries which assumed the burdens of war and Chinese resentment.

American Treaty.—The Chinese did not intend that the British alone should enjoy the privileges which they had been forced to concede. The eighth article of the supplementary treaty of 1843 clearly stated that the Emperor of China had been

graciously pleased to grant to all foreign countries whose subjects or citizens have hitherto traded at Canton, the privilege of resorting for purposes of trade to the other four ports of Foochow, Amoy, Ningpo, and Shanghai on the same terms as the English.

This was confirmed in an exchange of letters between the American Commodore Kearney and the governor of Canton. The United States and several European powers promptly dispatched diplomatic missions to China to secure formal treaty rights for their nationals. The American mission was headed by Caleb Cushing of Massachusetts and conveyed in a frigate to Macao, where it arrived on February 24, 1844. After trying unsuccessfully to arrange for negotiations at Tientsin, Mr. Cushing proceeded to treat with Kiyang, viceroy of the two Kwang provinces, who returned from Peking for that purpose. The commissioners took up their task on June 21st at Wanghia, a village just outside the Portuguese limits at Macao.¹ In spite of the death of a Chinese during a riot at Canton in which Americans had been attacked, and the refusal of Cushing to surrender the accused, the negotiations were successfully carried on. The American was tried according to American law and acquitted by an American jury, but this was before extraterritorial rights were granted under the treaty. On July 3rd the treaty was signed. Based as it was upon the two previous British treaties, it incorporated in one text, and frequently with more exact terms, the privileges granted in the two earlier conventions. Thus Americans were to be permitted not only to rent houses and places of business, but, having due regard for the feelings of the people in the

location thereof, to hire sites on which they could themselves construct houses and hospitals, churches and cemeteries. The desecration of the latter by natives of China would be severely punished according to law. But the most important contribution found in Cushing's treaty was the clear definition of criminal extraterritoriality and the extension of this right to civil cases.

Article XXI. Subjects of China, who may be guilty of any criminal act towards citizens of the United States, shall be arrested and punished by the Chinese authorities according to the laws of China; and citizens of the United States, who may commit any crime in China, shall be subject to be tried and punished only by the consul, or other public functionary of the United States thereto authorized, according to the laws of the United States. And in order to the prevention of all controversy and disaffection, justice shall be equitably and impartially administered on both sides.

Article XXIV. . . . And if controversies arise between citizens of the United States and subjects of China, which cannot be amicably settled otherwise, the same shall be examined and decided conformably to justice and equity by the public officers of the two nations acting in conjunction.

Article XXV. All questions in regard to rights, whether of property or person, arising between citizens of the United States in China, shall be subject to the jurisdiction, and regulated by the authorities of their own government; and all controversies occurring in China between citizens of the United States and the subjects of any other government shall be regulated by the treaties existing between the United States and such governments respectively, without interference on the part of China.

In defending his demand for extraterritorial rights Cushing, in a letter to Secretary of State Calhoun, September 29, 1844, pointed out that the British had already secured them, while the Portuguese attained the same end through their jurisdiction at Macao. As China lay outside the family of Christian states, a system of extraterritorial jurisdiction, such as had long prevailed in the Mohammedan countries around the Mediterranean, should be employed. A stronger argument lay in the fact that the foreigners had long since lost all re-

spect for the Chinese administration of justice, as concerned either persons or property. The British had already won exemption from Chinese criminal jurisdiction, and even before that time they had erected a criminal court to deal with their nationals in China. Cushing could ill afford to have Americans denied the protection which the British enjoyed. Because no mention of these rights was found in the treaty of Nanking, while the first clear statement was incorporated in Cushing's treaty, a wide currency has been given to the assertion that Cushing introduced this principle in China. We have seen that this was not the case.

Other Treaties.—Soon after the conclusion of the American treaty a French envoy arrived at Macao. France, the recognized protector of Catholic missions in non-Christian lands, was from the first interested in the performance of this duty. At the request of the envoy, transmitted in the form of a memorial from the Viceroy Kiyong, the emperor, on December 28, 1844, issued an edict tolerating the religion of the Lord of Heaven. This was broadened to include the Protestant as well as the Catholic religion, a year later, when Kiyong's attention was called to the differences which prevailed in the Christian Church. On February 20, 1846, a second imperial edict ordered the restoration of the church property which had been confiscated under the decree of 1724. In this way the toleration of Christianity was granted by the emperor himself. We shall see that it did not satisfy the Christian workers. The French treaty, in the meanwhile, had been signed at Whampoa on October 24, 1844, and resembled closely the form of the American treaty. The next year a Belgian agent was unable to secure a treaty, but all existing treaty rights were granted under an imperial edict. A treaty was negotiated by Sweden and Norway, at Canton, on March 20, 1847, which again followed the American model.

The First Treaty Settlement.—The foreign treaties, signed between 1842 and 1847, may be said to comprise the first treaty settlement between China and the Western powers. Because of the presence of the most-favored-nation clause in all the treaties, the rights of any nation must be determined

by the sum of all the rights conceded. Although the basic treaty was that of Nanking, gained only by a successful war, the master text was that of Wanghia, and this was most frequently referred to when foreign rights were in question in the next fourteen years.

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CHAPTER VIII

THE TREATIES IN OPERATION

Conflict of Ideas.—The Europeans and Americans thought that the first war had taught China a much-needed lesson. They lost all respect for the military forces of China and for her ability to impose her will upon the aliens within her borders. But they did not realize the ignorance and indifference of the Chinese officials, nor the resentment of many of the Chinese people who had suffered during the military operations. Moreover, the first war had merely touched the fringe of the great empire. Scores of millions of Chinese knew nothing at all about it. A few military defeats could not shake the confidence of the great body of classically trained officials that China was still the all-powerful Middle Kingdom. This inability of the officials, and especially those at Peking who had not witnessed the demonstrations of Western power, to understand the new conditions and to adopt new methods of dealing with the foreigners, accounts for much of the persisting friction. On the one hand, the Europeans wanted treatment such as they would have received at the hands of a Western power. Great as were the treaty concessions in comparison with the old Chinese regulations, they were not great enough. The foreigners wanted *more* concessions. The Chinese wanted to whittle down the concessions they had been forced to yield. In short, they wanted to have as little to do with the Europeans as possible, and in this they were very wise, for almost every Eastern people who had come into contact with the Europeans had lost their independence. Japan had preserved hers by enforcing her laws with strict impartiality. Siam was to retain at least the vital part of her domains by wisely yielding when European pressure could not be resisted. But China would follow neither course and further trouble was inevitable. In addition to the traditional attitude of superiority which the officials adopted toward all foreigners, it must be remembered that the years after 1842

were not only marked by a general collapse in China of administrative efficiency, which always meant local rebellions, but the empire soon found itself involved in the most terrible insurrection the world had ever known, the Taiping rebellion. For these reasons, even if the government had sincerely tried to live up to its treaty obligations, it would have found great difficulty in doing so. But the harassed officials believed that they had far more important things to deal with than the petty demands of foreign traders. When treaty violations, real or alleged, occurred and no redress could be obtained from local magistrates, the foreign consuls and ministers believed that in most cases only direct action could bring results. This was known as the "gunboat policy." For a dozen years the home governments tried to curb the aggressive policies advocated by their representatives on the spot. But ultimately they resorted to force in order to secure new concessions when diplomacy had failed. It was natural that in the West much should be said of the "grievances" of the foreigners. However, an impartial study of the period will soon indicate that these grievances were insignificant in comparison with the wrongs inflicted upon the Chinese by lawless foreigners.

The Treaty Ports.—The people of Shanghai, Amoy, Foochow, and Ningpo received the foreign traders amicably enough. At first they were allowed to rent houses within the walled city of Shanghai, but in 1845 the British secured a tract outside the city which developed into the Foreign Settlement. The French secured the first grant for their own settlement in 1849. No special regions for foreign residence were set apart at the other three ports, although the newcomers gradually congregated in one general district. At Foochow an argument arose as to the right to reside in the walled city, and this was gained by the British consul in 1845 but later abandoned. At each of these ports the foreigners were permitted to make excursions into the country within defined limits.

Disturbances at Canton.—The situation at Canton was quite different. On the one hand, the foreigners remembered the high-handed treatment they had endured for so many years,

and on the other the populace smarted under the misconduct of unruly seamen and the losses occasioned by the recent bombardments. It was but natural for the foreigners to insist that their new treaty-defined status should be recognized, and for the Chinese to resent any such assertion. A question promptly arose as to the right of entrance to the walled city, which had been denied the foreigners in the old days. The British representatives demanded this privilege as a sign of national equality. The Chinese officials protested, perhaps with doubtful sincerity, that they could not protect the foreigners if they entered the teeming city where resentment against them was rife. Moreover, the treaty did not definitely confer the right to enter the "walled city." That entrance to the city would result in clashes between the populace and the foreigners may be accepted as certain, but the foreigners were willing to take the chance so long as their right was openly recognized. In 1846 an agreement was arrived at to postpone the opening of the city, "the local authorities being for the present unable to coerce the people of the city." When in the following March a party of Englishmen were stoned by a mob in the near-by city of Fatshan, Sir John Davis ordered up the British fleet, the Bogue forts were taken and their cannon spiked. With Canton at the mercy of British gunboats, the viceroy agreed to open the city by April 6, 1849. This ruthless exhibition of the "gunboat policy" was approved by Lord Palmerston, the secretary of state for foreign affairs, but the Emperor Taoukwang refused to ratify what his viceroy had conceded. His decree may well be quoted here:

That to which the hearts of the people incline is that on which the decree of Heaven rests. Now the people of Kwangtung are unanimous and determined that they will not have foreigners enter the city; and how can I post up everywhere my imperial order and force an opposite course on the people?

In December, 1847, six Englishmen were killed by villagers near Canton, but this time the punitive measures of the viceroy were considered satisfactory. When the day arrived

for the opening of the city there was no compliance. The British protested, but the Chinese won the point. Honors were conferred on his loyal officials by the emperor, and the people of Canton presented them with honorific tablets inscribed "The People's Will strong as a Walled City."

✓ **Governor-General Yeh.**—The irritation produced by the "city question" and the occasional attacks upon foreigners in the vicinity of Canton was greatly magnified by the conduct of a new viceroy and high commissioner for foreign affairs, Yeh Ming-chin, who assumed this office in August, 1852. As early as 1848 he had been acting governor, and thus brought into correspondence with the foreign representatives. Only one American commissioner was granted an interview with the Chinese high officials at Canton between 1848 and 1858. In the former year Mr. John Davis was received by Viceroy Hsu and Governor Yeh in a packing warehouse near the factories. Requests for interviews on the part of other foreign representatives were unheeded. Viceroy Yeh, engaged in the suppression of a dangerous rebellion, had no time to waste in diplomatic conversations. It was the practice of the Chinese officials to refer all foreign questions to the attention of the high commissioner at Canton, and as Yeh, acting under instructions, resolutely refused to discuss, except by correspondence, any grievances which might arise, it is easy to understand why the foreign representatives soon lost patience and believed that only force could bring about a decent consideration of their complaints and desires.

Unruly Foreigners.—If in these years the foreigners could cite wrongs which called for redress, the Chinese could have matched each one many times over. For the most part these were the crimes of foreign nationals who flaunted the laws of China, but they should have been punished by their own consuls under the extraterritorial jurisdiction. We must remember that in the 'fifties China was in turmoil because of the Taiping and other rebellions. At the open ports congregated foreign seamen and adventurers, eager to fish in these troubled waters. The crushing defeat in the first war, and the prompt use of gunboats, warned Chinese officials to handle

all foreigners with very great caution. At Macao and Hong Kong were two communities removed from Chinese jurisdiction from which proceeded foreign and Chinese-owned crafts under foreign flags to engage in many forms of depredation. Macao was for many years a thorn in the flesh of China, and to a less extent this was true of Hong Kong until an effective administration was organized there in the 'sixties.

Opium Smuggling.—The opium trade was still contraband, but it assumed greater proportions than before the first war. The great bulk of the opium continued to come from India and it was now sold openly all along the coast. In 1840 the estimated imports from India reached 20,619 chests; in 1858, when the trade was legalized, it had risen to 74,966. None of this opium was brought to China in Chinese ships, but natives of the country took part in the coast-wise trade, protected at times by foreign flags.

The Coolie Trade.—Another lawless activity of the foreigners which occasioned untold misery was the coolie trade. This was the conveyance of Chinese unskilled laborers (coolies) to foreign lands where their labor was in demand. It became of importance just as the African slave trade was drawing to a close and labor was needed for the sugar plantations of Cuba and the West Indies. The usual transaction was for the coolie to accept a contract to labor for eight years, at a fixed wage, such as four dollars a month and two changes of clothing a year. The ship captain, usually representing a shipping firm, then sold these contract laborers to the planters at their destination. The price, which in Cuba ranged from \$120 to \$170, covered the cost of transportation and the profits from the transaction. In 1847 some 400 to 450 coolies sailed from Amoy to Havana in a British ship. From that date, through the 'fifties, the trade assumed large proportions. If the traffic had been carried on honestly and humanely it would have served a useful end. The able-bodied and industrious Chinese laborers would have found a good market for their strength, and the planters would have secured the labor they so much desired. But the trade was soon stained with horrors. The passage to the West Indies

was far more unhealthy than the old "middle passage" from Africa because it twice crossed the tropics and required four or five months in transit. The ships were overcrowded, sanitary conditions were appalling, and it is estimated that at least fifteen per cent of the passengers died on the voyage to Cuba. To a less extent coolies were shipped to British Guiana, Peru, and the East Indies. As soon as the news of the treatment endured by these pioneers, both on the voyage and in Cuba or Peru, reached China, the local officials denounced the traffic and warned the people. The American and British officials also cautioned their nationals to abstain from the trade, but with small success, while the Chinese who heard the alarming tales were on their guard against the coolie agents. Thus it soon became necessary to resort to various pretenses to decoy the coolies aboard the ships, and at times parties raided the coast villages and seized the men they needed. Although some coolie ships sailed from the open ports, and from Swatow, which was not open to foreign trade, most of the coolies were taken first to Macao and there detained in the barracoons until enough were on hand to fill an outward-bound ship. Occasionally Chinese were rescued before the ships left port, and consular investigations showed that many of the coolies claimed they had been decoyed on board through fraud. On other occasions coolies tried to seize the ships on which they were being transported away from their ancestral homes. Some of the terrible tragedies of the sea were enacted during the life of this nefarious traffic. In 1859 the Canton officials agreed to permit legal emigration to the West Indies, and the Hong Kong government tried to regulate the trade along humane lines. In 1860 the traffic was legalized by the British treaty of Peking, but two years later, by Act of Congress, Americans were forbidden to engage in the traffic. It continued at Macao, however, until 1874. Aside from the Chinese who lost their lives when ships were wrecked or during struggles for freedom, it is estimated that 7,842 died on the passage to Cuba between 1847 and 1859. In comparison with this loss of life, to a large extent due to in-

humanity and selfishness, the grievances of the foreigners in China seem pitifully small.

Convoying.—While some Englishmen and Americans joined the Portuguese in the prohibited coolie trade, the even more objectionable practice of convoying was almost entirely controlled by the last named. This was the protection of Chinese junks by well-armed foreign ships against the native pirates which infested the south coast of China. Again, if this protection had been honestly given, the system would not have been objectionable. But the practice arose of compelling the junks to pay for the convoy, and if this blackmail was resisted the junks would be plundered as effectively as if they had fallen into the hands of the pirates. Atrocious crimes against the natives dwelling along the coast were also ascribed to the convoy ships. In 1848 the British plenipotentiary warned British shipmasters of the risks involved in convoying and of their liability for any illegal actions while so employed. The Portuguese, operating from Macao and Ningpo, took the lead in this practice. It was estimated that the junks of Ningpo paid as much as \$500,000 a year for this protection. Although Portugal was not a treaty power, her consul at Ningpo assumed full extraterritorial jurisdiction over his nationals. Finally the Ningpo merchants deemed it safer and cheaper to employ Cantonese pirates to protect their junks rather than the Portuguese. A pitched battle was fought between the rival forces, in June, 1857, and the Portuguese were defeated. But it was some years before the practice was abandoned.

Abuse of Extraterritoriality.—If the misdeeds which we have described were the work of lawless individuals and hence deprecated by their governments and the respectable members of the foreign community, there was still another wrong which might be charged, in varying degrees, to the treaty powers themselves. This we may describe as the abuse of extraterritoriality. The removal of the nationals of the treaty powers from the territorial jurisdiction of China was a great privilege. Like every other privilege, it carried with it a certain responsibility. If the Chinese could not punish foreign

offenders for their misdeeds, the treaty powers must assume this responsibility. Unfortunately, the privilege was abused rather than respected. In this respect the record of the British stands out in marked contrast to that of the other powers. By the Act of 1833 provision was made for a criminal court at Canton, but this did not function until 1839. On August 23, 1843, before news of the General Regulations (signed on July 22nd) had reached England, an act was passed which authorized the exercise of British jurisdiction in territory beyond the limits of British possessions, and placed full power and authority for the exercise of it in the hands of the Queen. Under this act Orders in Council providing the necessary judicial machinery could be issued, and such an Order, of April 17, 1844, defined the jurisdiction of the British consuls and vice-consuls in China. The American Act providing for consular courts was not passed until 1848, although the responsibility was assumed in 1844. The British also made provision for the punishment of their offenders, but the American government, in spite of repeated requests, would not appropriate funds for jails at the ports. At this time there were many bad characters among the foreign seamen, but if an American was convicted of some serious offense he could only be imprisoned in the brig of a national ship or, by courtesy, in a British jail. The following extract from a letter of Mr. Reed, the American minister, to Secretary Cass, October 22, 1858, sums up this unpardonable situation:

Mr. W. L. G. Smith, the newly appointed consul at this port [Shanghai] has just arrived and entered on his duties. One of his first acts, rendered necessary by the absence of all means to pay jail expenses, has been to discharge all the American convicts in the British jail. They are now at large, ready for new outrages and new shame to their country and its representatives.

It was not until 1860 that the United States appropriated funds for consular jails. With the exception of the British consuls the early consular representatives of the treaty powers were resident merchants vested with consular powers. That such men should be invested with judicial power was unfortu-

nate, to say the least. Even in the British courts it was difficult to secure conviction of a national who had wronged a Chinese. In the other courts it was rarely achieved. And the Portuguese, among whom were many of the wrong-doers, assumed extraterritorial privileges without any treaty grant.

Additional Treaty Rights Desired.—The various grievances of the Europeans and the Chinese have been summarized in order to explain the state of mind which then prevailed. The foreigners wanted not only the specific performance of the first treaties, but additional rights as well. The Chinese, harassed by the countless difficulties which had followed the opening of five ports instead of one, very naturally desired to have as little as possible to do with the troublesome aliens. The American and French treaties of 1844 were revisable at the end of twelve years. The clause in the American treaty read as follows:

Inasmuch as the circumstances of the several ports of China open to foreign commerce are different, experience may show that inconsiderable modifications are requisite in those parts which relate to commerce and navigation; in which case the two governments will, at the expiration of twelve years from the date of said convention, treat amicably concerning the same, by the means of suitable persons appointed to conduct such negotiations.

The British government, making use of the most-favored-nation clause, claimed that its treaty of 1842 was also revisable after twelve years, or in 1854. In transmitting its desires to the British representative in China in 1853, it went far beyond the "inconsiderable modifications" which might be sought under the American treaty. Among the ten points enumerated were: Access to the whole interior or navigation of the Yangtze, with access to the cities up to Nanking and the seaboard cities of Chekiang province; legalization of the opium trade; prohibition of transit dues on goods imported or about to be exported; suppression of piracy; regulation of the emigration of Chinese laborers; residence at Peking of a British representative or habitual correspondence between this representative and the Chinese chief authority at Peking;

ready personal intercourse between the British representative and the governor of the province where he may be residing; the construction of the new treaty by reference to the English version alone. The American and French governments joined with the British in seeking revision of the treaties and enlarged commercial privileges, but their efforts to negotiate with the Chinese at Canton, Shanghai, and the Pei-ho were without result. Again, in 1856, the American commissioner failed, and among his proposals was one for "freedom of religious belief for all Chinese subjects." Apparently the Chinese, in spite of the weakness of the imperial government during the Taiping rebellion, could not be brought to negotiations except by force, and the powers were not prepared to resort to force at that time, especially as France and Great Britain were engaged in the Crimean War between 1854 and 1856.

The Judicial Murder of a French Missionary.—Just at this time when diplomacy had apparently failed, an excuse was given for strong measures, at least on the part of France. Père Auguste Chapdelaine had entered Kwangsi province in 1853. In doing so he had violated the French treaty, under which he should have remained close to the five open ports. But Kwangsi was the starting-point of the great Taiping rebellion, which in its origin was strongly influenced by Christianity. In February, 1856, the magistrate arrested the French priest, as well as many of his converts, on the charge that they were rebels. They were tortured, which was a regular judicial procedure, and two Chinese and the priest put to death. This was, of course, a serious violation of the extra-territorial rights of France, but the first offender was the missionary who had violated both the treaty and the toleration edict which clearly stated "they must not presume to enter the country to propagate religion." The edict further instructed the local officers to seize and deliver to their respective consuls any who rashly overstepped the boundaries. The news of this execution did not reach Canton until July, and immediate demands for the punishment of the magistrate were formulated. When the report reached Paris the govern-

ment found it an occasion not only for moving to the defense of the Catholic missions in China, but also for coöperating with Great Britain in forcing the revision of the commercial treaties. By October a common policy had been agreed upon—to demand reparation for the murder of Père Chapdelaine and to send a joint expedition to the Pei-ho and there demand satisfaction for the acts of hostility at Canton and elsewhere and the revision of the treaties.

The Affair of the Lorch "Arrow."—Before the joint action contemplated in October could be inaugurated, Great Britain found a justification of her own for military intervention. This arose from the affair of the lorch *Arrow*. In order to build up its trade the Hong Kong government gave British registers and the right to fly the British flag to ships owned by Chinese residing there. This was a very dangerous practice, and brought the British flag into disrepute, for it was at times used to protect opium smuggling, conveying, the coolie trade, and even open piracy. The *Arrow*, owned by a Chinese, commanded by an Irish captain, with a Chinese crew, lay off Canton. Learning that a notorious pirate was among the crew, Chinese officers and soldiers came aboard on October 8, 1856, hauled down, so it was claimed, the British flag, and took away twelve of the Chinese crew. The British consul, Harry Parkes, at once demanded the surrender of the prisoners to him. Here was a problem in international law too intricate for the viceroy, Yeh. He first denied that the ship had the right to fly the British flag, as it was owned by a Chinese subject, and then he asserted that one man was a notorious pirate, and the others had presumably taken part in a recent act of piracy, and that the British flag was not flying at the time of the arrests. But according to British law the ship was a British vessel, and under the treaty even a Chinese fugitive on board could only be arrested by order of the British representative. To-day, in such a technical dispute, moderation and forbearance would probably be applied, but at Canton the repeated indignities inflicted by Viceroy Yeh upon the British representatives stiffened their resistance to this latest high-

handed act. Moreover, the consul was Harry Parkes, then as always a resolute and energetic champion of his country's rights. Acting under instructions from the governor of Hong Kong, he demanded a written apology for the insult to the British flag and the surrender of the seamen on board the lorcha in his presence. Yeh first returned nine men, but refused to apologize, because the flag had not been hauled down. Parkes refused to receive the men, and repeated his demands. Yeh now offered ten, and on the 22nd returned the twelve men, but made no apology. The affair was now placed in the hands of Admiral Seymour, whose squadron, on the 23rd, took the Barrier forts below Canton, and on the 27th proceeded to bombard the viceroy's *yamen* (office). The next day the viceroy issued a proclamation ordering the extermination of the "English villains" and offering rewards for every head brought to his *yamen*.

War Inevitable.—Thus out of fourteen years of friction had come an open clash of arms. But the affair of the lorcha *Arrow* was only the match which fired a fuse already laid. In itself it was a most unworthy justification for a war between nations, and for that reason it does not deserve the importance it has received in many of the works on the period. From the point of view of the foreigners, and especially of the British with their large commercial interests, the vital question at issue was the revision of the treaties in favor of enlarged trading facilities. We have seen that Great Britain and France had agreed to send a joint expedition to the Pei-ho before the news of the insult to the British flag had reached Europe. The murder of Père Chapdelaine and the *Arrow* affair were useful as excuses or justifications for an aggressive policy which had already been agreed upon. Bearing in mind the unhappy state of China, almost torn asunder by the devastating Taiping rebellion, the conduct of the European powers, including Russia, and of many of the foreigners, both Europeans and Americans, makes the period between 1844 and 1860 the most regrettable in the whole story of the relations between China and the West.

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CHAPTER IX

THE SECOND TREATY SETTLEMENT

Britain Determines to Act.—The news of the *Arrow* affair strengthened the determination of the British government to take adequate steps to secure reparation for past injuries and the revision of the treaties. On February 12, 1857, the Palmerston ministry laid before the House of Lords a blue-book containing correspondence concerning China, in which twenty-eight outrages committed upon British and other foreigners between 1842 and 1856 were described. But the House of Commons, by a small majority, voted against the use of force in China. The ministry, believing that it could carry the country in support of its policy, advised the Queen to dissolve the lower House, which was done, and the election returns justified the political sagacity of the administration. A majority of eighty-five was returned in favor of suitable measures to enforce the British contentions. With this support, the Earl of Elgin and Kincardine was appointed high commissioner and plenipotentiary, with instructions to proceed to China and demand (1) reparation for injuries to British and French subjects; (2) complete execution of the treaty stipulations at Canton and elsewhere; (3) compensation for losses occasioned by the late disturbances; (4) residence of the British plenipotentiary at Peking, and recognition of his right to communicate directly in writing with the high officers there; (5) revision of the treaties with a view to obtaining increased facilities for trade, such as the opening of additional ports, and permission for Chinese trading-vessels generally to resort to Hong Kong.

Four-power Coöperation.—France and Great Britain had specific major wrongs which could be used as a ground for demands for reparation and treaty revision. Moreover, they had just participated as allies in the Crimean War (1854-56) against Russia, and they had already agreed to work together in China. The United States also desired treaty revision, but

although the American commissioners had at times advocated joint action, and Great Britain in 1857 had proposed an alliance, the Washington administration would only indorse peaceful coöperation in securing its ends. Russia, naturally embittered against Great Britain and France, could hardly be expected to join with them in a military and naval demonstration, but Russia desired a commercial treaty which would place her on an equality with the maritime powers. The Russian and American representatives, therefore, worked together, refraining from any use of force, but as eager as the allies to secure all that China might be forced to concede. France sent out an ambassador extraordinary in the person of Baros Gros and proposed, like Britain, to support him with an adequate naval and military force.

The Second European War.—Although Lord Elgin arrived at Hong Kong on July 2, 1857, some months were to elapse before any steps could be taken to carry out his instructions. Early in that year the Indian Mutiny had broken out and for a while the whole fabric of the company's administration in India seemed threatened with destruction. Troops designed for the China expedition were diverted to Calcutta, and not until the immediate danger in India was removed could they be released for their original destination. By December a sufficient force of British and French troops were available in China for offensive measures, and on December 28th Canton was bombarded. A few days later High Commissioner Yeh was seized and transported to India as a prisoner of war, where he died fifteen months later. The city of Canton was governed by a mixed English and French commission until 1860.


Negotiations at the Pei-ho.—The next step was the preparation of simultaneous notes by the four representatives which were signed at Canton on February 11th. These made clear the coöperation of the powers in seeking treaty revision. In addition to improved trade relations the notes stipulated the toleration of Christianity. They were sent to Shanghai for delivery to the Peking administration, and although the envoys desired to negotiate at that port, they were instructed to return to Canton and deal with the high commissioner there.

This they refused to do, and instead proceeded to the mouth of the Pei-ho, where they would be in close contact with the capital. The viceroy of Chihli was appointed a high commissioner to deal with them, but as the British and French envoys refused to consider his powers adequate for such negotiations the American minister alone opened discussions with him, but without success. The British and French envoys now determined to proceed up the river to the city of Tientsin and so demanded the surrender of the Taku forts, which guarded the mouth of the river, in order to protect their line of communication. When this was refused an assault was delivered and on May 20th the forts were taken. This resulted in the appointment of two high officials whose powers were now considered ample, and on June 4th the first of the interviews took place. Negotiations proceeded separately but simultaneously and new treaties were soon formulated; the Russian treaty, whose terms were very simple, being signed on the 13th, the American on the 18th, the English on the 26th, and the French on the 27th of June.

The Treaties of Tientsin.—As each treaty contained the most-favored-nation clause, the new rights accorded the treaty powers were the sum of all the treaty provisions, with the exception of the indemnities exacted by Great Britain and France. As the United States and Russia were not prepared to use force to gain their ends, their treaties contained little that the Chinese were unwilling to grant. But the three articles to which they offered the greatest resistance were found in the British and French treaties, and these rights were, of course, at once available for the non-belligerent powers. These articles were (1) resident ministers at Peking, although they might be located temporarily elsewhere; (2) freedom of travel in all parts of the interior, under passports issued by the consuls and countersigned by the authorities; (3) the opening of the Yangtze to foreign merchant ships, with the right to trade at certain specified ports. In addition the treaties contained clauses (4) for the protection of Christians; (5) the opening of ten additional ports; (6) a better definition of extraterritoriality; and (7) the most-favored-

nation clause. The British stipulated for the payment of 2,000,000 taels for losses incurred by British subjects and 2,000,000 taels for military expenses, while the French received an indemnity of the latter amount.

The New Treaty Rights.—Much as the Chinese objected to the idea of foreign representatives resident at Peking, this was a reasonable demand if foreign relations were to be conducted without constant misunderstanding. The experience of the powers in trying to deal with Viceroy Yeh at Canton had convinced them of the necessity of this. It will be noted that at almost the same time Japan freely granted this right. Freedom of travel in the interior, while very desirable in the interests of foreign trade and religious propaganda, was stoutly resisted by the Chinese because of their unpleasant experiences with the foreigners along the coast and the fear that they might not be able to guarantee their protection. This right, coupled with the extension of extraterritoriality to all treaty nationals wherever they might be, was recognized by Mr. Reed, the American envoy, as a most dangerous one. It greatly increased the problems occasioned by extraterritorial jurisdiction, even though the Chinese were empowered to make arrests. They must still return the accused foreigner to the jurisdiction of his consul, who might be stationed hundreds of miles away. The opening of the Yangtze, which would greatly enlarge foreign trade, was a right which would have been demanded of no Western power, and under the conditions which prevailed in China it could only result in the transfer of a large part of the interior river trade to foreign vessels. Ten new ports were to be opened; of these, two were named in the Russian treaty, seven in the American, six in the French, and nine in the British. The latter included Newchwang, Tchengow (for which Chefoo was substituted in 1862), Swatow, Chinkiang, Hankow and two other ports on the Yangtze (Nanking was named in the French treaty but was not opened until 1899, and Kiukiang was designated in 1862), Kiungchow and Taiwan (or Tainan) in Formosa. In addition the French treaty stipulated Tamsui, in Formosa, also. Additional treaty ports meant enlarged foreign trade, but, in view



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of the steadily declining efficiency of the Chinese administration, they also meant increased responsibilities and difficulties.

The Toleration Clause.—Finally, the toleration of the Christian religion was to work results by no means anticipated at the time. We have seen that toleration had been granted by imperial edict in 1844, but such an edict might be repealed at any time and no security could be hoped for. In spite of this edict Chinese Christians had been persecuted, and Père Chapdelaine had been slain. All the powers had included the protection of Chinese and foreign Christians in their demands for treaty revision—the French were the acknowledged protectors of Catholic missions, the Russians had for many years maintained an ecclesiastical mission of the Greek Church at Peking, and the American interpreter, Dr. S. Wells Williams, was a Protestant missionary. The clause in the American treaty was typical of the new treaty rights.

The principles of the Christian religion, as professed by the Protestant and Roman Catholic churches, are recognized as teaching men to do good, and to do to others as they would have others do to them. Hereafter, those who quietly profess and teach these doctrines shall not be harassed or persecuted on account of their faith. Any persons, whether citizens of the United States or Chinese converts, who according to these tenets peaceably teach and practice the principles of Christianity shall in no case be interfered with or molested.

Under such treaty provisions the practice of Christianity became a treaty right, and any interference with foreign or Chinese Christians became a treaty violation for which reparation might and would be demanded. The treaty powers thus stood between the Chinese government and its Christian subjects. While such a provision gave the Christian missionary a protection which he had not hitherto enjoyed, it also placed the Western faith upon a political basis which was bound to react unfavorably upon it. Disputes soon arose as to whether Chinese converts were being persecuted for their faith or prosecuted for breaches of Chinese law. It was only natural for the missionaries, who enjoyed freedom from Chinese jurisdiction, to attempt to extend this protection to

their followers. Thus an unauthorized but very real "convert extraterritoriality" was introduced, which proved most annoying to the Chinese officials. We now have reason to believe that the Christian faith would have made sounder, if slower, progress had it relied upon the inherent appeal of its message rather than upon the protection of foreign governments. For many years the major diplomatic questions which concerned the legations of France and the United States at Peking were concerned with cases arising from the alleged violation of this toleration clause.

Protection of Nationals.—In order to protect their nationals and safeguard the new privileges the powers stipulated in terms similar to those of the British treaty:

British ships of war coming with no hostile purpose, or being engaged in the pursuit of pirates, shall be at liberty to visit all ports within the dominions of the Emperor of China, and shall receive every facility for the purchase of provisions, procuring water, and, if occasion require, for the making of repairs. The commanders of such ships shall hold intercourse with the Chinese authorities on terms of equality and courtesy.

Under these provisions foreign ships of war might not only visit the coast ports, but also navigate the Yangtze and other streams.

The Opium Trade Legalized.—A revision of the existing tariff was provided for by the treaties of Tientsin. Negotiations for this purpose were now begun at Shanghai. In the meantime the American minister had settled the claims arising from the burning of the factories at Canton in December, 1856, for 500,000 taels (\$735,288), and as this proved to be far in excess of the liquidated damages, Congress in 1885 returned to China the balance, including interest, amounting to \$453,400. The new tariff, which provided for a general five-per-cent duty on imports and exports, also legalized the opium traffic at a low duty. The rate would be thirty taels a picul, or about \$45 for every 133 $\frac{1}{3}$ pounds. In recommending this legalization of the traffic the American minister ignored his instructions, believing that regulation was better than the

flagrant violation of the clause in Cushing's treaty which subjected American traders in opium to Chinese jurisdiction and forbade "clandestine and fraudulent trade along the coasts." Thus the long controversy over opium was for the time settled. No foreign opium dealer could travel in the interior under a passport, and no limit was placed upon the transit (*likin*) tax which might be imposed by the Chinese authorities. China, then as now, could not free herself from the opium menace until she was able to enforce rigorously her national laws.

Renewal of Hostilities.—Although the emperor had approved the four treaties before the allied expedition had left Tientsin in 1858, they would not go into effect until copies, ratified by the respective governments, had been exchanged. The new Russian minister proceeded overland to Peking and the exchange was effected without difficulty. The British, French, and American ministers arrived at the Pei-ho in June, 1859, the former escorted by naval vessels and the latter accompanied by two ships of war. The European treaties had stipulated that the exchange must be effected in Peking; on this point the American treaty was silent. Moreover, the British envoy had been instructed by his government to proceed to Peking by way of Tientsin. But the envoys found that the Chinese had greatly strengthened the Taku forts which guarded the entrance to Tientsin, and closed the mouth of the river with chains, booms, and spikes. The officials there were willing to receive the ministers at Pehtang, a little to the north of the forts, but any attempt to enter the river would be resisted. The British and French demanded the right to enter the Pei-ho and proceed to Tientsin. In doing so they were unquestionably in the wrong, and in opposing them the Chinese were justified. An attempt to force the barriers resulted in a general action and in the repulse of the allied force, during which the American Commodore Tatnall gave some aid to his British friends and defended his conduct by the phrase "blood is thicker than water." The allies returned to Shanghai and reported this renewal of hostilities. The American minister, Mr. Ward, continued his negotiations, landed at

Pehtang, was escorted to Peking, but, as he refused to perform the kotow or even to kneel on one knee, he was sent away without an audience, and the American treaty was exchanged at Pehtang on August 16th.

The Capture of Peking.—The allies now sent out a strong force to support their envoys, Elgin and Gros, in demands for an apology, the exchange of ratifications at Peking by way of Tientsin, and an additional indemnity for the military operations. The Chinese again said that if the ministers came to Pehtang they would be received, but if they insisted on proceeding by way of Taku they would manifest a hostile purpose. The Taku forts were now taken, August 21, 1860, and the expeditionary force was conveyed up the river to Tientsin and advanced toward Peking, which was some eighty miles away. The Chinese proposed to negotiate, but, in the foolish hope that if they held valuable hostages they would secure more favorable terms, they seized five allied officers and their small escorts who were supposedly protected by a flag of truce. The British officers included Harry Parkes, whose conduct at Canton had especially displeased the Chinese, and Mr. Loch, the private secretary to Lord Elgin. These foreigners, thirty-nine in all, were imprisoned and subjected to such treatment that only eighteen were eventually returned alive. The allies now advanced, defeating the Chinese with little difficulty. No discussion could take place until the prisoners had been returned. In Peking all was confusion, and the emperor, with his court, fled to the hunting-lodge at Jehol. Thus for the first time the young woman who was later to be known as the great Empress Dowager was forced to leave the capital to escape capture at the hands of foreign foes. Closing in on Peking, the famous summer palace was occupied and thoroughly looted. One of the city gates was now seized, without resistance, and the surviving prisoners and the bodies of eighteen were delivered up. For this act of treachery Lord Elgin determined that some signal punishment should be meted out, and this took the form of the destruction by fire of the summer palace, consisting of two hundred buildings designed by Jesuit architects in European style in the

eighteenth century. It goes without saying that this was a penalty inflicted, in the first place, upon the Chinese emperor and his people, who would be compelled to provide the funds for its rebuilding in another place. But it was also a penalty inflicted upon civilization, for this marvelous group of buildings should have been preserved for all time. Their ruins, which still exist in the outskirts of Peking, have for more than sixty years been an object lesson to every Chinese and every foreigner, not merely of European might, but of European ruthlessness.

Treaties of Peking.—The negotiation of the new conventions occasioned little difficulty, now that Peking lay at the mercy of the invaders and the Son of Heaven had fled before them. The indemnities were increased to 8,000,000 taels each. and France now received a sum equal to her ally, although her losses and expenses had been considerably less. The British treaty stipulated for the cession of a small piece of land at Kowloon, on the mainland opposite Hong Kong, previously leased in order to protect the English settlement from long-range cannon. Tientsin was now to be opened as a treaty port, which was most objectionable to the Chinese in view of what had happened at Taku, but which was desired not merely as a center for trading operations in the north, but also in order to keep open the line of communication with the British representative who would reside at Peking. Coolie emigration was now to be legalized. The French included in their treaty a provision for the restoration of all property confiscated from the Catholic Church since 1724, which was bound to create hardships for innocent holders of property long since taken over by the Chinese. Finally, the Chinese text of the treaty contained a clause to the effect that "it shall be lawful for French missionaries in any of the provinces to lease or buy land and build houses." This article did not appear in the French text, which was the definitive one, and therefore could not have been insisted upon, but the Chinese were disposed to permit these rights and French missionaries acted upon it. It was not until 1903 that an American treaty contained a similar provision.

The Second Treaty Settlement.—As the result, therefore, of this second war the terms of the first treaty settlement were greatly broadened. For the rest of the century most of the rights enjoyed by foreigners in China were based upon the terms of the treaties of 1858 and 1860, and these in turn were founded upon the rights obtained after the first war. For this reason the later contention of the Chinese that rights based upon the use or threat of force could have no validity, would only result in the abrogation of practically every treaty right which foreigners enjoyed. In considering the success of the military intervention of 1858 and 1860 we must constantly bear in mind that during these years the empire was engaged in desperate efforts to suppress the Taiping rebellion. Thus, the opposition directed against the allies in the north was much less resolute than that which was offered in 1840-42. And while these operations were in progress we shall note that around Shanghai and Ningpo the allies themselves were engaged in actions against the rebels which aided the imperial forces there. At the same time we shall see that Russia, which coöperated with the three other powers in securing a commercial treaty at Tientsin, also played a lone rôle which resulted in the acquisition of vast territories north of the Amur River and along the seacoast of Manchuria. Thus the English and French, who had just emerged from a war with Russia, brought to bear upon China the pressure which enabled Russia, in 1858 and 1860, to secure a great extension of her Far Eastern possessions. The United States, which sought peaceful negotiations and refused to countenance the use of force against China, profited through all the enlarged concessions which the combined forces of Great Britain and France were able to gain. In order to understand properly the way in which the second treaty settlement was concluded we must turn to a consideration of internal conditions in China.

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CHAPTER X

THE TAIPIING REBELLION

Significance of the Rebellion.—The greatest event in the domestic history of China during the Manchu period was the Taiping rebellion. In a study of this nature the internal history of an Eastern country must be neglected unless the incidents have influenced to some extent the course of its foreign relations. This, as we shall see, was distinctly the case in the Taiping rebellion.

Hung Siu-tsuen.—The leader of this movement, which eventually threatened the Manchu dynasty, was Hung Siu-tsuen, a native of Kwangtung province, whose people had immigrated from another prefecture and therefore were known as a *hakka* (guest or squatter) family. Like every ambitious boy, he hoped to follow the path of scholarship which led to civil office. A good student, he passed the district and prefectural test, but try as he would he was unable to succeed in the nine days' examinations at Canton, the provincial capital. In 1833, during one of these unsuccessful efforts, he was given some Christian tracts. He glanced at them but refused to seek out their meaning because they dealt with Christianity, then a proscribed religion. Again in 1837 he tried the examinations and failed. This time he suffered what we would call a nervous breakdown and, in a trance, saw visions. These continued and in them his destiny as emperor of China was made clear, but he took no steps toward this goal until, after another failure in 1843, at the suggestion of a relative, he again read the tracts which he had carefully preserved. They consisted of sixty-eight short chapters or extracts from the Bible. As he read them he found an explanation of his visions. They told about God the Father, Christ the Heavenly Elder Brother, and heaven the celestial abode. In his dreams he had visited heaven, and the Father and the Heavenly Elder Brother had instructed him and given him celestial commands. He himself was the Heavenly Young Brother. He at once began to preach

a new faith, based upon these simple Bible passages. Idols were to be put away or destroyed, the Confucian tablets taken down, and all believers were to be baptized. In 1847 he visited an American missionary at Canton, Mr. I. J. Roberts, remaining with him about two months and receiving further instruction in the Christian doctrines. By this time he had formed the "Association for the Worship of God" and his followers rapidly increased. By April, 1849, he had begun to promulgate decrees based upon revelations received from the Heavenly Father and the Elder Brother, and a compilation of these commands issued in March, 1853, sheds much light upon the religious and political notions of this new leader.

Persecution.—"The strange notions, unaffected earnestness, moral conduct, and new ideas about God and happiness of these men began to attract people to them, some to dispute and cavil, others to accept and worship with them." The officials soon viewed with alarm this growing society. In the first place, secret societies were old institutions in China and many of them had a political significance. Southern China had always been restless under the Manchu rule and any popular organization was an object of suspicion. Moreover, the removal of the Confucian tablets was a denial of the state religion and classified the new religionists with the proscribed Christians. Measures were therefore taken to break up the Association for the Worship of God and scatter the believers. It was not until August, 1850, that troops were sent against Hung, but without success. The next year larger forces were mustered, but the rebels cut their way through the besieging lines and started on the advance which was to bring them in triumph to Nanking and to threaten Peking itself.

The Advance of the Taipings.—Moving north through Kwangsi, the rebels besieged the capital of Hunan, Changsha, for seventy-three days and, failing to take it, swung round and proceeded to the Yangtze, where Wuchang, the capital of the Hukwang viceroyalty, was taken on January 12, 1853. It was during the siege of Changsha that Hung first assumed the imperial title as Tien Wang, the Prince of Heaven. His dynasty was called the Taiping Chao (Great Peace Dynasty),

and this name was given to his followers, but the imperialists called them *chang mao tseh* (long-haired rebels) because they cut off their queues, the sign of subjection to the Manchus, and allowed their hair to grow all over the head. The movement was no longer a religious one, but definitely committed to the overthrow of the dynasty and the elevation of the Heavenly Prince. Proceeding down the Yangtze, city after city was taken until in March, 1853, Nanking fell, with a ruthless slaughter of the Manchu garrison and their families. Here the Tien Wang established his capital, while he sent an army to capture Peking. This expeditionary force, greatly embarrassed by the floods caused by the Yellow River changing its course from south to north of the Shantung promontory, advanced within twelve miles of Tientsin, but, weakened by months of marching and fighting and attacked by Mongol levies, it was forced to retire. So near had the Heavenly Prince come to taking the imperial capital. In another direction he erred, for there is good reason to believe that if he had moved down to the coast and taken Shanghai and other open ports the active sympathy and aid of the foreigners would have been at his disposal at this time when relations between them and the imperial officials were so strained.

Weakness of the Imperial Forces.—In order to understand the astounding success of this rebellion, which in less than a year had swept from Kwangsi to Nanking, cutting a broad swath of destruction for almost a thousand miles, we must realize the weakness of the forces which opposed them. The Manchu administration had rapidly deteriorated, and in the period 1820-35 fifteen rebellions had testified to the general belief that the dynasty was about to lose the mandate of Heaven. The officials were corrupt, inefficient, and unprepared by any training to deal with a crisis such as this. Provincial decentralization prevented any united effort against the rebels until it was too late to nip the movement in its early stages. The troops sent against them were undisciplined, badly equipped, and worse led. "Corruption, venality, idleness, opium-smoking, had made the whole army a mass of rottenness." And the conduct of the imperial troops drove

many sufferers into the Taiping ranks. As the rebel army advanced, thousands of the lower classes joined it in order to plunder, while the upper classes fled before it to save their lives and property. There was no popular support for the imperial cause, nor did the Chinese make any adequate effort to suppress the rebels until the latter had demonstrated that, bad as the Manchu rule had been, the Taiping yoke would be even worse.

Taiping Organization.—Although we cannot question the sincerity of the first followers of Hung, it is evident that when the Taiping forces were numbered by hundreds of thousands few of them could have received much instruction in the principles of the Association for the Worship of God. Thousands joined the army because of the opportunities for plunder, others in order to overthrow the alien Manchus. Among the first followers were several men who possessed considerable ability as organizers and strategists. These were given the title of *wang* (prince), and to them may be ascribed the success of the offensive operations. The army, which in 1858 was estimated to number between five and six hundred thousand men, was organized into squads, companies, battalions, regiments, and divisions. The women were also organized into companies and strict discipline was maintained. Such a force, as well armed as the wretched green standards and banner men, living off the country, inspired by the desire to overthrow the hated Manchus, could meet successfully the imperial armies until, in the 'sixties, support came to the latter from unexpected quarters. It was the failure of the Taipings to establish a civil administration which was even as good as that of the Manchus which turned both the neutral Chinese and the foreigners against them.

Foreign Interest in the Rebellion.—The early successes of the Taipings met with a sympathetic response on the part of most of the foreigners in China. The Protestant missionaries hailed this professedly Christian movement which might easily win China for Christ. The Catholic missionaries were by no means so convinced of the Christian tenets of the Taipings. At this time the foreign merchants were eager for addi-

tional treaty rights and their national representatives had lost all patience in dealing with the stiff-necked imperial officials. If the Taipings had at once advanced to Shanghai and negotiated there with the foreign representatives, before there had been an opportunity to examine their principles and conduct, it is very reasonable to believe that recognition and possibly aid would have been forthcoming. The British and French ministers who visited Nanking in 1853 were not encouraged by what they learned there, and the American government maintained its policy of non-intervention. A controversy has long prevailed as to whether the Taipings were Christians, and as to whether the foreigners should have thrown their support to the imperial forces or to them.

The Overthrow of the Taipings.—In the final overthrow of the Taipings and the restoration of the imperial power two Chinese officials played the leading rôle. These were Tseng Kuo-fan, a Hunnanese who took the field with the provincial militia when the Taipings marched into his province, and who later became high commissioner and, in 1860, viceroy of the lower Yangtze provinces, and Li Hung-chang, a distinguished scholar who also entered the despised military service in this crisis. His talents were recognized by Tseng and in 1862 he was appointed governor of Kiangsu. It was Li Hung-chang who dealt with the foreign officers who raised the "Ever Victorious Army" and the Franco-Chinese force. By 1858 the Taipings were being pushed back on all sides, but the Anglo-French campaign in the north weakened the imperial efforts. Again, in 1859, they were driven within the walls of Nanking, but the renewal of the foreign war enabled them to break through the cordon and capture and pillage the rich cities of Kiangsu and Chekiang. At this time Hangchow suffered such terrible devastation, 70,000 being slain there, that it has not regained its former prosperity to this day.

"The Ever Victorious Army."—The shock battalions which finally broke down the Taiping resistance were to be commanded by foreigners. Frederick T. Ward, of Salem, Massachusetts, had visited China as an officer of an American trad-

ing ship in 1851, and in 1857 and 1859 he had been employed on coasting and Yangtze steamers. From the latter post he had joined the imperial war steamer *Confucius*. In June, 1860, he proposed to organize a force of foreigners to recapture Sungkiang, the expenses to be met by a group of rich Chinese merchants of Shanghai. His first attempt, with about a hundred foreign sailors, failed, but on July 17th, with an equal number of Manila-men (Filipinos) he was successful. Later attempts to regain Tsingpu failed, but Ward had demonstrated that a well-disciplined, well-led force of foreigners could defeat many times their number of Taipings. Imperial grants were now made for his force, and foreign adventurers, many of them deserting seamen, were attracted to his headquarters. Ward's conduct was not supported by the foreigners. The Americans because it involved a breach of their announced neutrality, and the British, because his forces attracted seamen from their vessels, were especially hostile. In May, 1861, the British admiral ordered his arrest and he was turned over to the American consul for trial, but he was released when he gave proof of Chinese citizenship. He now changed the composition of his little force and enlisted Chinese soldiers, with foreign officers, but retained his bodyguard of Filipinos. By this time the foreigners had come to the conclusion that their best interests demanded the maintenance of the Manchu régime, which had yielded both the Tientsin and the Peking treaties. In 1862 Ward was allowed to purchase munitions in Hong Kong and this greatly strengthened his effectiveness. In February British and French forces were landed at Shanghai to drive the rebels away from the foreign settlement. In these and later operations Ward's force participated, and he was commissioned a brigadier-general in the Chinese army and the title, "The Ever Victorious Army," was bestowed upon his troops. After other engagements, in which French and British troops at times took part, Ward was killed in action at Tzeki, on September 21st. By imperial decree altars to his memory were to be erected at Ningpo and Sungkiang, and eventually, in 1877, the latter was erected in a

memorial hall, where incense has been burned in his honor to this day.

Major Charles Gordon Assumes Command.—After the death of Ward, Colonel Forrester, a British officer, assumed temporary command. He was succeeded by General Burgevine, an American, who soon became involved in difficulties with the Chinese officials and a mutiny was impending. Then Captain Holland, a British officer, was placed in charge, to be succeeded in March 1863 by Major Charles Gordon, of the Royal Engineers, after the British government had granted permission to its officers to enter the Chinese service. Under Major Gordon the force, now consisting of about 5,000 Chinese with foreign officers, was brought to a high state of discipline, and their steadiness under fire was proof of the martial qualities of the Chinese when properly drilled and disciplined and led by officers in whom they had implicit confidence. At the same time a Franco-Chinese force of about 2,500 men rendered effective service to the imperialists. On December 5th the important city of Soochow surrendered to the imperial general, who was supported by the Ever Victorious Army and part of the Franco-Chinese contingent. Li Hung-chang's conduct, in beheading eight of the Taiping leaders, almost cost him the services of Gordon, who was enraged at this apparent breach of faith. By April the Taipings had been driven back to Nanking and they held only four outlying cities. Gordon then considered his task at an end, the British officers were ordered to return to the colors, and in June the Ever Victorious Army was disbanded. Gordon refused to accept any money reward, but he was promoted to the rank of major-general in the Chinese forces, and the Yellow Jacket and Peacock's Feather were conferred upon him by imperial decree. On July 19, 1864, Nanking surrendered to the imperial forces, commanded by Tseng Kuo-fan, the Tien Wang having committed suicide on June 30th, and 7,000 of his followers were put to the sword. By May, 1865, the last Taiping city, near Amoy, was captured, and among the prisoners was General Burgevine, who had gone over to his former foes. The great rebellion, which had carried fire and sword throughout the

most prosperous regions of China, which destroyed by war and disease and famine some 20,000,000 lives and impaired the power of the Middle Kingdom, was at last, after fourteen years, at an end.

Foreign Interest in the Rebellion.—We have already seen that at the beginning there was great sympathy with this movement among the foreigners in China and abroad. Recognition of belligerency and actual help were almost given. But finally the powers decided upon a course of neutrality and the protection of their commercial interests against all disturbers. In 1853 a rebel force, known as the "Small Swords" but not Taipings, captured the walled city of Shanghai. But when the imperialists, in April, 1854, entered the foreign settlement in order to attack the adjacent native city, a landing party of British and American sailors and volunteers drove them away. In December following a force of French sailors and troops coöperated with the imperialists against the Small Sword rebels. In 1860, as we have seen, British and French forces coöperated to drive the Taipings from the neighborhood of Shanghai, at the very time when their forces in the north were capturing the Taku forts, and in 1862 a mixed British and French force drove the Taipings from Ningpo. By this time the desirability of aiding the imperialists through the Ever Victorious Army and the Franco-Chinese force was generally recognized. French and British army officers were allowed to enter the imperial service, and adequate munitions were placed at their disposal.

The Inspectorate of Customs.—A very important development during the rebellion was the establishment of foreign control over the Chinese maritime customs. This began in 1854, when the Small Sword rebels held Shanghai. The imperial officials were driven away and the custom house was closed. At first the foreign merchants deposited bonds with their consuls for the custom duties, but in June an agreement was arrived at between the taotai and the consuls of Great Britain, France, and the United States that a board of inspectors would be appointed to handle these sums. The new system proved advantageous to the Chinese because of the

unexpected sums which were available for the imperial treasury, while the foreigners learned to appreciate its efficiency and integrity. Even after Shanghai was regained by the imperialists the system was continued, while at Canton the allies conducted the custom house during their occupation of the city between 1858 and 1860. In the "Agreement containing Rules of Trade," signed at Shanghai on November 8, 1858, the extension of the system to all the ports, with foreign officials, was made possible but not obligatory. On January 21, 1861, the service was created by imperial decree and Mr. Lay, formerly a British consular officer and one of the customs inspectors at Shanghai, was appointed inspector-general. On his return to England, Robert Hart, a young Irishman who had served in the British consular service in China since 1854, was, with another Englishman, appointed to act during the interim. In 1863 he received the appointment as inspector-general and during his long career in China the I.G., as he was commonly called, was not merely the most useful servant of the throne, but on many critical occasions he served as mediator between China and the foreign powers with whom she became involved. From the very beginning this service was staffed, in the higher posts, by foreigners: at first by English, American, French, and German nationals, and later by representatives of all the maritime powers, including the Japanese. The examples of honesty and efficiency which the Imperial Maritime Customs gave to the other branches of the administration might have had most wholesome results had they been taken to heart.

Summary.—Some of the effects of the Taiping rebellion upon the international relations of China may now be summarized. The rebellion broke out soon after the first treaties had defined the rights of foreigners in China. The administrative break-down occasioned by this terrible struggle, and contemporary minor rebellions in the coastal provinces, rendered it most difficult for the Chinese officials to fulfill the treaty obligations on the one hand, and, on the other, to insist upon obedience to Chinese law on the part of uncontrolled foreigners. So powerless did the imperial government become

that when demands for treaty revision finally resulted in war it was unable to offer any adequate resistance to the allied forces at Canton or at the Pei-ho in 1858 and 1860. Thus, not only were the maritime powers enabled to impose their will upon a helpless court, but Russia, taking advantage of their demonstration and the very evident weakness of China, was able to secure vast territories in the far north. The foreign war retarded for a time the efforts to suppress the rebellion, while the assistance finally given by European forces and foreign individuals enabled the dynasty to restore its hold upon the Yangtze provinces. What might have happened if strict neutrality had been preserved is an interesting question. The terrible loss of life and property during the fourteen years of civil war left China so weakened that she was unable for many years to resist any determined demand which a first-rate power chose to make upon her.

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CHAPTER XI

RUSSIA MOVES TO THE EAST

China and Her Neighbors.—We have seen how China, desiring to have as little as possible to do with the masterful Westerners, was compelled after one humiliating war to receive them on terms of equality and to enter into treaty engagements which, after a second war, were greatly enlarged. We must now study events which greatly increased the foreign contacts and complicated China's international relations. In the old days, when the Chinese justly considered their domain to be the Middle Kingdom, the eighteen provinces were almost surrounded by sparsely inhabited dependencies, and these in turn either by "dutifully obedient" vassal states or by lands occupied by weak and at times nomad tribes. Soon, however, this was to be greatly changed, and the expanding nations of Europe were to extend their control over most of these vassals and nomads until China had on her borders such powerful states as Russia, France, Great Britain, and finally Japan. This completely altered her old security.

Russia Turns to the East.—Both Russia and China had been conquered by the Mongols in the thirteenth century, but the latter was able to free herself much earlier than the Slavs. It was not until the end of the fifteenth century that Russia regained her independence and, with Moscow as a nucleus, began to build up the great empire which finally stretched across northern Europe and Asia. Advancing to the south-east, the Russians reached the Volga, some passing down to the Caspian and others advancing up the Kama to the Urals. Here the mountains were low, presenting only a slight barrier to the Russian advance, so it was easy for Yermak and his Cossack adventurers to drag their boats over the divide. In 1581 they fought with the Tartars of Sibir, on the Irtish, and from that insignificant tribe the name Siberia was later given to all northern Asia.


The Siberian River Systems.—The country which they entered was, for the most part, a vast plain, well wooded, with

mountains to the south and the frozen ocean to the north. Three great river systems flowed through this region, the Ob, the Yenisei, and the Lena. These streams and their tributaries provided some 30,000 miles of navigable water in the Siberian plains, but, unfortunately, they flowed into an ice-bound sea where only for a few days each year could navigation be attempted. Each river, with its tributaries, drained a wide, fan-like region. Their affluents were located near one another and so low were the intervening watersheds, that it was an easy matter to move across Siberia by water with only short portages. Between the affluents of the Ob and Yenisei a five-mile stretch must be crossed; between the Yenisei and the Lena ten miles intervened. But between the Lena and the branches of the Amur, which flowed east to the Pacific, the country was more difficult.

The Russian Advance.—The Russian pioneers in Siberia were adventurers, in spirit much like the Americans who led the way in their own westward movement. No regular troops were sent into Siberia until the path had been cleared by the Cossack bands. Furs were their great incentive, but instead of trapping the animals they found it much easier to impose an annual tribute and tax in furs upon the native tribesmen. Rarely did these pioneer bands number a thousand adventurers, but as they possessed firearms and light cannon they were able to terrify or defeat the small bands of Kalmucs, Buriats, Tunguses, and others who tried to oppose them. Moving as they did to the north of the Chinese territories, they met with small and weak Tartar tribes. The great obstacle to their advance was nature and not man. The intense cold in the winter and great heat in the summer would have checked a people less familiar with such extremes than the Russians, but these climatic hardships offered no hindrance to the Russian advance. In the summer they took advantage of the splendid waterways, and in the winter they found these frozen streams almost as available for their hard-driven steeds. As they advanced they built ostrogs (block-houses) exactly as the American pioneers, and these soon became the centers of towns and later cities.

The Eastward Movement.—The rapidity of the Russian advance was amazing. In a little over fifty years they stood upon the Pacific. America offered greater obstacles to the pioneers, and two hundred years elapsed before the white man reached the western ocean. Tobolsk, on the Irtish branch of the Ob, was founded in 1587; Tomsk, on the Ob, in 1604; Yeniseisk, on the river of that name, in 1619; Yakutsk, on the Lena, in 1632; and Okhotsk, on the Pacific, was reached in 1638. Even here the Russians did not stop, but continued on to Kamchatka, to Alaska, and by 1812 they had founded a fort at Bodega Bay, about fifty miles north of San Francisco.

The Russians on the Amur.—About 1639 the Russians learned of a great stream which flowed to the east and on whose banks lived Tartars who cultivated grain and were rich in pelts. This was the Amur River. Four years later the first Russians had reached this mighty stream and sailed down to the sea. A great affluent was the Sungari, coming in from the south, and this waterway led into the heart of northern Manchuria. On the Amur and the Sungari the Russians first came into contact with a strong power and one which was able to stem their advance. The Manchus, in 1644, had begun their conquest of China, and their northern outposts were by no means willing to permit the Russians to terrorize the natives and seize the furs which should be paid as tribute to the Manchu ruler. In 1651 the first clash occurred, and in the following years superior Manchu or Chinese forces opposed the Russian bands with varied success, until in 1658 they destroyed a Russian expedition and the latter temporarily withdrew from the Amur country in 1661. But the Russians were unwilling to abandon so rich a region. In 1669 a band of fugitives established a fort at Albazin, and this was soon sanctioned by the appointment of Russian officials. Against them the Manchus moved in force in 1683 and captured all the outlying posts but two; Albazin itself was taken in 1685. The Manchus were too sure of their victory to destroy the growing crops, and within two months the Russians were back again. For over a year, in 1686-87, the



Manchus besieged the fortress, but finally withdrew when an agreement to settle the dispute by negotiation was reached.

The Treaty of Nerchinsk.—Almost two years passed before the representatives of China and Russia met at the town of Nerchinsk, on the Shilka branch of the Amur. The Chinese envoys were supported by a force of two or three thousand men,¹ but of perhaps equal value were two Jesuit missionaries who gave them useful advice during the succeeding negotiations. The treaty which resulted was the first convention which China made with a Western power, and it has additional significance in being one of the few instances in which China was able to impose her will upon a European adversary. Henceforth the boundary between Russia and China was to run along the watershed to the north of the Amur, and the Russians were to evacuate their posts in the valley. Traders were to be permitted to cross the frontier if they were provided with proper passports, and a crude provision for extra-territoriality was inserted to the effect that fugitives and deserters, and persons committing crimes, would be returned to their respective officials.²

The Treaty of the Frontier.—Russo-Chinese relations now developed peacefully. Russian embassies visited Peking in 1693 and 1720, the chief of the latter performing the kotow on condition that when the emperor sent an envoy to the tsar he would follow the ceremonies in use at that court. In 1727 a Russian ambassador signed two conventions and

¹ Hsu, *China and Her Political Entity*, p. 50. The Russian estimates of the Chinese forces were many times larger.

² Considerable confusion has arisen concerning the terms of the treaty of Nerchinsk because six different texts are in existence. The standard texts were prepared in Chinese, Russian, and Latin, but these do not agree in all details, and the Latin and Chinese texts contain a statement in the preamble which does not appear, for obvious reasons, in the Russian: "In order to suppress the insolence of certain rascals who cross the frontier to hunt, plunder and kill, and who give rise to much trouble and disturbance." A French text was translated from the Latin, and an English text was first translated from the French and later from the Russian, hence these two texts differ in phraseology. For copies of the Chinese, Russian, Latin, French, and English (from the Russian) texts see *Treaties, Conventions, etc., between China and Foreign States*, Vol. I. For an English translation of the French text see Du Halde, *Description of the Chinese Empire*, Vol. II., also Golder, *Russian Expansion on the Pacific, 1641-1850*. The difference between the Russian and the Western calendar at this time was eleven days.

two protocols; three of these defined the boundaries east and west of Kiakhta, which was then a center of frontier trade, while the principal treaty provided for the conduct of this trade and permitted the establishment of a Russian ecclesiastical mission at Peking "to study the languages." This mission had been informally created when priests of the Greek Church sent in to minister to the Russian prisoners taken at Albazin remained in Peking. The treaty of the Frontier, or of Kiakhta, where the ratifications were exchanged, defined the commercial privileges of the Russians down to 1858. The trade passed through the frontier mart of Kiakhta by way of Urga to Peking. A few years later, however, the Russians saw fit to confine their trade to the frontier, and at Kiakhta an extensive exchange of goods developed in which Russian broadcloth, skins, and furs were exchanged for Chinese teas and silk. In 1733 an embassy passed from Peking to St. Petersburg, where presents were exchanged but no stipulations arrived at. Later, in 1768 and 1792, conventions were signed which further regulated the frontier trade and dealt with the return and punishment of offenders. Naturally, as we have seen, the Chinese looked upon the Russians very differently from the maritime traders at Canton. When two Russian ships arrived in 1806 at that port they were allowed, in this instance, to dispose of their furs and take on a cargo, but they were warned that in the future Russia must trade across the land frontier. That was why Russia sought a commercial treaty in 1857 with the right to visit the open ports.

The Colonization of Siberia.—The Russian occupation of Siberia after the days of the Cossack adventurers resembled somewhat that of the American West, with, however, some very important differences. There was the free colonization of hunters and farmers; the governmental colonization of Cossacks and peasants who had to perform certain duties of defense and the maintenance of communications: the garrisons of imperial troops; and the increasing number of exiles. The latter were at first religious nonconformists, rebels, and prisoners of war. Later ordinary criminals and political offenders swelled the number. By the first years of the nine-

teenth century about 2,000 persons were transported every year to Siberia, and after that time the number rapidly increased. Between 1823 and 1858 it has been estimated that the exiles, and the women and children who accompanied them, numbered 304,618. Yet so vast was Siberia that the population in 1860, estimated at 3,327,617, did not equal one to the square mile.

The Amur Question.—For many years Russo-Chinese relations were centered at Kiakhtha and no attempt was made to renew the occupation of the Amur. The Chinese wanted to avoid all contact with the Russians and did little to strengthen their claim to the sparsely peopled region north of the river, nor would the Manchus allow the Chinese to settle in their ancestral domain. In fact the Manchus stupidly or carelessly failed to place the boundary stones along the real watershed, while an undefined boundary was left between the mountains and the ocean. The Russians were not unmindful of the value of this river in expediting communication with their outposts on the Pacific. At this time they were interested in Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, where they first came into contact with the Japanese. An attempt, in 1805, to secure the right to use the Amur met with a flat denial. It remained for Nikolas Muraviev, governor-general of eastern Siberia, to gain the objectives which his countrymen had so long desired. Appointed in 1847 to this post, with Irkutsk as his capital, he at once gave orders for the exploration of the river and the seacoast at its mouth. Two years later Nevelskoi sailed around the north end of Sakhalin and proved that it was an island and not attached to the mainland. This made more valuable the acquisition of the Amur, for it could be approached from the warmer south and not only through the ice-bound Sea of Okhotsk. In order to protect its mouth the island of Sakhalin must also be obtained, and this meant a dispute with Japan. In 1851 Nikolaievsk was founded at the mouth of the Amur, and Mariinsk, a short distance up the river, to serve as trading posts of the Russian-American Company. Two years later three posts were

founded on the Manchurian coast. These activities of the Russians were in violation of the sovereignty of China.

Muraviev Acts.—Muraviev had already asked his government to sanction the occupation of the Amur. The tsar, in 1853, had gone as far as to authorize the occupation of Sakhalin, to which the Japanese claims were not well supported. But with the declaration of the Crimean War, March, 1854, Muraviev felt that the time for action had come. Although the Russian-American Company and the Hudson's Bay Company had agreed to remain neutral in this war between their governments and thus keep the peace in the American northwest, Muraviev fully realized that a joint British and French naval force would certainly try to capture his Pacific base, Petropavlovsk, as well as the small posts along the Manchurian coast. So in May, 1854, he commanded an expedition which dropped down the Amur with men and guns and munitions. It consisted of a small steamer, built on the Shilka with engines carried overland from Russia, fifty barges and many rafts. The first attack of the allies on Petropavlovsk, in August, 1854, failed, and when they returned the next year they found a deserted settlement, which they destroyed. That year Muraviev sent several expeditions down the Amur, but this time colonists accompanied the soldiers, with cattle, horses, stores, and munitions. The peace of Paris, March 30, 1856, brought the Crimean War to an end, but Muraviev only increased the Russian contingents which sailed down the Amur and settled on its banks. The next year, after a final visit to the capital to secure the authorization of the tsar, Muraviev gained the support which he needed to consolidate his occupation of Chinese territory.

Treaty of Aigun.—By this time Great Britain and France had sent their forces to China to secure reparation and treaty revision. Russia properly considered this a favorable time to secure her own ends. Admiral Count Putiatin was sent overland to Peking to negotiate a commercial treaty which would admit the Russians to the seaports, and to revise the boundary along the Amur. Denied permission to enter China at Kiakh'ta, he made use of the Amur route to the Pacific, and

in August, 1857, delivered his letter to Chinese officials at the Pei-ho. Although they insisted that the reply must be sent to Kiakhta—for the Russians were land neighbors—Putiatin finally carried his point that it be delivered to him on the coast. When it arrived it was entirely unsatisfactory. He then proceeded south, and at Hong Kong joined the representatives of Great Britain, France, and the United States in the four-power demands for treaty revision. While Putiatin was instructed to work in harmony with the other foreign representatives, Muraviev, who received additional forces, was authorized to deal directly with the officials at the frontier. On October 31, 1857, a ukase created the "Maritime Province of Eastern Siberia," which would include the Chinese territory north of the Amur. Early in May, 1858, the situation was much as follows: China had been engaged in the Taiping rebellion for eight years; an allied British and French expedition menaced Tientsin, while the United States and Russia were associated with the general movement for treaty revision; and Russian troops held fortified posts on the north bank of the Amur, where colonists had already established themselves. Under these conditions, supported by actual occupation and a strong body of troops, Muraviev found it an easy matter to convince the Tartar general at Aigun that the Russian desires for the land north of the Amur should be granted. In these perilous days China could not afford a frontier war in addition to the great rebellion and the attack from the sea. On May 20th the allies captured the Taku forts; on the 28th, after only six days of negotiations, the treaty of Aigun was signed.¹

According to this treaty China ceded to Russia the left bank of the Amur. Below the Ussuri River there would be a joint occupation of the region pending a delimitation of the frontier. The great Manchurian branches of the Amur, namely the Sungari and the Ussuri, would be opened to Russian merchants and travelers if provided with proper passports. Even

¹ Care must be taken not to confuse "old style" and "new style" dates when dealing with events chronicled by the Russians. Thus the "old style" date of the Aigun treaty is May 16th, and the "new style" is May 28th.

before the treaty was signed Muraviev, on the 21st, had given the name of Blagovestchensk (Good tidings) to the military post established in 1857 at the junction of the Amur and the Zeya, almost opposite to Aigun. For his services in acquiring this long-desired region Muraviev was created Count of the Amur (Amursky). As an empire-builder he towers aloft among the Russian national heroes. Sincerely believing that Russia could make better use of this region than the Chinese who neglected it, he did not quibble about the means which he used to attain this end. It now becomes clear why Putiatin, at Tientsin, made such moderate demands upon the Chinese, for he knew that the "rectification of the frontier" would take place at Aigun. His treaty, the first of the four to be signed at Tientsin, was concluded on June 13th, and two days later he learned of Muraviev's brilliant success. The British and French envoys, whose military pressure had contributed not a little to Russia's advantage, did not learn of the Aigun treaty until after they had left Tientsin.

✓ **The Peking Treaty.**—We have already seen that General Ignatiev, the Russian minister, had no difficulty in exchanging the ratifications of the Tientsin treaty, in April, 1859, in Peking. But the two treaties of 1858 had not satisfied all the desires of Russia. In the first place, the boundary east of the Ussuri remained to be defined, and in addition Russia desired an agreement as to the entire line between Siberia and Mongolia and Ili, as well as better trading facilities along the frontier. Once again the allies, who were by no means friendly to Russia, played into her hands. The Chinese, true to their old policy of playing off one foe against another, had solicited Russian aid in 1858, but Putiatin had refused to grant it. Muraviev, however, at Aigun, had agreed to supply cannon and ten thousand muskets, which were not actually delivered until 1862. When the allies were repulsed at the Taku forts, in June, 1859, it was alleged and quite generally believed that Russians had planned the new defenses and actually fought side by side with the Chinese. The next year, as the expeditionary force advanced to Peking, General Ignatiev found an opportunity to impress the Chinese with the sincerity of

Russia's sympathy and the great value to China of her friendship. Keeping in touch with the allies as they advanced, and for a time actually associated with them, he was able to convince Prince Kung that his intervention had saved the imperial capital from the fate of the summer palace. In return for these services he gained a new treaty, on November 14th, after Elgin and Gros had left Peking, which greatly enlarged the advantages gained at Tientsin and Aigun. Under this treaty the entire Manchurian seacoast from the Amur to the Korean frontier, passed into the possession of Russia. The western frontier of China was to be defined as far as Kokand. Russian traders might again proceed to Peking from Kiakhta and trade marts would be opened at Kashgar and other places. And Russian extraterritoriality was more carefully defined. From the point of view of Russo-Chinese relations the three treaties of Aigun, Tientsin, and Peking comprise one treaty settlement. With a few modifications, they formed the basis of the relations between the two countries until the end of the century. The territory acquired by Russia north of the Amur and along the Manchurian coast included approximately 350,000 square miles, and was by far the greatest portion of the old empire to pass into the hands of a Western power. Before the Russian possession of the coast was assured by the Peking treaty, Muraviev, in July, 1860, had founded Vladivostok, close to the Korean frontier, which he believed would justify the name he gave it—"dominion of the East."

Summary.—The eastward movement of Russia finally brought her to the frontiers of China until, in many conventions, the longest boundary between two nations was defined with varying degrees of accuracy. The first contacts were in the east, in the Amur valley. Then as Russia moved south from her earliest path across Siberia contact took place around Kiakhta, and later at Kuldja, *always moving from east to west along the Chinese frontier*. It was not until the 'eighties and 'nineties of the last century that the Russian advance on the borders of Chinese Turkestan (Sinkiang) was checked. Along such a long frontier, which bordered sparsely peopled and lightly governed Chinese dependencies, it would be more

difficult for China to enforce her municipal law than even at the open ports. The first boundary line, as agreed upon at Nerchinsk in 1689, was rectified in 1858 and 1860. We shall see that Russia later attempted, with only slight success, to alter the line at Ili, and after 1900 it seemed for a time as if all Manchuria and then Mongolia would pass out of China's possession as the vast area north of the Amur and along the coast had gone. With China becoming increasingly weak and Russia advancing steadily to the east and southeast the relations between the two countries were more intimate, and in many respects more important, than the other Westerners realized. The treaty of Tientsin gave the Russians all the commercial rights which the foreigners possessed, but along their far-flung frontier they enjoyed privileges which were peculiarly their own.

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CHAPTER XII


FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN IN INDO-CHINA

Indo-China.—To the south of China lies the great peninsula of Indo-China whose kingdoms all recognized at different times the overlordship of the Son of Heaven. The history of these nations, which in modern times includes Annam, Cambodia, Siam, Burma, and the Malay States, contains much of interest, but in the present study we are concerned primarily with the way in which the two European powers, France and Great Britain, either acquired possession of some or broke the protectorate relations which existed between the other states and China. The distinctive features of this region are the deep river valleys which run from north to south and down which the Mongoloid peoples penetrated the southern areas. From east to west these streams are the Song-ka, or Red River, the Mekong, the Menam, the Salween, and the Irrawaddy. The first is the chief river of Tongking, the second is shared by Annam, Siam, Cambodia, and modern Cochin-China, the third lies in Siam, while the last two lie within Burma. Along the southern coast, in the early Christian era, a strong Indian influence prevailed, but later this was overlaid by Chinese culture. All the modern states, as we have already seen, recognized the overlordship of China and sent up periodical missions bearing tribute or gifts to the court at Peking.

Early French Interests.—In the early days of European enterprise in the Far East the maritime powers, one after the other, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, England, and France, sent trading expeditions to the ports of these kingdoms. But France, whose dream of an empire in India was shattered by the military exploits of Robert Clive and the administrative genius of Warren Hastings, hoped to restore her prestige in Indo-China. A splendid opportunity was presented when the fugitive king of Cochin-China entreated a French bishop to escort his son to Paris to secure the aid

of Louis XVI against the rebels. A treaty was signed there in 1787 which provided for French assistance in ships and men and money, for which a cession of land would be made. The governor of French India was unwilling to carry out the terms of this engagement, but the bishop was able to enlist French officers and adventurers as well as to secure ships and arms, and with their assistance the king was not only restored to his throne, but was enabled to extend his conquests over the northern kingdom of Tongking. From this time the term Annam was applied to the enlarged kingdom. Deeply grateful to the French, the king, who now took the name of Gia-long, rewarded the adventurers and permitted the French missionaries to carry on their propaganda with royal support. His son, however, believed that the missionaries had participated in a conspiracy against him, and he turned against them. Eventually they were all ordered from the country, but, as in Japan and China, they refused to leave their flocks. Their defiance of his decrees led to the enforcement of strict penalties, and between 1833 and 1843 the arrested missionaries were cruelly put to death. France protested and gunboats were sent to Annamite ports in 1843, 1844, and 1847. The first of these armed missions demanded the release of French prisoners, which was granted, but the later ones demanded religious freedom as well, which was steadfastly refused. A final attempt was made in 1856, which resulted in a general bombardment of the forts at Tourane, the port of Hué, the capital.

France and Spain Coöperate Against Annam.—As Cordier, the French historian, tells us, an occasion and a pretext alone were wanting. The refusal of Annam to receive a French ambassador in 1857, coupled with the joint expedition against China which was then being organized, furnished the pretext and the opportunity. Spain joined with France against Annam, as Great Britain united with her against China, for a Spanish Dominican bishop had been executed in 1857. The naval and military operations, which began in 1858 against Tourane, were followed up by the capture of the desirable port of Saigon. The Spaniards sent Filipino troops and a gun-



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boat to coöperate with the French forces. The renewal of the war against China, in 1860, caused further action in the south to be postponed. In 1861 it was renewed, and the next year a treaty was signed which granted religious freedom, an indemnity of \$4,000,000, opened three ports to French and Spanish merchants, and ceded three provinces in Cochin-China to France.

Cambodia Protected.—To the west of Cochin-China lay the kingdom of Cambodia, a remnant of a once far more powerful state. Of late it had fallen under the influence of both Annam and Siam, and in order to break the influence of the latter France extended her protectorate over Cambodia in 1863. Siam, of course, protested, but in 1867 she recognized the accomplished fact, and France agreed never to annex Cambodia and to recognize certain disputed border provinces as belonging to Siam. In the same year France annexed by proclamation three more provinces of Annam, bordering on the three already acquired. The excuse for this was the failure of the king of Annam to repress native disorders in the French provinces.

The Opening of the Red River.—Aside from being a valuable port for ocean-borne commerce, Saigon was deemed desirable because of its access to the great Mekong River, by means of which trade with the western provinces of China, it was believed, could be carried on. But explorations soon demonstrated the unavailability of the Mekong for commerce because of the frequent rapids. Attention was then directed to the Red River, which, rising in western China, reached the sea through the Annamite province of Tongking. That this stream might be used by light craft as far as Yunnan was demonstrated by a French adventurer, Dupuis, who in 1872 delivered a valuable cargo of arms to the viceroy of Yunnan, under the protection of a passport issued by the viceroy at Canton. When he attempted to carry on private trade the next year, the governor of Tongking protested, and China disavowed his conduct. The French governor at Saigon was asked to order him away, but his representative, Garnier, believed a good opportunity was presented for securing the open-

ing of the Red River to French commerce. Unable to secure such a treaty from the governor of Tongking, at Hanoi, he proceeded to force the issue by capturing the fortress there as well as a number of towns in the delta. The people rose against him supported by Chinese irregulars known as "Black Flags." Garnier was driven out of town after town and finally he was killed in a desperate sortie at Hanoi. France, unable to support this aggressive officer because of her recent defeat at the hands of Germany, sent out a civilian who was able to make peace. In the treaty of 1874 France acknowledged the independence of Annam (a *démarche* which was not lost sight of by Japan when she negotiated her treaty with Korea two years later), and remitted the unpaid portion of the 1862 indemnity, while Annam opened the Red River for navigation, opened three more ports, including Hanoi, for commerce, granted extraterritoriality to all Europeans, and recognized the annexation of the provinces seized by France in 1867.

French Protectorate Over Annam.—While France was recuperating from the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 no further aggression occurred. But by 1882 she felt strong enough to resume her old policy of gaining a strong foothold to the south of China. A naval officer, Rivière, was sent to Hanoi. Acting very much as Garnier had done, he demanded a new treaty, which was again refused, for the governor had no power to act, and once more the citadel at Hanoi and some of the delta towns were seized. Again the people and the "Black Flags" rose in self-defense and Rivière was killed in action at Hanoi. But this time France was in no mood to negotiate. A strong force was sent out, Hué, the capital, was captured, and in 1883 and 1884 two treaties were signed in which Annam recognized the French protectorate and French residents might be established in all the districts of the Empire.

China Protests.—China, as might be expected, protested against the substitution of France for herself as overlord of Annam. Chinese troops had passed the frontier at the invitation of the emperor against rebels in Tongking. With these troops the French forces came to blows. Direct negotiations were now carried on between France and China, and in 1884

China agreed to recognize the French treaties if France would respect the fiction of Chinese suzerainty. A dispute arose as to the date for the withdrawal of the Chinese forces and a clash, in which the French were defeated, occurred. France now declared a state of reprisals against China. Naval operations were directed against the ports of Formosa, while a most regrettable action took place at Foochow in which more than five hundred Chinese were slain and a fleet destroyed. China now declared war. Direct negotiations had failed because of the insistence of France upon a crushing indemnity. Sir Robert Hart had repeatedly tried to bring this unhappy conflict to a close, and finally, under his instructions, an agent of the Chinese Customs Service was able to sign a protocol in Paris, which resulted in a treaty signed by Li Hung-chang and the French minister, at Tientsin, on June 9, 1885. Under its terms China agreed to recognize the treaties between France and Annam, and to permit French subjects and protégés to trade across the frontier. No indemnity was to be paid, but France secured a possible advantage through the understanding that should China decide to build any railways she would call upon France, who would give her every facility to secure in France the personnel she might need, but this was not to be considered as an exclusive advantage in favor of France.

French Indo-China.—By these successive steps France had secured a rich colony in Indo-China which she organized as Cochinchina, and had established her protectorate over Cambodia and Annam. In the northern province of the latter empire the restitution of order proved to be a difficult task. For seven years, between 1884 and 1891, France was engaged in costly military operations against rebels and brigands, aided at times by Chinese soldiers of fortune. In these years it was considered by many Frenchmen that Tongking was an autonomous part of Annam and that France should take possession of the province. But when, in 1891, a pledge was given never to annex this region, the resistance promptly subsided and peace and a very general prosperity has prevailed ever since. We shall see a little later how France extended

her protection over the Laos country on the ground that it had formerly belonged to Annam. To-day the French political organization of Indo-China consists of the colony of Cochin-China and the protectorates of Cambodia, Annam, and Laos. In Cambodia a native king reigns, in Annam an emperor, and in Laos several protected princes, while Tongking enjoys a separate administration, although a part of Annam. The fiction of native administration still persists, but France rules the country for all intents and purposes through her residents-superior and residents.

Burma.—The ancient history of Burma records the rise and fall of native kingdoms in that region and incessant wars with their neighbors to the east and west. At times Chinese arms invaded the country, and although in 1769 they suffered an overwhelming defeat, the recognition of Chinese overlordship persisted to modern times. When the English East India Company gained a foothold in Bengal, in 1757, it coincided with the rise of a great Burmese kingdom which eventually brought the entire present province within its bounds. Carrying its conquests to the west, the rising kingdom of Burma, which had defeated great China, had small respect for the British merchants who had overthrown weak Indian kingdoms. Remembering that exact boundary lines are very recent developments, we can understand how boundary disputes arose between the British in Bengal and the Burmese. A long controversy, over a period of twenty years, resulted in the first war between the English East India Company and Burma, and as a result the coast provinces of Arakan and Tenasserim were acquired by the company by treaty in 1826. A second war broke out in 1852, because of alleged violation of the commercial clauses in the first treaty. Again the company was completely successful and by proclamation the remaining seacoast of Burma (the province of Pegu) was annexed to British India. The third war growing out of boundary disputes, the alleged unjust treatment of a British corporation, and, probably of more significance, the fear that France would extend her protectorate over Burma, resulted, in 1886, in the annexation of the rest of Burma. This final

step involved the old tributary relations between Burma and China. By a treaty in 1886 China recognized the British annexation to Burma, but the decennial tribute was to be taken to Peking by persons of the Burmese race. Such a mission visited Peking in 1895, but after that the observance ceased. Burma was progressively incorporated into British India and is to-day one of the great provinces of the Indian Empire.

Siam.—The only one of the old kingdoms of Indo-China to retain its independence is Siam, and its present fortunate position is due more to European jealousies than to the wisdom of its rulers. Siam emerged as an independent kingdom about 1350. She too recognized the overlordship of China, although the triennial missions were not regularly sent up to Peking. Her relations with the European powers were unusually interesting and in the seventeenth century a Greek adventurer rose to be prime minister of the state. For a time relations with France were intimate, and in 1688 a French expedition, which might have overrun the kingdom, was expelled. Early in the nineteenth century commercial treaties were negotiated with Great Britain and the United States, that of 1833 being the first to be entered into by the United States with a nation of southern or eastern Asia. Additional treaties, this time including the right of extraterritoriality and a conventional tariff, were negotiated with the same powers and France in 1855 and 1856, the American envoy being Townsend Harris, who was later to be so well known in Japan. At this time the first king, for the custom of having two kings then prevailed, was a most enlightened man. Although educated for the Buddhist priesthood, he had studied philology and Western science and at a time when China was becoming embroiled in a second war with the European allies he was far-sighted enough to yield what was desired and thus maintain peace. His nephew, who reigned between 1865 and 1885, it might be observed, bore among his many given names the name of George Washington.

Siam and Her Neighbors.—The first British annexation of Burmese territory brought her to the borders of Siam. When

France acquired Cochin-China, one of her first steps, as we have seen, was to break the control of Siam over Cambodia, although in 1867 she promised that she would never annex the latter country and recognized that the provinces of Battambang and Ankor belonged to Siam. The British annexation of upper Burma, in 1886 again brought her to the Siamese frontier, and in 1892-93 a commission was engaged in delimiting the new boundary. By this time France was well established in her protectorate of Annam. When she first dealt with that country she recognized western frontier of Annam ran along the mountains to the east of the Mekong. But France believed that she could establish ancient claims of Annam to the country down to the river, although Siam had claimed this region by conquest in 1824. The unfortunate murder of a French officer in Siamese territory and the capture of another, in 1892-93, gave France an excuse for direct action. A fleet of gunboats was sent to the mouth of the Menam and an action with the Siamese forts followed. An ultimatum was presented, which Siam felt obliged to accept, and by a treaty, of October 3, 1893, she renounced her pretensions to the territory east of the Mekong and the islands in the river, agreed to pay an indemnity of 2,000,000 francs, and promised to refrain from constructing any forts within fifteen miles of the right bank. The newly acquired region, instead of being incorporated into Annam, in whose name it was demanded, was later organized as a new protectorate called Laos.

Anglo-French Entente.—The activity of France in Indo-China, which had previously inspired Great Britain to anticipate her expected advance toward Burma, was one of the difficulties which were resolved in the Anglo-French treaty of 1896, which paved the way for the important *entente* of 1904. This treaty tried to eliminate all grounds for friction in Yunnan, Szechwan, the lower Niger, Tunis, and Siam. In respect to Siam it divided the country into three zones, marked off by the watersheds on both sides of the Menam. To Siam was left undisputed control of the central zone, but the other two were marked out as a French and British sphere,

respectively. Assured that Great Britain would not protest, France renewed her demands upon Siam, and in 1902 a treaty was negotiated which granted her some territory (7,800 square miles), on behalf of her protégés Cambodia and Annam, but which was not ratified. Soon after this *démarche* Siam employed two American advisers, both experts in international law, and they recommended that Siam accede to the territorial demands of France, but as compensation gain control over French protégés who might commit offenses on Siamese soil. This extension of extraterritorial rights, already granted to French citizens, to the Cambodian and Annamite subjects, was an abuse of extraterritoriality which greatly embarrassed the Siamese local officials. In 1904 two provinces west of the Mekong were ceded to Cambodia, and a large strip added to Laos, or technically, to Annam. A few months later a new entente was arrived at between Great Britain and France which proved of such great significance when the World War broke out in 1914. Agreements were now signed respecting Egypt and Morocco, the Newfoundland fisheries, West Africa, Siam, Madagascar, and the New Hebrides. All the outstanding disputes between France and Britain were laid upon the council table and a good understanding was reached. In the case of Siam the former zones were perpetuated, but both powers agreed not to annex any Siamese territory in the regions subject to their influence.

Final Cessions to France and Great Britain.—In 1907 a further rectification of the Cambodian frontier occurred, by which 7,000 square miles passed to that protected state, but France agreed to restore some territory acquired in the earlier treaties. Under this treaty the Siamese courts now gained jurisdiction over French Asiatic subjects and protégés. Great Britain then exercised her rights under the entente and, in 1909, gained from Siam the relinquishment of her control over portions of the Malay states of Trengganu, Kelantan, Kedah, Perlis, Rahman, and Legah. These districts included some 15,000 square miles, slightly more than France had acquired in 1904 and 1907, and they were added to the states already under British protection in the Malay Peninsula. Now, how-

ever, Siam was given the right to extend her jurisdiction over British subjects, who would be subject to the international courts in Siam until the new Siamese criminal code came into effect. By later treaties, after 1920, Siam secured the withdrawal of extraterritoriality in the case of all foreigners as soon as her new penal, civil, and commercial codes and codes of procedure went into effect. Under the treaties described Siam forfeited her claims to some 90,000 square miles of territory on her eastern frontier, which passed to the French protégés, and to some 13,000 square miles on the southwest, which were placed under British protection. Siam managed, however, to retain her sovereignty in the rest of her domain and eventually regained control over foreign nationals within her borders before China was able to do so. Calling upon foreigners from many countries to serve as her advisers, and accepting their advice, she was able to reorganize her administration so that excuses for intervention were hard to find. It is doubtful if either France or Great Britain will take further advantage of the spheres of influence which they mutually recognized in Siam under their treaties of 1896 and 1904.

Straits Settlements and Malay Peninsula.—Great Britain had obtained a foothold in Indo-China thirty years before she acquired her first possessions in Burma. In 1785 the island of Penang was purchased from a Malay sultan, and this became a useful halfway station between Bengal and China. The once famous but then almost useless city of Malacca was taken from the Dutch in 1795 (who had held it since they took it from the Portuguese in 1641). Returned to the Netherlands in 1818, it was finally ceded to Great Britain in 1825, in exchange for the post of Bencoolen, in Sumatra. A little piece of the mainland opposite Penang was purchased in 1798, and some islands farther down the coast were obtained in 1826. But the most important of the Straits Settlements was the island of Singapore, with its well-protected harbor at the very tip of the Malay Peninsula. It was the famous Thomas Stamford Raffles, recently lieutenant governor of Java during the British occupation, who realized the commercial impor-

tance of Singapore. Steps were taken to establish a British post there in 1818-19, but it was not until 1824 that a good title to the island was obtained by treaty. Singapore soon became one of the great seaports of the world, and to-day it assumes a major importance in any plan for British defensive or offensive operations in eastern and southern Asia. The Malay Peninsula was divided into a number of small states under Malay sultans or chieftains. Misgovernment was the rule, and piracy prevailed along the coast. With Selangor the British negotiated a commercial treaty in 1818, while in 1824 Siam agreed that Pahang might pass under the protection of the East India Company. The disorders in the Malay states would have doubtless led to punitive measures and annexations in the 'fifties, but when the situation became critical, in the early 'seventies, a policy of protection and advice was adopted. In 1874 British residents were appointed to three of the Malay states, and the murder of the resident at Perak occasioned a punitive expedition. By 1888 the states of Perak, Selangor, Johore, Pahang, and the nine petty states which formed the Negri Sembilan, were brought under British protection and their administration guided by British residents. The next step was to unite these protected states, with the exception of Johore, in a federation in 1895. A central legislature for the federated states was created in 1909. Thanks to the exploitation under capable British administrators of the rich natural resources, at first tin and more recently rubber, and of the industry and commercial skill of Chinese immigrants, the Malay Peninsula has become one of the most prosperous territories of the entire Orient. In 1909, as we have seen, British protection was extended to some of the Malay states formerly subject to Siam, and they soon followed in the paths of peace and prosperity which their neighbors had blazed. British interests in the Malay Peninsula are represented by the Straits Settlements (Singapore, Penang, Malacca, and some tiny outlying areas) which are owned by Great Britain and administered as a crown colony; the Federated Malay States, under British protection by individual treaties, but federated for purposes of administra-

tive efficiency; and the unfederated Malay states, consisting of the state of Johore and the states or parts of states transferred to British protection in 1909. The whole complex constitutes what is known as British Malaya.

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CHAPTER XIII

PROBLEMS OF PEACEFUL INTERCOURSE

China, 1860-94.—After the close of the second European War, in 1860, a period of thirty-four years elapsed in which China's relations with the Western powers and with Japan were marked by occasional controversies, but by only one open clash, which, however, was not defined as a state of war. The problems which were from time to time presented to Chinese officials and foreign chancelleries involved the finding of formulas which would resolve diplomatic questions without a resort to force. Most of the commercial rights desired by the powers were gained through the second treaty settlement.¹ The legations at Peking were now concerned mainly with the carrying out of the treaties. In this period, as we have already seen, three of the Western powers established themselves along the frontiers of China (for it must be remembered that the Russo-Chinese boundary on the extreme west was not defined until the early 'nineties), and as contacts increased, the possibility of friction increased with them. Throughout the period China was not only suffering from the ravages of the Taiping rebellion, but was sorely tried by four contemporary rebellions on the part of Mohammedan elements in her population. In Yunnan, 1853-73, Kansu and Shensi, 1862-73, Turkestan, 1863-78 and Ili, 1866-71, independent governments were established. The losses of life during these rebellions were enormous, and estimates place them as high as during the Taiping rebellion, or 20,000,000, including the deaths from famine and disease. The creation of these independent states could not be a matter of indifference to the European powers on their borders, and there was some fishing in these troubled waters. Finally, it must be remembered that even if China possessed officials of experience, integrity, and broad knowledge of world affairs, it would be no easy matter to deal with the many complicated

¹ See Chapter IX.

questions which were bound to arise with the Western nations. But the Chinese hierarchy contained a pitifully small number of men who could adequately handle these problems. Only a few of the higher officials could appreciate, in part, the progress which the West had made, and the increasing weakness of the empire. The bulk of the classically trained officials, and the mass of the population, still considered China the "Middle Kingdom." The four outstanding leaders whose services repeatedly safeguarded the dynasty were Prince Kung, uncle of the Emperor Tungchih, and the ranking Manchu noble; Tseng Kuo-fan, the leader of the imperial forces against the Taipings; Tso Tsung-tang, who overthrew the Mohammedan rebels in Kansu and Turkestan; and Li Hung-chang, appointed viceroy of Chihli in 1870 and for many years the spokesman of China in her relations with the powers. Of inestimable value were the services of Robert Hart (Sir Robert after 1882) who as inspector-general of the Maritime Customs was the trusted adviser of the Chinese officials and the frequent mediator between China and the importunate powers.

The Empress Dowager.—Throughout almost the entire period the dominant personality in the palace was the remarkable woman known as the Empress Dowager or, as her subjects familiarly called her, the "Old Buddha." Yehonala was born in 1835, the daughter of a Manchu clansman. When not quite seventeen she was chosen as one of the twenty-eight concubines of the Emperor Hsienfeng. To her a son was born, and she was advanced in rank until she shared the honors of the court with the empress herself. In 1860 she fled with the court to Jehol, before the allied forces, and almost a year later the emperor died in this retreat. A conspiracy had been formed to deprive Yehonala of the regency for her infant son, and she showed the first signs of her masterful character when, supported by Prince Kung, she had the conspirators arrested and punished, while she and the real empress dowager assumed a joint regency in the name of the baby emperor Tungchih. At this time she took the title Tzu Hsi (Motherly and Auspicious) and by this she was

formally addressed in later years. The first regency lasted until 1873, when the young emperor attained his majority. During that time Tzu Hsi had taken great interest in political matters, while her co-regent, Tzu An, had been as indifferent to them. The death of her son, in 1875, occasioned the second crisis in her career. In spite of the opposition of a majority of the imperial clansmen and high Chinese officials who were summoned to a palace council, she imposed her will upon them and dictated the succession of her nephew, who took the name of Kuanghsu, and for whom the two former regents would continue to serve. In forcing this decision the Empress Dowager set aside one of the most rigid principles of succession, that the throne should pass to a member of a lower generation who would be adopted as a son of the deceased. Kuanghsu was, in fact, a cousin, and hence of the same generation, which meant that in her greed for power Tzu Hsi left her own son, the late emperor, without an heir to perform the ancestral rites. Six years later her co-regent, Tzu An, died, and the Empress Dowager was left in full control of the state until 1889, when she reluctantly surrendered her power to Kuanghsu. Reared in the palace and subjected to all the evil influences which prevailed there, it was to be expected that the Empress Dowager would be conservative and strongly anti-foreign in her ideas. Had she been more enlightened and her advisers been more courageous, her strong personality might have contributed much to the improvement not only of China's relations with the powers, but to the betterment of the internal administration. Instead, ignorance, inefficiency, and corruption dominated the central government until, in 1900, the Empress Dowager herself learned a never-to-be-forgotten lesson.

The Tsungli Yamen.—Before 1861 the machinery for the conduct of foreign relations was inadequate and, from the foreigners' point of view, most unsatisfactory. The affairs of the vassal states were under the direction of the Department of Territories or Dependencies, and to this bureau were assigned relations with Russia. The maritime powers trading at Canton were placed under the control of the viceroy there,

who held the concurrent post of high commissioner for foreign affairs. The British, in 1858, won the right to establish a minister at Peking, and also secured China's promise to nominate a high officer with whom the British minister might transact business on a footing of absolute equality. This promise resulted in the appointment of a new board, the Tsungli Yamen or Foreign Office in 1861. The membership was gradually increased until in 1876 it numbered eleven, including all the members of the Grand Council and several of the presidents and vice-presidents of the old Six Boards. By this time it had become the most important of the boards and was in fact an embryo cabinet. Its principal purpose was to register complaints and to settle disputes with the foreigners without yielding more than was absolutely necessary. In fact it was preceded by a short-lived body known as the "Soothing Office," which functioned in 1860. Sir Harry Parkes, when British minister at Peking, said that to get a decision from the Yamen was "like trying to draw water from a well with a bottomless bucket."

The Burlingame Mission.—We have already seen that soon after the second war the representatives of the powers reached the conclusion that their interests coincided with the support of the imperial authority against the Taiping rebels. This was but part of the policy of coöperation which was so ably advocated by the American minister, Anson Burlingame, and this coöperation was the dominant note in the Far Eastern policy of Mr. Seward, one of the ablest of American secretaries of state. Burlingame arrived in China in 1861 and soon won the confidence of Prince Kung and the members of the Tsungli Yamen, as well as of the representatives of Great Britain, France, and Russia. The latter agreed to rely upon joint diplomatic action rather than force in dealing with all matters of general interest, and while doing all they properly could to support the imperial government to refrain as far as possible from interference in internal affairs. Such a policy, if wisely carried out, would eliminate individual pressure for selfish ends, but it might also be employed less beneficially. After serving for six years, an unusually long term for an

American representative in Peking, Burlingame was about to resign his post when, at a farewell dinner, Wensiang asked if he would not represent China officially abroad. Urged to do so by Robert Hart, he accepted the appointment and submitted his resignation. Up to this time China had sent no representatives to the treaty powers, except a mission to Russia in 1733, and a minor official without status who accompanied Robert Hart to Europe in 1866. Burlingame was appointed an official of the first rank, and two Chinese of second rank were associated with him. His colleagues manifested their approval by loaning, respectively, a British and a French secretary, while a staff of thirty clerks and attendants completed the company. The purpose of this strange mission, headed by an American, was to plead for patience with China in working out her domestic and foreign problems and, if possible, to secure a favorable revision of the 1858 treaties. Burlingame was a man of vision and of magnetic personality, and the policy which he advocated was sound, even though events in China did not support his generous optimism. At Washington, in July, 1868, the three representatives signed a treaty drafted by Mr. Seward, which provided for reciprocal rights, in place of the old unilateral treaties. Among other things it recognized the territorial integrity of China, conceded her sole control over inland trade and navigation except as stipulated by treaty, and recognized

the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance, and also the mutual advantage of the free migration and emigration of their citizens and subjects, respectively, from one country to the other for the purposes of curiosity, or trade, or as permanent residents.

In Europe Burlingame was less successful, although in London, Paris, Stockholm, Copenhagen, The Hague, and Berlin he was courteously received. Unhappily he died in St. Petersburg in February, 1870. In proceeding to sign the treaty of Washington he had acted without precise instructions, but the Tsungli Yamen approved his action and the ratified treaties were exchanged a year later in Peking.

Relations with Japan.—The first modern treaty based upon reciprocity was the Burlingame treaty with the United States in 1868. The second was with a neighbor state which had only recently resumed intercourse with the outer world. The cultural and commercial relations between China and Japan were of long standing, but Japan alone of her neighbors had never recognized the overlordship of China. After the two attempts of the Mongols to conquer Japan relations between the two countries were broken off, except for the incessant raids of Japanese pirates and adventurers along the Chinese seacoast. When Japan adopted a policy of seclusion, in the seventeenth century, she placed the Chinese trade on the same basis as the Dutch and allowed a certain number of junks to visit Nagasaki every year. With the opening of Japan to Western intercourse under the treaties of 1854-58, and the restoration of the imperial government in 1868, she took steps to renew the long-severed relations with China. In 1871 she appointed an envoy extraordinary who visited Tientsin and entered into negotiations with Li Hung-chang. The Chinese made fun of these Asiatics who wore Western dress, but they failed to realize that they had adopted Western standards of international relations as well. The terms of the resulting treaty were reciprocal. The most-favored-nation clause was omitted, so Japanese commerce did not enjoy all the privileges conceded to Westerners. In respect to criminal jurisdiction the treaty contained a provision which, if it could have been applied to all foreigners, would have removed many of the abuses of the existing system. In the treaty ports of each country jurisdiction over alien criminals would be shared by the local official and the resident consul, in the interior the local official alone would act. While such a stipulation placed Japanese in the interior of China under the jurisdiction of courts and codes which were by no means satisfactory, it also served to control the conduct of these travelers so that they might not be brought before the Chinese courts. The extra-territorial privileges of the Westerners, coupled with the right to travel with passports through the interior, was a constant

occasion for friction. Much of this the Japanese avoided under their treaty arrangement.

Foreign Ministers Received by the Emperor.—The treaty of 1871 met with no little opposition in Japan when it was realized that the reciprocal rights defined therein were inferior to those enjoyed by Europeans in China. Nevertheless, the two countries were ready to proceed to the exchange of ratifications in 1873. Japan sent an *ambassador* to China who, of course, outranked the *ministers* representing the Western powers there. When he arrived in Peking he found that the Western envoys had almost won a tenaciously fought battle for audience with the emperor. Ever since 1861 the right had been requested, but the Chinese court insisted that there could be no audience as long as the emperor was a minor. When, in 1873, he assumed full powers, the ministers dispatched a joint note requesting an audience. For four months correspondence took place with the Tsungli Yamen, the Chinese officials at first demanding that the ministers kneel, and finally agreeing to accept three bows as a mark of respect. On these terms the Japanese ambassador was received in audience on June 29th, and the five Western ministers later that day. But the Chinese carried their point, in part, without the knowledge of the representatives, for the audiences were held in the "Pavilion of Purple Light," which was only used for receiving the missions of vassal states. Only three other audiences were held during the short reign of Tungchih, and then another long minority postponed the question until 1891.

Formosa and Loochoo.—Among the subjects discussed by the Japanese ambassador in 1873 was one which concerned the claims of the two countries to the island kingdom of Loochoo, as well as Chinese jurisdiction in Formosa. Loochoo sent biennial tribute to China after 1372 and culturally was more assimilated to China than to Japan. In 1451, perhaps as a matter of insurance, Loochooans sent tribute to Japan, and in 1609 the islands were conquered by the Japanese feudal state of Satsuma. Therefore when, in 1871, sixty-six Loochooans were wrecked on the coast of Formosa and put to death by the

aborigines there, Japan raised the question of the responsibility of China. The Chinese at first tried to evade the issue by disclaiming any control over the inhabitants of southern Formosa. The Japanese government then decided to act alone and in 1874 dispatched a naval and military force to Formosa which severely chastised the native offenders and then occupied a portion of the island pending a settlement of the diplomatic issue with China. This was finally secured through the mediation of Mr. Wade, the British minister at Peking, and consisted of an indemnity of 100,000 taels for the families of the murdered men and 400,000 taels for the cost of the buildings and roads constructed by the Japanese in Formosa. But more than that, the agreement was a tacit recognition that Japan had the right to defend the interests of the Loochooans. Even the mediation of General Grant in 1879 during his trip around the world did not affect the ultimate result, and although China later protested, Japan proceeded to incorporate the islands in the Japanese empire as a prefecture.

China's Suzerainty in Korea Questioned.—In addition, Japan in 1873 made formal inquiry as to China's claims to Korea. Under the principles of Western international law a protecting state assumed responsibility for the acts of the protégé. Relations between Japan and Korea had been strained since 1868, so the inquiry made of China was a pertinent one. China, however, refused to accept the Western notions, and replied that while she maintained her old rights of suzerainty in Korea she recognized the right of the latter to make peace and war on her own account. Later, we shall see that these conflicting views respecting suzerainty involved China and Japan in a war over Korea.

Relations with Russia.—We have already indicated that the delimitation of the long Russo-Chinese boundary proceeded from east to west. In the 'fifties frontier trade was allowed across the frontier of Ili, at Kuldja. Taking advantage of the Mohammedan rebellion in that province, Russia in 1871 sent in a force "to preserve order." At this time it seemed very doubtful whether China would ever be able to regain her control over her western dependencies, and both Russia

and Great Britain took steps to protect their interests in the new state of Yarkand, to the south. However, as the result of a very remarkable campaign conducted by Tso Tsung-tang, China's sovereignty was completely restored in 1878. Russia was then requested to evacuate Ili, but she demanded compensation for her expenses during the seven years' occupation. A treaty was negotiated in 1879 which granted Russia an indemnity of 5,000,000 rubles and yielded two-thirds of the region in question. Peking at once disavowed this treaty, and war impended. China was advised by Western friends to attempt a second negotiation, and the treaty of St. Petersburg, in 1881, restored almost all the region to China, but increased the indemnity to 9,000,000 rubles. The treaty also defined Russia's trading rights along the western frontier and became the basis of these relations with China for some forty years.

Relations with Great Britain.—Just as Russia's advance to the western frontier of China precipitated the Kuldja affair, so Britain's annexation of Upper Burma gave rise to new questions in that region. In 1868 and 1873 Major Sladen was sent from upper Burma to visit the independent Mohammedan chieftain in Yunnan. Neither expedition reached its destination, and in the latter year China had restored her control there. In 1874 a third expedition was sent forward, and Mr. Margary was sent down from Peking to join the mission. On the Yunnan frontier the party was opposed by Chinese troops, Mr. Margary and five of his Chinese escort were treacherously killed, and Colonel Browne was forced to retire before superior numbers. A demand for satisfaction was at once made upon the Peking government coupled with a reopening of the audience question and additional commercial rights. To the indemnity the Chinese offered no objection, but the additional terms occasioned a long delay and much ill feeling, which, after a naval demonstration, resulted in the Chefoo convention, September 13, 1876, signed by Li Hung-chang and Sir Thomas Wade. This treaty carried an indemnity of 200,000 taels for the families of the slain and for expenses and losses; it provided for trial by the official of

the defendant's nationality in mixed civil cases; for the opening of four new treaty ports—Ichang, Wuhu, Wenchow, and Pakhoi, and six ports of call on the Yangtze; and for better regulation of the opium trade—*likin* (transit dues) would be collected when the import duty was paid, and then the opium might be transported without further duty to any point in the interior. In view of the origin of the controversy and the broadening of the demands this convention was naturally the occasion for strong criticism on the part not only of the Chinese, but of many foreign residents.

Relations with France.—In order to provide the proper correlation of events we need only recall here that in 1874 France recognized the independence of Annam and in 1883 threw her protection over that empire. This resulted in a series of clashes between Chinese and French land and naval forces, which France deemed only a state of reprisals, but which China considered a state of war. Friendly relations were restored in 1885.

Attacks Upon Foreigners.—In addition to the specific incidents which have been narrated, the relations between China and the treaty powers in this period were concerned mainly with alleged treaty violations in respect to commerce and religion. Of the two issues, Britain was more concerned with commerce, and France and the United States with the protection of missionaries and converts. France was the traditional protector of Catholic missionaries in heathen lands irrespective of their nationality, but by the end of the period Germany and Italy were insisting that missionaries of their nationality look to their own representatives for protection. The United States was involved because of the rapid progress of American Protestant missions in China. In the 1860-94 period there were a few attacks upon foreign missionaries, some destruction of church property, and no little molestation of Chinese converts. When we recall that in Japan, after the ports were freely opened in 1859, there were no attacks upon foreign missionaries as such, we must seek some explanation for the different treatment of the foreign preachers in the two countries. One very important difference lay in the

fact that in China the Christian religion was tolerated by treaty and any interference with the missionary or his converts became a breach of treaty enforceable by means of diplomatic or other intervention. In Japan Christianity was, in 1873, tolerated by her own act, so the treaty powers never had occasion to intervene. In China, therefore, the missionaries might be looked upon as political agents; in Japan they never acquired this dangerous status.

Missionary Outrages.—In addition there were peculiar conditions in China which led to attacks upon missionary workers. It should not be necessary to dwell upon the very useful services of the Christian missionaries. Irrespective of the value of the religious teaching which they proclaimed, their services in introducing Western education, medicine, and sanitation, and new standards of social life, were immeasurably great. It should not be forgotten, however, that the conduct of a few thoughtless and headstrong, ignorant and bigoted missionaries might cast reflections upon the great majority of the devoted workers. For several reasons the missionaries were peculiarly subject to misunderstanding and attack. They often resided in the remote interior, away from the treaty ports where the merchants congregated. They were, therefore, less easily protected by their national agents. They felt called upon to question and oppose certain fundamental Chinese religious and social institutions, which alienated the sympathy of the literati. The merchants bothered little about these things; business and profits were their chief concern. The missionaries also often aroused the hostility of the officials because of their efforts to protect their Chinese converts from official interference. The threat to invoke the treaty toleration clause, with subsequent diplomatic or gunboat activity, often checked the hand of Chinese officials who might be on the point of proceeding against Chinese converts for ordinary civil infractions. For these reasons the missionaries were looked upon as political agents rather than as religious propagandists solely. In addition, the return of Church property, provided by the French treaty of 1860, occasioned difficulties. The opening of orphanages which often paid a small sum to indigent Chinese

parents to surrender their children to the protection and training of the Church, encouraged kidnappers to ply their nefarious occupation. Hospitals were quite beyond the comprehension of the ignorant masses, and a frequent charge against the missionaries was that they extracted the hearts and eyes of children to make an elixir of life for the use of foreigners. This vicious falsehood, which so often fired a mob to attack the hospitals and orphanages, was used as recently as 1927 in Foochow. The presence of women missionaries was shocking to the sensibilities of the Chinese, who could not understand how they could live with men workers in the mission compounds. And the almost unbelievable lack of tact in erecting certain cathedrals greatly embittered the officials and gentry. In Canton the cathedral was erected on the site of the viceroy's yamen, seized in 1858. In Tientsin, as in Canton, the cathedral was the most imposing building in the native city and towered above the temples and yamens. A cathedral was erected in Peking so close to the palace grounds that it overshadowed the residence of the Son of Heaven. At Chinese cost this structure was removed to a less objectionable site. Yellow tiles were sometimes placed on the roofs of these structures, a serious violation of Chinese custom, which restricted this color to imperial palaces and signally honored temples. In spite of these trouble-making incidents, most of the missionaries carried on their work without serious difficulty, although attacks were occasionally made upon them, and reparation of one kind or another frequently demanded by the foreign representatives.

The Tientsin Massacre.—In Tientsin, in 1870, the most serious missionary outrage occurred. The old charges that children were being kidnapped and their hearts and eyes extracted were spread abroad concerning the Roman Catholic orphanage. The French consul handled the situation very badly and a mob assembled which destroyed not only the orphanage, the cathedral, and the French consulate, but plundered a number of American and British chapels. Eighteen French nationals, including ten Sisters of Charity and two priests, and three Russians were slain, as well as thirty or forty

Chinese servants. All the foreigners were alarmed at this outburst, which was followed by dangerous manifestations in other provinces. A force of French, British, and American warships assembled near Tientsin. France demanded the decapitation of the two leading local officials, but her hand was stayed by the war which soon broke out with Germany. Finally Li Hung-chang was instructed to settle the matter and after an investigation the prefect and magistrate of Tientsin were sent into exile, while twenty of the rioters were condemned to death and twenty-one banished. An indemnity of 250,000 taels was paid, and a mission of apology, headed by Chunghow, imperial commissioner for trade at the northern ports, proceeded to France. The Tsungli Yamen took this occasion to propose to the treaty powers certain rules which should be observed by missionaries. While conforming with Chinese custom and law, these rules would have hampered the religious work of the foreign teachers, and the American minister alone was prepared to discuss them. Fifty years later the situation had so developed that there was good reason to regret this reluctance of the treaty powers to consider at least how Christian propaganda might be freed from some of its objectionable features until the Chinese people were ready to consider the missionaries as religious workers without political implications. Remembering the great ignorance of the Chinese masses and the hostility of the educated and official classes, only the wisest Church statesmanship could safeguard the missionaries and their converts in these difficult days.

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PART TWO

JAPAN TO 1895


CHAPTER XIV

THE COUNTRY AND THE PEOPLE

The Japanese Empire.—In ancient times the Japanese called their country Yamato, but after 670 they began to make use of the Chinese name Jih-pen (Sun origin), which was corrupted to Nippon or Nihon, and to the English form Japan. Until the first decade of the twentieth century Japan was an island empire. Old Japan, where the Japanese race established itself and where the great bulk of the people to-day reside, consisted of three islands and tiny adjacent bits of land: Honshu, or Hondo (Mainland), about 87,000 square miles, and 1,130 miles long; Kyushu (Nine Provinces), about 14,000 square miles, and 200 miles long; and Shikoku (Four Provinces), about 7,000 square miles, and 170 miles long. To the north the Japanese gradually occupied Hokkaido (Yezo), 30,340 square miles, and the Chishima (Kurile) Islands, thirty-one in all, with 6,000 square miles. To the island of Karafuto (Sakhalin) the Japanese claims were relinquished to Russia until 1905, when the southern two-fifths were regained, some 13,000 square miles. To the south Japan successfully challenged the claims of China to the suzerainty of the Ryukyu (Loochoo) Islands, fifty-five in number, with 6,000 square miles, and gained Taiwan (Formosa), 14,000 square miles, and the tiny Hokoto (Pescadores) Islands, thirty-four in number but only forty-seven square miles, as a result of her victory over China in 1895. And, finally, in 1910, she annexed the mainland kingdom of Korea, 85,000 square miles. The total area of the present empire is about 261,000 square miles, or almost as large as the state of Texas. In spite of the common belief that Japan is a land-hungry, imperialistic nation, it should be noted that the total amount of her annexations scarcely reach 113,000 square miles, an area less than that of the Philippine Islands, acquired by the United States in 1899, and not one-third of the Russian acquisitions from China in 1858-60.

Significance of Insularity.—Old Japan before the annexation of Korea was an island empire. Like Great Britain, whose area was somewhat larger than Old Japan, the empire consisted of a group of islands lying off a populous continent. In both cases the intervening sea proved a strong bulwark against invasion, but it served Japan more effectively than Britain. The latter country was invaded by Romans, Angles, Saxons, Danes, and Normans, while Japan, in historic times, was never conquered even in part. Many dynasties have ruled in Britain, while only one house has held the imperial throne in Japan. And just as Japan was never subjected to a foreign ruler, so she was able to develop her peculiar culture without the imposition of alien influences. She was permitted to select those elements of the great culture of China which she desired—they were not forced upon her. The history of Japan presents many similarities to that of Britain. Each was a maritime nation, but just at the time when the British were faring all over the world and planting their flags on the ruins of the Spanish and Portuguese empires, the Japanese adopted a policy of seclusion and exclusion which brought to an end the healthy commercial expansion of the nation. But as soon as the bans were removed the Japanese at once turned to the sea and soon built up, in a surprising manner, a great mercantile marine and a very effective navy. The future prosperity of Japan, as of Great Britain, depends upon industry and commerce, the manufacturing of raw materials, and the shipment of the output to all parts of the world in her own vessels. Japan, however, is poor in natural resources. She has some coal and copper, but lacks iron and coking coal. She must import cotton and iron and rubber, three of the basic materials of industry. China has considerable stores of iron, coal, and other minerals and raises much cotton. These two facts will explain much of Japan's recent policies in China. She has, however, a large and industrious population and a wonderful supply of water power which will make up for the lack of adequate coal.

Extensive Coast Line.—It would be a great mistake to think of Japan merely in terms of her limited area. Before Korea



JAPANESE ISLANDS AND PORTS

was annexed the whole empire was much smaller than the single Chinese province of Szechwan, but the islands of Japan are so located as to have great strategic importance as well as physical advantages. From south to north they extend from $21^{\circ} 48'$ to $50^{\circ} 56'$, north latitude, from within the tropics well into the temperate zone. If placed on a map of North America the Japanese islands would extend from below the tip of Lower California to the northern shores of Vancouver Island, and from San Francisco almost to Chicago. In Formosa sugar is the principal crop and subtropical vegetation abounds; in the Kurile Islands seal-hunting is a regular occupation. The main islands have a coast line of some 13,000 miles, and thirty-six harbors are now open to foreign vessels. For this reason the Japanese consider a naval force able to defend her extensive coast line and keep open her communications with the continent absolutely indispensable, and as the islands flank the coast of eastern Asia from south China to Kamchatka, a powerful Japanese navy could control the approaches to that entire region.

Mountains and Rivers.—Japan is a very mountainous country; there is a mountain in every landscape. It was a region of great volcanic activity, and about fifty peaks are still active. And, like most of the regions around the Pacific, it is the scene of frequent earthquakes, some of great intensity. Most beautiful of the Japanese mountains is Fujiyama, the sacred mountain, rising 12,467 feet, but its primacy was lost when Formosa was acquired and Mt. Morrison was found to reach 13,075 feet. The mountain ranges served to divide Japan into little valleys, like Greece. Intercourse was difficult, and the passes were easily guarded. This favored the development and persistence of a feudal organization, and, as the intermingling of people could not go on extensively until the physical barriers were broken down and the feudal restrictions removed, marked differences may be observed between the people of the east and west coasts, and of the north and south. Mountains separate peoples, while rivers and seas unite them. The rivers, as would be the case in such small mountainous islands, are short and turbulent. Only nine

are more than a hundred miles long, and they are of small value for transportation, while the sand carried down by their freshets must be incessantly dredged out of the harbors. They are, however, of great value for rice irrigation, and in recent times for hydroelectric power.

Soil and Climate.—The soil is extremely fertile, enriched by mineral and vegetable matter washed down from the mountains by the heavy rains. But ages of intensive cultivation have robbed it of much of its productivity. The arable land is limited in amount, because of the mountain areas. About twenty per cent of the area of Japan proper is now considered capable of cultivation, and possibly an additional ten per cent could be added if every tillable moor and hillside were used. The climate is that of the temperate zone, and, because of the moderating effect of the surrounding ocean and the warm current which flows north from the tropics, it is milder than that of corresponding latitudes on the continent. The rainy season comes in the summer when the crops are growing, but tropical storms (typhoons) frequently destroy much of the standing rice. Intensive agriculture and incessant industry have produced a high yield of rice and other crops per acre, but in recent years Japan has had to import much of her food supplies. Fortunately the seas abound with fish and these furnish one of the staple foods of the people—and fishermen make good sailors for a merchant or naval service.

The People.—"Of no great people, forming part of the world's active leaders, do we know so little racially with exactness as we do concerning the Japanese." The Japanese are a mixed race, but the mingling took place so long ago that a distinct racial type has been developed. From many conflicting views held by Japanese and Western anthropologists the following statement will serve our present purposes. The earliest people dwelling in the Japanese islands of whom we have record were the Ainu, a very ancient and primitive people with certain physical characteristics of the Caucasian type. Invaders from the continent and from the southern islands drove the Ainu further and further back to the north and east. A mingling of these conquering stocks with the vanquished

Ainu, for in those days the men would be put to the sword and the women spared to be wives or slaves, produced the present Japanese. The principal difference of opinion among scholars is as to the relative influence of the mainland and the maritime invaders. The former certainly entered Japan by way of the Korean peninsula, the latter from Malaya. Among the present Japanese marked physical differences may be observed, indicative of the racial origins of the whole group.

Mythical and Legendary History.—The Japanese, like other people, possess an elaborate account of their origin and early history in which myth and legend are inextricably blended. These records are preserved in two of the earliest books written in Japan, the *Kojiki*, or *Record of Ancient Matters*, dating from 712, and the *Nihongi*, or *Chronicles of Japan*, from 720. Here we learn of the many generations of gods who reigned in high heaven, of the creation of the islands of Japan, and of the first human emperor, to whom the name of Jimmu Tenno was long afterward given, who ascended the throne, so it is officially recognized, in 660 B.C. Unfortunately, the early chronology of the *Kojiki* and *Nihongi* cannot be accepted as authentic and, in fact, few events before the middle of the fifth century A.D. have been confirmed by reference to contemporary Chinese and Korean annals.

The Tenno (Mikado), Lord of Heaven.—The Tenno, or emperor, descendant of the Sun Goddess, was the leader of the clans in their struggles with the Ainu and other foes. Europeans later frequently made use of the old title Mikado, or “August Gate,” a term rarely employed by his subjects. Although the official genealogies trace the descent of the present emperor from Jimmu, as the 124th of the line, we can only say that from the dawn of recorded history only one imperial house has ruled in Japan. No royal house can compare in antiquity with that of Japan. The succession, however, was not always in the direct line or through the imperial consort, but when adoption was resorted to, a descendant of a former emperor was always chosen.

Shinto—the Way of the Gods.—The ancient, indigenous religion of the Japanese was Shinto, the Way of the Gods.

This was rather a ritual of observances than a religious system. It had no moral code, no ethical instruction, no system of philosophy, no sacred books. It insisted upon loyalty to the sovereign, reverence for ancestors, and abounding filial piety. The Japanese, it will be observed, placed the emphasis upon loyalty, the Chinese upon filial piety. The ceremonies of Shinto consisted of prayers and offerings to the gods and the deified ancestors and heroes, prayers of "thanksgiving, supplication, penance, and praise," as well as purification by bathing in cold water. The people generally appeased not only the gods, good and evil, but also propitiated animals and trees and natural objects which might aid or injure them. To fill out this religion on the side of ethics and philosophy came the writings of Confucius and his disciples. But these appealed only to the intellect and, although they profoundly affected the Japanese literati, they had little influence upon the people at large. It was Buddhism which gave them the moral guidance they needed. In spite of being overshadowed in later years by this alien faith, Shinto continued to keep alive a spirit of patriotism and loyalty, until it flowered again with the restoration of the imperial authority in the nineteenth century.

Influence of Chinese Civilization.—Although many of the ancestors of the present Japanese entered the islands from the mainland, they did not develop in civilization as fast as their Chinese and Korean neighbors. Chinese culture began to penetrate Korea with the conquests of the Han dynasty, after 107 B.C. It was but natural that these contributions should in time cross the narrow straits into Japan. Intercourse between the two countries probably began about the Christian era, but by the first half of the third century A.D. the relations between Japan and the nearest Korean kingdoms were very intimate. Japanese envoys visited the Chinese provinces to the north of Korea and even ventured as far as the capital of the kingdom of Wei. A Chinese historian of the end of the third century was able to prepare a valuable account of Japan, based upon the reports of Chinese travelers. In the fourth century Chinese colonists arrived, and the Chinese ideographs

gave the Japanese their first written language. But it was many years before the Japanese could master them, and Koreans and Chinese were employed as scribes. With the introduction of Buddhism, in the sixth century or perhaps earlier, the full flood of Chinese culture poured into the country. Not only were Korean and Chinese priests the teachers of the people, but Japanese priests visited China to study this alien faith at the centers of instruction. From China in these years came "letters, religion, philosophy, literature, laws, ethics, medicine, science, and art." Before the end of the seventh century the government had been entirely remodeled on the Chinese bureaucratic plan. The glories of the Tang dynasty, 620-907, dazzled the impressionable Japanese. So for the first time Japan imitated, absorbed, and then adapted an alien civilization to satisfy her own needs, but when the process was completed her civilization was Japanese and not Chinese. She had taken what she pleased, freely, and there was one striking omission in the list of Chinese contributions—she had not taken over the civil-service examinations which in China served to crystallize the educational curriculum, although for a brief period she experimented with them. Birth and breeding were considered more important qualifications for public office than knowledge of the classics. The second period of imitation and assimilation was to come many years later when the treasures of Western civilization were as eagerly sought out by the Japanese.

Buddhism.—Just as the introduction of Buddhism was the most important foreign influence in the history of China down to modern times, so its advent in Japan was of equal significance. Officially, its introduction dates from 552 A.D. when a gold image of Buddha and some scrolls of the sutras were presented to the emperor by the king of Kudara, or Pekche, in Korea. But the faith was certainly introduced directly by Chinese colonists many years earlier. At first the new religion was rejected by the imperial court, but the great regent Shōtoku, 593-621, lent it his powerful support. Buddhist monks and nuns came over from Korea, and others from China. Temples were built, religious and secular instruction given,

and for the first time a code of morals was given the people. The splendid temples which were soon reared, the noble images, the impressive ceremonial, all appealed to the common folk. And in terms so simple that all could understand, the good was set off from the bad, and rewards for right conduct were proclaimed while the penalties of sin were vividly portrayed. When a conflict threatened between the alien faith and Shinto, the indigenous cult, the Buddhist priests worked out a formula which accepted the gods and deified ancestors and heroes of Shinto as various incarnations of the Lord Buddha. In Buddhist temple grounds a Shinto shrine would be erected whose deity would be the patron and protector of the foreign faith. Buddhism owed its rapid growth in Japan to the sympathy and active support of the emperors and the high officials. Under their orders temples were erected, images were cast, and monasteries were established. And it furnished a complement to the patriotism of Shinto by adding "a calm trust in fate, a quiet submission to the inevitable, that stoic composure in sight of danger or calamity, that disdain of life and friendliness with death." And like the Christian missionaries of a later day the Buddhist priests were not only religious teachers, but secular instructors as well. Their monasteries and temples were the great schools, their priests were the real leaders of the people in every phase of social, intellectual, and even material progress.

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CHAPTER XV

THE DEVELOPMENT OF DUAL GOVERNMENT

Dual Government.—The Great Reform of 645, which was finally codified in 702, had a profound influence upon the history of Japan. The Chinese system of administration was introduced, with minor modifications. The ministers of the court assumed more and more of the governmental duties, and the emperors withdrew gradually from their former leadership of the old divinely sprung clans. The practice of abdication, followed by retirement to a Buddhist monastery, further weakened the imperial authority. All that was necessary was for some powerful noble family to take and transmit the actual governmental powers for a dual form of government to arise. This proved to be the case, and because in later years the Europeans who visited Japan as merchants, missionaries, and diplomats were unable to understand this system we must now trace its development.

The Fujiwara Family.—The first noble family to secure unquestioned control of the administrative machinery was the Fujiwara (Wistaria Meadow), which claimed descent from the heavenly deities. At the time of the Great Reform the head of this house was a powerful noble. Some sixty years later one of its members became minister of the left, an office never before held by a noble. But Yoshifusa became chancellor in 857, and the next year regent for his grandson, the Emperor Seiwa, and even after the latter became of age the regency continued. Thus for the first time a person not of the imperial blood held this important post. The next step was for Yoshifusa's successor to receive the office of *kwampaku*, which may be translated "mayor of the palace," and from that time until the end of Fujiwara control the head of that powerful family acted as regent for emperors during their minority and as *kwampaku* after they became of age. In addition, the child emperors or the heirs apparent were married to Fujiwara ladies. Between 851 and 1069 there were fifteen emperors, of

whom seven were minors and eight either abdicated or were compelled to retire. Most of the high offices at the court were held by members of this masterful family, as well as many of the lucrative posts in the provinces. In this period the feudal system gradually developed as the conquerors of new lands from the Ainu to the east and rebels and pirates to the west, received them free from imperial taxes, and in turn distributed them among their fighting men under the obligation of military service. The first form of dual government, in which the emperors reigned but did not rule, and power was transmitted from generation to generation in a noble family, was that of the civilian court nobles (*kuge*), the Fujiwara. During this period the imperial capital was located at Nara, in 710, which was laid out as a replica of the Chinese capital, Sian. Later, after a brief establishment at Nagaoka, 784-794, the capital was permanently located at Kyoto, where it remained until 1868.

The Rise of the Military Class.—At first the Fujiwara governors would lead their provincial troops against the barbarians, but gradually they abandoned these duties to two military families, both descended from emperors, the Taira and the Minamoto. The former built up strong forces in the west, while the Minamoto subdued eight or ten provinces about the present Tokyo. Too late the Fujiwara realized that both power and wealth were being concentrated in the hands of the military class. In 1110 they issued an edict forbidding the warriors to become vassals of the Taira and Minamoto, and a little later they tried to stop the enlargement of the tax-free estates, which had already greatly reduced the imperial revenue. But as late as 1156, when a struggle for the throne occurred, the houses of Fujiwara, Taira, and Minamoto were split into factions and members supported each of the claimants. In 1160, however, a clear break occurred, and the Taira not only defeated their military rivals, but destroyed for all time the influence of the Fujiwara. In 1167 the Taira chieftain, Kiyomori, received the office of chancellor, never before conferred upon a military man, while the revenues of thirty provinces swelled his war-chest.

Taira Against Minamoto.—Control of the state had now passed to the military family of the Taira, but no one dreamed of setting aside the imperial house and founding a new dynasty, as would have been the case in China. The old administrative organization was continued, but the Taira warriors rather than the Fujiwara civilians ruled in the name of the puppet emperors. Kiyomori was an able administrator as well as a brave soldier. The destruction of the head of the Minamoto family and his two eldest sons, in 1160, seemed to remove all danger from that quarter, but in sparing the youngest son, Yoshitomo, and his three half-brothers, Kiyomori made possible the restoration of the Minamoto clan. In the eastern provinces they slowly regained their strength, and when, under Yoritomo and Yoshitsune, they began to attack the Taira, success attended them until in 1185, at the naval battle of Dannoura, near the straits of Shimonoseki, the Taira were virtually exterminated and the Minamoto assumed control of the dual government.

The Minamoto Shogunate.—Yoritomo introduced two important innovations in the dual government. He continued to reside at his capital, Kamakura, some 300 miles from Kyoto, near the present port of Yokohama. And in 1192 he finally received the long-desired office of Sei-i-tai Shogun, or "Barbarian Subduing Great General." This was not a new title, but it now took on a new meaning. Former sei-i-tai shoguns had been appointed for a specific purpose; the powers of Yoritomo were general and permitted him to act on his own initiative in dealing with the military class. Before this date he had obtained authority to appoint a high constable in each of the provinces and land stewards to collect the taxes, administer justice, and maintain order. The civilian governors appointed by the court at Kyoto lost all power and importance. From 1192 until 1868, except for a period of thirty years, the real or nominal head of the dual government was the shogun, and the administration which he directed was known as the bakufu. Yoritomo had planned to transmit his great powers to his descendants, but on his death his eldest son was a child and a regency was established in the hands of the Hojo leader,

Tokimasa, the father of Yoritomo's widow and hence grandfather of the infant shogun. The first child was deposed, and his brother assassinated, so in 1219 the line of Yoritomo became extinct, but the Hojo regency persisted.

The Hojo Regents.—From 1199 to 1333 the office of regent was transmitted from generation to generation in the Hojo family. Two Fujiwara nobles and four imperial princes were successively appointed to the office of shogun, but five of the six were forced to abdicate under the pressure of the regents. In the same period eleven emperors succeeded, and nine of them abdicated. The first of the Hojo regents, of whom there were nine, were able men, and they developed a very efficient administration, under which the feudal chieftains were held in subjection and peace generally prevailed. It was in this period that the two Mongol invasions, in which their Korean vassals participated, were repulsed, in 1274 and 1281. But after this heroic event the power of the Hojo rapidly waned. A four-fold system at times was in operation, in which a minister (*kwanryo*) acted on behalf of the regent (*shikken*) who acted for the titular shogun in the name of the powerless emperor.

The Ashikaga Shogunate.—It happened that just when the regency had fallen upon evil days a resolute and courageous emperor began to assert the former prerogatives of his line. Go-Daigo Tenno assumed the throne in 1319, and he was a man of thirty-one instead of a child as had long been the case. His independent spirit caused the regent to move for his abdication in 1331, and Go-Daigo, taking the imperial seal, fled to a fortified monastery. This was, however, taken and the emperor was banished, but his partisans, led by the gallant hero Kusunoki Masahige, continued the struggle. The emperor soon escaped from his island prison, and his loyal supporters now carried the war into the eastern provinces. In July, 1333, Kamakura fell, and the last of the Hojo, with some 300 of his clansmen and retainers, committed hara-kiri. For two years the emperor really ruled, and an imperial prince was appointed shogun, though without the former administrative powers. But the military leaders who had fought to over-

throw the Hojo were not prepared to accept civilian control again. The head of the Ashikaga clan, Takauji, had commanded a Hojo army against Go-Daigo in 1333, but he had then gone over to the emperor and was one of his most powerful supporters. Two years later he assumed such authority that a force was dispatched against him, and soon all Japan was in a turmoil. Kyoto was captured and the emperor fled. A rival emperor was now installed in the capital, but Go-Daigo carried away with him the insignia of authority, the sacred sword and seal. The imperial prince who held the title of shogun having been deposed and assassinated, Takauji received from his puppet emperor the title, and in 1338 founded the Ashikaga shogunate. It arose under most unpromising circumstances. Two imperial courts shared the loyalties of the military men and the nobles. At Kyoto five emperors reigned between 1336 and 1392, and in the mountains of Yamato four rivals, possessing, however, the real insignia, held court. Finally the breach was healed when the southern emperor, in 1392, surrendered the insignia to his Kyoto rival. The four emperors who in these years resided in the palace at Kyoto, but without the regalia, are now considered as usurpers. The unification of the courts did not, however, bring peace to the war-torn land. The Ashikaga shoguns, of whom there were fifteen, made their headquarters in Kyoto. Their authority over the military class had practically vanished. Feudal wars prevailed on all sides, and one of the strongest military organizations was made up of Buddhist monks in their many mountain monasteries. When the Portuguese first reached Japan the empire "was mostly a weltering chaos of warring feudal atoms." What was needed above all was some strong power which could curb the warring nobles and bring about internal peace. This crying need was met by the services of three outstanding generals.

Nobunaga.—During the Ashikaga shogunate the central government broke down completely and the military class took possession of estates and fought with their neighbors to gain new territories. One of these chieftains was Nobunaga, of the Oda family, who had inherited a small estate in Owari and

through successful campaigns had acquired control of six provinces. A good judge of men, he had recognized the military genius of Hideyoshi and Iyeyasu, who became his most trusted generals. Quarreling with the shogun, he arrested and, in 1573, deposed him. But he did not take the title for himself, for he belonged to the Taira, rather than to the Minamoto clan. By 1582, when he was assassinated, he had brought thirty-two of the sixty-eight provinces under his control, and others were held by allies faithful to him, and he had destroyed the power of the militant Buddhist monks. Although he was an able soldier, he lacked administrative ability and he was not able to consolidate his conquests.

Hideyoshi.—The sons of Nobunaga were unable to succeed to their father's power, and after three years of struggle among his generals Hideyoshi emerged as the war lord of Japan. A brilliant general, he carried his conquests from the far north to the southern provinces, and his ambition to conquer China led to a disastrous invasion of Korea. An able administrator, he was able to build upon the foundations laid by Nobunaga, so that internal peace began to emerge from the feudal chaos of the Ashikaga days. Although Hideyoshi aspired to the office of shogun, his humble birth stood in the way. Not until 1586 did he assume the family name of Toyotomi, which would suggest kinship with the ancient family of Fujiwara. At first he took the title of *kwampaku*, and later that of *taiko*, but he was shogun in all but name. In 1598 he died, leaving his infant heir to the protection of his five most trusted generals.

Iyeyasu.—Of the five regents appointed by Hideyoshi, Iyeyasu, of the Tokugawa family, was the chief. A descendant of the Minamoto, Iyeyasu had served under both Nobunaga and Hideyoshi and had acquired large estates from their enemies. The expected struggle for power soon arose, and in 1600 Iyeyasu defeated his foes in a desperate battle. Like Yoritomo, he retained his headquarters in the east and Yedo, not very far from Kamakura, became the capital of his house. The last Ashikaga shogun, whom Nobunaga had deposed in

1573, died in 1597. As soon as Iyeyasu had defeated his open foes he asked and received the old title from the emperor, and in 1603 founded the Tokugawa shogunate. The only threat which now remained was Hideyori, the son of the late *taiko*. A quarrel was easily stirred up, and in 1615 Hideyori was probably slain in the destruction of Osaka castle.

Summary.—We shall have other occasions to refer to these three generals and statesmen who brought to an end the long period of feudal anarchy. Their characters are suggested by a Japanese popular verse: "Nobunaga said, 'I'll kill the cuckoo, if he doesn't sing'; Hideyoshi said, 'I'll try and make the cuckoo sing'; and Iyeyasu said, 'I'll wait till the cuckoo sings.'" Iyeyasu, building upon the work of his predecessors, and possessed of administrative talents of a rare order, was able to organize a machine of state which functioned smoothly down to the middle of the nineteenth century. For twelve hundred years a dual form of government prevailed in Japan. At first controlled by individual court nobles, it passed into the hands of the Fujiwara family. Then the military class seized the power, to hold it with scarcely a break to modern times. Only once, for about two years under Go-Daigo, did the emperor assert the powers he nominally possessed. But although at times the emperors were treated very badly, frequently deposed, even driven out of their capital and exiled, no court noble or war lord dared to assume the title of Tenno. Such a form of government proved almost unintelligible to foreigners. The Ashikaga shogun Yoshimitsu was recognized by the emperor of China in 1404 as "King of Japan," and the presents which he sent to the Ming court were looked upon as tribute. The Portuguese missionaries at a later date spoke of the emperor as the "ecclesiastical ruler," and considered Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, Iyeyasu, and the Tokugawa shoguns as the real rulers. Foreign affairs were handled in the name of the shogun, and the first modern treaties, 1854-58, were negotiated on behalf of the shogun and for this purpose a new title, tycoon (great lord), was invented. The significance of the dual government in the history of

Japanese foreign relations will be considered from time to time in the following chapters.

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CHAPTER XVI

EARLY FOREIGN INTERCOURSE

The Portuguese Reach Japan, 1542.—It was during the feudal anarchy of the Ashikaga period that the first Europeans reached Japan. The generally accepted account of this event is that three Portuguese traders or deserters, on a voyage in a Chinese junk from Siam to China, in 1542, were blown out of their course and carried by the north-bound current to the little southerly island of Tanegashima. There they were well received and they presented to the local governor some fire-arms and gunpowder, the first to be used in Japan. In their reports they dwelt upon the politeness and intelligent curiosity of the Japanese and these traits have impressed foreign visitors ever since that time. The Japanese eagerly received the new weapons which would prove so serviceable during the incessant feudal wars. News of the great profits to be gained from this trade inspired the Portuguese merchants in China, the Straits, and India. Soon other adventurers followed the discoverers, and profits of 1,200 per cent on the trade were reported.

Xavier and the Christian Missionaries.—The merchants were soon followed by the missionaries, and first of these was one of the greatest of Christian workers in the East. Francis Xavier, a Spaniard, was one of the co-founders in 1540 of the Society of Jesus, better known as the Jesuits. The next year he sailed for India to carry the faith into the recently gained Portuguese possessions. In southern India and in the Moluccas he preached the gospel, and at Malacca, in 1547, he met a Japanese, Anjiro, who had come down from Japan in a Portuguese ship in search of religious instruction. Xavier then determined to visit this new-found land. Anjiro, in the meantime, was pursuing a course of studies in the college of St. Paul, at Goa, and in 1549 he was prepared to take part in this new adventure. In August of that year Xavier with a priest and a lay brother, Anjiro and two Japanese converts,

landed at Kagoshima, the port of the feudal estate of Satsuma. The strangers were welcomed by the daimyo (lord), and permission accorded them to preach in his domain. A few baptisms were recorded, but within a year the daimyo turned against them and the acceptance of Christianity was made a capital offence. Xavier then proceeded to the island of Hirado, where better success attended his mission, and the next year he visited Kyoto, in a vain attempt to obtain an audience with the emperor. In November, 1551, he left Japan, after a sojourn of twenty-seven months in which the foundations of the Christian Church were laid in that land. One of his Japanese body-servants was sent on to Europe and was no doubt the first Japanese to visit the Western World.

Marked Success of the Missionary Enterprise.—Other missionaries took up the work of Xavier. The faith spread rapidly, especially in the southern island. Churches were erected, at times purified temples were made use of. The daimyos were generally friendly, and a few accepted the new faith. When this occurred, large numbers of their people followed their example. Perhaps the chief reason for the great success which attended these early missionary efforts was the fact that the feudal anarchy had left the common people broken in spirit and crushed with exactions. The native faith, Shinto, offered no heavenly rewards; Buddhism offered them, but far in the future and only after desire had been extinguished. Christianity offered them immediately. Moreover, there were many striking superficial similarities between the ritual and paraphernalia of Buddhism and Christianity which made the new faith understandable to the people. Buddhists who turned to Kwannon, the goddess of mercy, for help in time of need, found her counterpart in the merciful Virgin, while there seemed to be more than a similarity in name between the god Jizo, who helped those in trouble, travelers and women and children, and Jesus, the Christ. At this time, also, Nobunaga, the war lord, was engaged in crushing the temporal power of the Buddhist monasteries, and thus he favored the Jesuits. By 1579 there were said to be 105,000

Christians in Japan; two years later the number was given as 150,000 with two hundred churches. If this estimate is correct, the Christian group numbered one per cent of the total population, a percentage far larger than exists at the present time. Of these converts some were doubtless actuated by self-interest, but by far the greater number were sincere in their acceptance of the Christian faith, as their stanchness under persecution in later years convincingly testified. At its height in 1596 the Church numbered some 300,000 converts.

Christian Propaganda Prohibited.—In spite of the favor shown by Nobunaga, and for a few years by Hideyoshi, the missionaries met with local persecution in some of the fiefs. This was in part due to excess of zeal on the part of their converts, and to strife between Christian and Buddhist elements in the communities. As early as 1557 five Japanese Christians were put to death in Hirado, and ten other executions were reported before 1591. But by that time Hideyoshi had turned against the foreign missionaries. The reason for this seems to have been that by 1587 Hideyoshi had defeated the daimyo of Satsuma and thus controlled the southern island of Kyushu. It was there that most of the Christians were to be found. Fearing, no doubt, that these believers might be organized under their foreign teachers into a hostile body which would cut across the old feudal boundaries, he issued an edict in 1587 which ordered the foreign missionaries to leave Japan within twenty days. If any were found after that time they were to be seized and punished as the greatest criminals. This edict, it should be observed, did not forbid the Christian religion, but was designed to expel the foreign workers. It did not affect the Portuguese merchants, who were still permitted to reside at the ports and trade, but they were not to bring priests with them. In fact, in order to encourage the merchants to come to Japan Hideyoshi soon modified the edict so that priests might come in the merchant ships, but must also return in them. The edict of 1587 was, however, ignored by the priests. Only a few left the country, and the friendly daimyos in Kyushu protected those who remained. Hideyoshi, on his part, was too busy with his campaign in the

north and then with the Korean invasion to bother about the disobedient missionaries.

Spanish Missionaries from Manila.—Up to this time Japan's relations with the Westerners had been confined to the Portuguese, who entered the country from Malacca or Macao. In fact, the concordat under which Philip II of Spain ascended the throne of Portugal in 1581 confirmed the trade of Japan exclusively to the Portuguese. The Pope, in 1585, also vested the sole right to preach Christianity in Japan in the Jesuits. But Hideyoshi's attention was called to the presence of the Spaniards in Manila, and in 1591, when he was planning the conquest of China, he sent a letter to the Spanish governor-general ordering him to recognize Hideyoshi as his suzerain. This led to an embassy from Manila in 1592, whose members were lost on the return voyage, and to a second embassy in 1593. Accompanying the envoys were four Franciscan friars, who thus entered Japan in violation of the Papal bull in the guise of ambassadors. The reply of the governor-general to Hideyoshi's demand was a temporizing one which asserted that he could not act without first consulting his master, the king of Spain. The priests were allowed to remain in the country, but not to preach. This injunction they entirely ignored. Three more friars soon joined them and services were openly conducted in Kyoto, Osaka, and Nagasaki. As in China, national and religious jealousies were soon aroused, the Spanish Franciscans and the Portuguese Jesuits united in complaints against each other. Finally, in 1597, Hideyoshi acted. The episode which brought about the first enforcement of his earlier edict was the affair of the *San Felipe*, a galleon bound from Manila to Mexico which was caught in a typhoon, disabled, and lay becalmed off the coast of Tosa. Towed by Japanese boats into the harbor, it was stranded on a sand bank (purposely, said the Spaniards) and then it became the prize of the daimyo of the fief. In attempting to secure redress from Hideyoshi the Spanish captain made use of the resident Franciscans as intermediators, and their action in turn caused complaints to be made against them for violating the orders of the *taiko*. At this time, it was said, the pilot

of the *San Felipe*, in order to impress the Japanese custodians, produced a map of the world and pointed out the vast domains of Philip II, in Europe, the Americas, and Asia. When asked how these lands came into Spanish possession he said:

Our Kings begin by sending into the countries they wish to conquer *religieux* who induce the people to embrace our religion, and when they have made considerable progress, troops are sent who combine with the new Christians, and then our Kings have not much trouble in accomplishing the rest.

This speech was, of course, reported to Hideyoshi, who had already ordered the arrest of the Franciscans, and he now decided that the time for action had come. On February 5, 1597, six Franciscans, three Japanese Jesuits, and seventeen Japanese laymen were crucified at Nagasaki. As they were escorted from Kyoto to their execution ground their sentence was borne before them on the carts:

I have ordered these foreigners to be treated thus because they have come from the Philippines to Japan, calling themselves ambassadors, although they were not so; because they have remained here for long without my permission; because, in defiance of my prohibition, they have built churches, preached their religion, and caused disorders. My will is that after being thus exposed to public derision, they be crucified at Nagasaki.

Thus, after ten years, the edict of 1587 was first put into effect. The Portuguese Jesuits were not molested, although Hideyoshi knew full well that they also were disobeying his commands. Spain, rather than Portugal, was feared as an aggressive power. When an embassy, with presents, came up from Manila and asked for the property seized on the *San Felipe* and for the bodies of the martyrs, Hideyoshi replied that the ship had been seized according to law, that the friars had broken his commands in his very court, and that he wanted no more such sent to Japan; the bodies, however, would be given to the envoys. In 1627 these first martyrs were canonized by the Church. The Jesuits were again ordered to leave the country, but once more they testified

their allegiance to the divine law rather than to any human decree.

Liberal Commercial Policy of Iyeyasu.—Hideyoshi died in 1598, and within a few years the power which he had consolidated passed into the hands of his ablest general, Iyeyasu. His policy in respect to foreign trade and relations was most liberal and more enlightened than that which prevailed in Europe at the time. He sought commercial relations with both the Philippines and New Spain, he desired Spanish naval architects and silver miners to instruct his workmen, and when the Dutch and English finally reached Japan he gladly opened his ports to them and gave them favorable trading privileges. His liberality, which was shown by his tolerance of the missionaries although the expulsion edict was not repealed, encouraged friars of several orders to enter Japan from Manila, and in 1608 a papal bull opened Japan to missionary effort from any quarter. The next year the Spaniards legalized the Manila trade, which up to that time had been in violation of their compact with Portugal.

Dutch and English Merchants.—By the dawn of the seventeenth century the Dutch and English had demonstrated the hollowness of the monopoly claims of Portugal and Spain to all the Eastern commerce and possessions, and the English East India Company was formed in 1600, to be followed by a powerful combination of the Dutch companies in 1602. One of the early Dutch companies had sent out in 1598 a fleet of five vessels by way of the Straits of Magellan. One of these ships, blown out of its course by storms, entered the harbor of Bungo in April, 1600. The pilot of this vessel was Will Adams, an Englishman. Brought into the presence of Iyeyasu, he made a good impression; he was taken into the regent's service, given an estate, and employed as an adviser in ship-building and commercial affairs. The presence of this English Protestant at the court of Iyeyasu boded ill for the Portuguese and Spaniards and their Catholic workers. In 1609 two Dutch ships followed up the accidental visit of 1600, and a Dutch factory was erected at Hirado. At this time Iyeyasu sent a letter to the "King of Holland," Maurice

of Nassau. The success of the Dutch encouraged the English company to extend its operations to Japan. In 1613 an English ship arrived at Hirado. Will Adams hastened there from Yedo and escorted the captain and others of the company to the court of Iyeyasu, who hospitably received them at Shidzuoka. A charter for free trade was given them as well as the right to build a factory at Yedo and punish their own offenders. Iyeyasu desired the English to trade at Yedo, and Will Adams strongly urged it, but Captain Saris determined to establish the factory at Hirado, in the south. This enterprise was badly managed, and in 1623 the English gave up their trade with Japan at a time when the Dutch were making large profits from their commerce.

The Christian Religion Proscribed.—Iyeyasu retired as shogun in 1605, but until his death in 1616 he was the real power in the land although his son, Hidetada, was nominally the shogun. As a part of his liberal commercial policy Iyeyasu had tolerated the foreign missionaries. He had forbidden the daimyos and his own officers to accept the faith, but it was not until 1612 that he turned against the foreign religion and absolutely forbade its practice in Japan. It is difficult to determine satisfactorily the motives which brought about this fateful decision. The national, commercial, and religious rivalries of Dutch, English, Portuguese, and Spaniards were, of course, brought to his attention. Will Adams, the English adviser, had nothing good to say of the Catholic missionaries. A Japanese who had visited Europe is also reported to have given Iyeyasu an unfavorable report on the religious dissensions and wars which prevailed in the West. At the same time a conspiracy, in which Christians were involved, was disclosed. Any one of these reasons might have prompted the founder of a new shogunate to eradicate an alien faith which was actively supported by two of the great world-empires of the West, Spain and Portugal. The assertion of the temporal authority of the Pope was enough to alarm an Oriental statesman. If it were true that the Japanese Christians, perhaps 300,000 strong, would in a crisis obey the orders transmitted by their foreign teachers, and perhaps coöperate with the forces of

Spain and Portugal, then a dangerous political situation existed which must be considered quite apart from any religious doctrines. Although in some of the feudal fiefs there had been some execution of Japanese Christians before 1612, no instance was recorded in the vast domains of Iyeyasu. But immediately after the promulgation of the edict of 1612 all the Franciscan churches were demolished, as well as eighty-six of the Jesuit. The next year twenty-seven Japanese Christians were executed in Iyeyasu's capital, Yedo, and in 1614 a drastic proclamation ordered the suppression of Christianity throughout the empire. Even then the foreign priests were spared, and many of the daimyos refused to molest the native Christians in their domains. It was at this time that a remarkable mission from the daimyo of Sendai crossed the Pacific to present a letter to the Pope. Leaving Sendai in 1613, the Japanese mission arrived three months later at Acapulco, Mexico. From Vera Cruz it crossed the Atlantic to Spain and proceeded by land to Italy, reaching Rome in 1615. Returning by the same route, the mission reached Sendai in 1620, and only in that year was the feudal lord compelled to issue decrees against the practice of Christianity in his fief.

Enforcement of the Anti-Christian Decrees.—It should be observed that in 1587 Hideyoshi ordered the foreign missionaries to leave Japan, but only once did he enforce the penalties, in 1597. In 1612 Iyeyasu forbade the Christian religion, but he refrained from punishing the recalcitrant priests and tried to impress the native Christians by only a few exemplary executions. After his death, in 1616, Hidetada, now shogun in fact as well as name, announced that he would enforce the well-known decrees. Two priests were finally arrested and beheaded in May, 1617. Two more suffered the same fate a month later, and these were high officials of the Dominican and Augustinian orders. The punishment of Japanese Christians steadily increased. It should be observed that the Japanese officials tried to persuade the converts to recant in order to avoid punishment and much preferred to have the priests quietly leave the country rather than proceed to ex-

treme measures, and at no time were the edicts rigorously enforced. Accurate figures will probably never be available, but an estimate that 280,000 Japanese and a few foreigners suffered punishment of some kind between 1614 and 1635, principally imprisonment or exile, with some executions by beheading, crucifixion, burning, and the *fosse* (ditch), even if exaggerated, testifies to the stanchness of the loyalty of these early Japanese Christians. Hidetada, we have reason to believe, was sincere in his belief that the missionaries were but the forerunners of a Spanish invasion. Two missions which came up from Manila were sent away without results. Finally the governor-general of the Philippines and the governor of Macao forbade any ship captain to carry missionaries to Japan, while the archbishop of Manila, on his part, repeated the prohibition.

The Spaniards Excluded.—The next step, which indicates the political nature of the Japanese action, was to order the deportation of all Spaniards from Japan in 1624. This brought to an end direct relations between Japan and the Philippines, which had been carried on since 1592. At the same time Japanese Christians were forbidden to leave the country, while non-Christians and renegades were forbidden to visit the Philippines. It is interesting to note that during the period of the Nagasaki-Manila trade a large part of the goods imported from Manila consisted of Chinese produce, notably silk, which found their way to Japan in this indirect fashion because of the limited direct trade between China and Japan.

Seclusion Decreed.—Hidetada followed the example of his father and retired in 1623, but wielded the power until his death in 1632. His son, Iyemitsu, who stands next to Iyeyasu as a great Tokugawa administrator, maintained the policy handed down to him. In 1636 he issued a seclusion edict which forbade any Japanese vessel to proceed abroad, while subjects attempting to leave the country as well as those abroad who might return would be put to death. Thus, with one decree, the overseas commerce which Iyeyasu had tried so hard to develop was brought to an end. No ship could be

constructed which would be sea-worthy on an ocean voyage. The reason for this decree seems to have been that Japanese Christians were going abroad and receiving religious instruction at Macao or Manila so that they might return and carry on the Christian propaganda in place of the foreign missionaries. Not until 1866 was this seclusion edict repealed. The trade of the Portuguese and Dutch was still permitted, but many restrictions were imposed to prevent the entry of priests, some of whom, however, continued to smuggle themselves into the forbidden land. In 1636 the Portuguese were removed to an artificial islet, known as Deshima, at Nagasaki, which later became better known as the site of the Dutch factory, although at this time the Netherlands were subjected to similar restrictions at Hirado.

The Portuguese Excluded.—The Portuguese were not to enjoy their privileged position for long. At this time (1581-1640) Portugal was united with Spain, but the Japanese had distinguished between the two nations and had feared Spanish encroachment far more than Portuguese. But in 1637 a peasant revolt broke out in the Shimabara peninsula, of Hizen province, and Amakusa island, in Higo. Among the leaders were some Christian ronins (samurai who had been stripped of their privileges and pensions because of their faith), and many of the insurgents were also adherents of the proscribed faith. Japanese historians, therefore, assert that this was a Christian rebellion, a hopeless attempt to escape from the religious persecutions, while the Church historians maintain that it was the soulless tyranny of the local daimyos which drove their submissive people into revolt. In any case, some 20,000 fighting men, with their women and children, took possession of the abandoned castle of Hara, where they defied the feudal levies sent against them. The lords of Kyushu, some twenty-five in number, assembled their forces around the doomed city. From the sea a bombardment began, and a Dutch ship was ordered to join in the attack. Finally, in April, 1638, the fortress was taken by assault and almost all the defenders put to the sword. Two important effects followed this last civil struggle in Japan—for unbroken peace

was now to prevail for 226 years. The Christian leaders in western Japan were destroyed in this single tragedy, so that few penalties were later meted out to Christian believers. As the Portuguese were believed to have encouraged this revolt—for Nagasaki was only a few miles away from Shimabara—an edict was promptly issued which forbade any subject of the Spanish king from setting foot on the shores of Japan, while any Portuguese ship entering the ports would be burned with its cargo and those on board executed. In this way the period of Portuguese intercourse, which had lasted for ninety-six years, was summarily brought to a close. In 1640 the Portuguese sent up an imposing embassy to testify that no missionaries had gone to Japan from Macao for many years and to prove the innocence of their nationals in the Shimabara revolt, but it met with a determined enforcement of the decree. The four envoys and fifty-seven of their companions were beheaded, the ship was burned, and a few were spared to carry the dread news back to Macao. Near their burial place a tablet was erected with this inscription:

So long as the sun warms the earth, let no Christian be so bold as to come to Japan, and let all know that if King Philip himself, or even the very God of the Christians, or the great Shaka contravene this prohibition, they shall pay for it with their heads.

In this very year Portugal regained her independence, and five years later a second embassy carried the news to Japan with a plea for the renewal of the old intercourse; but nothing could be gained, although this time the vessel was allowed to depart.

Dutch and Chinese Permitted to Trade at Nagasaki.—Inter-course with Europe was not, however, entirely cut off. The Dutch, who had been consistently hostile to the Spaniards and Portuguese, who had cared nothing about religious propaganda and were interested solely in commerce, were allowed to continue their trade with Japan. In 1641 they were removed from Hirado to Nagasaki, where they were consigned to the Portuguese factory at Deshima. The trade with China was similarly regulated, and a fixed number of Chinese junks was permitted to visit this port every year. Nagasaki, far to

the south and west, became the sole port of entry for Western and Chinese goods and ideas. The Koreans, at an earlier date, had applied similar restrictive measures to Japanese commerce at Fusan. The Chinese, later, attempted to confine all foreign trade to Canton. The Japanese alone enforced their exclusion edicts with rigid impartiality, so that respect for Japanese decrees was ingrained in the Dutch merchants and visitors.

Summary.—Attempts have been made to show that the exclusion policy of Japan was based primarily upon the fear of Western ideas rather than of Western aggression. But the development of this policy, as we have traced it, indicates clearly that it was due to fear of the political implications of the Christian religion as disseminated in this era. The Japanese had shown themselves so liberal in the acceptance of Chinese and Indian religious and cultural ideas as to preclude the idea that they had suddenly turned against other alien influences. The attempt to curb the Western missionaries, beginning in 1587, and then to check the foreign faith after 1612, coupled with the exclusion first of the Spaniards and then of the Portuguese, and the permission granted to the Dutch to visit the country, all indicate that it was the fear of the Christian religion, which, in spite of all their efforts, could not be divorced from the Spanish and Portuguese commerce, which prompted their action. And this fear was, for a brief period, revived after Japan resumed her open Western intercourse in the nineteenth century.

The effects of this policy of exclusion and seclusion were great. First of all, the country abandoned its mercantile and naval marine establishment, and withdrew from the overseas commerce which had been so liberally encouraged by the great Iyeyasu. Secondly, the withdrawal from foreign intercourse, except for the limited trade of the Dutch and Chinese, certainly removed the danger of international friction and war. Japan now entered upon an amazing period of freedom from internal and foreign strife, a period unique in the history of all the present great powers. The fears of the Japanese on account of Spanish aggression were soon set aside by the

march of events, for Spain had entered upon her long period of decline, while the rising maritime powers of Europe, the Dutch, English, and French, were centering their interests upon the New World or upon southern Asia, the East Indies, and later China. It was not until the second quarter of the nineteenth century that the commercial expansion of the West reached the region of Japan, and when that time arrived the old policy of seclusion was doomed. Thirdly, the policy of seclusion prevented the expansion of Japan into the adjacent regions, which at that time were little prepared to stem a determined Japanese advance. Although the Japanese might have increased their influence in Indo-China, the East Indies, the Pacific islands, and even Australia (which was not occupied by Great Britain until 1788), there is little reason for believing that this would have been the case. During the Great Peace the population of Japan remained almost stationary, at about 30,000,000, so the pressure which to-day prevails was not then present. Moreover, the feudal organization which existed at the time did not lend itself to overseas enterprise. The effect of open commerce and world intercourse upon the political organization of Japan might have modified these conditions, as they did so rapidly in the nineteenth century, but, given the conditions which actually prevailed, there is no reason to believe that Japan would have built up a great overseas empire in the lands now held by the European powers. Finally, the cutting off of almost all foreign intercourse accounts in large measure for the crystallization of the social, political, and economic order in Japan during the next two centuries. Progress, as has been pointed out, is due no less to competition than to thought. Isolation retards progress. Although some Western ideas seeped into Japan through the Dutch at Nagasaki, it was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that the Japanese stood amazed at the material progress made by the West during the centuries when their country, as it were, slumbered. During the first half of the period Japan suffered little in comparison with Western nations, but with the utilization of steam as a substitute for human power, and the industrial revolution, the

West forged ahead in material strength and effectiveness. The efforts of Japan to catch up with this march of progress make one of the fascinating chapters of modern history. What would have happened if Japan had found it possible to carry out the liberal foreign policies of Iyeyasu, and had not receded to a policy of seclusion and exclusion, affords a rich field for the imagination.

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CHAPTER XVII

THE GREAT PEACE, 1638-1864

The Feudal System of the Tokugawas.—If the policy of seclusion and exclusion freed Japan from foreign complications, the feudal system perfected by Iyeyasu and his grandson Iyemitsu assured Japan internal peace for a long period. Iyeyasu had risen, during the years of warfare after the fall of the Ashikaga shogunate, from a small landholder to a lord of provinces, master of Japan, and shogun. His fundamental policy was to maintain a balance of power so that no combination of the old feudal families could shake the control of the Tokugawa and their loyal feudatories. To bring this about he punished the daimyos who had opposed him at the battle of Sekigahara (1600) by stripping them of large portions of their estates and transferring these lands to retainers of undoubted fidelity. Thus, the Mori family lost six of the eight provinces which it had acquired. A similar fate befell other families. The land confiscated in this way was given to his sons and relatives and to the daimyos and samurai who had rallied to his banner. By transferring the daimyos from one fief to another Iyeyasu saw to it that loyal chieftains were interspersed among men of doubtful allegiance, while the important highroads and passes were controlled by trustworthy lords. At the principal ports his own administrators were placed in charge. It was in western Japan that these arrangements were least effectively carried out. Here many old families, who looked upon the Tokugawas as newcomers and upstarts, still held vast estates. And it was in this region that opposition to the Tokugawa family never disappeared, and finally rose to bring about its downfall in 1868. The old daimyos, many of whom still possessed large estates, were known as *tozama* (exterior nobles), while those who supported Iyeyasu before the fall of Osaka were enrolled as *fudai* (hereditary retainers). Out of 262 daimyos the latter numbered 176. They alone could hold offices in the shogunate

administration. The destruction of Hideyori at Osaka, in 1615, removed the only immediate menace to the new organization, and soon after that event Iyeyasu and Hidetada issued the "Laws of the Military Houses" and the "Rules of the Imperial Court and the Court Nobles" which formulated the details of the perfected feudal system. Communication with the emperor could only pass through the shogun's representative at Kyoto. All war-like plans of the feudal lords must be approved by the shogun, and during the Great Peace this approval was never granted. No intermarriage could take place between daimyo families. In these, and other ways to be mentioned, the opportunities for feudal strife were adequately controlled.

Residence of the Daimyos at Yedo.—Under Iyemitsu, in 1626, all the daimyos were compelled to leave their wives and families permanently at Yedo, and themselves reside at the shogun's capital for half the time. Those living in central Japan spent six months of every year in Yedo, while the daimyos from the east and west spent every other year there. At their Yedo residences, known as *yashiki*, a body of retainers, including a picked force of samurai, was always present, while the daimyo processions, which passed up and down the great highways at regular intervals, were imposing spectacles and have been the subject of many famous pictures by the artists of the time. The many daimyo residences, with the thousands of officials and servants who thronged them, added to the prosperity and magnificence of the Tokugawa capital.

Administrative Powers of the Daimyos.—Within their own fiefs the daimyos had complete administrative powers. Taxes were levied and revenues collected according to their own will. Their income was estimated in terms of the estimated yield of rice in their domains and no daimyo had an income of less than 10,000 koku. The koku was approximately equal to five bushels, and the cash value varied, of course, with the value of rice at any time. Not a few daimyos had incomes of over 100,000 koku, while Maeda, the greatest of the *tozama* lords, was rated at 1,027,000. Out of this income the private expenses of the lord were met, as well as the administrative

charges of the fief, but no contribution was demanded by the shogunate. It derived its revenues from the vast estates which it acquired by conquest and confiscation at the time of Iyeyasu. In the same way, although certain general laws were laid down for the feudatories, the estates had their own courts and codes of law. Within the shogun's domain a uniform code existed, but not until the Restoration period were universally applicable codes of law promulgated.

Military Service.—The shogunate armies were made up of the direct retainers of the shogun in his own estates. In time of war, however, the feudal lords were expected to supply a fixed number of men and maintain them in the field at their own expense. The number of these fighting men was based upon the assessed income of the fief, and varied from a mere handful in the case of the *hatamoto* to a thousand or more on the part of the richer lords. Such levies were assembled to repress the Shimabara rebellion and to repel foreign ships which tried to visit Japan during the days of exclusion.

Punitive Measures.—In dealing with the feudatories the Tokugawa shoguns did not fail to resort to severe measures. Any sign of disaffection might be punished by fine, exile, or even death, while fiefs were confiscated or reduced in size for real or alleged offenses, including misconduct or maladministration. When it was believed that a *tozama* lord had amassed too large a surplus in his treasury, which might encourage him to oppose the shogun, the honor of executing costly public works would be intrusted to him, such as the building or renovation of castles or the curbing of unruly rivers. A notable example was the building of the famous castle of Nagoya, which drained the treasuries of twenty great daimyos, while the lord of Satsuma, as late as 1753, was ordered to repair the levees of the Kiso River, some 750 miles from his fief, which cost far more than the estimated allowance and resulted in the suicide of seventy-nine samurai who had hastily borrowed money from Osaka bankers in order to complete the undertaking and avert the punishment which otherwise would have befallen their lord. To-day they are honored as examples of samurai who were true to their lord even unto death. Such,

in brief, were the more significant measures devised by the early Tokugawa to curb the feudal chaos which had existed during the Ashikaga period and the thirty years which followed it. The shogunate was distinctly a military régime, and under it the men of the sword were exalted in honor, but the Tokugawa organization assured Japan internal peace and the blessings which accompanied it.

The Social Order.—In the days of feudal warfare many opportunities were offered to men of courage and resourcefulness and not a few of them rose from low estate to become, like Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and Iyeyasu, great generals and lords of wide domains. But all this was changed during the Great Peace. Then the social order crystallized, and although there was some movement from class to class, there was little in comparison with the spectacular changes of the days of strife. First in rank and honor were the old court families, the kuge, but as they possessed no landed estates and depended upon pensions granted them by the shogun or disbursed from the petty imperial revenues, they were rich in honor but poor in purse. Their court rank and the titles which had been transmitted from almost countless generations were envied by the territorial nobles, but their influence was small. Next ranked the daimyos, who in turn were listed in terms of their assessed revenues and their order of precedence at the shogunate court. While all were compelled to spend half of their time in Yedo, only the fudai were permitted to hold any of the official posts in the Yedo administration. Below them stood the hatamoto (under the flag), direct vassals of the Tokugawa, about 2,000 in number, who enjoyed lands or income of less than 10,000 koku, the minimum income of the daimyos. These men were used in many of the minor administrative positions, while between them and the samurai stood the gokenin, about 5,000 in all, who were similarly employed. The right to bear arms was, during the Great Peace, enjoyed in the main solely by a class of hereditary fighting men known as samurai. These were vassals of the daimyos or of the shogun himself. During the earlier days of strife any able-bodied farmer or peasant would be summoned to the colors, but in the days of peace the

privilege of wearing the two swords, one a long weapon grasped in both hands, was jealously guarded by the warrior class. The samurai were maintained by their superiors, usually being granted a pension in rice or money, and in some estates holding a tract of land. Their incomes rarely exceeded 100 koku, but they were trained to shun luxury and to find contentment in their honor and their opportunities for martial or civil employment. During this period the samurai families numbered around 450,000. Additional troops, who did not enjoy the social prestige of the samurai, were the foot warriors and the light infantry. Unlike the bannermen in China, the samurai kept themselves at a high pitch of military efficiency. Archery was practiced, although its effectiveness had been destroyed by the introduction of firearms, while the use of the sword and spear was part of the training of every military man. The deadly two-handed sword could be swung with fatal effectiveness by these hard-muscled warriors.

The Civilians.—Below the military men stood the civilians. First in order came the farmers, whose status was much higher than in mediæval Europe. They were respected as the class who provided the rice and other food-crops for the entire population. They were also the principal taxpayers, and it was not unusual for a successful farmer to pass into the samurai class. In the Satsuma fief, notably, many of the samurai were also farmers. The artisans stood just below them, for they also produced something useful and their services merited recognition. But the merchants were held in low esteem. They produced nothing and profited simply by disposing of the products of others. Great merchant families arose at the principal trading cities, and some of the great corporations of to-day go back to such beginnings in feudal times, but for the most part the merchants were looked upon as the lowest of the common folk. This attitude toward trade and its participants proved to be one of the most difficult survivals of Old Japan to eradicate when world intercourse was later renewed. And at the bottom of the social order stood the outcasts, those wretched people whose hereditary occupations involved some form of pollution. These were the eta or hinin,

and among them were numbered the beggars, those who handled dead bodies, those engaged in professional amusements, as well as executioners. In Japan the military class ranked above the civilians. In China the scholars, who made up the official hierarchy and the gentry, stood first, while the soldiers were classified with the servants and slaves at the very bottom of the list. If this distinction is kept in mind much light will be shed upon the relations which prevailed between two such different social organizations and the Western people with whom they came into contact.

Bushido.—As the samurai were to play a leading part in the making of New Japan, some attention should be given to the ideals which animated this influential class during the days of the Great Peace. As generation after generation passed without any opportunity to make use of the military training which they kept alive, the military men, or *bushi*, naturally dwelt upon the great deeds of their heroes who won undying fame in more spirited times. These glorious traditions were handed down by word of mouth and by writing until a code of the warrior, *bushido*, was roughly perfected. In this unformulated code emphasis was laid upon such virtues as rectitude, courage, benevolence, politeness, sincerity, honor, disdain of money, self-control, and above all, loyalty. This loyalty was to be given without reserve to the lord of the domain, be he the daimyo or the shogun himself. Loyalty to the emperor was not considered part of the duty of the samurai, and it was the transference of this loyalty from the feudal lord to the imperial personage which marked the great Restoration in the middle of the nineteenth century. Perhaps the acid test of samurai conduct was what was known as *renchishin* (the consciousness of shame). No samurai should under any circumstances do anything which brought upon him a consciousness of shame. "A man who had lost his sense of shame forfeited his human claims," the great Japanese exponent of bushido tells us. This unwillingness to be looked down upon proved to be one of the most powerful forces in bringing about the rapid transformation of Japan after 1868, for her leaders would not be content until Japan possessed all the attributes which

gave a modern state a standing in the eyes of the world. It must not be expected that all the samurai lived up to the high ideas professed by their order. Treachery was not unheard of in the records of samurai conduct, courage was at times lacking, and benevolence, especially in the treatment of the inferior classes, was often forgotten, but in the main these virtues were held aloft for the samurai to follow, and their measure of success was great. After the Restoration these standards were openly professed by the former inferior classes and have had profound influence in formulating standards of conduct in recent times.

Foreign Relations.—After 1641 Japan's intercourse with Europe and China was confined to the Dutch and Chinese trading at Nagasaki. No Japanese ships could proceed overseas except to the Loochoo Islands, considered a vassal of Satsuma, and to the port of Fusan, in Korea, a strictly limited commerce enjoyed by the daimyo of Tsushima. The Dutch were removed to Nagasaki in 1641 and established in the old Portuguese factory on the artificial islet of Deshima. Here, on a fan-like piece of land about 600 by 240 feet in dimensions, the Dutch traders were confined. The whole island was inclosed by a high board fence, and a well-guarded stone bridge connected it with the town. High posts were erected in the harbor warning all boats from approaching the forbidden zone. Only licensed Japanese might visit the factory, and rarely were the Hollanders allowed to emerge from their confinement. Down to 1790 the number of Dutch ships visiting the harbor had been reduced from six or seven to only two a year, and at that time the number was finally fixed at a single vessel. When it arrived, all papers, books, and even coins, which might have the slightest reference to Christianity or bore a cross upon them, had to be carefully concealed. All guns, weapons, and even the rudder were removed, and guard-boats prevented any unauthorized communication with the mainland. Every year before 1790, and then every four years, the head of the factory was required to proceed to Yedo with presents for the court. On this journey, which then frequently occupied two months, the party was conveyed in

veiled palanquins, and careful measures were taken to prevent their communicating with any Japanese along the route. At Yedo they were taken before the shogun, where they were received in most humiliating fashion, but this was to be expected in a country where the native merchants were so ill esteemed. In spite of the many precautions which the officials insisted upon, some of the foreigners succeeded in gathering a surprising amount of information about Japan, and the works of Dutch and others who were attached to the Nagasaki staff furnished Europe with its most accurate information concerning Japan after the missionaries were expelled. On the other hand eager Japanese scholars visited the Dutch at Nagasaki, or during their visits to Yedo, and plied them with questions concerning the West. Much information, especially of a scientific and medicinal nature, seeped into Japan in spite of the exclusion edicts. The Dutch language was studied and a few Western books were secretly circulated, for not until 1740 were foreign works of a secular nature permitted to be brought into the country. It must not be imagined that Japan was entirely shut off from Western thought during the long period of seclusion. In spite of the commercial restrictions the trade of the Dutch was a very profitable one. This was largely due to the low price of copper in Japan and the great profit which came from minting the ore into coins and circulating them in the East Indies. But with only one ship a year no expansion of the trade was possible. The Dutch, however, were most careful of their conduct in order not to lose their monopoly of the Western trade and constantly hoped that some relaxation in the regulations would be forthcoming.

Oriental Trade.—The seclusion edict applied equally to trade with the neighboring lands. Political relations with China had ceased with the Mongol invasions and the piratical reprisals of Japanese adventurers in the following years. Chinese junks were allowed to visit Nagasaki, where trade regulations similar to those imposed upon the Dutch were enforced. Before 1684 the number of junks was fixed at seventy a year, then, until 1740, it was reduced to twenty, and after that year to ten annually. The annual value of this

trade was small, but information regarding China and her dealings with the Westerners entered Japan through this channel. With the Loochoo Islands trade was conducted through Kagoshima, the port of Satsuma. The trade at Fusan will be considered in another chapter, but it is of interest to note here that the Koreans segregated the Japanese community at Fusan long before the Japanese applied similar measures to the Dutch and Chinese at Nagasaki. This trade was carried on in small Japanese vessels from the neighboring island of Tsushima, and by this route came the Korean embassies which bore presents and congratulations to each new shogun until 1811.

Summary.—The Great Peace, between 1638 and 1864, almost covers the whole period of the Tokugawa shogunate. It began with the withdrawal of the feudal levies from the smoking ruins of Hara; it ended when similar forces were assembled to punish the rebellious daimyo of Choshu. In this long period Japan enjoyed perfect peace, in marked contrast to conditions in China, India, Europe, and even America. The social order crystallized, the arts flourished; in spite of weak shoguns and administrative abuses the political machinery devised by the early Tokugawas continued to function with evident success. But it was adapted to other days, and should Japan face the modern world it was doomed to immediate disaster. Toward the end of the period improved transportation and new trade routes were relentlessly drawing Japan into the circle of world intercourse. The success of the isolation policy caused all but the most enlightened students of affairs to rely upon it to save Japan from newly threatening complications. But, as we shall see, the first determined effort to break down the barriers of exclusion was to meet with an unexpected success.

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CHAPTER XVIII

THE REOPENING OF JAPAN

Western Nations Seek Intercourse with Japan.—It was not to be expected that Japan would be able to maintain her seclusion policy indefinitely. The English East India Company, which had voluntarily abandoned its factory at Hirado in 1623, sent up a representative fifty years later and requested the renewal of the old trading privileges, but although the ship and its company were allowed to depart in safety, the request was not granted on the ground that the king of England was married to a Portuguese princess. For the next hundred years the maritime powers of Europe were interested primarily in the trade and exploitation of southern Asia and the East Indies and the increasingly profitable commerce with Canton. Approaching the East by way of the Cape of Good Hope, Japan lay at the very end of the trade route, and aside from the regular Dutch trading ships no European vessels entered her waters. The rapid expansion of Russia across Siberia had brought this European country into close proximity to Japan. In 1638 it was only a question of time when the Russians would explore and attempt to occupy the islands which lay to the north of Old Japan. In the early eighteenth century this process began. By 1736 a Russian ship had visited Yezo and northern Honshu, and in the following years several Russian explorers and traders touched at Japanese ports. In 1804 a Russian mission was repulsed at Nagasaki, although it brought back shipwrecked Japanese seamen and counted upon this humanitarian gesture as an argument in favor of modifying the exclusion laws. The southward movement of Russia caused great alarm among the shogunate officials and some of the northern daimyos, and proved to be one of the effective arguments in favor of opening the country to general foreign intercourse. Around 1800 British and French exploring expeditions visited the coasts of Japan, and attempts were made by American and British traders to

exchange goods. During the Napoleonic wars the Dutch chartered an American ship on seven occasions to carry on their trade with Nagasaki when they were afraid to venture into waters controlled by the British, and in 1813, when the British held Java, one of their vessels visited Nagasaki, where the Dutch flag still waved. An English man-of-war, the *Phaeton*, entered the harbor of Nagasaki in 1808, which resulted in the suicide of several Japanese officers who should have halted its advance. A new element was introduced after 1820 when the whaling ships of many nations began to cruise off the northern islands of Japan. Not only did they desire wood and water and provisions, which could not be obtained as long as exclusion existed, but occasionally a whaling ship would come to grief on this dangerous, fog-bound coast. The ships and their property fell into the hands of the Japanese, while the seamen, who according to the then standards of the West should be treated with kindness and compassion, were liable to execution—which, however, was never enforced—or to close confinement and conveyance to Nagasaki, where they could be sent away in a Dutch or Chinese ship. Such treatment accorded to American seamen in the 'forties, and especially the report that they were required to trample upon a cross or a picture of the Crucifixion, stimulated interest in measures which would assure better treatment of shipwrecked men and property in Japan. On several occasions foreign ships attempted to return Japanese seamen who had been rescued away from their shores. The most interesting attempt was that of the American ship *Morrison*, which in 1837 brought back some Japanese seamen who had been blown clear across the Pacific to British Columbia. Having been sent around to England and then carried to Macao in a ship of the East India Company, an American merchant there outfitted an expedition to return them to Japan and at the same time endeavor to open up commercial relations. At Yedo and Kagoshima the *Morrison* was repulsed and fired upon, and in 1843 an edict appeared which stated that Japanese castaways could only be returned in Dutch or Chinese ships. This was a slight modification of the seclusion edict which

had proclaimed the death penalty for all Japanese who, on any pretense, left the country.

Special Interests of the United States.—Although American traders had visited Canton in 1784 and soon participated in the China trade to a degree second only to the British, few of these ships approached the coasts of Japan except those which in the early days carried out cargoes of furs from the northwest coast. As early as 1815 Commodore Porter, famous for his naval exploits during the second war with Great Britain, proposed that a naval expedition be sent to open the Japanese ports. The presence of American whalers off the northern islands after 1820 made the opening of these ports especially desirable, as well as arrangements for the proper treatment of shipwrecked men and property. The American occupation of the Oregon country early in the century, which was finally recognized by Great Britain in 1846, brought the United States to the Pacific and made Japan her nearest Asiatic neighbor. The annexation of California in 1848 and the discovery of gold there the next year, with the rise of a vigorous population on the west coast, enlarged America's interests in the Pacific. Direct trade between San Francisco and the recently opened Chinese ports was inaugurated, and proposals were made for the employment of steam vessels in this service. Before this could be done coaling stations were needed, for the small ships of the time could not carry enough coal to supply the demands of so long a voyage. Such a depot could be arranged for in the Hawaiian Islands, but another was needed in Japan. Coal was known to exist in Formosa and was reported as being found near Nagasaki. The furtherance of steamship communication between California and China was to be the prime motive in the first deliberate and carefully planned attempt to reopen Japan.

American Diplomatic Efforts.—Before this time the Washington administration had instructed three of its representatives in the East to visit Japan and, if possible, negotiate a commercial treaty. In 1832 and 1835, Edmund Roberts, who negotiated treaties with Siam and Muscat, was given a letter of credence to Japan, but on his last mission he died at Macao.

In 1844 Caleb Cushing was commissioned to make such a treaty, but these instructions failed to reach him before he left China. The next year Alexander H. Everett, commissioner to China, was given similar instructions, and in his place Commodore Biddle, with two warships, visited Yedo, where his requests for trading privileges were politely but firmly denied. Then came the annexation of California, and in 1851 Commodore Aulick, in command of the East India squadron, was instructed to visit Japan with his naval force, present a letter to the emperor from President Fillmore, and, if possible, sign a treaty of amity and commerce. In the instructions furnished him by Daniel Webster, secretary of state, he was first to request the protection of American sailors and property, and then permission to purchase coal. The president's letter said nothing about the protection of seamen, specified the desire for coal, but also indicated that general trade was desired. At Hong Kong Aulick found a letter of recall, and the mission was intrusted to a brother officer, Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry, who was assured an enlarged naval force suitable for such an important but unpromising mission.

Perry's Mission to Japan.—The new envoy was allowed ample time to make adequate preparations for his task. All available information and charts concerning Japan were secured, and the good offices of the Dutch at Nagasaki were solicited, which prompted them to attempt to secure a modification of the restrictions which they had endured even before the American expedition might arrive. New instructions defined the objects of the mission to be some permanent arrangement for the protection of American seamen and property wrecked on the coasts or driven into the ports of Japan; to secure permission for American ships to enter one or more ports for supplies of provisions, water, and fuel, or to refit in case of disaster, as well as to establish a depot for coal; and permission for such ships to enter one or more of the ports for the purpose of disposing of their cargoes by sale or barter. These were moderate requests and were based upon the well-known opposition of the Japanese to any enlarged foreign

intercourse. The promised reinforcements did not reach Perry in time, so it was with only four ships, two of them steam vessels, the first of the kind to visit the ports of Japan, that the American expedition entered the Bay of Yedo on July 8, 1853. The decks were cleared for action, not as an offensive measure, but because of the treatment accorded the *Morrison* in 1837. Soon the armed forces of the shogun and the nearest daimyos were put in motion, and Yedo resounded with the tramp of warriors summoned to protect the threatened capital. Commodore Perry acted with the greatest caution and dignity. To the Japanese officials who came out to his flagship he sent word that he would only deal with a functionary of the highest rank, and that a suitable person should be sent to receive the letter from the president to the emperor. Under no circumstances would he treat at Nagasaki with its traditions of Dutch subservience. While the Japanese deliberated he moved his ships up the bay, nearer to Yedo, and sent out armed boats to make surveys of the harbor. Finally, with unusual promptness for an Eastern country, the two governors of Uruga, who were announced as the daimyos of Iwami and Izu, appeared in state on the 14th and the letter was delivered with fitting ceremony. On the 17th the fleet sailed away, Perry having wisely announced that within a year he would return for the Japanese answer. President Fillmore's letter, while enumerating the objects already mentioned, contained two effective points. One stressed the fact that the Constitution and laws of the United States forbade all interference in the religious and political concerns of other nations, and the other suggested that the exclusion laws might be suspended for five or ten years and then renewed if the experiment were found detrimental.

Treaty of Peace and Amity.—Perry returned to China, where an attempt was made to divert his forces to the protection of Americans at the ports during the Taiping rebellion. In the meantime he learned that a Russian admiral had visited Nagasaki and demanded commercial intercourse, which prompted him to hasten his return to Yedo. At the capital heated discussions took place as to the wisdom of acceding

to the American requests. Copies of the president's letter were sent to the daimyos and their opinions requested. War-like preparations were made, strong forts were erected to protect Yedo, and the coastal lords were ordered to mobilize their retainers. But, happily, wise counsels prevailed and the shogun decided to treat with the naval diplomat rather than enter upon a costly and perhaps disastrous war. In February, 1854, Perry returned to the Bay of Yedo. This time his squadron numbered seven vessels, three of them steamships, and two more joined him before the treaty was signed. On the 8th of March the reply to the president's letter was transmitted, which granted all the requests, but did not satisfy the commodore because he desired to have the concessions written into a formal treaty. Three days later the presents for the emperor and high officials were landed, including articles of all kinds which would impress the Japanese with the mechanical advances of the West. Perhaps the most interesting was a miniature railroad, large enough for the Japanese to ride upon the roofs of the model cars. They soon understood how to operate this surprising contrivance, but the principle involved in the accompanying telegraphic apparatus was for some time quite beyond their comprehension. A few days later suitable presents were exchanged in the name of the emperor, and the actual treaty negotiations were rapidly and smoothly conducted. The treaty was signed on March 31, 1854. It was, as its first clause indicated, a treaty of peace and amity rather than a general commercial convention. The twelve articles contained these significant provisions:

1. The port of Shimoda would be opened immediately for supplies of wood, water, provisions, and coal. Hakodate would be opened a year later.

2. Good treatment would be accorded shipwrecked men and goods. They would be taken to Shimoda or Hakodate and would not be confined or subjected to the restrictions imposed upon the Dutch and Chinese at Nagasaki.

3. Trade would be permitted under Japanese regulations, and the supplies mentioned above could only be procured through the agency of the proper Japanese officers.

4. The most-favored-nation clause was inserted.

5. The United States might appoint consuls or agents at Shimoda after eighteen months, if either government deemed it necessary.

It should be observed that this treaty did not provide for general trade, but only under Japanese regulations and through the agency of Japanese officers. Unlike the existing treaties with China, it contained no conventional tariff nor extraterritorial privileges. Dr. S. Wells Williams, an American missionary from China who was the interpreter of the mission, advised Perry to omit the extraterritorial clause because he was familiar with its abuses on the mainland. In additional regulations signed at Shimoda on June 17th, a crude extraterritorial provision was inserted to the effect that Americans who were found transgressing Japanese laws might be apprehended by the police and taken on board their ships. As the treaty did not provide for the residence of Americans at the two open ports, except in the case of consuls or agents, this regulation would apply only to seamen or others frequenting the ports while their ships were in the harbor.

Reasons for Perry's Success.—The modification of the Japanese exclusion laws through the efforts of the American commodore was accomplished under conditions in marked contrast to those which prevailed when China was brought into treaty relations with the maritime powers. For this reason some attention should be paid to the various influences which made possible a peaceful conclusion to the American mission. At first, before the West understood the conditions which prevailed at the shogun's capital at this time, it was generally believed that the Japanese yielded only to fear and that Perry threatened to open hostilities if they refused to grant him the treaty rights he demanded. As a matter of fact, Perry at no time threatened to use force, and he was under the strictest instructions that only in self-defense was violence to be resorted to. The president warned him "that the great end should be attained, not only with credit to the United States, but without wrong to Japan." On his first visit Perry informed the Japanese that he would land and deliver

the president's letter if it were not properly received, and when the Japanese hesitated to write their concessions in the form of a treaty he warned them that by doing so they would not only save time but also prevent the necessity of sending more ships and men from America, and possibly with instructions of more stringent import. But these "threats" were mild in comparison with the gunboat policy which had by this time been operating on the China coast. In spite of his pacific instructions, Perry, as a naval officer, believed it his duty to formulate plans for carrying out his mission in case he failed in Japan. He proposed, therefore, that the Bonin Islands, Great Loochoo, and Formosa be occupied, but he received no approval of his ambitious program. Part of the Bonin group was taken possession of by one of his captains on the ground of discovery by an American ship in 1823, but the claim was not later asserted against Japan.

It was not the use of force (which, of course, did not take place) or even the threat to use force at some later day if the treaty were denied, which brought about the success of his mission. Four important factors entered into the final outcome. Briefly, these were (1) Perry's personal qualities, his "firmness, sagacity, tact, dignity, patience, and determination." (2) The evidence of force, not merely in the fleet, but in the modern nation behind the fleet. That this made a deep impression was shown by the careful drawings that were made for the shogun's officers and the coast daimyos of every detail of the American armament and equipment, as well as by the interest taken in the books, mechanical contrivances, the steam locomotive and cars, and the electric telegraph, presented to the emperor. (3) The fear of Russia, whose activities in the northern Pacific alarmed the Japanese and who demanded trade rights just after Perry's first visit. It was felt by some that the best way to meet the Russian advance was to enter into intercourse with all the Western powers. (4) Finally—and this cannot be overemphasized—great credit is due to a handful of enlightened Japanese who had learned about the West through the Dutch at Nagasaki and were convinced that the time had come for Japan to

abandon her policy of isolation. Such was Hotta, the daimyo of Sakura, who had long been interested in Western science and medicine and had introduced Western tactics into his feudal army. The great majority of the daimyos who were informed of the American requests were in favor of maintaining the exclusion laws, but a few of their number and especially some of the shogunate officials at Yedo were able to carry their arguments in favor of peace and intercourse. In China there had been no highly placed officials who were able to bring about the peaceable acceptance of the British requests for commercial rights and political equality.

Treaties with Other Western Nations.—Like the Chinese before them, the Japanese did not intend to limit their treaty concessions to a single power. Before Perry won his epoch-making treaty every request for commercial rights had been refused, even when the Russians twice visited Nagasaki with a squadron as large as Perry's first fleet. But once the doors were partly opened, all who sought admission would be received. The first to request the new privileges was the British Rear-Admiral John Stirling, who obtained a treaty like Perry's at Nagasaki in October. This opened Nagasaki and Hakodate to British vessels and contained the most-favored-nation clause. As the Crimean War was then in progress, the British were anxious to have access to the ports of Japan for their warships operating against the Russians. Vice-Admiral Putiatin, who had tried to secure a treaty for Russia in 1853 and 1854 without success, again visited Japan. This time his only ship was destroyed by a tidal wave at Shimoda, but he was able to secure the desired treaty, although he had no force at hand to support his request. This convention, of February, 1855, contained a general extraterritorial provision, which however was to be reciprocal, and marked the introduction of this principle in Japan. Trade, under Japanese regulations, was to be permitted at Shimoda and Hakodate. The Dutch, who were eager to gain exemption from the old regulations at Nagasaki, negotiated a convention in November, 1855, which was revised in January following and put into force. This gave the Dutch access to Shimoda and Hakodate, and removed

many of the aggravating restrictions which had so long existed at Nagasaki. Such were the terms of the treaties of 1854 and 1855. By the application of the most-favored-nation clause the sum total of foreign rights in Japan was the privilege of resorting to Shimoda, Hakodate, and Nagasaki for supplies; of carrying on trade at these ports (although only the Dutch made use of this privilege at Nagasaki) under Japanese regulations and through Japanese officials; of residing at Nagasaki, a right which did not apply to women and children; of appointing consuls at Shimoda and Hakodate; and of extraterritoriality, which was reciprocally granted to any Japanese in Russia.

The Emperor Ratifies the Treaties.—The first treaties were negotiated by officials of the shogun under his instructions. But instead of the emperor's name being used, a new title tycoon (great lord) was inserted in some of the texts. No foreigner questioned the right of the shogun's officials to act in the name of the emperor, and as a matter of fact the shogun, as representative of the emperor, was considered competent to deal with such questions. Iyemitsu had closed the country without considering it necessary to first obtain the emperor's approval, and at this time a reference to Kyoto would only have been a matter of form. The shogunate, had, however, considered it desirable to consult the daimyos in 1854, although its decision was contrary to the bulk of daimyo advice. The decision to set aside the long-established isolation policy was such a serious one that the advisers of the shogun believed that the emperor's approval would quiet any chauvinistic criticism. This approval was therefore requested, and as the shogun's influence was still great at Kyoto it was obtained without difficulty in February, 1855, but it did not include the first Dutch treaty which was negotiated the next year.

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CHAPTER XIX

THE TREATIES OF COMMERCE OF 1858

The Influence of Townsend Harris.—Although foreign vessels might visit three of the Japanese ports under the first treaties, the limited trading rights prevented any considerable development of commercial relations. The next step must be the negotiation of a treaty of commerce. To this end the United States appointed as its first consul-general Townsend Harris, a highly respected merchant of New York City who had been engaged in the Eastern trade on his own account since 1849. He had been appointed consul at Ningpo, in China, in 1854, but without serving at this post he returned to the United States, where he obtained the appointment to Japan. On his way to Shimoda he negotiated a treaty with Siam, which was based on a British treaty of 1855, and contained full extraterritorial privileges and a conventional tariff. On August 21, 1856, he entered the little port of Shimoda in the United States steamship *San Jacinto*. His reception was far different from what he had expected. The Japanese officials were alarmed at the prospect of a foreign representative living among them. They first assured him that the treaty provided that a consul might be stationed at Shimoda only if both countries desired it. But the English text of Perry's treaty read if "either of the two governments deem such arrangement necessary." What seemed to Harris to be an apparent attempt at misrepresentation was really a mistake in interpretation, for the Japanese text of the treaty read exactly as the officials asserted. On other occasions Harris believed that he was being deceived when in fact the Japanese were faithfully reporting conditions of which he had not been aware. After he was permitted to land and take up his residence in a Buddhist temple, it was some time before he could free himself from the constant espionage of petty officials. But at length, during these months when Harris and his interpreter Heusken were for the most part the only foreigners

in Shimoda, he convinced the local officials of his sincerity and sympathy. When their confidence was gained and favorable reports transmitted to Yedo, the success of his mission was assured. Frankness and understanding were to serve this untrained merchant far better than a lifetime of diplomatic experience.

The Conventions of 1857.—Although Harris was under instructions to obtain a treaty of commerce if possible, he did not act precipitately. He first endeavored to remedy certain defects in the Perry treaty and to secure a formal grant to the United States of the several additional privileges granted in the later treaties. He knew of the draft treaty with the Netherlands of 1855, but did not see the final 1856 text until after he had negotiated his convention. On June 17th the first of the three conventions of 1857 was signed by Harris. It granted Americans the right of permanent residence at Shimoda and Hakodate, the right to obtain supplies at Nagasaki, criminal extraterritoriality, and the exchange of coins by weight with an allowance of six per cent for recoinage. Although we have seen that extraterritoriality was introduced by the Russian treaty of 1855 and incorporated in the Dutch treaty of 1856, and under the most-favored-nation clause might be claimed by all the treaty powers, it is frequently asserted that the principle was introduced by Harris, an error as misleading as that which ascribed the same priority to the American treaty with China in 1844. At Nagasaki the Dutch superintendent was endeavoring to improve the status of his nationals, and on October 16th additional articles to the treaty of 1856 were agreed to. These removed most of the remaining traces of the old Deshima restrictions, fixed the import duty temporarily at thirty-five per cent, restated the extraterritorial clause, and contained two new and interesting provisions: the importation of opium into Japan was prohibited and the Dutch were permitted to practice "their own or the Christian religion" within their buildings or burying-places. Vice-Admiral Putiatin, who visited Nagasaki at this time, negotiated a similar treaty on the part of Russia, on the 24th, which contained the principal terms of the American and Dutch con-

ventions and permitted direct trade between Japanese and Russian merchants. In respect to opium the convention read: "In case Russian vessels shall import opium in Japan, their cargoes will be confiscated and the guilty shall be dealt with according to the Russian laws, strictly forbidding that pernicious trade."

Harris Received in Yedo.—The American consul-general now informed the Japanese that it was time for him to proceed to Yedo and deliver his letter of credence from the president of the United States. Great was the consternation, for no foreign representative had been received in audience since the English Captain Saris in 1613. Again the enlightened counselors of the shogun carried the day, and permission was accorded. The most careful preparations were made for the journey and Harris was treated as a lord of the land as his party of 350 proceeded up the great highway, the Tokaido. At the capital he was installed in an official residence near the castle, and eight noblemen were appointed as "Commissioners of the Voyage of the American Ambassador to Yedo." On the 7th of December he was received in audience by the shogun, without any attempt to impose upon him the court ceremonial which required even the highest nobles to remain on their knees in the presence of their master. Harris made three bows, but stood erect when he addressed the shogun, and later the ministers told him they were filled with admiration to see him "look the awful tycoon in the face, speak plainly to him, hear his reply—and all this without any trepidation, or any 'quivering of the muscles of the side.'" The right of audience—for the shogun was the real ruler of Japan, was thus won with little argument and without any question of humiliating observances.

The Negotiation of the Commercial Treaty.—Having secured an honorable reception at the capital, Harris then brought forward the real object of his mission, which was to secure a treaty of commerce. Within a few days he visited Lord Hotta, the enlightened daimyo who was now virtually minister of foreign affairs of the shogunate. For two hours Harris brought forward arguments why Japan should voluntarily abandon

every trace of her old isolation and accept a resident minister at her capital and free commerce with all lands. He naturally stressed the disinterestedness of the United States, her pacific policies in the Far East, and the improvements in steam navigation which made her a near neighbor of Japan. On the other hand, he pointed out the misfortunes which had befallen China at the hands of the Western powers, her defeat by Great Britain, and her war at that moment with Britain and France. Russia was also mentioned as a menace to Japan while France and Great Britain might be expected to transfer their operations to that quarter in the near future. The evils of the opium trade were also emphasized. In the presence of these dangers Japan's safety lay in making a treaty with the United States which would be acceptable to the other powers and remove the excuse for aggressive measures. At the same time he pointed out that religious tolerance prevailed in the West and that Japan should adopt such a policy. When, at a later date, it was learned that Harris had warned the Japanese against the European powers he was, and still is, subjected to no little criticism, but the fact remains that their conduct in China and other parts of Asia at this time gave force to all that Harris said. The Japanese now took the initiative and appointed two commissioners to visit Harris and consider the terms of the proposed treaty. On January 16, 1858, Harris was told that the shogun had agreed to the principal terms—a resident minister and open trade. Negotiations now proceeded, although slowly, for Harris had to explain carefully to the Japanese the significance of the new foreign relations which they proposed to inaugurate. Twenty sessions were held between January 18th and February 9th, at which Harris acted not only as the representative of the United States, but as an instructor in diplomatic procedure and international law to the Japanese. That he did not take advantage of their ignorance in order to secure the maximum advantages for his country is one of the reasons why Townsend Harris is so highly respected to-day in Japan. By February 26th the treaty was practically agreed to and the signatures were to be affixed at the end of sixty days, on April 21st.

Opposition to the Shogun's Foreign Policy.—The American treaty was not, however, to be signed on the appointed day. A new and entirely unforeseen complication arose, which was to have the most important effects upon the domestic and foreign relations of Japan during the next ten years. Opposition to the liberal policy of the shogunate, which had manifested itself at the time of Perry's mission, had rapidly increased among the daimyos, and the hostile faction was led by one of the great Tokugawa princes, the ex-daimyo of Mito. For this reason the shogun's advisers deemed it advisable to secure the emperor's approval of the new treaty before it was signed, rather than afterward as had been the case in 1855. In January a subordinate official had been sent down to Kyoto to secure the approval which in former days would have been immediately granted. Assured of the support of many of the territorial nobles, the leading kuge prevented a favorable response. Alarmed by this unexpected show of independence, Hotta, the prime minister of the shogun, went down to Kyoto in March, and although he presented all the arguments he could muster in favor of voluntarily abandoning the old isolation, he was no more successful. It was while he was detained at Kyoto that Harris returned to Yedo to sign the treaty, but nothing could be done until the prime minister returned. Harris now learned that a superior power resided at Kyoto, and a Japanese historian tells us that he even threatened to go there and conclude his treaty. Hotta returned on June 1st and Harris had to agree to a second postponement, until September 4th, but he also secured a promise that no treaty would be signed with a foreign power until thirty days after the American treaty, for the Dutch superintendent was now in Yedo seeking a new treaty.

The American Treaty of Commerce.—Thus matters rested until the end of July, when, on the 23d, an American warship arrived at Shimoda with the first news of the Tientsin treaties, recently signed on June 13th-27th. Two days later Commodore Tatnall arrived with additional information, which was confirmed by a Russian ship on the 26th. It was reported that the victorious squadrons of the allies were about to sail

for Japan to enforce their demands for commercial rights. Harris believed that no time was to be lost, so he embarked on the *Powhatan* for Kanagawa. He was soon in contact with the officials who had negotiated the treaty. His arguments for its immediate signature before the European forces arrived were transmitted to the shogun's council. A spirited debate occurred, in which those who advocated its immediate conclusion were opposed by others who believed that the emperor's approval must first be secured. At that time Ii Naosuke was acting as *tairo* (regent), and although he believed that in time the approval could be gained he finally accepted the advice of the majority of the council and authorized the two commissioners to sign the treaty. The signatures were affixed on board the *Powhatan* early on the morning of July 29th. The terms of this memorable treaty, which governed the relations between Japan and the foreign powers down to the revision of 1894 and which was the product of the friendly counsel of Townsend Harris and the open-mindedness of the shogun's advisers, may be briefly summarized:

1. ~~A reciprocal right to station a diplomatic agent at the capital and consuls or consular agents at the open ports was granted.~~

2. Additional treaty ports were to be opened for general commerce. Typical of the moderation and understanding of Harris was the arrangement for the gradual enlargement of foreign contacts. Kanagawa was to be substituted for the worthless port of Shimoda and, with Hakodate and Nagasaki, was to be opened on July 4, 1859; Niigata, on the west coast, on January 1, 1860; Yedo, for residence only, on January 1, 1862; and Hiogo and Osaka (but not for shipping) on January 1, 1863.

3. Extraterritoriality, in both civil and criminal cases.

4. A conventional tariff of five per cent on raw materials imported, twenty per cent on manufacturers and thirty-five per cent on intoxicants, with an export duty of five per cent.

5. The prohibition of the importation of opium.

6. Freedom of Americans to practice their religion and erect places of worship.

7. The most-favored-nation clause.

8. The right of revision after July 4, 1872, on one year's notice by either party.

It will be observed that Harris had obtained, without the presence of force, most of the concessions which China had been compelled to yield at Tientsin. Although the importation of opium had already been prohibited in the Dutch and Russian treaties, the presence of this clause in the basic commercial treaty precluded any possibility of opening the question in the very year when the drug was legalized as an article of commerce in China. Harris did not try at this time to secure a clause tolerating the Christian religion, and when, in 1860, he made an additional request to this effect the Japanese wisely denied it and thus escaped the political complications which resulted from this treaty right in China.

Other Foreign Treaties.—As Harris had warned the Japanese, the Western representatives soon appeared from the China coast. But they found their ends had already been achieved and all that was necessary was the preparation of treaties almost identical with that won by the solitary American diplomat. The Dutch superintendent had come overland from Nagasaki, and his treaty was signed on August 18th, the Russian on the next day, the British on the 26th, and the French on October 7th. The only important change was in the British convention which substituted July 1 for July 4, 1859, as the date on which the new treaty would go into effect, which, under the most-favored-nation clause, was applied to all the treaty powers, and it reduced the duties on imported cotton and woollen goods from twenty to five per cent. When the French tried to win a similar reduction on wines the Japanese were unwilling to agree. In the following years other changes were made in the Harris tariff, until, in 1866, a general five-per-cent duty on imports and exports was substituted.

Japanese Politics and the New Treaties.—The action of the Tairo Ii in proceeding to complete the treaties without the

emperor's approval fanned the flames of resentment against the shogun's foreign policy and against the shogunate itself. For his brave act—for he believed Japan would be faced with serious foreign complications if he did not act promptly in this emergency—he forfeited his life two years later at the hands of Mito ronins. He still hoped to win the emperor's approval, and in October a third mission proceeded to the capital, where, in spite of strong measures against the opposing kuge, the best that could be obtained was a temporary approval to the effect that the emperor "approved the resolution of the Shogun, the Tairo, and the Council of State to keep the barbarians at a distance and eventually restore the old policy of seclusion, and authorized the Shogun to take temporary measures to this end." It naturally followed that from time to time the opponents of the shogunate would insist that the time had come for the restoration of the old policy, while the shogun's advisers, better informed of the temper and strength of the foreigners and knowing well that exclusion was out of the question, could only temporize. The fact that the shogunate had acted without the emperor's approval in opening Japan to general foreign intercourse served as a unifying force among all the elements which had long cherished opposition to the Tokugawa family and the shogunate. These included the great clans of the west, who had suffered at the hands of Iyeyasu and Iyemitsu and looked forward to the time when this upstart family could be deposed from its high estate. Among the fudai daimyos were many who opposed the pro-foreign policy of the shogun's advisers. And the leading branches of the Tokugawa family were hopelessly divided, not only because of the foreign policy, but over a disputed succession to the shogunate. While the Harris treaty was being negotiated the claims of two candidates to be named as heirs of the childless shogun Iyesada divided the Tokugawa families into hostile factions. When the Kishu claimant was named, the Mito clan, already hostile because of the foreign policy, became a leader in the forces which rallied around the emperor.

Growing Influence of the Emperor.—Coincident with the weakening of the shogunate in the nineteenth century was the growing influence of the emperor. Japanese historians had been devoting their attention to the ancient history of the empire and their studies clearly set forth the usurpation of the emperor's powers by the military lords. Most influential of these historical works was one compiled under the direction of the daimyo of Mito, a direct descendant of Iyeyasu, which was completed in 1715 and circulated in manuscript until its publication in 1857, on the eve of the new treaty relations. A similar work had been completed in 1827. Under the influence of these historical treatises the students, and in most cases these were samurai, began to insist that the emperor should be restored to his former greatness and that the shogun should be simply the chief of his ministers. At the same time a movement was in progress for the restoration of pure Shinto, freed from the gloss of Buddhism. As Shinto stressed loyalty to the emperor above all, it was easy to understand why the Tokugawa shoguns had thrown their support to Buddhism. The renewal of interest in the ancient faith could only swell the rising tide of loyalty to the emperor and opposition to the shogunate.

Anti-foreign Policy of the Imperial Court.—Before the coming of Perry in 1853 there had been little change in the relative position of the shogun and the emperor. But the action of the shogun's advisers in consulting the emperor and the daimyos in 1853 had been recognized as a sign of weakness. Still, the shogunate's influence was great enough to secure the emperor's approval of the first treaties in 1855. In 1858 the approval was almost gained by Hotta, but by that time sufficient support had been received from hostile daimyos, and especially from the great Tokugawa daimyo of Mito, to stiffen the opposition of the leading court nobles. From that time until 1865 the emperor and his court were the leaders of the anti-foreign movement. This, in turn, was so involved with opposition to the shogunate that even pro-foreign daimyos rallied around the emperor and supported his anti-foreign policy in the hope of embarrassing the shogun.

A new rallying cry was heard in all parts of Japan, except in the fiefs most loyal to the shogun. It took the form of *son-o jo-i* (honor the emperor, expel the barbarians). Under such conditions the course of foreign relations under the new treaties was bound to be fraught with great uncertainty. The shogun, on his part, attempted to carry out the treaty stipulations or secure some modification in them, because he understood far better than the kuge and daimyos at Kyoto the impossibility of withdrawing the commercial privileges. If the foreign representatives had understood more adequately the complicated political situation in Japan they might have modified their conduct in the next few years, but it was not until 1863 that the vital importance of securing the emperor's approval of the 1858 treaties was brought home to them. Between 1858 and 1865 the treaties were constantly in jeopardy, and only by the merest chance was Japan spared a clash with all the powers, which would have placed her foreign relations upon the same basis of wars and enforced treaty concessions which marked China's intercourse with the West.

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CHAPTER XX

THE RESTORATION OF THE EMPEROR

Attacks upon Foreigners.—The new treaties went into operation at the ports of Kanagawa, Hakodate, and Nagasaki on July 1, 1859, at a time when the imperial party was denouncing their validity and already calling upon the shogun to keep his promise to restore the old exclusion laws. This swelling opposition caused the Tairo Ii to refuse to permit the foreigners to establish themselves in the old city of Kanagawa, which lay near the Tokaido along which the feudal processions passed to and from Yedo and where the foreigners would be exposed to the attack of patriotic samurai. Instead, he made provision for the foreign traders at the near-by village of Yokohama, where Perry's treaty had been negotiated, and so satisfactory were these arrangements that the merchants were quite content to establish their offices there in spite of the insistence of their representatives that they should reside in Kanagawa. Yokohama was soon to become the chief port of Japan. It was unfortunate that so many of the traders and the ships came up from China, where, as in India and the East Indies, the Europeans enjoyed a privileged position. It took a little time for them to realize that they were dealing with a different people and that the two-sworded samurai would brook no insult, real or assumed. This criticism applies to the first two British representatives, Sir Rutherford Alcock and Sir Harry Parkes, whose previous service in China schooled them in methods which were poorly adapted to the very different conditions in Japan. During the six years between 1859 and 1865, when the presence of the foreigners in Japan was denounced by every imperialist, twelve Westerners lost their lives, the British legation was twice attacked, and the British and American legations were burned. The surprising thing is that so few tragedies occurred in view of the hostile attitude of so many of the military class. Only the vigilance of the shogun's troops—a most unpopular duty—

as well as the presence of foreign warships and guards, saved the foreign representatives and their nationals from greater harm. Of these attacks upon foreigners the five in 1859 and 1860 were probably made as reprisals for ill-treatment accorded by other foreigners, but the inability of the shogun to protect the strangers was clearly demonstrated when in the latter year the powerful Tairo Ii was cut down by former samurai of Mito. The later murders, the attacks upon the British legation, and the incendiarism were all due to a political motive on the part of samurai who believed it was their personal duty to exterminate the troublesome foreigners, or of others who hoped to involve the shogunate in a foreign war which would arouse all Japan against the aliens and in its wake bring down the whole shogunate system. The first of these crimes to have a serious import was the murder of Mr. Heusken, the interpreter of the American legation, on January 14, 1861. While the other foreign representatives held the shogun responsible for this failure to protect the American official and withdrew from Yedo to Yokohoma as a protest, Townsend Harris maintained that the shogun's officers were doing all that could be reasonably expected and that Heusken's indifference to danger brought about his destruction. He refused to join his colleagues, and for some time remained alone, the only foreigner in Yedo, guarded by the shogun's troops. Harris had a far better understanding of the difficulties which confronted the Yedo administration than his European colleagues and his policy of moderation balked the proposals for united action that were at times made. In this respect his policy was more moderate than that of his chief, William H. Seward, the secretary of state, who proposed to the European powers that a joint naval demonstration be made in Japanese waters. Opinions differ as to the motives which led Seward to propose such an unusual procedure, but the fact that the United States was involved in the great Civil War indicates that there was small chance of naval operations against Japan.

The Murder of Richardson.—Of all the attacks upon individual foreigners, the one which produced the most important

results was the murder near Yokohama, of Mr. C. L. Richardson, a British subject, on September 14, 1862. A visitor from Hong Kong, he was riding on the highway with three British residents of Yokohama, two men and a lady, when the feudal procession of the father of the lord of Satsuma was seen approaching. This influential personage was one of the leaders of the anti-shogun faction at Kyoto, and he was escorting a messenger from the court who had just served upon the shogun a summons to appear at Kyoto to explain his conduct. The Europeans, of course, did not know the hostile spirit of the troops in this company, but the Yokohama residents knew that trouble with armed men was to be avoided. To their warning Mr. Richardson replied: "Let me alone! I have lived in China fourteen years, and know how to manage this people." For this mistake he paid with his life. Although no insult was intended, or given, according to Western notions, the very fact that these merchants remained on horseback in the presence of a high personage was, according to Japanese custom, an offense punishable by death. An order was quickly given, the long swords flashed, and Richardson was slain, while the other men were severely wounded. Many of the foreigners in Yokohama demanded that a British force be sent at once to arrest the Satsuma chieftain, but happily the British *chargé* and the admiral refused to adopt so hasty a course which might have precipitated an immediate war. Instead, the crime was reported to London and instructions were awaited.

The Emperor Decrees the Expulsion of Foreigners.—This unfortunate tragedy occurred at a most embarrassing time for the shogun. Opposition to his foreign policy and to his office had rapidly increased. He was at that time under orders to go up to Kyoto to explain his conduct to the emperor. Any additional foreign complications were bound to weaken his position, and incidentally to destroy the only protector of foreign rights and lives in Japan. Early in 1863 he set out from Yedo to obey the imperial summons, and just at this time the British ultimatum was delivered. This called for the payment of an indemnity of 100,000 pounds by the shogun,

of 25,000 pounds by the daimyo of Satsuma, and the immediate trial and execution of the chief perpetrators of the crime in the presence of one or more British naval officers. If these terms were refused, naval operations would be resorted to. Irrespective of the justice of such demands, the time for their presentation was most inopportune. Colonel Neale, the *chargé*, who had some understanding of the difficult position in which the shogun was placed, proposed to use the naval forces, if necessary, to crush Satsuma, a measure which he believed would give satisfaction to the Yedo government. While the French minister supported the British demands, and the French naval forces were prepared to unite with those of Britain, the American minister, Mr. Pruyn, in no uncertain terms expressed his disapproval of the whole proceedings; yet he advised the Japanese to yield to the demands rather than become involved in a costly and disastrous war. The first ultimatum gave the Japanese twenty days in which to accept, but happily this period was extended when the impossibility of dealing with this question while the great conference was going on at Kyoto was made clear. There, in spite of the attempts of the shogun to postpone any definite action the opponents of his foreign policy carried the day, and on June 5th the emperor handed down a decree which ordered that the ports must be closed to foreign commerce on June 25th, and the daimyos were ordered to defend their coasts and sweep away invaders. The anti-foreign agitation had succeeded; Japan was to be freed again from the presence of the undesirable aliens. The shogun and his advisers knew that the enforcement of the imperial decree would mean the ruin of Japan. Something must be done to save the empire from the ignorance and blind partisanship of the Kyoto faction. While the indemnity negotiations were proceeding at Yokohama, the British and French representatives formally offered to place their naval forces at the disposal of the shogun against the anti-foreign daimyos. This offer was wisely declined, but in doing so the shogun's ministers agreed to pay the 110,000 pounds demanded by Britain, of which 10,000 pounds were an indemnity for the murder of two British marines when

the legation was attacked in 1862. This sum was delivered to the British *chargé* on the morning of June 24th, the day before the exclusion edict was to be enforced, and that day the foreign representatives were informed of the emperor's decree; but instead of demanding compliance the shogun's ministers simply announced that negotiations on this subject would take place later. The immediate reply of the foreigners was to the effect that the treaty rights once granted could not be withdrawn. Mr. Pruyn, usually so moderate and forbearing, took the strong position that "the right thus acquired will not be surrendered and cannot be withdrawn. Even to propose such a measure is an insult to my country and equivalent to a declaration of war." The shogunate officials had no intention of carrying out the imperial command. Their policy was a temporizing one—perhaps something might happen which would relieve the intense anti-foreign feeling which then prevailed.

Choshu Attacks Foreign Ships.—Among the leaders of the anti-foreign, anti-shogun party was the lord of Choshu, one of the great *tozama daimyos*. Although the imperial decree was to be carried out by the shogun, and no *daimyo* was authorized to act without orders from Yedo, the Choshu lord saw in it a splendid opportunity to involve the shogunate in trouble with the foreigners. The fateful day, June 25th, had scarcely begun when the Choshu ships and forts at Shimonoseki opened fire, without warning, on a little American trading vessel which lay at anchor in the straits. On July 8th and 11th a French and a Dutch naval vessel were fired upon. Before news of the later attacks had reached Yokohama an American warship had hastened to Shimonoseki and bombarded the forts there, and a few days later a French squadron repeated the lesson. These direct reprisals were only explainable on the ground that the shogun could not punish this disobedient feudatory. The foreign ministers in Japan agreed that the straits should be forced by a joint naval expedition if the shogun could not open them himself, but the home governments refused to support this proposal. As a matter of fact the navigation of the straits was not es-

sential to access to the open ports, nor could the right be supported on any treaty grounds.

The British Bombard Kagoshima.—In spite of the expulsion edict and the hostile actions of Choshu the position of the foreigners at Yokohama, under the shogun's protection, was so secure that the British admiral was ready in August to demand the compliance of Satsuma with the British demands. A squadron of seven vessels appeared before his port of Kagoshima on the 11th, and the immediate acceptance of the ultimatum was called for. In reply the Satsuma representative deprecated the murder and asserted that the assassins had escaped—if they were taken and found guilty they would be punished as the British demanded. But the question at issue, he contended, should be decided between the shogun and Satsuma. As this reply was considered unsatisfactory, the admiral, on the 15th, proceeded to seize three small steamers which he proposed to retain until Satsuma complied with the demands. No sooner was this action taken than the forts opened fire upon the squadron. This fire was returned and a general engagement ensued, which resulted in great losses, as a typhoon arising in the night swept the flames started by the shells throughout half the town. The next day the action was resumed, and after this summary punishment, but without securing compliance with the demands, the squadron returned to Yokohama. Its casualties numbered fifty-six killed or wounded. The sequel, however, was hardly to be expected. Three months later two envoys from Satsuma visited Colonel Neale, agreed to pay the 25,000 pounds indemnity, and give a written promise to continue the search for the assassins and to punish them when discovered, but they also requested the good offices of the British *chargé* in arranging for the purchase of a ship of war for Satsuma in England. In spite of its position as a leader in the anti-shogun forces the Satsuma clan had not been at heart opposed to foreign intercourse. If any doubts remained, the one demonstration of the strength of a foreign power convinced all but the most conservative. Satsuma from this time could be counted upon to support a liberal foreign policy, although

it was more than ever determined to bring about the fall of the shogunate.

Joint Expedition Against Shimonoseki.—Meanwhile the proposed expedition against Shimonoseki had not passed beyond the stage of discussion. The high-water mark of the anti-foreign agitation was reached in Kyoto just about the time when the British were bombarding Kagoshima. In September Choshu was charged with having made plans to seize the emperor's person and its troops were ordered to withdraw from the capital. This weakened the anti-foreign party and goaded a number of Choshu's irregular troops to attempt to overawe the court in August, 1864, which caused the emperor to order the shogun to punish the unruly clan. Between these two events, which marked the temporary eclipse of Choshu's influence at Kyoto, Sir Rutherford Alcock returned from a two years' absence in England. He was now convinced that the foreigners should unite to crush Choshu, not because it had fired upon foreign ships and closed the straits, but in order to support the shogun and warn the anti-foreign daimyos of the danger of their course. He was able to secure support of his views on the part of the four foreign representatives at Yokohama, but the home governments did not approve the proposed measures and Alcock received positive injunctions from London not to undertake any military operations whatever in the interior of Japan, as well as authority to prohibit British vessels from frequenting the straits. Confident that his plans would be approved in time, Alcock proceeded with the arrangements which resulted in a joint naval expedition, consisting of nine British vessels, four Dutch, three French, and one American, sailing from Yokohama in August, 1864. As no American steam warship was available, a little American merchant ship, the *Ta-Kiang*, was chartered in order that American participation in the joint demonstration might be made clear. No attempt was made to open negotiations, for an earlier visit to Choshu of two British ships bearing the young samurai Ito and Inouye, who had hurried back from England to warn their prince, had failed. The bombardment of the forts began on the 5th of September, and by the 8th

all the batteries had been silenced and their guns destroyed by landing parties. Choshu was, as it seemed, crushed; the shogun had been supported; and Sir Rutherford, who had been recalled when London learned of his violation of instructions, was promptly congratulated as soon as the success of the joint demonstration was known. He was not, however, sent back to Yedo. Upon Choshu the effect was much the same as the earlier punishment of Satsuma. The straits would be opened, the forts would not be repaired and no new ones built, and a ransom for the town of Shimonoseki as well as all the expenses of the expedition would be paid. The clan now hastened to secure modern armaments and introduced Western military tactics, so that it was soon able to defeat the second expedition sent against it by the shogun in 1866.

The Shimonoseki Convention.—The shogun, of course, could not permit the foreigners to enter into direct treaty relations with a daimyo, and especially with one as hostile to himself as Choshu. So, in October, a convention was signed under which the shogun agreed to pay \$3,000,000 in place of Choshu, for the indemnities, ransom, and expenses. This sum was far larger than any damages or expenses involved, but was fixed at this amount in order to accept a reduction in case the shogun would open a port at Shimonoseki or in the Inland Sea. At the same time the shogun's ministers promised to do all that they could to secure the emperor's approval of the commercial treaties, for by this time the foreigners understood that the absence of this approval greatly weakened their position.

The Emperor Ratifies the Treaties.—The Richardson indemnity and the extraordinary expenses of these disturbed years had depleted the shogun's treasury. The Shimonoseki indemnity was payable in six quarterly payments of \$500,000. But although the first installment was delivered a year before it was due, the Yedo officials asked that a postponement be granted for the following payments. The British and American governments had been more anxious for additional treaty ports than for the money, but France, with little trade involved, desired a full performance of the convention. At this

time Sir Harry Parkes arrived as British envoy, with twenty-four years of eventful experience in China to give point to his proposals. He saw in the Japanese request for a delay in making the indemnity payments an opportunity for opening new ports and other concessions. A second naval demonstration was worked out, and this time the French minister participated in violation of his instructions. The plan was to proceed to Osaka, the nearest port to Kyoto which was not only the center of the anti-foreign forces, but was where the shogun happened to be at this time. There, supported by British, French, and Dutch ships (for no American vessel was at hand to join in the demonstration), certain proposals would be submitted. Two-thirds of the Shimonoseki indemnity would be remitted if (1) Hiogo and Osaka, whose opening had been postponed until 1868, were at once opened; (2) the emperor's approval of the treaties was obtained; and (3) the tariff was reduced to a general five-per-cent basis. The Japanese were given until November 24th to accept the demands, and in case of refusal the envoys would "be free to act as we may judge convenient." At Kyoto a spirited debate ensued, the shogun's supporters pointing out that a refusal to accept these demands might lead to war. At last a decision was reached, and notified to the envoys on the final day: the emperor had ratified the treaties; the tariff would be reduced as desired; but Osaka and Hiogo would not be opened before January 1, 1868, and therefore the full amount of the Shimonoseki indemnity would be paid.¹ Although the tariff reduction which was written in the four-power treaty of 1866 proved to be of great value to foreign commerce and was not modified until 1899, the most important immediate result of the Osaka naval demonstration was the emperor's approval of the commercial treaties. From this time organized opposition to the treaties and to foreigners ceased. There were, to be sure, a few sporadic attacks upon individuals, but

¹ It is of interest to note here that the indemnity was divided among the four powers on the basis of \$645,000 to Great Britain, and \$785,000 to the United States, France, and the Netherlands, the larger amounts being due to alleged damages suffered by their ships when attacked in the straits. The United States returned its share of the indemnity in 1883. Cf. Treat, *The Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Japan, 1853-1865*, pp. 413-434.

the old *son-o jo-i* agitation rapidly ceased. Gradually the leaders of the imperial party had realized that they could be pro-foreign and still anti-shogun. With the emperor's approval of the treaties the rivalry between the emperor and the shogun was divested of any foreign entanglements. Otherwise, if the emperor had still been anti-foreign in 1868, some of the powers would have deemed it expedient to take sides with the shogun against the imperial forces, just as Britain and France offered to do in 1863.

The Restoration of the Emperor.—It has not been possible to follow the complicated political developments which marked the rise of imperial influence after 1853. In 1866 the shogun Iyemochi died and Yoshinobu, better known as Keiki, succeeded him. Yoshinobu was the Mito candidate who had been set aside in favor of Iyemochi in 1858. Although his clan was strongly anti-foreign, Yoshinobu's experience at Yedo, where he became regent in 1863, convinced him of the wisdom of the shogun's policy. At the same time it was a law of his house never to oppose the emperor, for, as their motto read, "Loyalty knows no blood relationship." The Emperor Komei, who had been the leader of the anti-foreign party, died on February 3, 1867, and was succeeded by his son Mutsuhito, a boy of fourteen. Within a few months the daimyo of Tosa advised the shogun to surrender his administrative powers, not only in order that a united government might be restored, but so as to "lay a foundation on which Japan may take her stand as the equal of all other countries." The shogun, at this time, was in Kyoto and representatives of some forty clans were summoned to express their opinions, for the shogun himself favored the proposal. He repeated the arguments for union which would enable the country "to maintain its rank and dignity among the nations of the earth." The clan representatives gave their support to the plan and the shogun submitted his resignation to the court. On November 10th the emperor's pleasure was made known—the surrender of the shogun's administrative powers was accepted, although he was to continue to defend the realm and conduct foreign affairs until a conference of daimyos

could be held. It was not the intention of some of the western clansmen to permit the Tokugawas to retain their primacy among the nobles. Their plans were well laid, and on January 3, 1868, a palace revolution occurred which placed the young emperor in the hands of the lords of Satsuma, Tosa, Echizen, and Owari. An imperial decree soon appeared which abolished the office of shogun and reorganized the government in the hands of men hostile to the old régime. Not merely was the surrender of his office required, but also his lands and revenues. Yoshinobu, who had no desire to oppose the imperial will, secretly withdrew from Kyoto to his castle at Osaka, where loyal troops soon rallied around him. Among his retainers there was great bitterness at the treatment accorded their lord. Finally he determined to return to Kyoto at the head of his forces to remove the evil counselors of the youthful emperor and to consult a general council of the nation. His forces, however, were defeated by the opposing soldiery and treachery among their own ranks. Yoshinobu, who had not left Osaka, realized that all was lost, and taking refuge for a brief time on an American warship, he proceeded to Yedo on one of his own vessels. The ex-shogun now refused to oppose his emperor even though he knew he was under the influence of men hostile to himself. His loyal retainers, infuriated against the western daimyos, fought in his name but without his support. Not until early November, when the castle of Wakamatsu in northern Japan was taken, did the civil war cease on the main island, and then for a short time the shogun's navy proclaimed a republic at Hakodate. At the outbreak of hostilities the French minister offered naval support to the shogun, but he wisely refused it, and thus there were no foreign complications in the war of Restoration. The new government had cast aside entirely its former hostility to foreigners and the ports of Hiogo and Osaka were opened early in 1868 as promised. The dual government was now brought to an end and the emperor restored to his ancient position in the state. For the rapid weakening of the shogunate after 1853 the foreign treaties may be held most responsible. That the shogunate had outlived its

usefulness and would eventually give way to some other system was certain. The foreign problems proved most effective in unifying the hostile forces. That the change was brought about with so little bloodshed was due to the loyalty and submission of the last of the shoguns. Here again foreign affairs exerted no small influence, for the shogun was willing to surrender his powers in order that Japan might take her proper place among the nations of the world. Happily, after the civil war was over the ex-shogun was granted an honorable estate, and later raised to the rank of prince, while members of the Tokugawa house are to-day among the honored personages of New Japan.

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CHAPTER XXI

THE ABOLITION OF FEUDALISM

The New Government.—The period between 1858 and 1868 has been surveyed with some detail because in those years the Japanese leaders, in spite of internal political complications, recognized the wisdom of enlarged foreign intercourse. In China the official class, from high to low, resented the treaty guaranties which the foreigners had won, while in Japan the imperial authorities were to prove themselves even more liberal than the old defenders of foreign rights, the shogunate officials, had dared to be. The elimination of the shogun as administrative head of the state called for a drastic reorganization of the political system. While at the beginning of the movement against the shogunate some of the clans had believed that a rearrangement of the old system would be in order, with Satsuma or some other powerful daimyo taking the place of the shogun, and *tozama* daimyos supplanting the trusted *fudai* in the administrative positions, the rapid development of imperial influence rendered this impossible. Feudalism could not be immediately abolished, but the feudal basis of government, resting on the military class, was doomed. In order to find precedents for a government in which the emperor was supreme, the historians turned to the reforms of the Taikwa and Taiho eras, between 645 and 703 A.D., when the Chinese system had been introduced. Eight departments of state were created, and on these boards were leading members of the *kuge*, the daimyos, and the samurai. The department of foreign affairs was an innovation and confirmed the liberal views of the Kyoto leaders. The first chancellor was an imperial prince, and his associates were a *kuge* and the daimyo of Satsuma. As the western daimyos and their fighting men had taken the lead in the overthrow of the shogun and the restoration of the emperor, so the posts in the new government were held by their clansmen. Just as the Northern states controlled the American federal govern-

ment for most of the time after the Civil War, so the victorious westerners jealously retained power in Japan.

Foreign Ministers Received by the Emperor.—Although it was natural for many of the foreigners to suspect the imperial designs—for Kyoto had long been considered the center of anti-foreign feeling, and an attack upon foreigners by imperial troops at Hiogo seemed to support this view—the new officials testified that their master would observe all the existing treaty engagements. A formal letter to this effect was presented to the foreign ministers on February 14, 1868. A few days later six of the great daimyos, including Tosa, Choshu, and Satsuma, some of whom had generally been believed to be strongly anti-foreign, sent up a memorial to the emperor advocating foreign relations and even the reception of foreign representatives at the court. In part this memorial read:

Let the foolish argument which has hitherto styled foreigners dogs and goats and barbarians, be abandoned; let the court ceremonies, hitherto imitated from the Chinese, be reformed, and the foreign representatives be bidden to court in the manner prescribed by the rules current amongst all nations; and let this be publicly notified throughout the country, so that the countless people may be taught what is the light in which they are to regard this subject.

A proposal so strongly supported was of course accepted. An invitation was accordingly sent to the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Prussia, and Italy. Sir Harry Parkes and the Dutch minister were prepared to accept at once; the others accepted for some future day. Before the arrangements could be made, the murder of eleven French sailors by troops of the Tosa clan precipitated a crisis which only the prompt acceptance of the French demands cleared away. The indemnity of \$150,000 for the most serious outrage upon foreigners in Japan was in marked contrast to the \$625,000 exacted for the Richardson assassination. The good faith shown by the imperial officials brought a favorable reply to a second invitation to the court and the British, French, and Dutch ministers, who were at

Kobe (the name given to the treaty port at Hiogo), proceeded to Kyoto. The significance of this event could hardly be overestimated. Never before had a foreigner entered the sacred precincts or gazed upon the face of the emperor of Japan, the descendant of the gods. The reception of the French and Dutch ministers was carried out as planned, but when Sir Harry Parkes was on his way to the palace, escorted by British soldiers and policemen and a large number of Japanese infantry, two samurai, who considered the presence of this foreigner an insult to their emperor, dashed into the procession, swinging their long swords with terrible accuracy. Ten of the British escort and a Japanese were wounded, but Sir Harry escaped injury. One of the attackers was slain by the Japanese officer in command, the other, severely wounded, was taken alive. Two days later the audience took place. The emperor testified to his detestation of this unpardonable attack upon the representative of a friendly power and the wounded survivor was degraded from his rank, publicly beheaded, and his head exposed. An imperial decree warned the samurai that death and dishonor would be meted out for attacks upon foreigners. The audience question which for so many years was to engross the attention of the foreign diplomats and Chinese officials at Peking, never emerged in Japan.

The Emperor's Oath.—In the early days of the Restoration the principles which should guide the new government were enunciated in an oath sworn to by the young emperor in the throne room of the palace at Kyoto on April 6th, and then proclaimed to the assembled officials in the former castle of the shogun there. Many translations have been made of this most significant covenant upon which "the whole structure of New Japan was raised." It is difficult to convey the exact English equivalent of the Japanese characters. A version which may be considered satisfactory reads:

1. A deliberative assembly shall be formed, and all measures decided by public opinion.
2. The principles of social and political economics should be diligently studied by both the superior and inferior classes of our people.

3. Everyone in the community shall be assisted to persevere in carrying out his will for all good purposes.

4. All the absurd usages of former times would be disregarded, and the impartiality and justice displayed in the working of nature be adopted as the basis of action.

5. Wisdom and ability should be sought after in all quarters of the world for the purpose of firmly establishing the foundations of the Empire.

At this time when the imperial armies were still in the field against the former shogun's retainers, such a public statement might have been prepared to win support, with little thought of translating it into action when the emergency had passed. In this respect the Charter Oath, as it has sometimes been called, differs from many state papers. It was taken to mean exactly what it said. In the later years when proposals of many kinds were under consideration, every argument for progress in political, educational, social, and international affairs would gain strength by basing it upon the imperial pledge at the beginning of the new era.

Tokyo (Yedo) Becomes the Imperial Capital.—Typical of the progressive ideas which now prevailed was the proposal of Okubo, a Satsuma samurai who had taken a prominent part in the Restoration, that the emperor abandon the rigid ceremonial which had prevailed for centuries at his court and transfer his capital to Osaka or Yedo. It was soon decided that the break with the past would be clearly demonstrated if the emperor took up his residence in Yedo, where the shoguns had ruled since the days of Iyeyasu. On November 26, 1868, the emperor entered Yedo, whose name was changed to Tokyo (eastern capital) while Kyoto was to be known as Saikyo (western capital). The latter change in name did not meet with popular favor and Tokyo soon was accepted as the sole capital.

The Abolition of Feudalism.—The destruction of the dual government gave Japan, in name, a centralized administration, but, as a matter of fact, much remained to be done before the empire could take its place among the nations of the world as its zealous supporters desired. As long as the feudal sys-

tem existed there could be no adequate national revenues, no effective military and naval services, no uniform laws. The revenues of the new government came principally from the lands confiscated from the Tokugawas and their rebellious vassals—all the rest passed into the treasuries of the feudal lords. The imperial armies which had defeated the rebels had been furnished by the loyal daimyos and maintained by them. Feudalism broke up that unity and centralization which was necessary if Japan were to hold her own with the thoroughly organized states of the West. The supporters of the emperor realized this perfectly, but how was feudalism to be brought to an end? In Europe the system had gone down only under the thundering blows of kings and commoners. In Japan a happier solution was found. Early in March, 1869, the daimyos of Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, and Hizen, whose clans had taken the lead in the Restoration movement, submitted a memorial to the emperor in which they asked him to accept their men and possessions and assume all the governmental functions of the state. A few extracts from this remarkable document may well be given:

In the humble opinion of certain Ministers [*i.e.*, in our opinion] the Great Body [the Imperial Government] must not lose a single day, the Great Strength must not delegate its power for a single day. Since the heavenly ancestors established the foundations of the country, the Imperial line has not failed for ten thousand ages. The heaven and earth [*i.e.*, Japan] are the Emperor's: there is no man who is not his retainer. This constitutes the Great Body. By the conferring of rank and property the Emperor governs his people: it is his to give and his to take away: of our own selves we cannot hold a foot of land; of our own selves we cannot take a bit of land; this constitutes the Great Strength. . . . Now the great Government has been newly restored, and the Emperor himself undertakes the direction of affairs. This is indeed a rare and mighty event. We have the name [of an Imperial Government], we must also have the fact. Our first duty is to illustrate our faithfulness and to prove our loyalty. . . . The place where we live is the Emperor's land and the food which we eat is grown by the Emperor's men. How can we make it our own? We now reverently offer up the list of our possessions and men, with the prayer that the Emperor will take

good measures for rewarding those to whom reward is due, and for taking from those to whom punishment is due. Let the Imperial orders be issued for altering and remodeling the territories of the various clans. Let the civil and penal codes, the military laws, down to the rules for uniform and the construction of engines of war, all proceed from the Emperor; let all the affairs of the Empire, great and small, be referred to him. After this, when the internal relations of the country shall be placed upon a true footing, the Empire will be able to take its place side by side with the other countries of the world. This is now the most urgent duty of the Emperor, as it is that of his servants and children. Hence it is that we, in spite of our own folly and vileness, daring to offer up our humble expression of loyalty, upon which we pray the brilliance of the heavenly sun may shine, with fear and reverence bow the head and do homage, ready to lay down our lives in proof of our faith.¹

This amazing proposal was at once approved by the emperor. It was followed by similar offers from the other feudal lords, until within a few months 241 of the 276 daimyos had offered up their possessions. Only seventeen failed to do so, and the rest were minors. The assessed revenue of their estates was 20,000,000 koku, worth at that time about \$200,000,000. The simplest explanation of this unique manifestation is that the keen and progressive samurai who were so largely in control of the new government realized that feudalism would have to be wiped out before a government of adequate strength and efficiency could be set up. Happily, Japan was glowing with loyalty to the imperial house and under these circumstances it was easy to persuade the feudal lords to offer up powers which they had in most cases rarely exercised. There is no reason to accept the explanation that self-interest prompted a handful of samurai to build up a central government where greater rewards for their services would be possible than in the local fiefs.

Feudalism, however, was not abolished precipitately. In July the feudal lords were appointed governors of their old estates and one-tenth of their former revenues was to be granted them. The costs of local administration and the pensions of the samurai would be paid out of local revenues,

¹ Cf. Adams, *A History of Japan*, Vol. II, pp. 181-184.

and the balance turned into the central treasury. The old titles of kuge and daimyo were abolished, and the civil and military nobles were merged in a new class known as kazoku (noble families). On August 29, 1871, the imperial decree which brought the ancient system to an end was promulgated. The former daimyos were removed from their positions as governors and required to reside in Tokyo. One-tenth of their former revenue was still allotted them.² The samurai pensions were assumed by the central government. Governors, appointed by the emperor irrespective of their place of birth, were to administer the old fiefs, and the bounds of these were soon modified, many of the smaller fiefs being joined to others to form seventy-one prefectures.³

Some Results of the Fall of Feudalism.—Now for the first time a strong central government was possible, with uniform laws, increased revenues, and the power to create a national army and navy in place of the feudal levies and the hereditary samurai. The common people could now be freed from feudal exactions and restrictions, and uniform taxes take the place of feudal dues. The daimyos lost honor, power, and, to some extent, fortune. The titles which they enjoyed, based upon their lineage, wealth, and rank at the shogun's court, were now abolished, and all the lords, great and small, possessed a common title. Their feudal powers, which included control of their local forces, taxation, and lawmaking, were surrendered. It should be remembered, however, that by this time very few indeed of the daimyos exercised these powers directly, for in most fiefs they were intrusted to samurai whose families had held these administrative posts for generations. The first financial arrangements probably benefited some of the less wealthy daimyos, for one-tenth of their former revenues was perhaps more than they had enjoyed after all the expenses of their fiefs had been met. But, as we shall see, the final arrangements greatly reduced these pensions.

² McLaren, *Political History of Japan during the Meiji Era, 1867-1912*, p. 80 ff., arrives at some very erroneous conclusions by assuming that the daimyos received one-half of their former revenue.

³ There are to-day forty-four prefectures (*ken*) and three prefectural cities (*fu*).

Although some of the samurai rose to positions of great honor and reward in the new government, the effect of the abolition of feudalism upon the entire class was, in the main, disastrous. They suffered both in honor and in purse, and to the samurai the former was the more difficult to bear. Their pensions were assured them for a time, but the right to be the only soldiers in the land was soon withdrawn. In dealing with the samurai the government, whose most powerful members were themselves samurai, believed it was its duty to sacrifice a class, even a most honorable one, if the public interest would be served. There were at this time about 450,000 samurai families, only one member in each enjoying the title. The government had no intention of organizing its new armies of samurai exclusively. Conscription, under which the manhood of the entire nation would be liable to service, was quickly adopted. Nor did it favor the maintenance of an idle, pensioned class at the expense of the overburdened farmers who paid the bulk of the taxes. If possible, the samurai would be encouraged, or even forced, to abandon their privileged status and take a worthy part in all the public and private activities of those busy years. Immediately after the abolition of the fiefs an imperial decree permitted the samurai to lay aside their two swords and take part in some peaceful occupation. Many did so. The next year the conscription law was proclaimed, which placed the obligation of military service upon every male subject, without distinction of rank or class. At the very end of 1873 the government offered to commute the pensions of daimyos and samurai, so that they might have a lump sum to invest in some profitable undertaking. About a third of the samurai accepted this offer. Again government moved slowly, although it realized that something must be done to reduce the \$10,000,000 which was paid out for pensions every year. Three years later it felt in a position to act.

Compulsory Commutation of Pensions.—The financial arrangements which were announced in August, 1876, were carefully formulated so as to place the losses where they could best be borne. The large pensions, of more than 70,000 yen,

would be commuted for five times their annual value; the smallest, of less than twenty-five yen, at fourteen times their value. The bonds which were issued also bore different rates: on the large amounts the interest rate was five per cent, on the smallest it rose to seven per cent. Only 586 pensioners, at this time, had an annual income of more than 1,000 yen. These were of course the former daimyos and a few of the highest samurai. Between 25 and 100 yen there were 175,174 pensioners, and below 25 yen there were 127,184. The total number of pensioners in 1876 was 318,428. We can now work out the financial effects of the fall of the feudal system upon the lords and their retainers. A great daimyo whose income before 1869 was 1,000,000 yen received, after that time, a pension of 100,000 yen. Under the commutation law of 1876 he received bonds for 500,000 yen, with interest at five per cent, or 25,000 yen per annum. This was only one-quarter of his income before the commutation, and only two and one-half per cent of the former revenues of his fief. A samurai who had received an annual pension of 100 yen now received bonds for eleven times that amount, or 1,100 yen, at six per cent. This brought in an annual income of 66 yen in place of the former 100 yen, or a reduction of one-third of his former income. The large group who had received small amounts less than 25 yen suffered very little by the change. They received bonds for fourteen times the amount—if the pension had been 25 yen this would amount to 350 yen. Interest was at seven per cent, or 24.50 yen. This was ninety-eight per cent of their former income. These details are of interest and of some value, because they show the spirit which animated the new government. The daimyos who could best afford the reduction in income were cut down to from one-quarter to one-third of their former pensions. The samurai retained from two-thirds to ninety-eight per cent of their income. So although it is true that the government broke faith with the pensioners and imposed some financial loss upon all of them, the adjustment was made with as little hardship as possible and its purpose was to reduce the burdens upon an already overtaxed treasury.

At this time another decree prohibited the wearing of two swords by the samurai. The right to bear arms would henceforth be vested in the new soldiers of the empire. The samurai cup of sorrow was filled to the brim. Denied their honorable profession of arms, enriched with bonds which they did not know how to use, many of these men of high ideals plunged into business ventures which proved disastrous and wiped out their small capital. Others found honorable employment in the civil and military administration. Even the police force was a welcome field, for its officers might at least wear a sword. We shall see that resentment against the government officials was rife among the samurai at this time and was soon to lead to an ill-fated attempt to restore their position in the land.

The Feudal Tradition.—The progress of Japan in the next fifty years cannot be properly understood unless it is borne in mind that feudalism did not pass away until 1871. There are men still living who in their youth wore suits of armor and swung the long sword. The surprising thing is not that Japan in this or that respect has failed to measure up to the standard reached by the most progressive powers of the West, but that so much has been accomplished in so short a time. Although the feudal system could be destroyed by edict, the feudal tradition was less vulnerable. Loyalty to one's clansmen was a product of feudalism and for many years Japan was governed by a succession of able men and their protégés from the western fiefs of Satsuma and Choshu.

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CHAPTER XXII

ENLIGHTENED GOVERNMENT (MEIJI)

The Meiji Era.—Soon after the emperor took up his residence at Tokyo the *nengo*, or name given to a varying period of time, was changed to Meiji, which meant Enlightened Government. This aspiration was to be admirably achieved during the long reign of this capable ruler, and on his death in 1912 this reign-name was adopted as the posthumous name of the great emperor.¹

Rapid Introduction of Western Ideas.—Japan now entered upon an amazing period of progress and reform, marked by the rapid introduction of Western ideas and methods. No Eastern people have accomplished so wide-reaching a revolution in so short a time. Perhaps the most comparable phenomenon may be found in the introduction of Chinese civilization in Japan in the early Christian era. It should be remembered, however, that conditions were much more favorable in Japan for this transformation, than in any other Eastern land. Japan was a small insular country, with easy access to outside influences but free from the pressure of powerful neighbors. The climate was favorable and the soil fertile, although limited in amount. The people were one of the most homogeneous national groups in the world, with only a negligible problem created by the Ainus. There were no language barriers, for one written character was universally used, and only dialectic differences were found in the spoken word. There were also no religious antagonisms, such as complicate every problem in India. The people had long been noted for their intelligent curiosity, which would lead them to study eagerly any new

¹ Since the Great Reform in the seventh century the Japanese had made use of *nengo*, borrowed from China. There the name was changed with the accession of each ruler, but in Japan some unusual or portentous event was made the reason for the change. The first foreign treaties were spoken of as the "Ansei treaties," from the name of the 1854-60 period. Four other periods covered the years 1860-68. Since that time a new period dates from the accession of each ruler, thus Meiji, Taisho, and to-day Showa.

ideas which came to their attention, while their training in obedience during the feudal régime caused them to accept, with little question, the innovations adopted by their leaders. In addition they possessed a marked capacity for adaptation, for working over alien ideas to meet their peculiar needs, so although at first the process would naturally be one of imitation, in time adaptation and assimilation would take its place. Happily, in these first years a tremendous spirit of loyalty to the restored emperor was everywhere manifest, and few there were who would oppose a change, no matter how destructive of ancient customs, if it proceeded from *his* ministers. Finally, and of great importance, was the fact that during these critical years, while the emperor was young and inexperienced, the government of Japan was under the influence of really great men, open-minded men, who realized the necessity of bringing Japan into step with the rest of the world. Perhaps the old samurai "sense of shame" motivated them. They could not see their country looked down upon by the rest of the world, and when they found that nations were rated in terms of armies and battleships, railways and telegraphs, popular education and industrial efficiency, they were prepared to make every sacrifice to acquire these things. This sense of shame or honor is still a force to be reckoned with, and Japan is amenable, to an unusual degree, to well-intentioned foreign criticism. It is not unlike what the American patriots termed "a decent respect for the opinions of mankind." When, during the first years of Meiji, the views of conservatives and liberals clashed, as it was certain they would, the liberals always won—not perhaps all that they desired, for the government preferred to move steadily forward rather than precipitately, but the forces of reaction never long prevailed. In Japan, therefore, the officials led in the introduction of new ideas. In China, during the same period, the officials and the literati steadily opposed them.

Material Progress.—Railways, the telegraph, a merchant marine, and a postal system were soon introduced, and in every case their coming antedated the fall of the feudal system. The Japanese had learned how to operate the model railway

equipment which Perry gave them in 1854, but the introduction of steam railways was due to the advice of Sir Harry Parkes in 1869. The Japanese, however, did not rely upon foreign companies to build and operate their railways. British capital was secured and British engineers and equipment, but the Japanese owned and controlled their own lines. In 1870 work was begun on a line from Yokohama to Tokyo and one from Osaka to Kobe. The former was opened in 1872 and the latter two years later. By 1878 the Japanese had trained enough of their own people to carry on additional construction, and after that time foreigners were employed as advisers only. The telegraph was also introduced by Commodore Perry, but the Japanese were unable to master this new principle. In 1858, however, the daimyo of Satsuma had telegraph wires strung in his castle, at a time when he was considered to be the leader of the anti-foreign faction. In 1869 a government line from Yokohama to Tokyo was installed under the direction of a British engineer. In 1879 Japan joined the International Telegraph Union. The seclusion edict of 1636 forbade the construction of junks of more than seventy-five tons, or with more than one mast. They had no keels and were useless for more than coasting voyages, although some were occasionally blown clear across the Pacific. The first Western-style vessels to be built after 1854 were warships, but in 1858 the shogun bought a Dutch three-master for commercial uses. The seclusion edict was repealed in 1866 and both sailing-ships and steamships were bought or built, so that by 1871 they possessed forty-six ships totaling 17,948 tons. The development of the Japanese mercantile marine since that time is one of the remarkable events of the next half-century. In the same years a regular postal service was created, first between Tokyo and Osaka in 1871, and then to all parts of the empire. So rapid was this progress that in 1875 the United States closed its postal agencies in Yokohama, Kobe, and Nagasaki, and in 1876 Japan was admitted to the International Postal Union.

Educational Reforms.—Although the Japanese had at an early time taken over the whole treasure of Chinese culture,

they had not adopted the Chinese system of literary examinations. In Japan the military man and not the scholar ruled the land. The educated men, therefore, in the Tokugawa period did not confine their attention to the classics; they might study modern or, toward the end of the period, Western works. As in all other countries at that time, education was confined mainly to the males of the upper classes. Few women received any instruction. The leaders of New Japan were wise enough to see that only a literate people could carry onward the reforms which were essential to the welfare of the nation. They therefore adopted an educational policy which was one of the most enlightened as well as the most important of the Meiji reforms. The emperor's oath, that wisdom and ability should be sought after in all quarters of the world, was the basis of these reforms. By 1871 a department of education was established, and the next year the educational law was proclaimed which stated: "All people, high or low, and of both sexes, should receive education, so that there should not be found one family in the whole empire, nor one member of a family, ignorant and illiterate." At this time no Asiatic country, and few indeed in the West, had adopted the principle of universal education, while the fact that women as well as men were to receive instruction was the greatest break with the past. Elementary schools were rapidly organized, under the guidance of David Murray, an eminent American educator. By 1874 the school enrollment reached 1,590,115, or one-third of the children of school age. Higher schools were added, and universities, where German influence was strong, were developed. As a result of this educational policy the people of Japan to-day are among the most literate in the world, and this fact must always be reckoned with when Japanese affairs are under consideration.

Newspapers and Books.—In the spread of new ideas newspapers and other printed matter play a prominent part, provided the people are able to read them. The growth of literacy provided a widespread demand for printed matter. The first newspaper, of which only one copy was issued, appeared in Yedo in 1861. Three years later a semi-monthly was issued

for a while at Yokohama by a Japanese who had been in America. In 1871 the first daily newspaper appeared, and four years later there were more than a hundred daily and periodical issues. To-day the great newspapers of Japan have a circulation rarely equaled in any part of the world. Their power for good or ill is great. The translation of Western books, and the writing of Japanese texts based upon Western authors, was also undertaken on a large scale. The Japanese are great readers, and the introduction of foreign-language instruction in the higher schools soon provided a market for books printed abroad.

Army and Navy Reorganization.—Some of the daimyos had introduced Western military tactics in their feudal levies before Perry arrived. In 1866 the Choshu clan was able to defeat the shogunate forces because it had accepted Western methods in place of the old samurai tactics. The shogun then equipped and trained some of his troops in the new way and French military advisers were employed. In 1871 the principle of conscription was adopted, and the new forces were called upon the next year to serve three years in the active army and four in the reserves. French instructors were employed in the imperial army, for the French army was considered the finest in the West, but the success of Germany in the war of 1870-71 led the Japanese to substitute German advisers in 1885. The modern Japanese army, therefore, was organized largely upon the German system, although the foreign advisers had been dismissed before the war with China. The navy, in turn, boasts a British tradition. The first modern vessel was presented to the shogun by the Dutch in 1855. This was followed by steam and sailing vessels purchased in America and Europe. Some of the feudal lords also had modern steam and sailing vessels. But the imperial navy really dates from the employment of a group of British naval officers in 1873. Japanese were also sent abroad to study military and naval science, one of whom, who served brilliantly in the Russian War, graduated from Annapolis in 1878. In these services the feudal tradition has continued to a marked degree. The army has largely been controlled by men of Choshu, the navy

by men of Satsuma. Of the two, the navy has been the more popular branch, probably because it has been the first line of defense of an island empire, while the stern military discipline, the product of feudalism and Prussian methods, has made conscription generally unpopular. The rivalry between the military and naval leaders has been a major problem confronting the ministries in recent years.

The Gregorian Calendar.—Not the least of the reforms, and one which caused much concern to the conservatives, was the introduction of the Gregorian calendar. This was effected on the 1st of January, 1873. Up to that time the lunar month, as in China, had been used. Now the days would conform to those in the West, but the reign name, Meiji, would be used. In Russia the Julian calendar was still used, which was thirteen days behind the Gregorian reckoning. China did not adopt the Western calendar until 1912, nor Russia until after the Revolution.

Christianity Tolerated.—In spite of the edicts forbidding the practice of Christianity in 1612, and the enforcement measures which had followed, some Christian communities still persisted in Western Japan. With the new treaties the Japanese granted to foreigners the right to practice their religion, but they did not permit Christian propaganda. In 1860 they refused Harris's plea for a treaty guaranty of toleration, and thus escaped the evils which China was forced to endure. With the opening of Nagasaki in 1859 the Catholic missionaries visited the Christian communities and renewed their work among them. This was a distinct violation of the treaties. It resulted in the arrest and confinement of some of the native believers, and in the renewal of the old edicts by the new government. In 1869 some 3,000 Christians were arrested and distributed among near-by daimyos who were ordered to see that they changed their faith. There was nothing that the foreign representatives could do but protest against this unenlightened act, and endeavor to convince the Japanese that intolerance would cause them to lose the respect of the world. The exiles were then allowed to return to their homes. In 1873 the mission of Iwakura, which had visited

the United States and Europe, returned with much information concerning the Western World. On the strength of their report the government determined, on its own motion, to abandon the old anti-Christian policy. In that year the sign-boards, which proclaimed the penalties for the practice of the proscribed faith, were taken down. Religious tolerance was accepted by Japan herself, it was not forced upon her. The Japanese Christians were freed from oppression, and the foreign missionaries were allowed to carry on their work not only in the open ports but in the interior when provided with proper passports. No foreign missionary lost his life, for any religious reason, after 1854.

Growth of a Reactionary Party.—It was not to be expected that the sweeping changes introduced in the first years of the Meiji era would meet with universal acceptance. The amazing thing is that there should have been so little expressed opposition. In the movement which culminated in the Restoration a few kuge and daimyos assumed the leadership, but the bulk of the active agents were samurai, mostly from the Western clans. Saigo and Okubo, of Satsuma, and Kido, of Choshu, were the most influential, although two kuge, Iwakura and Sanjo, held the highest positions in the government. Later Ito and Inouye of Choshu, Okuma of Saga, Itagaki of Tosa, and others rose to prominence. In the early councils three divisions soon arose; one group favored very rapid progress and change, another urged caution and slow advance, while in between stood a group which advocated a middle course. The latter included most of the abler administrators, and their advice was in every case accepted by the emperor. The result was that by 1873 the leaders of the two wings had withdrawn from the government, one group criticizing the emperor's advisers because they were dangerously progressive, and the other because they were not progressive enough. It was natural that the former should reach a larger following, because among the new reforms were many which affected the honor and influence of the samurai. Again, as in the pre-Restoration days, it was a question of foreign policy which united the opponents of the ministry.

The Korean Question.—The diplomatic problem which at this time served to complicate the domestic situation was one concerning Korea. The refusal of the Hermit Kingdom to enter into friendly relations with Japan, now that the imperial government had been restored, aroused the keen resentment of many of the samurai. Several times friendly Japanese missions were rebuffed until in 1873 a strong party in Japan, led by the great Field-Marshal Saigo, advocated immediate punitive measures. On the one hand an appeal was made to those who would defend the national honor against the contemptuous treatment accorded by the Koreans, and on the other such a campaign was advocated because it would give the samurai a chance to take the field before the new conscript army could be relied upon for offensive measures. The peace party in the ministry was able to postpone a decision until the return of the Iwakura mission from abroad. Its members were convinced from what they had seen in foreign lands that Japan must use all her resources and her energies in order to carry out the reforms which were so necessary to her acceptance as a modern power. A war which would dissipate her strength and bring as compensation only a doubtful glory was not to be thought of. The debates in the ministry raged in the middle of October, and the final arguments were presented in the presence of the emperor himself. His decision—and it was a memorable one—supported the peace party, of Iwakura, Okubo, Kido and Ito. The opponents of this policy, Saigo, Itagaki, Goto, Okuma and others, withdrew from the government. Agreeing on a policy of war with Korea, these men were in other matters at the two extremes of conservatism and liberalism. Too much credit can hardly be accorded to the advisers of the emperor who advocated the less popular cause of peace against Saigo, the military hero of the Restoration, and his proud samurai supporters.

Satsuma Becomes a Center of Conservatism.—The defeated war advocates retired to their homes. In 1874 and 1876 three short-lived revolts occurred, designed to force the Korean issue or to overthrow the too-liberal ministry. Saigo returned to Satsuma and threw himself into the task of training the

young samurai of that and neighboring fiefs in the martial exercises of the past. The Korean question was reopened in 1875 when a Japanese ship was fired upon, but this time the ministry, instead of sending over a punitive expedition, followed the example of the United States and won a treaty from Korea after a demonstration of naval and military force. This year, 1876, was a humiliating one for the samurai. The ministry had committed three unpardonable crimes, in the opinion of many of them. It had recognized as an independent state Korea, which sent regular tribute to China. This, said these samurai, placed Japan on an equality with a vassal of China. It had forbidden the samurai to wear their two swords as of old, and it had forcibly commuted the pensions. Early in the new year a most serious attempt was made to overthrow this unpopular government and to restore the old privileges of the samurai.

The Satsuma Rebellion.—The revolt began in Satsuma on the part of the "private school" students. Some believed a conspiracy existed to assassinate their leader, Saigo. The clansmen were by no means united in opposition to the government. Saigo himself did not join the rebels until a punitive force was mustered against them. But his younger brother was one of the imperial commanders, while the Oyama brothers were likewise divided in allegiance. The former daimyo, Shimazu Saburo, would have nothing to do with the movement, while the leader of the imperial ministry at this time was Okubo, a Satsuma man. In this short civil war, which lasted from January until the end of September, 1877, an army of commoners fought, with surprising success, against a body of samurai. The losses on both sides were heavy, but the imperial forces were superior in numbers and material. Finally Kagoshima was retaken, and in the last battle Saigo was wounded and beheaded, at his request, by a friend. From the popular point of view the Satsuma samurai were not rebels. They did not fight against the emperor, but for him, in order to free him from the influence of ministers who had advised him so badly. So when the war was over, instead of wholesale executions which might have marked the overthrow of a

dangerous rebellion, only twenty were beheaded, and these were men who abandoned a position of trust in order to join the rebels. More than 39,000 were pardoned, and 2,800 were deprived of rank or fined and imprisoned. The influence of the Satsuma clan in the civil and naval administrations was not forfeited, nor did Saigo fall from his high position of popularity. To-day a statue in his honor stands in Tokyo, and his son was later created a marquis. The real significance of this ill-starred insurrection lies in the fact that it was the last time the forces of conservatism attempted to check the liberal march of Japan. Never again could the emperor be divorced from his ministers. A rebellion against the government would be considered a rebellion against the emperor, and this, in the minds of Japanese, was an unthinkable thing. Criticism of the ministers must, in the future, take the form of speech or writing, or, as sometimes happened, of personal violence. The flower of the samurai had been defeated by an army composed of young men of the common people. In spite of 240 years of peace the manhood of Japan could be depended upon to fight as valiantly as of old.

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CHAPTER XXIII

REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS

Western Political Ideas.—The ready acceptance by the Japanese of Western ideas in the fields of applied science, military and naval organization, and education was accompanied by the more gradual introduction of Western political ideas. At first the traditions of the remote past were drawn upon to provide a centralized government in place of the dual organization, but gradually the whole framework of government and the political life of the nation were modified under the influence of ideas from the West.✧ The emperor's oath in 1868 has been described as "the fountain-head of all constitutional ideas in Japan." and its first article, that "a deliberative assembly shall be formed and all measures decided by public opinion," was translated into political institutions which went far beyond the ideas of the original leaders. It is evident that in 1868 the Restoration leaders had in mind, at most, a general conclave of the daimyos and ranking clansmen whose advice might serve to guide the new officials. But nothing would satisfy the liberal leaders until the force of public opinion was provided with a channel in the shape of representative institutions. The development of this idea is the central theme of this chapter. Progress in this field was not made by leaps and bounds. In every discussion the liberals were opposed by those more conservative, while the majority of the government took a middle ground. Thus progress was slower, but surer. In some respects, as in the introduction of Western ideas of jurisprudence, the progress was probably too fast.✧ Between the emperor's oath and the promulgation of a constitution twenty-one years elapsed. The Chinese reformers in the early twentieth century tried to cover the same ground in six years (1908-14) while in Japan almost sixty years were to pass between the oath and the first exercise of manhood suffrage in 1927.

The Kogisho (Assembly).—An attempt to carry out the first article of the emperor's oath was made the very next year,

when representatives of the 276 clans, appointed by their lords, assembled in Yedo. The members of the Japanese assembly of 1869 were all military men, samurai; no commoners, merchants, or farmers were present. The powers of this assembly were limited to discussion and the offering of advice. No legislative duties were intrusted to it. Although many topics were debated and some useful reforms advocated, a body of this kind could not survive the abolition of feudalism. At the close of the second session, in 1870, it was prorogued indefinitely, and finally abolished in June, 1873.

Itagaki and the Liberals.—In that year, which saw the cabinet crisis over Korea and the withdrawal of the advocates of strong measures, the liberal leaders, headed by Itagaki, petitioned the government to grant “popularly elected” institutions, in accordance with the imperial oath. An extract from this memorial sounds very reminiscent to an American. “We venture to say that it is a universally accepted principle that the people who pay the tax are entitled to a voice in the government.” The liberals of this period did not advocate manhood or universal suffrage, but would restrict it to samurai and farmers and merchants of property. The government, however, was not prepared to move so promptly. A compromise was arrived at wherein a senate and an assembly of prefectural governors were to be established (which were erroneously described as the upper and lower houses of a legislature), as well as a high court of justice.

Assembly of Prefectural Governors.—This was decreed in 1874 and first convened the next year. The members were the imperially appointed governors of the prefectures. They were not elected, nor did they represent the people of their administrative areas. They possessed no legislative power. The purpose of the government was to bring together these local officials so that they could report on conditions in their regions and also receive instructions as to the purposes and policies of the government and as to the new measures which they were to carry out. Two residents of each prefecture might be admitted as hearers at the sessions. While these meetings were of great value in standardizing the reforms, they did not

in the least satisfy the advocates of real representative institutions.¹

The Senate (Genro-in).—This also was a body composed of appointed members which met for the first time early in 1876. Its purpose was to discuss and decide upon measures of new legislation or the revision of existing laws. It had no initiative powers, and could only discuss measures sent down from the cabinet by command of the emperor. Although its advisory duties were exercised with no little ability, the fact that it was neither a representative nor a legislative body caused it to be as unsatisfactory to the liberals as the assembly of prefectural governors. Between 1874 and 1881 numerous petitions were sent in to the government praying for the inauguration of really representative assemblies.²

Elective Assemblies in Prefectures and Cities.—The suppression of the Satsuma rebellion in 1877 removed the strongest group of conservatives. In May of the next year the most influential member of the ministry, Okubo, was assassinated by six men of the Kaga clan. The reasons which they gave were most contradictory. On the one hand they blamed Okubo for the rebellion which had cost Saigo, their hero, his life, and on the other hand they held him responsible for the failure to grant the liberal petitions for a representative assembly. It happened that a month before this tragedy the government had presented to the assembly of prefectural governors the drafts of three laws which would have introduced real representation in the local assemblies. Two months after the assassination of Okubo these laws were promulgated. They provided for assemblies in the prefectures and largest cities, the members of which would be elected by the male inhabitants, twenty-five years of age, who paid a land tax of five yen or more. These assemblies were empowered to determine the budget of expenditures and the means of raising the local taxes. Their resolutions could be vetoed by the governor, but his veto must be confirmed by the home minister. In addition, they might present petitions to the central government

¹ The assembly of prefectural governors still meets annually in Tokyo.

² The Senate was abolished when the Diet convened in 1890.

and, on the request of the governor, consider matters relating to their regions. Now, for the first time, the principle of election and representative institutions was incorporated in the Japanese system of government. To be sure, the legislative power was not granted to these local bodies, but through their control of the purse they might in time follow the precedent of the English House of Commons. In 1879 these elective assemblies met for the first time. They were to serve as training-schools for the leaders of the national parliament which was to come eleven years later. In many an assembly warm disputes arose between the governor, who was the representative of the central administration, and the elected assemblymen, who considered every proposal in the light of local interests and needs. The introduction of representative institutions in the local government was a wise step in the path which was to lead to an imperial Diet.

The Emperor Promises to Summon a Parliament.—The local assemblies did not, of course, satisfy those who had so long been petitioning for a national parliament. Again the ministry moved forward, although not as fast as the liberals, now strengthened by the support of Okuma, desired. In October, 1881, an imperial decree was issued promising to convene a national assembly in 1890, the twenty-third year of Meiji. This allowed nine years for preparation, for the reorganization of the governmental machinery to meet the requirements of parliamentary government, and for the creation of political parties which might control the elected branch of the parliament. Within a year Itagaki had organized the first political party in Japan, the *Jiyu-to*, or Liberal Party, and a few months later Okuma organized the *Kaishin-to*, or Progressive Party. In principle there was little to distinguish these political groups. Both were opposed to the existing bureaucracy, with its dominant Satsuma-Choshu (Sat-Cho) control of the government. Itagaki, a military man, was the more radical, and his followers were influenced more by French and American political theories. Okuma, a civilian, was more moderate, and the British system of constitutional government appealed to his followers. But then, as for many years, political align-

ments were determined more by personal sympathies than political theories. The Liberals were primarily the followers of Itagaki, and the Progressives of Okuma.

Administrative Reorganization.—In March, 1882, the emperor instructed Ito to work out a draft of a constitution for submission to his approval. Within a few days Ito and a group of secretaries were on their way to Europe, where for a year and a half they studied the actual operation of the constitutional systems of the leading European monarchies. The American and French systems could offer little which would serve the needs of a constitutional monarchy. On his return, in September, 1883, Ito and his staff, supplemented by foreign advisers, continued their labors, submitting their proposals from time to time to the emperor for his consideration. It was at this time that the influence of the German political systems began to have effect in Japan. Ito believed that in the German states, such as Prussia, Bavaria, and Saxony, conditions prevailed more like those in Japan than could be found in England, where the political institutions were of great antiquity. We have seen that in the 'eighties the Japanese army was reorganized along German lines, and in the same years German influence may easily be traced in the constitution, the new civil and commercial codes, the development of university organization, and in the sending of government students abroad. The first of the political changes in preparation for the promised parliament was the creation of a new peerage. This took place in 1884 and was primarily designed to provide a basis for the upper house. Under the original law 500 peers were created, whose titles were the equivalent of the Western ranks of prince, marquis, count, viscount, and baron. The new peers represented the old orders of kuge and daimyos, while a few of the samurai who had attained distinction in the new government were included in the list. The peerage law was based upon Western practices, and although it restored the distinctions in rank which had been abolished in 1869 it did not make use of the old imperial and shogunate classifications. This was followed, late in 1885, by the reorganization of the cabinet, again according to West-

ern usage. The cabinet was now to be composed of the minister-president (premier), and the heads of the various departments, which were fixed at nine. Count Ito became the first minister-president and under his direction the efficiency of the various departments was greatly improved. Finally, in April, 1888, a privy council was established to serve as an advisory body to the emperor. It was composed of a small number of experienced men, usually retired officials, who were to present their opinions to the emperor on all important matters of legislation and foreign treaties, and on all other matters upon which their opinion might be asked. It was possible, and it sometimes happened, that the advice given to the emperor was at variance with that submitted by the cabinet. In such a case the emperor would come to his own decision, usually with the aid of an extra-constitutional group of advisers commonly spoken of as the Genro, or Elder Statesmen.

The Promulgation of the Constitution.—After almost seven years of investigation and preparation the work of Ito and his associates was completed, and on February 11, 1889, the imperial constitution was promulgated by the emperor in person. The draft had been submitted by the emperor to the privy council and, Ito tells us, the emperor presided over these deliberations, hearing the conflicting opinions on disputed articles and rendering the final decision. "His Majesty's decisions inclined almost invariably toward liberal and progressive ideas, so that we have been ultimately able to obtain the constitution such as it exists at present." In fact as well as in theory this constitution was the free gift of the emperor to his people. In spite of the political discussions which had gone on for fifteen years or more, there was no organized opposition strong enough to force the concession of such a limitation of the imperial prerogatives. This, in itself, made the grant more highly esteemed. A concession grudgingly made, in the face of compelling force, would not have received such popular acclaim. Only twenty-one years had passed since the boy emperor had sworn to abide by the enlightened principles of the imperial oath, and less than eighteen years

since feudalism was abolished by imperial decree. In the life of a nation but a brief span had passed between these significant events, yet profound changes had been crowded into these years. But the living force of old ideas was brought home with tragic force on this day of rejoicing when Viscount Mori, one of the most progressive of the ministers, was slain by an outraged samurai because he had been lacking in respect when he visited the shrine of the Great Temple of Ise.

The Spirit of the Constitution.—In the following chapter the form of government provided by the new constitution will be considered in some detail. Here it should be said that although in most quarters the work of Ito was considered to be a liberal and forward-looking charter in view of the political conditions which then prevailed in Japan, there were some who criticized it as a conservative or even a reactionary plan of state. For this criticism there was no excuse whatever. In drafting the constitution Ito and his associates never lost sight of the fact that Japan had but recently passed out from feudal conditions. The political inexperience of the people was great. He tells us: "The virtues necessary for the smooth working of any constitution, such as love of freedom of speech, love of publicity of proceedings, the spirit of tolerance for opinions opposed to one's own, etc., had yet to be learned by long experience." The constitution was criticized mainly because whereas the imperial prerogatives were clearly and unquestionably defined, the people enjoyed no immutable rights, but every one was to be enjoyed "subject to law"; because no amendment could be considered without the approval in the first instance of the emperor; and because the system of ministerial responsibility, which vested control of the ministers in the majority of the lower house, was not precisely granted. On the other hand, Ito formulated a political system which was to a surprising degree elastic, and which might be adapted to the needs of the nation, from time to time, without the necessity of formal amendment. The success of this endeavor is now clearly shown by the liberalization which has taken place in the government since 1889 without any change in the fundamental law. As political experience increased, additional

privileges were granted by law to the people until adult male suffrage was finally attained in 1927. And although the system of ministerial responsibility was not provided for in the constitution, it was not denied and from time to time the lower house has been able to control the acts of the ministries for the time being.

The Imperial Diet.—On the day that the constitution was promulgated four important laws were published which provided the details which were wisely omitted from the fundamental law. These were the imperial ordinance concerning the House of Peers, the law of the houses, the law of elections, and the law of finance, but these in turn could be modified by the Diet after its organization. The first general election was called for July, 1890. The suffrage was granted to males, aged twenty-five, who paid direct national taxes to the amount of fifteen yen. Out of a population of 42,000,000 only 460,000 were qualified voters, or a little over one per cent. A strenuous political campaign preceded the elections in which the principal point at issue was opposition to or support of the ministry in office. When the emperor personally opened the first session, on November 29th, the three hundred members were divided among four party groups, with a small number of independents. In this first Assembly 170 were opposed to the ministry, consisting of Constitutional Liberals (130) and Progressives (40). At best the government could count upon 130 supporters in the lower house. At this time Count Yamagata, the able military leader and a Choshu clansman, was prime minister, while Ito acted as president of the House of Peers. The opposition followed British precedent in attacking the budget introduced by the government, and proposed a reduction of 8,000,000 yen. The ministry cited the sixty-seventh article of the constitution which stated:

Those already-fixed expenditures based by the Constitution upon the powers appertaining to the Emperor, and such expenditures as may have arisen by the effect of law, or that appertain to the legal obligations of the Government, shall be neither rejected nor reduced by the Imperial Diet without the concurrence of the Government.

The House of Representatives, however, stood firm. A compromise was finally arrived at by which the government accepted a reduction of 6,310,000 yen. The session, which had narrowly escaped dissolution, came to an end in March, 1891. This was but the beginning of a long struggle, relieved only when a national crisis, such as a foreign war, or a political truce, freed the ministries from the attacks of an opposing majority in the lower house, until party governments were established which could count upon the support of their own members.

Summary.—All the new political machinery of Japan, the assemblies, political parties, representative institutions, orders of peerage, privy council, constitution, and the whole fabric of the central and local administration as well as the system of courts and jurisprudence, was either taken directly from the West or was profoundly influenced by Western methods or ideas. It should not be expected, however, that the new ideas entirely supplanted the old. In its actual operation the whole political organization and administrative system was modified by customs and methods which had come down through the ages. To condemn the Japanese Diet because its sessions compared unfavorably with those of the British Parliament would be entirely beside the point. The surprising thing is that, within thirty years after the abolition of feudalism, an Imperial Diet existed, in which the representatives of the taxpayers were able to impose their will upon the ministers of state.

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CHAPTER XXIV

THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN

Underlying Factors.—The constitution of 1889 has remained unaltered to the present day. For this reason it is important to examine the form of government created by this fundamental law, whereas the later Chinese constitutions were never effectively put into operation. But although the Japanese constitution has not been modified, some very important changes have taken place in the laws which supplied the working details of the constitutional system. In every instance these changes, made by laws which were approved by the emperor and the Diet, were along liberal lines and served to carry forward the policies which have marked the government of New Japan. In this way the hopes of Ito were realized, that political privileges would increase with political experience.¹ Moreover, before a detailed study of the constitution is attempted, some attention should be paid to certain underlying factors whose influence upon the actual operation of the constitutional system was great. The machinery of government was foreign, but the living forces which set the machinery in operation and kept it functioning were Japanese, and subject to the profound influence of Japanese history and tradition.

The Unique Influence of the Emperor.—No study of the political development of modern Japan can afford to overlook the unique position held by the imperial house. For centuries the emperors had dwelt in seclusion in Kyoto, their absolute powers exercised in their names by the shoguns or other military masters. But the opposition to the foreign treaties and to the shogunate centered around the Emperor Komei and when the dual government came to an end, at the beginning of the Emperor Meiji's reign, a great manifestation of loyalty to the restored imperial house swept over Japan. As

¹ See above p. 254.

the boy emperor advanced in years and ripened in experience he held more and more the respect and confidence of his advisers until finally he lived to become the most experienced official in the state, having survived most of the makers of New Japan. For him and for the imperial house there was profound respect. Criticism of the emperor, or opposition to him, was deemed unthinkable, and no one dared publicly to propose a form of government which would eliminate the throne. So when Ito took up the duty of drafting a constitution he tells us:

It was evident from the outset that mere imitation of foreign models would not suffice, for there were historical peculiarities of our country which had to be taken into consideration. For example, the Crown was, with us, an institution far more deeply rooted in the national sentiment and in our history than in other countries. It was indeed the very essence of a once theocratic state, so that in formulating the restrictions on its prerogatives in the new Constitution, we had to take care to safeguard the future realness or vitality of these prerogatives, and not to let the institution degenerate into an ornamental crowning piece of an edifice.

After the Diet assembled and the struggle between the elected representatives and the ministers began, the emperor could by a word harmonize the disputes which seemed beyond all compromise. While rarely intervening in these disputes, the emperor possessed the unique influence which could silence opposition and permit the government to function without prolonged obstruction. There was, of course, the danger that the official advisers of the emperor would in most cases win his approval of their policies, and this was constantly charged in the early days of Meiji. In fact, the early attempts at armed insurrection were proclaimed to be for the purpose of freeing the emperor from his dangerous advisers. But in the later years of his reign the Emperor Meiji intervened rarely, but always effectively, in disputes between his ministers and his Diet. This influence, which seems to be as strong to-day under his liberal-minded grandson Hirohito, is a stabilizing influence in Japanese politics which has its roots in history and tradition rather than in any written charter.

The Feudal Tradition.—The influence of the feudal tradition must also be considered. Feudalism stressed local interests rather than national ones. It also stressed loyalty to one's clansmen. The new government was controlled at the beginning of Meiji by the leaders of the victorious Western clans. The civil, military and naval administrations were largely staffed by their followers. At first the government was spoken of as the Sat-Cho-To, because of the prominence of the Satsuma, Choshu, and Tosa leaders. Soon, however, the Tosa clansmen were subordinated to the other two. Officials in high places looked out for the interests of promising young men from their districts, so that Choshu men largely controlled the army and Satsuma men the navy. Twenty-four cabinets have held office since the constitution was promulgated. Of these the prime ministers have been Choshu men in ten instances, Satsuma men in four, former kuge in two, and eight have come from other than the Sat-Cho clans. The passing of more than fifty years since the abolition of feudalism has, of course, had its effect upon this feudal tradition. The military and naval services do not, as of old, secure the pick of the young men. Civil offices, the professions, and business have laid claim to them as in other lands. And since 1918, when the first really strong party ministry took office, only two of the eight prime ministers have come from the former dominant clans.

Political Inexperience.—Under the feudal régime the people enjoyed no political privileges. Representative institutions, with limited legislative powers, were inaugurated with the local assemblies in 1879. It would take time for the qualified voters to learn how to use the suffrage which they now enjoyed. The political parties which soon arose were based upon personal leadership rather than political principles. And although when the Diet assembled in 1890 there were many men in the elected house who had gained some experience in parliamentary procedure as members of the local assemblies, there was still much ground to be covered before the Diet could compare in legislative efficiency with the older and more experienced parliaments of the West. By this time, however,

the administrative system of the empire had been gradually developed during the past twenty-two years. The various departments were staffed by officials, many of whom had served for years and were familiar with the problems and duties of their offices. It was only natural that when the newly elected representatives attempted to control the permanent officials (the "bureaucrats") a bitter contest was in store. The bureaucracy in Japan, as in all other lands, had little respect for the views of the representatives, who owed their importance to political successes rather than to years of administrative experience. In Japan the administrative system preceded, by many years, the creation of the Diet. For this reason the bureaucrats were intrenched and in many instances were protected from any legislative interference. The army and navy were under the control of active officers as heads of the departments. Foreign affairs were entirely removed from political control, except through criticism. The home minister retained great power over the local governments, in spite of the various elected assemblies. And the minister of education controlled the very important educational machinery of the state. The efforts of the Diet to control the ministries and establish the principle of ministerial responsibility, as well as to control to greater extent the permanent officials, have been of prime significance in the political history of Japan since 1890. It has been called the struggle between bureaucracy and democracy, with the bureaucrats waging a losing fight. But this does not mean that their cause was without merit. Political power without experience or a sense of responsibility is a dangerous thing, and it was fortunate for Japan that her administrative machinery could continue to function with creditable success while her people were gaining the political experience requisite for the carrying on of a parliamentary form of government.

The "Elder Statesmen".—Finally, in order to understand the actual workings of the Japanese constitution we must know something about that small group of extra-constitutional advisers of the emperor known as the "Elder Statesmen," or

Genro.² Here was another custom of Old Japan which profoundly affected the new constitutional régime. Just as the head of a family would turn to the oldest members for advice in any important matter, so the emperor, the head of the state, was accustomed to seek the opinions of a small number of able men whose wisdom and loyalty had long been demonstrated. In the West a constitutional monarch was supposed to follow the advice of his ministers. In Japan the Elder Statesmen might give counsel contrary to that presented by the cabinet and in such cases the opinions of the Elder Statesmen would prevail. Thus an advisory body was created whose influence surpassed that of the ministers and the privy council as provided in the constitution. At the height of their influence the Elder Statesmen included Ito, Yamagata, and Inouye, of Choshu, and Oyama and Matsukata, of Satsuma. Their advice was sought when a prime minister was to be chosen, and all other matters of vital importance were first considered by them. Within this group Ito and Yamagata, though from the same clan, were often found in opposition. Ito, the framer of the constitution, was fundamentally liberal in his political views. Yamagata, the father of the Japanese army, was the head of what was known as the military group. The tragic death of Ito in 1909 left Yamagata as the most influential Genro. But in the next reign all these trusted advisers of the Meiji Emperor and his son had passed away, and only a more recent creation, Prince Saionji, remained, too old to take an active share in political life, although his advice was still sought. It is extremely doubtful if any Elder Statesmen will take the place of the group which so naturally attained great influence before party leaders arose.

The Constitution.—The Japanese constitution, the first to be adopted by an Asiatic state, is a model of concise statement. Only the broadest outlines of the government are sketched out, the details to be provided by ordinance or law. Because of the general terms which were used the constitution was open to interpretation, but this would take place through legislation, which must have the sanction of the emperor,

² Not to be confused with the Genro-in.

rather than through judicial interpretation as in the United States. Details which are found even in the American Constitution were left by Ito to less formal enactment, so that they might be modified if occasion arose by means of laws rather than through the more difficult process of amendment. A comparison of the Japanese constitution with one of the more elaborate state constitutions in the United States testifies to the wisdom of the Japanese framer and his associates. The sovereignty of the emperor, however, is not dealt with in general terms. There can be no question as to where the ultimate power resides, except in so far as it has been precisely limited. This, as we have seen, was in keeping with the national sentiment which then prevailed. And in times of war or public danger the constitutional rights of his subjects may be withdrawn. The law, however, has no power to hold the emperor accountable to it, but what would happen if an emperor should deliberately violate the terms of the constitution is an academic question. The Emperor Meiji solemnly proclaimed that he and his descendants would rule in accordance with the provisions of the constitution.³

The Emperor.—The first chapter of the constitution deals with the emperor. "The Emperor"—so reads the third article—"is sacred and inviolable." In his *Commentaries on the Constitution of Japan* Ito tells us:

The Emperor is Heaven-descended, divine and sacred; He is pre-eminent above all His subjects. He must be revered and is inviolable. He has indeed to pay due respect to the law, but the law has no power to hold Him accountable to it. Not only shall there be no irreverence for the Emperor's person, but also shall He neither be a topic of derogatory comment nor one of discussion.

The powers of the emperor, which are then defined, are those which we would ordinarily associate with the head of a state. These include the right to issue imperial ordinances, when the Diet is not sitting, "in consequence of an urgent necessity," but such ordinances must be laid before the Diet at the next session and if not approved they have no further validity. The supreme command of the army and navy, the determina-

³ The student should read carefully a text of the constitution.

tion of the organization and peace standing of these forces, the declaration of war, the making of peace, and the conclusion of treaties, are among the enumerated powers. The power to determine the peace standing of the army and navy, however, is circumscribed by the power of the Diet to approve appropriation bills. We shall see that in spite of repeated recommendations that the army and navy be enlarged the Diet has many times refused to make the necessary appropriations. The right to make war and conclude treaties without the Diet's approval constitutes the most significant power from the point of view of foreign relations.

Rights and Duties of Subjects.—The second chapter enumerates the rights and duties of the subjects. Here will be found most of the rights enumerated in Western bills of rights and found in the first amendments to the American Constitution. But it will be observed that these are not unqualified rights. In every case they shall be exercised according to, or as provided by, law. Subjects may be appointed to offices, they shall not be arrested, detained, tried, or punished; they shall not be deprived of the right of trial by judges, their houses shall not be searched nor the secrecy of their letters violated, their property rights shall remain inviolate, they shall enjoy freedom of speech, writing, publication, and assemblage, *all according to law*. Freedom of religious belief was accorded "within limits not prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects." In addition to rights, duties were also defined. These included service in the army or navy and the paying of taxes, but in both cases according to law.

The Imperial Diet.—Upon the composition of the Imperial Diet the constitution sheds little light. Here again Ito wisely allowed the details to be worked out from time to time as necessity required. The constitution simply says that the Imperial Diet shall consist of two houses, a House of Peers and a House of Representatives. The former shall, in accordance with the ordinance concerning the House of Peers, "be composed of the members of the Imperial Family, of the orders of nobility, and of those persons who have been nominated by

the Emperor." The latter "shall be composed of Members elected by the people, according to the provisions of the Law of Elections." But as the imperial ordinance and the law of elections might be modified by subsequent legislation, the composition of the houses must be learned from a study of the respective ordinance or laws. The third chapter also enumerates certain constitutional rights and powers of the Diet. It must consent to every law, for the legislative power according to Japanese theory is exercised by the emperor with the approval of the Diet. The Diet must be convoked every year, its sessions may last for three months except when prolonged by imperial order, and extraordinary sessions may also be convened. After a dissolution the newly elected members of the lower house must meet within five months. One-third of the members must be present for debate or vote in either house, and an absolute majority is necessary for the approval of a bill. Deliberations shall be public, except on the demand of the government or by resolution of the house. Both houses have the right to make rules for the management of their internal affairs, and the members are guaranteed freedom of speech and freedom of arrest, with the customary exceptions. Ministers of state and delegates of government may sit and speak in either house.

The House of Peers.—As originally constituted by imperial ordinance the House of Peers was a unique upper house. First of all it should be noted that only a small percentage of the peers of the realm were entitled to a seat in the house, although a majority of the members must be peers. Secondly, provision was made for talent of all kinds outside of the peerage. For these reasons the House of Peers played a more influential rôle in the political life of the nation than could have been assumed by a body consisting of hereditary titleholders. Between 1890 and 1925 the membership was divided into five classes. The first consisted of imperial princes, who entered the house at majority, which in their case was at the age of eighteen. The second was composed of princes and marquises, at the age of twenty-five. These two classes, which rarely exceeded a total of sixty, included all the mem-

bers whose admission was based upon their rank. The third class was composed of representative peers. The counts, viscounts, and barons were instructed to elect one-fifth of their total number to serve for a term of seven years. They also were eligible at the age of twenty-five. A selection as limited as this was bound to include the ablest of the newly created and hereditary holders of these titles, while the only way in which any of the remaining four-fifths of each class could gain admission was as an imperial nominee or as a representative of the highest taxpayers. The former were found in the fourth class. They were, according to the imperial ordinance, to be specially nominated by the emperor "for meritorious services to the State or for erudition." They were eligible at the age of thirty and, unlike the representative peers, they served for life. In this group were found presidents of imperial universities, distinguished professors, former civil and military officials, and others who could contribute special knowledge to the problems of legislation. The fifth group represented the highest taxpayers. In every *fu* and *ken* (prefectural cities and prefectures) the fifteen highest taxpayers chose a representative who would then be nominated by the emperor. These members were eligible at the age of thirty and served for seven years. In formulating these details Ito was influenced no doubt by the composition of the Prussian *Herrenhaus*, where an unlimited number of members might be nominated by the king, and where representatives of the large taxpayers sat with the hereditary and life peers. In time criticism was directed at the composition of the Japanese upper house because it was too largely representative of the titled classes. In 1925 a reform bill was passed which raised the qualifying age for princes and marquises to thirty years, fixed the number of representative peers at eighteen counts, sixty-six viscounts, and as many barons, added four representatives of the Imperial Academy, and increased the number of representatives of the highest taxpayers (now including all who paid 300 yen or more) to sixty-six. It was furthermore provided that the nontitled members might now exceed the holders of titles. Other reforms have been under considera-

tion, so the process of liberalizing the House of Peers should not be considered at an end.

The House of Representatives.—According to the law of elections, promulgated in 1889, the suffrage in elections of members of the lower house would be enjoyed by male subjects, aged twenty-five, who paid direct national taxes of fifteen yen annually. There were, of course, certain disqualifications for cause. In 1900 the property qualification was reduced to ten yen, which increased the number of qualified voters from one per cent to two or two and one-half per cent of the total population. Many attempts were made to reduce further the taxpaying qualification, and a manhood suffrage bill actually passed the lower house in 1911 only to meet defeat in the House of Peers. In 1919, however, the qualification was reduced to three yen, and the voting strength doubled. Finally, in 1925, manhood suffrage, still at the age of twenty-five, was enacted. The first elections under the new law took place, for the prefectural assemblies, in 1927, and it was estimated that the qualified voters will reach thirteen or fourteen million, or twenty-three per cent of the population. Universal suffrage is the next step in the march toward democracy. No better example can be found of the wise foresight of Ito than in his provision that the suffrage qualification might be determined by law from time to time rather than by amendment to the constitution. For the first twelve years the membership of the house was fixed at 300; it was then raised from time to time by law until the last measure fixed it at 466. The members are eligible at the age of thirty and their term is fixed at four years. Few members, however, have served the full length of their terms. The constant disputes between the Diet and the ministries have resulted in frequent dissolutions of the lower house. Only three general elections have been held since 1890—in 1902, 1908, and 1912. The other eleven have been extraordinary elections, due to a dissolution of the lower house.

The Ministers of State and the Privy Council.—Two brief articles comprise the fourth chapter, which deals with the ministers of state and the privy council. Concerning the

former we learn that they "shall give their advice to the Emperor, and be responsible for it. All Laws, Imperial Ordinances, and Imperial Rescripts of whatever kind, that relate to the affairs of State, require the countersignature of a Minister of State." The purpose of this provision was simply to fix responsibility for every political act of the emperor. But nothing may be found here on the great question of ministerial responsibility. The liberal leaders advocated the system found in Great Britain and in most constitutional monarchies under which the cabinet held office only as long as it enjoyed the confidence of a majority of the lower house. Under the English cabinet system of government, if a dispute arises, the sovereign ordinarily accepts the resignation of the cabinet and appoints a prime minister who can count upon parliamentary support. But he might also accept the advice of his ministers and dissolve the lower house in order that the voters might pass upon the question at issue and elect new members who would either support or oppose the ministerial program. It is not an easy matter to provide for such a system in a written constitution. The Australians, for example, found this to be the case. Ito, however, did not positively rule such a system out of consideration. Again, he left the way for ministerial responsibility if it should prove desirable. In the meantime the constitution made it possible for the emperor to select his ministers irrespective of the political situation in the lower house. So from 1890 to the present day the struggle for ministerial responsibility has raged. The first ministries tried to gain the support of a working majority by any means, but constant disputes and dissolutions occurred. In 1898 Okuma headed a party cabinet, but it was short lived. Ito, by 1900, realized that the ministries must have the support of the house, and therefore he entered the political field as leader of a party, the Seiyukai. It was not until 1918 that a really strong party cabinet was formed when Hara, the first civilian to become prime minister, formed a Seiyukai ministry. His unfortunate assassination deprived his party of his able leadership, and his successor was unable to hold office long. Since that time only one premier has been summoned because

he was the leader of the majority party. The principle of ministerial responsibility has not been firmly established, but every political leader knows that without the support of a majority in the lower house the ministerial program is bound to meet at times with baffling opposition. The privy council remained, under the constitution, exactly as before, a body to deliberate upon important matters of state when consulted by the emperor. Its position has often been attacked by liberal leaders because, free from all political control, it is in a position to advise the emperor to reject the proposals of the ministry at the time. A striking example of its influence was given in 1927 when its failure to approve an imperial ordinance recommended by the Wakatsuki cabinet brought about the downfall of the ministry.

Miscellaneous Provisions.—The constitution also provides for courts, the organization of which shall be determined by law. It deals in some detail with the fiscal powers of the Diet, removing from its control the fixing of administrative fees or other revenue having the nature of compensation. The budget must first be laid before the House of Representatives. The grant to the imperial house was to continue without further consent, but an increase must be approved by the Diet. Expenditures based by the constitution upon the powers pertaining to the emperor, or which have arisen by the effect of law, or that pertain to the legal obligations of the government should neither be rejected nor reduced without the consent of the government. One very important provision freed the government from the control of the Diet. "When the Imperial Diet has not voted the Budget, or when the Budget has not been brought into actual existence, the Government shall carry out the Budget of the preceding year." The refusal to grant supplies could not be used as a weapon to force an unpopular ministry to resign, but this constitutional proviso could, at most, grant only a respite. A growing country like Japan required enlarged appropriations every year, and these could only be secured with the consent of the Diet. Provision was made for the amendment of the constitution. Such a change must be submitted by imperial order, and two-

thirds of the members of each house must be present for debate, while two-thirds of those present must approve the measure. No amendment has ever taken place because most of the reforms advocated by the liberal leaders could be secured through the easier processes of legislation. Ministerial responsibility can come, just as manhood suffrage, without changing a letter of the constitution. Likewise the peers can be shorn of their remaining influence, although some must always be found in the upper house as long as the titled orders exist. In the same way the influence of the privy council may pass into a mere formality whenever the emperor chooses to accept in every case the advice of his ministers.

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CHAPTER XXV

THE REVISION OF THE TREATIES

Foreign Relations.—Having surveyed the progress of Japan in the Meiji Era and indicated the contributions of Western ideas and methods in bringing about these changes, we can now resume our story of the diplomatic relations between Japan and the Western powers. Between 1868 and 1894 the major diplomatic question at issue was concerned with the revision of the commercial treaties of 1858 and 1866. The new government, whose leaders were better informed concerning foreign affairs than the shogun's advisers and who believed the imperial régime was entitled to world-wide respect, chafed at certain impairments of Japanese sovereignty which were incorporated in the early treaties. The Chinese, at a much later day, came to a realization of similar and more far-reaching limitations upon their autonomy. The way in which Japan gained relief from most of the provisions of her "unequal treaties" in 1894 becomes of special interest when the Chinese are now wrestling with the same problem.

The Points at Issue.—There were two main points at issue between Japan and the treaty powers. One was the system of extraterritoriality, and the other was the conventional tariff. The former was introduced in the Russian treaty of 1855, repeated in the Dutch and American treaties of 1856 and 1857, and clearly defined in the commercial treaties of 1858, in respect to civil as well as criminal cases. The latter was found in the four-power convention of 1866, which took the place of the tariff regulations in the 1858 treaties and the subsequent amendments. On almost all imports and exports the duties were fixed at five per cent. The imposition of a conventional tariff was designed to prevent arbitrary tariff charges, as had been the case at Canton, and thus protect and encourage foreign trade. But after a well-organized government was in operation only selfish reasons caused the powers to insist upon this advantage. The Japanese protested,

because it denied them tariff autonomy, and thus impaired their sovereignty, because it prevented them from using import and export duties as a major form of national revenue when money was so much needed, and because Japan was denied the protection which foreign tariffs gave to their national industries. But far more than the conventional tariff the Japanese resented the extraterritorial privileges of treaty power nationals in their country. Not only was this an impairment of their sovereignty, but it also testified to the low esteem in which the foreigners held the Japanese codes and courts. As long as Japan possessed no uniform laws, employed torture in criminal cases, and imposed penalties unusual or long-since abandoned in the West, the extraterritorial protection of foreigners might be defended. But when Japan had provided modern codes and reorganized her courts she insisted, with increasing emphasis, that she was competent to assume jurisdiction over the foreign residents. The denial of this claim aroused the keenest resentment among patriotic Japanese. In Japan the abuses of extraterritoriality were not so flagrant as in China. The Japanese controlled the movement of foreigners in the interior by the careful enforcement of passport regulations. The Japanese police did not hesitate to arrest foreign malefactors, even though they had to surrender them to the consular officials. There were frequent irritating abuses, none the less, which, thanks to a widely read native press, were brought to the attention of the public. Seventeen countries enjoyed these privileges in Japan and seventeen different systems of law were in force among the foreign residents. As usual, the British made most adequate provision for meeting their responsibilities under this grant. The European governments took the position that their subjects were not bound by Japanese law, but only by their own laws. If a Japanese law or ordinance was to be considered applicable to one of their nationals, it must be notified to them by their resident minister. The American ministers, on the other hand, asserted that Americans must obey Japanese law, for the extraterritorial grant was only in respect to trial and punishment. But this difference in interpretation

had no practical effect, because an American accused of violating a Japanese regulation could not be punished in an American consular court unless an American law could be found covering this very point. Thus an American traveling on a Japanese railway train without a ticket could not be punished for this offense. Perhaps the most famous case occurred in 1879 when the British and German ministers refused to accept the Japanese quarantine regulations at Yokohama, designed to prevent the entrance of cholera from western Japan. The American minister instructed his nationals to abide by the Japanese law. A German ship entered the port, and, when the Japanese tried to detain it, a cruiser appeared and removed it from quarantine. Its passengers and cargo were discharged at Yokohama in spite of Japanese protests. The spreading of the epidemic to eastern Japan was believed by many Japanese and foreigners to be due in part to this denial of the right of the Japanese to impose necessary quarantine regulations upon the ships of certain powers. General U. S. Grant, who was in Japan at this time on his famous trip around the world, did not hesitate to say that the Japanese would have been justified in sinking the German ship. In return for these important concessions no reciprocal privileges were granted the Japanese. In all important respects the first treaties with Japan, like those with China, were unilateral. The Japanese believed that a revision of the treaties might be effected in 1872, on the strength of the wording of the 1858 treaties. The American treaty contained this clause:

After the 4th of July, 1872, upon the desire of either the American or Japanese Governments, and on one year's notice given by either party, this Treaty, and such portions of the Treaty of Kanagawa as remain unrevoked by this Treaty, together with the regulations of trade hereunto annexed, or those that may be hereafter introduced, shall be subject to revision by commissioners appointed on both sides for this purpose, who will be empowered to decide on, and insert therein, such amendments as experience shall prove to be desirable.

In the case of China the powers insisted upon revision at the

appointed time, and Great Britain and France supported their demands by ships and men. The Japanese were to find that revision, although permissible, depended upon the agreement of all the parties, and this agreement was not easy to secure.

The Iwakura Mission.—As the time for revision drew near the government appointed a very strong mission to proceed to the treaty powers and announce that Japan would be ready to revise the treaties as soon as she had made certain necessary reforms in her government and administration. At the head was Iwakura, a former kuge and now one of the three chief ministers of state. Associated with him were Kido, Okubo, Ito and Yamaguchi, and their suite numbered about fifty. This was a period of feverish reform in Japan. Feudalism had just been abolished. The mission sailed before the end of December, arrived in Washington in February, 1872, and, after visiting the principal capitals of Europe, returned in September 1873. It was learned that the United States was quite ready to consider revision, so Okubo and Ito were sent back to Japan to obtain full powers. The mission proposed to the Tokyo cabinet that the country should be gradually opened to foreign travel, away from the treaty ports; that gradual steps should be taken for extinguishing extraterritoriality; and that the prohibition of Christianity should be removed. But before a treaty along these lines could be prepared the negotiations were hurriedly stopped by the Japanese because of the advice given Iwakura by the German minister to Japan, who happened to be in Washington, that if individual revision were attempted each country would, under the most-favored-nation clause, enjoy every concession granted to the others. A direct result of this mission was the establishment of Japanese legations in Washington, London, Paris, St. Petersburg, Berlin, and Vienna. The first Japanese mission to go abroad had visited the United States in 1860, and the first consul to be commissioned was an American citizen who represented Japan at San Francisco in 1867. The information gained by members of the party, which was later published in Japan, was of great usefulness. We have already seen that on

the return of the mission a policy of peace with Korea was adopted and the prohibition of Christianity withdrawn.

Tariff Autonomy Project.—An attempt was immediately made to secure revision by joint conference, but although Italy was willing to relinquish extraterritoriality, the other powers, who had more nationals residing in Japan, persuaded her to draw back. The Japanese now realized that the relinquishment of extraterritoriality could not be obtained until further progress had been made in judicial reform, but they saw no reason why the powers should object to revising the conventional tariff. The matter was first discussed with the United States, whose secretary of state at the time did not support the co-operative policy. A treaty was signed at Washington, July 25, 1878, under which the United States recognized the right of Japan to regulate her tariff and coasting trade, and in return Japan agreed to open two additional ports and abolish export duties. But this treaty was not to come into effect, naturally, until similar treaties were concluded with the other powers. There was little chance of this because the leading commercial nations enjoyed too many benefits from the low conventional tariff, and the readiness of the United States to yield this advantage brought down upon her much criticism in certain quarters. Just at this time great indignation was aroused because of the action of one of the consular courts, so a popular demand for judicial as well as tariff autonomy arose.

Promulgation of Penal Codes.—The refusal to relinquish extraterritoriality was based upon the unsatisfactory system for the administration of justice which then prevailed in Japan. The Japanese understood that the only real objection lay against the criminal laws and procedure, and that if foreign lives were safeguarded, questions concerning property would cause little trouble. The first penal code, to supplant the feudal legislation, was promulgated in 1871, but it was based mainly upon the Chinese system with some modifications, notably in respect to the use of torture. In 1873 this was revised and much of the severity removed. A distinguished French jurist, M. Boissonade, was employed as an adviser, and a committee was appointed to compile a penal code and a code

of criminal procedure. After seven years of investigation and preparation these codes were completed and promulgated in July, 1880, and were to go into effect in January, 1882. They were based very largely upon French models, and for this reason the procedure in Japanese criminal courts has seemed unsatisfactory to persons familiar with Anglo-Saxon methods.

Diplomatic Conferences.—With the promulgation of the new criminal codes, which compared favorably with those of most of the Western powers, the government believed revision was near at hand. They were again doomed to bitter disappointment. Between 1882 and 1887 the negotiations took the form of diplomatic conferences in which the minister of foreign affairs, Inouye, met with the foreign representatives in Tokyo. The early discussions were interrupted by the Korean and Chinese difficulties of 1882-85, so it was not until 1886 that the formal negotiations began. Twenty-nine sessions occurred before the conference was finally adjourned on July 29 following. During these discussions the American minister supported the Japanese desires in every possible way, and his government made a friendly gesture by negotiating an extradition treaty which strengthened Japan's pleas for judicial autonomy. But the treaty powers were quite unwilling to yield the advantages they enjoyed. A draft treaty was worked out which would provide for the gradual relinquishment of extraterritoriality, but would place foreign judges in the Japanese courts until 1903. The tariff was also to be increased, in most cases to ten per cent. These terms fell so far short of the national desires that Inouye gave up the fight, after having served as foreign minister for the notable term of eight years.

Individual Negotiations.—Count Okuma, who succeeded him, adopted a different policy. He proposed to enforce the existing treaties strictly, especially in the matter of travel in the interior, so that the powers might realize the desirability of reasonable concessions on both sides. He also made use of individual negotiations in place of diplomatic conferences. Mexico, a state which had few nationals in Japan and little trade with that country, signed a treaty at Washington, in November, 1888, which provided for an autonomous tariff, for

reciprocal freedom of residence, trade, and travel, and no extraterritorial rights. Negotiations along these lines now proceeded at Tokyo. On February 11, 1889, the constitution was proclaimed, and more than ever the Japanese desired the recognition of their equality with the other nations of the world. An American treaty was signed on the 20th, but this was less liberal. Consular jurisdiction would continue for five years, the tariff was to be in part conventional, and Japan agreed that foreign judges would be added to the supreme court so that a majority would sit in cases appealed by American citizens. This convention was not, however, submitted to the Senate for approval. A treaty along similar lines was negotiated at Berlin, and Russia also accepted the plan. A British treaty was being negotiated in Tokyo and its terms were printed in the *Times* (London). When the Japanese learned of the concessions Okuma had been compelled to make, not only was there great popular indignation, but a majority of the Genro and cabinet opposed the terms. Returning from a cabinet meeting, Okuma was seriously injured by a bomb hurled by a former samurai who committed suicide on the spot. This tragic expression of popular disapproval sealed the fate of the Kuroda cabinet and forced the retirement of Count Okuma.

Promulgation of the Civil and Commercial Codes.—In all the discussions which took place after 1882 much stress was laid by the foreign diplomats upon the necessity of postponing action until the new civil codes were proclaimed. The Japanese had thought that penal code revision would suffice. A committee for the compilation of a civil code was appointed in 1875, and M. Boissonade worked on this draft after the penal codes were completed. The personnel of the codification committee was often changed, but the work steadily progressed. Finally, in 1890, those parts of the code dealing with property and persons were promulgated. They were to go into effect in 1893. Before this time arrived a new committee was appointed and a new draft compiled. This time the German codes had much influence. Finally the complete civil code was proclaimed in 1896-98, to go into effect in June of the latter

year. Although the civil code had been under consideration for over twenty years and the strong French influence had been modified by German ideas, and, in the last revision, by attaching more importance to Japanese customs, the process of codification was at times hurried through in order to meet the demands of the Western diplomats. In the same way a commercial code was undertaken in 1881, with Dr. von Roesler as adviser. It was promulgated in 1890, then postponed and revised with more attention paid to Japanese conditions, and finally put in force in 1899. The code of civil procedure was compiled between 1884 and 1890 and put into operation in 1892.

The Diet and the Treaties.—With the convening of the Imperial Diet in 1890 a new factor was introduced in the struggle between Japan and the treaty powers. Although the Diet had no control over foreign affairs, the question of treaty revision became an important subject of discussion. The members demanded that revision be secured along lines which comported with the national dignity of Japan. By this time revision had been delayed for almost twenty years, and a cynical distrust of the good faith of all the treaty powers was manifest in many quarters. In 1890 Viscount Aoki resumed negotiations, but now the Japanese terms were stiffening. No foreign judges would be tolerated in her courts, although a conventional tariff was still offered. The resignation of Aoki brought these discussions to a close. In 1893 the House of Representatives addressed the throne praying that consular jurisdiction should be abolished, that tariff autonomy should be recovered, and the coasting trade prohibited.

Treaty with Great Britain.—Mutsu, the foreign minister of the new cabinet, determined to try two new steps toward treaty revision. Instead of dealing with all the powers or with the friendly United States he would turn first of all to Great Britain, who had the largest interests at stake and whose decision would be accepted by the other powers. And instead of negotiating in Tokyo he would remove the discussions to London, away from the pressure of the treaty-port communities. At this time a Liberal ministry was in power

in Great Britain, and Viscount Aoki, then stationed at Berlin, was instructed to open negotiations with Lord Kimberley in London. The discussions proceeded with such success that on July 16, 1894, the revision of the British treaty was completed. It provided for reciprocal rights of travel, residence, commerce, navigation, and religion; the most-favored-nation treatment in commerce and navigation; the abolition of consular jurisdiction and foreign settlements in 1899; and a conventional tariff on the principal imports of from five to fifteen per cent. As Mutsu anticipated, the process of treaty revision was a simple one after Great Britain had yielded. The United States followed in November, and omitted any tariff schedule. Germany and France added some of their distinctive articles of commerce to the conventional tariff, but all the powers, including the United States, enjoyed the sum total of the tariff concessions under the most-favored-nation clause. Japan, therefore, did not gain tariff autonomy but her financial situation was greatly improved because the new treaties only covered some sixty articles of commerce, and on these the duties were raised from the former five per cent to ten or fifteen per cent. The new tariff did not go into effect until August 4, 1899, for the original French treaty was in force until that date. Extraterritoriality passed away in the same year, and although some foreigners were fearful of what would happen when they passed under the jurisdiction of Japanese codes and courts, their fears were not justified by events.

Japan Admitted to the Family of Nations.—Japan was the first non-Christian land to gain freedom from extraterritoriality and thus to be admitted to the family of nations. Much currency has been given to the erroneous statement that Japan was able to secure her revised treaty with Great Britain because of the military efficiency demonstrated in her war with China. As the British treaty was signed on July 16th, and Japan did not declare war upon China until August 1st, the absurdity of this explanation becomes evident. The British treaty was negotiated because well-informed British statesmen realized that the consistent progress of Japan had earned

for her the national equality which she properly demanded. The repeated failures of treaty revision had been laid at the door of British diplomats. With the rising temper of the Japanese people, as was evident from the press and the Diet debates, no power could afford to bear the responsibility for denying Japan simple justice. It was fortunate that Britain was able to lead the way, for all the other powers were content to follow her. But this does not alter the fact that if American diplomacy had possessed more weight in the affairs of the world in this period Japan would have gained treaty revision many years before she did. Two features of this long controversy deserve special consideration. While the Japanese did not hesitate to demand treaty revision as a right, they also did not falter in their feverish efforts to provide such conditions of law and order, such adequate codes, and such trained judges, that there could be no excuse for anyone upholding the extraterritorial system as essential to the protection of foreign lives and property. A thoroughly modern system of courts had been organized in 1890, well-trained judges and experienced lawyers were everywhere available, and all the new codes were in operation before the consular courts were closed. Japan had done all that could be expected of her, while the long-prevailing attitude of the foreign diplomats was that some additional concessions must be made by Japan in return for the surrender of the advantageous tariff and the extraterritorial rights. Thus what should have been merely a question of fact—is Japan prepared to assume responsibility for the lives and property of foreign residents?—became a bargaining contest, in which diplomats on both sides tried to secure as much or yield as little as they could. The longer this haggling continued the stiffer became the Japanese terms as public opinion crystallized in favor of complete autonomy. By agreeing to the Japanese desires in 1894 the powers saved some of the old advantages, notably a low conventional tariff. If revision had been longer delayed, if, for example, the British treaty had followed rather than preceded the victorious war with China, there is at least reason to be-

lieve that Japan would have been less willing to make any *quid pro quo*.

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CHAPTER XXVI

THE KOREAN QUESTION

Korea.—Jutting out from the Asiatic mainland, in the direction of the southern islands of Japan, lies the peninsula of Korea. Its area in modern times is about 85,000 square miles, and its dimensions are about 660 miles long and 150 miles wide. Separated from China proper by mountains and the Manchurian plain, the Korean kingdoms were able to maintain practical autonomy, although subject to occasional invasions. Culturally, Korea was soon subject to the superior civilization of China. The strait between Korea and Japan was only about 120 miles wide, and almost in the center lay the island of Tsu (Tsushima) which was held by the Japanese from the earliest times. When, in the nineteenth century, the Russians established themselves on the northern frontier of Korea the political difficulties of the little kingdom were greatly increased and she became but a pawn in the game played by China, Japan, and Russia. The mountains, which run down the peninsula, lie nearer the eastern coast, leaving the large arable plains to the west, where the chief cities and the ancient capitals arose. The larger rivers, too, flow to the west, and the harbors, of which Korea has few, are found principally on that coast. The people, while of Mongoloid origin, are usually easily distinguishable from their Chinese kinsmen.

Early Relations with China.—Just before the Christian era three kingdoms were well established in Korea. These were, to the north, including part of Manchuria, Korai; along the east coast, Shinra; and on the west coast, Pekche.¹ The northern kingdoms, naturally, had more intimate relations with China, having been conquered by the Han dynasty in 108 B.C. and for a time held as a Chinese province, while the coast kingdoms had intercourse and relations of peace and war with Japan. Soon after the middle of the seventh century the Tang

¹ Much confusion has been caused by the use of the Korean, Chinese, and Japanese names of these kingdoms. Thus the Japanese equivalents of those given in the text would be Koma, Shiragi, and Kudara.

armies invaded Korea and destroyed Korai and Pekche, annexing the northern portion of the peninsula and allowing Shinra to govern the remainder as a vassal state. Almost three hundred years later a rebel general founded a new dynasty which not only included Shinra but most of the earlier kingdoms. This dynasty recognized the overlordship of the Mongol emperors of China, and the help given by Korea in the Mongol invasions of Japan, 1274-81, was one cause for the ill will which prevailed between Korea and Japan for many centuries. No change occurred in the relations between the suzerain and the vassal when the Mings succeeded the Mongols in China, nor when a new dynasty arose in Korea which, in 1392, adopted the name Chosen (Land of Morning Calm) for the kingdom. When a Japanese force under Hideyoshi invaded Korea the Chinese came to the aid of their vassal. The Manchus twice invaded Korea before they gained control of China, but although they conquered the country they did not incorporate it in their rising kingdom, nor did they impose the wearing of the pigtail upon their vassals. For many centuries, therefore, Korea had been a vassal state of China. The Korean kings asked and received investiture from the Chinese emperors, they were graciously permitted to make use of the Chinese calendar, and annual tribute offerings of gold, silver, rice, silk, cotton cloth, and paper were sent up to Peking. In addition the Koreans employed the Chinese system of administration and ceremonies, the national educational system and the civil service examinations, and proved to be even more conservative than the Chinese, for they retained the customs of the Tang dynasty long after changes had occurred in China.

Early Relations with Japan.—Between the Korean kingdoms and Japan commercial and political relations began at an early date. In general the relations were more intimate between Japan and Pekche, on the west coast, and for several centuries Japan held a district on the southern coast which was spoken of as a granary. Japanese armies frequently entered the peninsula between the third and seventh centuries to help their allies against their foes and as late as the Tang

invasions Japanese troops came to the aid of Pekche. With the destruction of this old ally, Japan's influence in the peninsula ceased. We have already seen how Chinese culture and the Buddhist religion entered Japan from Korea in this period, but after the rise of Shinra relations between the two countries practically ceased until the Mongol invasions of Japan. For her part in these aggressions the shores of Korea were raided for many years by Japanese pirates, often sent out by coast daimyos but without any national warrant; and finally, in order to renew friendly relations the shogun, in 1392, informed Korea that piracy had been forbidden (which, unhappily, did not mean that it had ceased) and that all prisoners would be restored. At last, in 1443, three ports were opened to Japanese trade, and their merchants were allowed to dwell there under strict control. Of these ports the principal one was Fusan. The trade was a monopoly of the So family, daimyos of Tsushima, who gave licenses for fifty Japanese junks a year to visit the three open ports. A revolt of the Japanese at Fusan, in 1512, led to their expulsion from the three settlements and they were finally allowed to return only to Fusan with only twenty-five ships a year.

Hideyoshi's Invasion.—As soon as Hideyoshi had brought all Japan under his sway he looked abroad for new worlds to conquer. First he called upon the king of Korea to renew the long-forgotten exchange of envoys and gifts, and when this was resumed he asked him to allow Japanese troops to pass through his territories on the way to the conquest of China. This request was supported by the reminder that Korea had assisted the Mongols in their attacks upon Japan. Korea refused to abandon her old suzerain, and thus brought down a terrible vengeance upon her head. Early in 1592 the first Japanese army crossed the strait unmolested. The capital, Seoul, was soon taken, and the country overrun as far as the Yalu. The Ming dynasty now sent aid, at first only a few thousand, who were defeated, and then perhaps a hundred thousand men. At the same time a brilliant Korean admiral gained control of the sea, which greatly embarrassed the Japanese troop movements. By May, 1593, the Japanese were

forced to withdraw to Seoul, while negotiations were carried on with China. For the next four years the Japanese held twelve fortified camps along the southern coast, and when Chinese envoys brought to Hideyoshi not an investiture as sovereign of China, but merely recognition of his office as regent of Japan, the invasion was renewed. In 1597 nine fresh army corps entered Korea, and Chinese reinforcements battled with them. Victory had crowned the Japanese standards when news of the death of Hideyoshi reached Korea. An armistice was quickly arranged and evacuation soon commenced. The campaign had lasted for more than six years. Great loss of life and destruction of property had occurred, and nothing was gained except the bitter ill will of the Koreans, which was time and again to be a factor in the international rivalries of later years.

Iyeyasu's Policy.—Part of the liberal foreign and commercial policies of Iyeyasu was the endeavor to restore friendly relations with Korea. Finally, Fusan was again opened to Japanese trade, a settlement was laid out, and forty Japanese junks a year might frequent the port. It has been suggested that the regulations introduced by the Koreans to control the Japanese traders were followed later when the Japanese had to deal with the Portuguese and Dutch at Nagasaki. It was also agreed that missions of respect, with presents, would go up to Yedo on the accession of each shogun. In 1617 the first Korean mission appeared at the Tokugawa capital. From Tsushima the entire expense was borne by the shogun, and the reception accorded the envoys was hospitable and costly. For this reason it was arranged, in 1790, that the mission need not proceed beyond Tsushima, and in 1811 one was received there. This was the last Korean mission to visit Japan. One should have been sent in 1837, and in 1853 it was arranged to have it received at Osaka castle; but the burning of the palace at Yedo delayed the visit. Then came the political complications in Japan which caused Korea to be almost entirely forgotten until the new government assumed responsibility for Japan's foreign relations in 1868.

Early Western Intercourse.—Korea was even more remote from the early trade routes of the Western nations than was Japan. Here, as in many other foreign lands, the missionary preceded the trader. Christianity was introduced about 1784 by Korean converts who had visited the Catholic mission in Peking. The first ordained priest was a Chinese, who crossed the frontier ten years later. As soon as the officials learned of this new faith and its reception by the common people persecution began, and the priest and seven Korean converts were beheaded in 1801. The first Western priest, a French missionary, entered the country in 1836 and a few co-workers soon joined him. By 1839 the converts numbered 9,000, and this caused a renewal of the persecution, in which three French priests were cut to pieces. At the very time when the French were protesting against the execution of their missionaries in Annam a frigate, in 1846, demanded an explanation of the treatment of their nationals in Korea. The reply, which stated that the missionaries were in disguise (native dress) and associated with rebels (native Christians), furthermore informed the French that Korea was a vassal of China. The advance of Russia to the Korean frontier in 1858-60 should have aroused the same concern which her earlier movements had produced in Japan, but there were no well-informed officials or scholars to warn the conservative court. In 1864 a boy succeeded to the throne, just as a few years later a youth was to ascend the throne of Japan. In Korea the king was under the control of his father, usually spoken of by his title, Tai Won Kun. This prince, cruel and unscrupulous, was bitterly opposed to foreign intercourse and was a relentless persecutor of the native Christians. He was to be the evil genius of his son's long reign. Two years later foreign affairs were brought home to the court by the visit of a Russian warship to Genzan, demanding freedom of trade and residence, to which the Koreans again replied by stressing their vassal relations to China; by a French naval and military expedition, which was actually driven off by the Koreans; and by the destruction of an American trading ship, the *General Sherman*, and its crew, which had entered the Tatong River without

permission. The latter event awakened American interest in Korea, and Secretary Seward actually proposed that France and the United States unite in joint measures to obtain satisfaction. The shogun's government, on the other hand, offered to mediate between the United States and Korea, knowing well what would happen if the Hermit Kingdom became involved in war with one of the Western powers. In 1867 two American squadrons visited Korea to ascertain the fate of the crew of the *General Sherman* and in the same year a band of adventurers led by a German and an American made an unsuccessful attempt to rob the royal tombs of the Korean kings. Finally, in 1871, the American minister to China, Mr. Low, supported by five steam warships, attempted to secure a treaty. A clash occurred when the Koreans fired upon a surveying party, and later the Americans destroyed five forts but could neither secure a treaty nor an apology. The Tai Won Kun was jubilant, for within a few years his forces had repelled both the French and the Americans and, as we shall see, he had repeatedly rebuffed the Japanese attempts to renew the former friendly relations.

Japan Attempts to Renew Relations with Korea.—In 1867, as mentioned above, the shogun's government attempted to mediate between Korea and the United States and appointed the Tsushima daimyo as an envoy to Korea. But before any steps could be taken the shogunate had been overthrown and the daimyo was instructed, instead, to send a mission to Seoul to announce the recent change in Japan and the desire of the new government to continue peaceful intercourse. The Tai Won Kun, however, rejected this friendly advance, for he disliked extremely the innovations which had begun in Japan and deemed her false to the spirit of the East. Although China and Japan had entered into relations with the Western powers, Korea intended to hold fast to her old isolation. The next year Japan sent three commissioners to investigate conditions in Korea, and they reported that steps should be taken to preserve Korea's independence in view of the secret designs of Russia and China's political control of the government. It should be remembered that Japan's attention was directed to

the menace of Russia in Korea as early as 1869. In the same year a direct mission from Japan was again refused. Such also was the fate of a third mission, in 1871, although it was supported by two men-of-war. These repeated refusals to enter into friendly relations, in spite of the fact that under the shogunate Korea was obligated to send over periodical missions, aroused the sullen samurai of Japan and the issue of peace or war with Korea was fought out in the cabinet in 1873, which, as we have seen, resulted in the triumph of the party of peace and progress. In 1873, when the Japanese envoy exchanged ratifications of the first treaty with China, the question of China's responsibility for Korea's actions was raised, and China waived any responsibility by maintaining that Korea, though a vassal state, still possessed the right to make war or peace. In that year the Korean king became of age and assumed the ruling powers, but only to pass under the control of his masterful queen and her family. From this time the rivalry of the king's father and the queen dominated the palace intrigues. The next year a Japanese mission gained a slight success, for Korea promised to receive a letter from the Japanese government and send an envoy in return, but when the letter arrived, in 1875, the envoy was denied an audience. That year a Japanese gunboat, engaged in surveying the entrance to the river Han, was fired upon, and the Japanese, following the precedent set by the French and the Americans, landed a party and destroyed a fort. The time for positive measures had now come.

Commercial Treaty with Japan.—Instead of proceeding to severe punitive measures the Japanese ministry decided to profit from their own experience and apply the methods which, when used by Commodore Perry, had proved so successful in their own case. In fact, the American minister at Tokyo was asked to lend them an account of Perry's mission. China was informed of Japan's plans and she expressed her approval and advised Korea to yield peaceably. A small force, of two gunboats and three transports, with less than 800 men, was sent to Korea. Ample warning was given and, following Perry's procedure, time was allowed for full consideration. Happily

the anti-foreign regent was no longer in office and the young king was surrounded by more progressive officials. Negotiations were conducted without serious difficulty and on February 26, 1876, a treaty of commerce was signed. Japan, so recently brought into relations with the world, had acted as the medium for bringing Korea out of her long seclusion. The first clause of this treaty (which unquestionably was based upon the Franco-Annamite treaty of 1874) recognized Korea as an independent state, enjoying the same sovereign rights as Japan, and intercourse between the two countries would be on terms of equality. The old restrictions at Fusan would be abolished (just as they had been in the case of the Dutch at Nagasaki), and two additional ports would be opened. The Japanese also obtained extraterritorial privileges. While many foreigners in Japan considered this inconsistent with Japan's repeated attempts to free herself from this limitation upon her own sovereignty, the Japanese maintained that the difference between the judicial systems of Korea and Japan were even greater than existed between those of Japan and the Western nations in 1858. In a supplementary treaty of August 27th following, which included trade regulations, the Japanese inserted a provision which prohibited the importation of opium into Korea. In this way she passed on a boon which she herself had enjoyed. Prompt steps were taken to establish a *chargé* at Seoul, and in 1880 a minister resident was sent to the Korean court.

Treaties with Western Powers.—The United States took steps to secure advantages equal to those of Japan. An attempt by Commodore Shufeldt in 1880 was rebuffed, principally because he had acted through Japanese representatives, which alarmed Li Hung-chang who, as viceroy of Chihli, was directly concerned with Korea. On the other hand, Li was willing to facilitate Shufeldt's efforts if he would proceed through Chinese channels. The next year a draft treaty was agreed upon by Shufeldt and Li, in which the former successfully opposed Li's attempt to insert a statement that Korea was a dependent state of China. This draft was sent to Seoul in a Chinese vessel, and when Shufeldt appeared, in May,

1882, no difficulty was found in obtaining the Korean signatures. In a letter from the king to the president of the United States the former "distinctly pledges his own sovereign powers for the complete enforcement in good faith of all the stipulations of the treaty in accordance with international law." This treaty, while containing provisions much like those in the treaty with Japan, gave expression of American good will in two articles:

Whenever the King of Chosen shall have so far modified and reformed the statutes and the judicial procedure of his kingdom that, in the judgment of the United States, they conform to the laws and course of justice in the United States, the right of extra-territorial jurisdiction over United States citizens in Chosen shall be abandoned.

And, following the precedents in the Tientsin and Yedo treaties, if other powers dealt unjustly or oppressively with either government "the other would exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feeling." Twenty years later this willingness to mediate was deemed by some a promise of active intervention in Korea's behalf. A treaty with Great Britain was negotiated the same year, but in its place Sir Harry Parkes obtained a convention, a year later, which better protected British interests. Opium was, however, prohibited. Germany obtained a treaty in 1883 also, and Italy in 1884. The French treaty of 1886 contained a provision that French students and teachers would be assisted, and although Korea later protested she found that this simple phrase opened her land to missionary propaganda. Under this clause American and other foreign missionaries followed the lead of the French.

Domestic Politics and Foreign Relations.—The first decade after the opening of Korea was much like the same period in Japan. A few liberal leaders, recognizing the overwhelming military strength of the foreigners (in the case of Korea this term included the Japanese), advocated the opening of the country. In so doing they incurred the wrath of the conserva-

tives. In both countries fanatics attacked liberal statesmen and foreign residents. In Korea the situation was complicated by bitter palace intrigues in which the Tai Won Kun headed the anti-foreign, pro-Chinese party, and the queen, for the time being, sided with the pro-Japanese element. Until the American treaty went into operation, in 1883, Japanese were the only foreigners resident at the capital and the three open ports, and upon them fell the force of the anti-foreign opposition. This came to a head in July, 1882, when the Tai Won Kun supported a conspiracy to destroy the queen. It was carried out by mutinous soldiers who had long been unpaid. The palace was attacked, some of the ministers slain, but the queen narrowly escaped destruction. Then the soldiers and a mob attacked the Japanese in Seoul. The legation was gallantly defended, but finally the little band of defenders burst through the surrounding assailants and fought their way to the port of Chemulpo, twenty-six miles distant, where, again attacked, they put out in a small boat and were fortunately rescued by a British warship. This was a most serious affront, and no parallel could be found even in the days when the hostile Japanese samurai attacked the welcome foreigners in Yedo. Both Japan and China sent over forces to restore order. The Chinese, acting first, seized the Tai Won Kun and carried him off to China. The Japanese, refusing to accept Chinese mediation, dealt directly with the Koreans, and in a convention of July 27th secured from Korea a promise to punish the perpetrators of the crime, an indemnity of 550,000 yen, a special mission of apology, new privileges for Japanese traders, and the right to establish a garrison in Seoul (just as the British and French had maintained garrisons at Yokohama between 1864 and 1875). In the latter instance Korea, like Japan, was required to build the barracks, but the promise was given that if no further disorders took place the force would be removed at the end of the year. The Korean envoys who visited Japan to make apology for the outrage upon the Japanese legation were kindly received and they returned with many new ideas gained from the study of Japanese progress.

So well disposed did the Korean government appear to be that the garrison in Seoul was reduced to a legation guard, while the indemnity was cut down to only 150,000 yen. In this way Japan followed the action of the United States in returning to her the Shimonoseki indemnity only a few months earlier.

Sino-Japanese Rivalry.—The removal of the Tai Won Kun to China left the queen's party all powerful. There was now no reason for her partisans opposing the conservative policy of the former regent, and they adopted the prevailing views of Korean officialdom, which were favorable to China. The reform party, composed in the main of young Koreans of little official importance, advocated closer relations with Japan and the adoption of reform measures. In this they were actively aided by the Japanese minister at Seoul. In 1884, when China was involved in open warfare with France, the reformers believed that they could act with a free hand. A *coup d'état* was planned which resulted in an attack upon the palace where several of the conservative ministers were murdered. Again the queen escaped. The weak king acted upon the advice of the party in power and called upon the Japanese for protection. A small force entered the palace grounds, only to be attacked forthwith by the Chinese troops who were stationed in the outskirts of the city. Retiring to the Japanese legation, they were still under fire, and again they fought their way to the coast and safety. This time some thirty Japanese were killed. Although the attack upon the legation was much the same as that which occurred in 1882, there was this profound difference: Chinese troops had taken part in this outrage, and for this offense Japan must deal directly with China. Two missions were promptly dispatched. One under Inouye to Seoul, and the other under Ito to Tientsin. The Koreans, alarmed at the possibility of stern reprisals, quickly met the Japanese terms—an indemnity of 110,000 yen, punishment of the guilty, a mission of apology, and a statement that the Japanese minister was not concerned in the *coup d'état*. But the conference at Tientsin was not so easily managed. Here met, for the first time, the greatest viceroy of China, Li Hung-

chang, and the leading minister of New Japan, Ito Hirobumi. Li was striving manfully to preserve the old suzerain rights of China in Korea. Ito argued for a more modern status, for the independence of the peninsula kingdom. But Ito was unwilling to take advantage of the pressure which France was bringing to bear upon China, nor would his country consider joining the French in punitive measures. After the French protocol dealing with Annam was concluded the Sino-Japanese convention of Tientsin was signed, April 19, 1885. It was, in effect, a compromise. Both countries agreed to withdraw their troops from Korea. Neither would send in officers to drill Korean troops. And if, in the future, disturbances should arise, neither would send troops into the country without notifying the other. At the same time Li handed to Ito a note of apology for the attack by Chinese troops upon the Japanese legation in Seoul. If China had been willing to withdraw her dangerous claim of suzerainty the course of Sino-Japanese relations might have been completely altered and the war which broke out less than ten years later averted. When Ito and Li again met at a council table Ito could speak as the representative of a victorious power.

Gathering War Clouds.—The triumph of the Korean progressives was short lived. Their leaders escaped to Japan and some of their followers met with summary punishment in Korea. Yuan Shih-kai, who had been on military duty in Korea since 1880, was appointed Chinese resident at the capital and for the next nine years he was the dominant foreign representative there. Nothing of importance was done by the pro-Chinese ministry without his approval, and he never failed to block any attempts of the Japanese to increase their political or commercial influence in the country. In spite of a previous agreement with Japan, Yuan secured a concession to erect a telegraph line to Seoul and to control all the services in the peninsula. China tried also to strengthen her control of Korean foreign affairs and in 1888 attempted to prevent the dispatch of a Korean minister to the United States. Supported by Yuan, the Korean government refused to meet the

Japanese demands for damages due to the prohibition of bean exports to Japan in 1889, and this question provoked constant irritation until 1893. The next year the Korean progressive leader, Kim Ok Kiun, who had enjoyed protection in Japan since 1884, was enticed to Shanghai and there murdered by Korean agents. Instead of punishing the criminal the Chinese sent the murderer and his victim's body to Korea, where the one was rewarded and the other dismembered and publicly exhibited as a warning. This callous conduct of the Chinese inflamed Japanese public opinion at a time when universal education and a widely read press had greatly stimulated national consciousness. The old agitation for war with Korea, which had blazed forth in the early Meiji period, now took the form of a demand that China's interference in the peninsula be brought to an end. If, as some believe, Japan had long cherished the desire to intervene in Korea and bring that country under her control, there was nothing in the conduct of the Japanese government to support the contention. To be sure, Japanese publicists, from the early Meiji days, had advocated such a forward policy, but their views were no more influential than those of American expansionists who have advocated time and again the conquest of Mexico and all the countries to the Isthmus of Panama. If the Japanese government had sympathized with these views it had ample cause for action when, in 1873, it firmly refused to adopt the most influentially supported war proposals, and again when, in 1882 and 1884, the Japanese legation was attacked and the Japanese representatives driven from the country. During these years the official conduct of Japan had been correct in every detail. It had accepted the principle of Korean independence and it had furthered all plans for progress and reform which would have enabled Korea to maintain this independence. It had failed in its endeavors to secure from China a relinquishment of her ancient claims of suzerainty. The time was approaching when Japan would feel compelled to raise this question anew, and when she did so she would act in full consciousness of her strength and her national needs.

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CHAPTER XXVII

THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR, 1894-1895

The Tong Hak Rebellion.—The crisis in Sino-Japanese¹ relations was precipitated much sooner than anyone had anticipated. Early in 1893 alarm was created among the foreign residents of Korea by the activities of the Tong Hak society. The name meant "Eastern Learning" and, about 1859, its founder had proclaimed a new religion based upon the tenets of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism. He had been put to death as a heretic and sorcerer and an attempt was made to stamp out the faith. On the one hand the Tong Haks, in 1893, prayed for a vindication of their martyred leader and for permission to practice their religion, and on the other they manifested their discontent with the government and their hatred of Japanese and other foreigners. An American, Japanese, and Chinese warships were hurriedly sent to Chemulpo, but after some early defeats the Korean troops were able to quell the incipient rebellion in the south. Just a year later the Tong Haks again rose in rebellion, this time supported by many discontented people, and they succeeded in capturing one of the southern provincial capitals. Yuan Shih-kai had promptly urged Li Hung-chang to send over Chinese troops to aid the ineffective Korean soldiers, but he refused until, on June 2nd, a request came from the Korean king acting on the advice of Yuan. A small force was hastily prepared and notice sent to Japan, according to the terms of the Tientsin convention. The Japanese had followed the developments in Korea, where their nationals outnumbered all foreigners except Chinese, and when the Chinese expedition was being prepared a Japanese force was also made ready. On June 8th the first Chinese troops landed at Asan. On the 10th, 400 Japanese marines entered Seoul, to be relieved by 800 infantrymen on the 13th. The king of Korea, alarmed at this unexpected development, now asked the Chinese to withdraw,

¹ Sino from *Sinæ*, a name used by Ptolemy for an Oriental people and thus applied to China and things Chinese.

especially as the rebellion had been suppressed before their troops actually arrived, but in the presence of the Japanese they refused to retire.

Korea: Vassal or Independent?—In the notice sent to Japan on the 7th Li Hung-chang explained that the Chinese troops were sent to Korea "in order to restore the peace of our tributary state." To this Mutsu at once replied that Japan had never recognized Korea as a tributary state of China. And on the same day the Japanese minister in Peking notified the Chinese government that Japan was about to send troops to Korea. Both countries had acted correctly in respect to the prior notice. There is no basis for the frequent explanation that Japan declared war because China broke the Tientsin agreement. Instead, war was brewing for seven weeks, from June 2nd until July 25th, and in these days the Japanese press, which correctly reflected public opinion, insisted that their government should once and for all settle the status of Korea and bring to an end the record of Chinese interference in the peninsula.

The Question of Korean Reforms.—On June 17th Japan proposed to China that commissioners be sent to Korea to investigate measures of improvement in the financial administration, the selection of central and local officials, and the establishment of an army. The reply was promptly given that these measures of improvement must be left to Korea herself. "Even China herself," ran the dispatch, "would not interfere with the internal administration of Korea, and Japan, having from the very first recognized the independence of Korea, cannot have the right to interfere with the same." But Japan was not inclined to quibble over terms. She replied: "The interests of Japan in Korea, arising from propinquity as well as commerce, are too important and far-reaching to allow her to view with indifference the deplorable condition of affairs in that kingdom."² The Japanese troops, it was pointed out, would only be withdrawn after some understanding had

² The position of Japan in respect to Korea in 1894 bears a strong resemblance to that of the United States in respect to Cuba in 1898. Cuba, however, did not present the political dangers that a weak and foreign-controlled Korea did to Japan.

been arrived at which would guarantee the future peace, order, and good government of the country. Japan, with her troops stationed near the capital, now determined to act upon her own responsibility. Her minister demanded an answer as to whether Korea was tributary to China or was an independent state. The reply, on June 30th, was an assertion of independence. Then followed the presentation of an elaborate program of reform, which went far beyond the proposals made to China for joint action. This advice was formally accepted, and a special commission appointed to investigate the measures. China could ill afford to see such a reform program actually carried out, for it would mean the downfall of the conservative, pro-Chinese party in Korea. She asked Great Britain and Russia to use their influence to reconcile the existing differences. Li Hung-chang turned to the United States to initiate a joint move of the powers to request Japan to withdraw her troops from Korea, but he learned that the United States could not join another power even in a friendly mediation. Efforts for peace were made by the American, British, and Russian ministers at Tokyo, but Japan was in no mood to accept foreign interference. With the Korean government committed to a policy of reform she intended to be in a position to see that something more than verbal or written promises ensued. On July 14th a dispatch of the greatest importance was sent to the Tsungli Yamen. It intimated that as China would not coöperate in introducing reforms in Korea

. . . the only conclusion deducible from these circumstances is that the Chinese Government are disposed to precipitate complications; and in this juncture the Imperial Japanese Government find themselves relieved of all responsibility for any eventuality that may, in future, arise out of the situation.

It was later said that this note contained a specific warning that the sending of more Chinese troops would be considered an unfriendly act. This was not the case, but the final words of the Japanese note, as quoted above, should have served as a sufficient warning. The presence of both Chinese and Japanese troops in Korea alarmed the incapable government of the

kingdom. On the 18th a request was made that Japan withdraw her troops, for reforms could not be undertaken during their presence. The reply was to the effect that Korea must furnish barracks for the Japanese troops, that she must send away the Chinese soldiers, and abrogate all agreements with China which conflicted with the sovereign rights of Korea. By this time Yuan Shih-kai had left the capital and retired to China. The Korean government replied on the 22d that the Chinese troops had come at its request and would not leave until similarly requested. This convinced the Japanese that the ministry was not prepared to follow the Japanese advice, and it resulted in the one hostile act against Korea. The next day the Japanese troops entered the city, attacked the palace, secured possession of the king's person—which meant that decrees in their favor would issue in the king's name—and invited the king's father, the Tai Won Kun, once so hostile to all foreign influences and to reform, to head the new cabinet. His availability depended solely upon the fact that he was the most influential Korean noble who opposed the former ministry controlled by the queen's partisans and relatives. Very promptly, on the 24th, a decree was issued which abrogated Korea's treaty with China and intrusted to the Japanese troops the expulsion of the Chinese forces at Asan. Japan had carried through her policy of Korean independence to the logical conclusion.

The Outbreak of Hostilities.—Before Japan had secured control of the king, Li Hung-chang had decided to strengthen the Chinese forces in Korea in order to block Japan's measures. On July 21st and the following days eleven steamers were dispatched from Tientsin with some 8,000 troops. Japan learned of this and sent out three cruisers from her naval base. On the 25th, the Japanese met two Chinese warships near Asan. Both sides cleared for action and shots were soon exchanged. One of the Chinese ships was disabled and run aground; the other escaped to Weihaiwei. Shortly afterward a Chinese dispatch boat and a transport were sighted. The former was captured and the latter ordered to surrender. This proved to be a British merchant ship, the *Kowshing*, carrying

1,200 Chinese troops and a German military adviser. The Chinese soldiers, fearing that they would be summarily executed should they surrender, refused to allow the British officers to obey the Japanese signals. The Japanese acted with decision, a torpedo was launched, and the *Kowshing* sunk, with the loss of about 1,000 lives. On the same day the Japanese troops in Korea marched toward Asan, and on the 29th the Chinese were defeated there.

Declarations of War.—On July 31st China broke off relations with Japan, and on August 1st both countries issued declarations of war. Japan based her action on the fact that Korea was an independent state, that she had urged reforms, and that China had endeavored to thwart them.

Such conduct on the part of China is not only a direct injury to the rights and interests of this empire, but also a menace to the permanent peace and tranquillity of the Orient.

China, on the other hand, asserted that Korea had been her tributary "for the past two hundred odd years." She had been asked to send in troops, but the Japanese (*Wojen*) sent theirs without any cause. They also attempted to bully Korea into governmental changes. Japan had shown herself bellicose, nor would she confer amicably, and she had treacherously attacked a Chinese transport. The Chinese declaration further asserted that

As Japan has violated the treaties and not observed international laws, and is now running rampant with her false and treacherous actions, commencing hostilities herself, and laying herself open to condemnation by the various powers at large, we therefore desire to make it known to the world that we have always followed the paths of philanthropy and perfect justice throughout the whole complications, while the *Wojen*, on the other hand, have broken all the laws of nations and treaties which it passes our patience to bear with. Hence we commanded Li Hung-chang to give strict orders to our various armies to hasten with all speed to root the *Wojen* out of their lairs.

The issues were clearly stated, independence and reform against vassalage and conservatism. After the warning given

on July 14th the dispatch of a single Chinese soldier to Korea was equivalent to a declaration of war, and even the potent British flag could not protect a ship engaged in such a mission.


The Progress of the War.—The progress of the war may be briefly summarized. Most foreigners in the East expected China to win with little difficulty and were amazed at the temerity of the Japanese in making war upon the great Middle Kingdom. Few realized the amazing progress which Japan had made in the preceding twenty-five years or her ability to make use of all her limited resources. On the other hand, China, while great in potential strength, was entirely unable to muster it. Her vast population, ignorant and uninformed of the state of affairs, took little interest in what was happening, while the Japanese, literate and informed by a widely circulated press, were eager to maintain their national honor. While the Chinese, on paper, had a superior navy, they had earlier dismissed their British advisers and their equipment and munitions were poor. Funds which should have gone to strengthening the navy had been diverted to build the summer palace of the Empress Dowager near Peking. Only the northern fleet took part in the operations, except for three ships of the southern fleet which happened to be in northern waters when war was declared. The Chinese troops, also, came entirely from the northern provinces, and although a few were trained in Western methods, most of them were militia and "braves" utterly unable to oppose the Japanese advance. A united, centralized nation, though numerically weaker in manpower and in natural resources, fought only a part of a huge, decentralized state. On August 20th a treaty of alliance was signed by Japan and Korea, in order to expel the Chinese and establish the independence of the country. Korea was not expected to furnish troops, but to give some help in transportation. By September 15th the Chinese were driven out of northern Korea. On the 17th the only important naval action occurred, off the mouth of the Yalu. This was the first large engagement in which ironclads and rapid-firing guns were used. The Chinese lost four ships, and one was blown up by its crew. The Japanese ships suffered some damage. This

battle actually gave the Japanese control of the sea and the ability to land their troops at will on the continent. One Japanese army crossed into Manchuria from Korea, while another landed near Port Arthur and captured that naval base in a single day. This disaster caused the first peace mission to be sent to Japan. Among the generals who took part in the Manchurian campaigns of the first and second armies were men who later were to command larger forces against the Russians in this very terrain. During the winter the Japanese sent a third force to take the naval base of Weihaiwei, in Shantung. Troops were landed in January and in spite of a stout defense by the Chinese fleet the fortress and the ships surrendered on February 16th. In Manchuria the two armies advanced along the coast, capturing Newchwang on March 4th, Yingkow on the 7th, and, now united, crossed the Liao on the 9th. With the opening of the river in the spring this base would enable the Japanese to press on to Peking with little to oppose their advance.

Peace Negotiations.—The humiliating defeats inflicted on the Chinese forces aroused the enemies of Li Hung-chang, and he had many in the Peking court. Only a favorable peace could restore his shattered prestige. In November he sent a personal agent, Mr. Detring, to Japan with a letter to Ito, but he could not be received, as he was not properly accredited. At the end of January a second mission was sent to Japan, this time composed of two officials of inferior rank with an American adviser, John W. Foster. Again the Japanese would not treat with them on the ground that there was no assurance that their commitments would be approved by the emperor. Finally, in April, Li Hung-chang proceeded to Japan on what was bound to be a most humiliating mission. At Shimonoseki he met Count Ito, the prime minister, and Mutsu, the minister of foreign affairs. Li was accompanied by a large retinue, and by Mr. Foster, formerly secretary of state of the United States. Ito and Mutsu had as their adviser an American, Henry W. Denison, who had been attached to the Japanese foreign office since 1881. And when the war began the two belligerents had asked the United States to look out for the

interests of each in the other's domain. First of all Li asked for an armistice, but the Japanese terms were so excessive, including the occupation of Taku, Tientsin, and Shanhaikwan, that Li could not agree to them. On his return from the session a Japanese fanatic, who held Li responsible for all the troubles which had arisen over Korea, attempted to assassinate him. The pistol bullet lodged below the left eye, and although the wound was most painful its results were happily slight. No blood, however, shed by all the Chinese victims of this unhappy war proved as useful to China as that which poured from the face of her most distinguished statesman. All Japan was crushed by the enormity of this offense. From the emperor to the commoners expressions of regret and sympathy arose. The armistice which Li had asked for in vain was now promptly granted, and there is no doubt that the terms of the later treaty were modified in China's favor. The negotiations pursued the usual course. In her first demands Japan asked for the recognition of the independence of Korea, the cession of a large portion of South Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, an indemnity of 300,000,000 taels, and certain trade concessions. China's reply, which was drafted by Mr. Foster, agreed to the independence of Korea, objected to any cession of territory, suggested a smaller indemnity, and criticized the trade concessions demanded. On being asked to state his proposals more definitely, Li proposed that both China and Japan recognize the independence of Korea, agreed to a small cession in Manchuria and the Pescadores, an indemnity of 10,000,000 taels without interest, and a new commercial treaty on the terms of the most-favored nation. Japan's reply was followed by an ultimatum which gave Li four days for consideration. In spite of his final protest and appeal, he found Ito unwilling to modify further the Japanese demands, and the treaty was signed on April 17th.

Treaty of Shimonoseki.—The terms of this significant treaty, which was to usher in a new era in the Far East, were as follows:



SOUTH MANCHURIA, SHOWING THE TREATY LINES

1. China recognized the independence of Korea. (Japan had done so in 1876.)

2. China ceded to Japan the Liaotung peninsula, Formosa, and the Pescadores.

3. China would pay an indemnity of 200,000,000 taels within seven years, with interest at five per cent.

4. Four additional treaty ports in China would be opened to Japanese trade and residence. (Which meant that all the treaty powers in China might enjoy them.)

5. A new treaty of commerce and navigation would be negotiated, but until that time Japan should enjoy in China the privileges of the most-favored nation.

Japan, who had recognized the independence of Korea in 1876, now forced China to yield her old pretensions of suzerainty. But she had gained more than that. The cession of the Chinese islands was to cause little difficulty, although the Japanese were to find in Formosa problems which taxed their administrative ability. But in asking for a cession on the mainland Japan was to incur the active opposition of several of the European powers. It is believed that Ito questioned the wisdom of this demand and that it was supported by the military leaders who wanted the Port Arthur base as an advanced post for the defense of Korea. As the Japanese had actually conquered all the Manchurian territory they demanded, and more, this claim was in keeping with other precedents after a successful war. The indemnity was not only to fasten upon China her first foreign debt, but was to give Japan the gold which would place her upon a gold standard as well as greatly foster her industrial development. Moreover, Japan would now enjoy for the first time the rights in China which the other powers claimed.

The Three-power Intervention.—When it was evident that Japan would ask for a territorial compensation from China the foreign ministers of Russia, France, and Germany began to consider the effect, if any, that this would have upon their interests. The English cabinet decided against any intervention, thus reversing her policy of the previous October. Discussions took place between the European capitals and among

their representatives in Peking. Before Li proceeded to Shimonoseki he called upon the ministers of France, Germany, and Russia in Peking and begged their good offices in supporting China and the original Japanese demands were promptly made known to them. An understanding was soon reached, under the influence of Count Witte, if his *Memoirs* may be relied upon, by which the three powers would join in advice to Japan not to insist upon the Liaotung cession. On April 23d the ministers of the three powers called at the Japanese foreign office in Tokyo and presented identic notes (the original German note being replaced by a text similar to the others). They stated that "the possession of the Peninsula of Liaotung, claimed by Japan, would be a constant menace to the capital of China, would at the same time render illusory the independence of Korea, and would henceforth be a perpetual obstacle to the peace of the Far East," and they advised Japan to renounce the definite possession of the peninsula. The effect of this unwarranted interference so soon after a successful treaty had been won was great. But Japan was in no position to oppose the armed strength of three of the great powers of Europe. On May 1st she replied that she would renounce all of the peninsula except the very tip, which included Port Arthur, but this reply was considered unsatisfactory. On the 5th Japan further replied that she would renounce the entire peninsula, but demanded that the treaty of Shimonoseki be ratified as it stood, and an additional indemnity be granted for the retroceded territory. On this understanding China proceeded to exchange the ratified treaties at Chefoo on the 8th. The modifications of the terms concerning Liaotung were worked out in Tokyo in conferences between the Japanese officials and the three ministers and the subsequent treaty was signed in Peking on November 8th. China agreed to pay Japan an additional 30,000,000 taels, but she refused to promise not to cede Liaotung to another power. The total indemnity amounted, therefore, to some \$161,000,000. Gold, however, could not wipe out the loss of honor. The Japanese could not forget.

It is not yet possible to trace the origin of the three-power

intervention. The best available evidence points to Russia, but there are some who hold either France or Germany responsible. In any case Russia was concerned with keeping Japan, a growing power, out of Port Arthur, for Manchuria was already considered the next field for Russian penetration. France, the ally of Russia, might be expected to support her desires, especially when it offered a chance to win favor in China. And Germany probably was influenced both by a willingness to win the good will of Russia, her powerful neighbor, and the desire to play an influential part in the politics of the Far East. Perhaps, as has been suggested by some writers, the policy of encouraging Russian enterprises in the East, in order to turn her attention from European politics, had already been adopted by Berlin. The Japanese, with clear discernment, understood why Russia should oppose a rival in South Manchuria, and they realized that France, her ally, might be expected to stand with her. But for Germany's action they could find no reasonable excuse. It lay in the European situation, where Germany hoped by this gesture to win the gratitude of Russia and relieve the Russian threat on Germany's eastern frontier.

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PART THREE

THE FAR EAST, 1895-1927

CHAPTER XXVIII


THE UNITED STATES BECOMES AN ASIATIC POWER

The Philippine Islands.—Before we consider the international relations in the Far East which assumed new proportions after the Sino-Japanese war we should for a moment turn our attention to the entrance of a new nation among the Western colonial powers in the East. The United States had been interested in the trade of China from the early days of the republic, and she had played a considerable and worthy rôle in the early period of Japan's new foreign intercourse. During and after the American Civil War her interest and influence in foreign affairs waned, and so far as Eastern Asia was concerned were considered negligible, but when she came into possession of a colonial empire off the coast of Asia she assumed a new importance in the councils of the nations. The Philippine Islands, which in 1899 were surrendered by Spain to the victorious Americans, contained more than 3,000 islands, located entirely in the tropics, to the southwest of Asia. Two of the islands, Luzon and Mindanao, were of considerable size, and nine more had an area of more than 1,000 square miles, but seven-eighths of the group were less than one square mile in area. Manila, the Spanish capital, lay 623 nautical miles from Hong Kong, 1,365 from Nagasaki, 4,843 from Honolulu, and 7,000 from San Francisco. The islands were well supplied with harbors for commerce, the natural resources were potentially great, and the tropic heat was tempered by the surrounding ocean, while mountain ranges offered favorable refuges from the sultry heat of the coast.

The People.—With the exception of a few thousand Negritos or Pygmies, the native inhabitants were spoken of as Malays. These really included the mingling of an older Indonesian group with more recent Mongoloid peoples from southern Asia, and types of the earlier group are found in many parts of Malaya. Many tribal divisions arose and linguistic differences appeared. Although evidence of Indian cultural influ-

ences at an early period may be found, the dominant cultures in the later years were Mohammedan and Christian. This has given rise to a threefold division of the present population according to culture. The Christian Filipinos, including nine-tenths of the population, are found in all the islands; the Mohammedan Filipinos in the southern islands; and the Pagan Filipinos in the mountainous interior of the larger islands. The Filipinos are the only Asiatic people who, by religion and culture, are to a large extent Christian.

Discovery and Occupation.—The archipelago was discovered by Ferdinand Magellan (Fernão de Magalhães), a Portuguese navigator in command of a Spanish expedition, in 1521. His objective was the discovery of spice islands by sailing through the Spanish waters, around South America. Although he lost his life in Cebu, one of his ships was able to continue its course through the seas claimed by Portugal and was the first ship to circumnavigate the globe. After three unsuccessful attempts to occupy these or other spice islands, in spite of Portuguese protests, the king of Spain sold his claims (which had no existence in fact, for the Philippines lay in the Portuguese half of the world) and agreed to a line of demarcation $297\frac{1}{2}$ leagues east of the Moluccas, or Spice Islands, which lay to the south of the Philippines. After some years Spain tried again to discover spice islands in her own sphere, and one of her captains, in 1542, gave the name of Philippines to the islands discovered by Magellan. Twenty-two years later she determined to occupy the Philippines in spite of Portugal's rightful claims. Miguel López de Legaspi set sail from a Mexican port and in 1565 founded the city of Cebu. Harassed by the Portuguese, he transferred the settlement to the better defended port of Arevalo, near the present Iloilo, and in 1571 he captured the native city of Manila and made it the Spanish capital. Not only did Legaspi occupy the sites of what became the three great ports of the archipelago, but in spite of great discouragements and the absence of the spices and gold which he sought, he laid the foundations for the Spanish control of the archipelago. It was the most isolated outpost of Europe in the East, for it depended upon Mexico, many



thousand miles away, while the Portuguese held a complete line of posts down the African coast, in India, Ceylon, and the East Indies.

Missionary Activities.—The Spaniards soon found that the islands contained no spices, no silver, and little gold. In these respects they compared most unfavorably with the Portuguese islands and with Mexico and Peru. The first Spanish conquerors were adventurers, who sought glory and gain. Few cared to follow in their steps. The commercial value of the islands was soon found to consist in their nearness to China, and Chinese wares made up the bulk of the exports of Manila to New Spain. Were it not for the influence of the Church, which found the Filipinos ready converts, the islands might soon have been abandoned as a costly adventure. Although a few secular priests entered the islands, the bulk of the missionaries were members of the regular orders, usually spoken of as friars. This was largely due to the fact that only the rich and well-established orders in Spain could afford to send out and maintain the missionary workers. As a result, the friars, in the Philippines, were allowed to remain as parish priests after the conversion of the natives, while in other parts of the Catholic world the parishes were turned over to members of the secular clergy. This gave rise to the friar question in later years. In no part of the East did the Christian missionaries achieve such gratifying results. The religious conquest of the islands was rapidly effected, except in the case of the isolated hillmen and the unyielding Mohammedans (Moros) of the south. With few Spanish officials and civilians in the islands the friars assumed great political importance. The parish priests became the real rulers of the communities and to them the native headmen turned for guidance, and the heads of the orders in Manila and the higher religious leaders at Madrid frequently exerted profound influence upon the civil administration.

Commercial Restrictions.—The Spanish colonial theory considered the colonies as places to be exploited for the benefit of the metropolis. In order to prevent the merchants of Manila from competing with the trade of the merchants and

manufacturers of the home land, restrictions were placed upon the islands' commerce which checked all healthy growth down into the nineteenth century. The trade with China was conducted by Chinese, who came down annually in many junks laden with the necessities and luxuries which the Spaniards desired. Were it not for the proximity of China, with its many desirable goods, the Spaniards, so remote from Mexico and Spain, would have fared badly in the Philippines. Trade with Japan was also conducted by Japanese except for the period 1609-24, when Spaniards were allowed to resort there. But the Japanese exclusion law brought to an end this commerce, which never approached in value the trade with China. The export trade of Manila was confined to the single Mexican port of Acapulco, and during most of the period, to 1815, only one royal ship a year carried the entire trade of the archipelago. For this reason only goods of great value and small bulk could be shipped, and Chinese silks and other wares made up the bulk of the cargoes. In exchange, silver came out from Mexico, and a steady stream of Mexican silver flowed into China during the life of this commerce. The value of the goods shipped and of the silver returned was strictly regulated, but in both cases we have reason to believe that understatement was the rule. Naturally, the capture of the Acapulco galleon was one of the dreams which inspired the seamen of all the powers which warred with Spain in this period. These restrictions upon commerce, and others which might be enumerated, hampered all attempts to develop the natural resources of the islands, for such produce as might be obtained there could not compete in value with the handicrafts of China. In 1765 Spain and Portugal agreed to set aside the papal bulls and the treaties which closed half the world to the ships of either power, and now royal ships made the direct voyage from Spain to Manila by way of the Cape of Good Hope. This service lasted from 1765 to 1783. Soon afterward a royal company was incorporated which it was hoped would do for Spain what the great East India companies had done for the Netherlands and England. To this company was given a monopoly of the trade *via* the Cape of Good Hope. A portion

of its earnings were to be used for the development of Philippine products, and from about this time the export of indigo, tobacco, and sugar begins. The independence of Mexico dissolved the old connection between the Philippines and the American continent, which was not to be renewed until 1898. The last Acapulco galleon sailed to Manila in 1815. The Royal Company, from which great profits were expected, failed to meet the hopes of its founders. Finally, in 1834, the trade of Manila was thrown open to foreign commerce, although even earlier foreign ships could bring Eastern wares to Manila, and some years later Iloilo and Cebu were made open ports. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 had profound effects upon conditions in the Philippines. Commercially, it reduced the steaming time to Barcelona to thirty-two days, whereas the sailing route around the Cape took from four to eight months. Philippine goods, of relatively small value and large bulk, could now be profitably exported. The development of commerce, and the market for Philippine produce, brought many Spaniards to the islands, and their presence naturally weakened the unchallenged position of the friars. Well-to-do Filipinos sent their sons to Spain and other European countries to study, and on their return they became, in many instances, critics of the mediæval government which persisted in the islands and of the influence of the Church there. And among the Spanish newcomers were some who voiced the liberal views which just at that time were prevalent in Spain.

Rebellions Against Spain.—There had been many attempts in the old days to throw off the Spanish rule. In many cases these had been due to the harsh conduct of Spanish officials or *encomenderos*, although it should be observed that the Filipinos fared far better than the natives of Mexico or Peru. Rarely, however, did these rebellions extend beyond a single province, for the tribal divisions prevented united effort and the superior armament of the Spaniards, together with the influence of the friars, soon brought the people to submission. By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, the Spanish administration and the political influence of the friars became

the subject of criticism on the part of educated and wealthy Filipinos and the native priests. An agrarian problem was created by the discontented tenants of the large friar landholdings. In 1872 a mutiny at the Cavite arsenal was easily repressed, but a court martial condemned to death three native priests: a Spanish mestizo (half-breed), a Chinese mestizo, and a Tagalog. In addition a number of prominent natives were sentenced to exile for life. As the evidence was never made public, many Filipinos were convinced that the mutiny was used as an excuse for removing some of the leading critics of the government and Church. Among the later leaders of the Filipinos was José Rizal, an able surgeon, artist, and man of letters, who had been educated abroad. In 1892 he founded the Liga Filipina, whose purpose was to develop the commercial, economic, and educational interests of the people. This was considered a dangerous movement, and Rizal was arrested and exiled in Mindanao. At the same time another Filipino, less educated and more radical, founded a secret society, the Katipunan, which was designed not only to throw off the control of Spain, but also that of the Church and the great landlords. This society gained most of its members among the Tagalogs, who resided in the provinces around Manila. The Spanish officials, aware of these aims, struck before the plans were fully matured. In August, 1896, many of the leaders were arrested in Manila, and this drove the others to immediate rebellion. The Spanish military forces were very weak and consisted largely of Filipino troops, who on this occasion remained loyal. Stern measures of repression were employed, including the execution of members of the Katipunan and prisoners taken in battle. By the end of December reinforcements had arrived from Spain, although the Cuban insurrection had depleted the Spanish resources. At that time Dr. Rizal, who was accused of fomenting this rebellion, was executed in Manila, December 30th, although he had actually volunteered as a surgeon in Cuba and was returned from Spain to the Philippines for trial. His martyrdom has made him the Filipino national hero. By the beginning of February, 1897, sufficient troops had arrived to

make possible an offensive against the rebels, who were strongly established in Cavite province. The campaign lasted about two months and the Filipinos were defeated and scattered. They had fought bravely, but their guns and munitions were most inadequate. In this rebellion, although most of the leaders and participants were Tagalogs, some help had been received from neighboring tribes. Peace was, for a time, secured by an agreement under which the governor-general promised to pay 800,000 pesos to the leaders, who would withdraw from the islands. The Filipinos asserted that the compact contained the promise of certain reforms—the expulsion of the friars, freedom of press and assemblage, representation in the Spanish Cortes, and a general amnesty. The existing copies of the compact do not contain such pledges. When Aguinaldo and thirty-four of his associates arrived in Hong Kong half the promised sum was paid them. The balance was not paid (although the governor-general said he paid 200,000 pesos to other leaders) because the arms were not surrendered as promised, and the arms were not surrendered because the promised reforms were not instituted. Distrust prevailed on both sides, and sporadic risings occurred in several places early in 1898. Then the unexpected happened and the Filipinos hailed a champion who, in their belief, would win for them the freedom they desired.

The Spanish-American War.—For many years Cuba had been an object of interest to the American people and their government. Concerning the Philippines they knew little. Aside from commercial and planting interests in Cuba there was much popular sympathy with the struggles of the Cuban patriots for freedom. Cuban affairs had frequently created difficulties between the United States and Spain. In 1895 a new insurrection broke out there, and the repressive measures of Governor-General Weyler, who had previously served in the Philippines, were brought home to the American people and their representatives in Congress by a new sensation-seeking press. At this juncture the American battleship *Maine* was destroyed by an explosion in the harbor of Havana. In spite of the plea of her captain, Sigsbee, to “suspend judg-

ment," a wave of indignation swept over the United States. Congress on March 7, 1898, placed \$50,000,000 in the hands of the president for defense, and public feeling was not allayed when the board of inquiry reported that the explosion had taken place outside the battleship. Finally a joint resolution of Congress was passed on April 19th to the effect that the people of Cuba are and of right ought to be free and independent, that it was the duty of the United States to demand the withdrawal of Spain from the islands, and that the president was directed to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States to carry these resolutions into effect. There was no intention to absorb Cuba, and her independence was pledged. Spain had promptly broken off relations with the American minister, so the cabled ultimatum was not presented. On April 25th a congressional resolution declared that a state of war existed from April 21st.

The War in the Philippines.—With the military and naval operations in and around Cuba we are not concerned. Commodore George Dewey, in command of the Asiatic squadron, had been advised of the strained relations between the two countries and had taken steps to meet any eventualities. He promptly received orders to capture or destroy the Spanish fleet in the Philippines. Ordered from Hong Kong by the British authorities, he made use of Mirs Bay, in China, for his final preparations, and on April 27th set sail for Manila. Early on the morning of the 1st of May his little squadron entered the bay, without effective opposition. The battle which ensued was a complete victory for the smaller, but more powerful, American fleet. Four of the seven Spanish vessels were destroyed, with considerable loss of life, while on the six American ships only nine were wounded. Commodore Dewey then established a blockade of the city, and cabled that he could take Manila at any time, but needed 5,000 men to hold it. It was at this point that the American government took a decision which was to have far-reaching results. Instead of ordering Dewey to withdraw, now that his objective had been gained, it determined to follow up his victory and carry the war into the Philippines. No other

decision could have been expected at this time of national rejoicing. One of the first steps taken by Dewey to embarrass the Spaniards was to bring back Aguinaldo in an American dispatch-boat. Weapons were given to his followers from the Spanish arsenal at Cavite and his forces were soon far better equipped than they had been in 1896. Around him rallied not only the old soldiers of the rebellion, but trained Filipinos who deserted from the Spanish units. He proceeded to proclaim a dictatorial government on June 18th, and a revolutionary one on the 23rd. In these weeks Commodore Dewey was sorely tried by the conduct of Admiral Dietrichs, of the strong German fleet, who had so recently planted the German flag at Kiaochow, in China. The friendly attitude of the British and Japanese naval commanders served to strengthen Dewey's position. On the 30th the first troops, under General Merritt, arrived, and any fear of German intervention was removed. It was no easy matter to send an expeditionary force across the Pacific and it was not until August that enough Americans were in position to make an offensive possible. These troops occupied the lines which the Filipinos had thrown about the city pending the arrival of American troops. As resistance was useless, the Spanish commander agreed to surrender the city after a show of force. This, through some mistake, developed into a small action, and five Americans were killed. The city surrendered on August 13th, actually a few hours after a peace protocol had been signed in Washington which bears the date of August 12th.¹

The Treaty of Paris.—During the war the interests of Spain at Washington were intrusted to the French ambassador there. On July 26th he sounded the American government as to its peace terms. As presented on the 30th these included the occupation of the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which should determine the control, possession, and government of the Philippines. In spite of Spain's objection the protocol signed on August 12th contained this provision. The peace conference assembled at

¹ Due to the difference in time August 12th in Washington was the 13th in Manila. The protocol was signed at 6 A.M. on the 13th, Manila time.

Paris on October 1st. The American commissioners included William R. Day, late secretary of state, C. K. Davis, W. P. Frye, George Gray, senators, and Whitelaw Reid, ambassador to France. The appointment of three senators, in view of the power of the Senate in treaty-making, was a wise step. In the instructions given to the commissioners the minimum terms respecting the Philippines were the cession of the island of Luzon and commercial privileges in the other islands of the group. When the disposition of the Philippines came up for discussion, late in October, the commissioners could not agree on the terms to be demanded. Three favored taking the entire group; Day favored taking Luzon and possibly the undeveloped islands of Mindoro and Palawan; Gray opposed any annexations. On the 25th they cabled for instructions. The reply, which was dispatched the next day, indicated the growing interest in the Philippines since the instructions of September 16th. President McKinley now instructed them to demand the cession of the whole archipelago, and in coming to this conclusion he stressed the interests of the Filipino people "for whose welfare we cannot escape responsibility." This demand was presented to the Spanish commissioners and produced one of the most difficult problems of the entire conference. Finally it was agreed that the United States would pay to Spain the sum of \$20,000,000, not in payment for the islands, but in compensation for a bond issue of that amount which was charged against the Philippines. The treaty was signed on December 10th. The islands, it should be observed, were demanded as part of the indemnity which Spain, as the defeated party, might be expected to pay. Both Porto Rico and the Philippines were demanded and ceded in lieu of a monetary consideration. The treaty was then submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent. Here strong criticism was voiced against the acquisition of the Philippines. If the Senate had divided on strictly party lines the Republicans could not have secured the necessary two-thirds vote, but enough Democrats and members of other groups joined them to secure ratification on February 6, 1899. A change of two votes would have defeated the treaty.

Establishment of American Control.—By the treaty of Paris Spain relinquished her sovereignty in the Philippines to the United States, but during the nine months of uncertainty as to what America's policy would be a new factor had entered into the situation. Although there was no formal or official basis for the belief, the Filipinos were quite justified in feeling that the Americans, who had waged war upon Spain to free Cuba, would certainly help them realize their national aspirations. But the more the Philippine question was studied the more convinced did the president become that an independent government could not survive in the presence of the tribal rivalries and international complications which would confront it. The transfer of Porto Rico to American control occasioned no popular resentment. But in the Philippines a strong independence movement had developed since the return of Aguinaldo, and the American naval and military commanders had refrained from checking it in view of the uncertainty as to the ultimate disposition of the islands. Even after the treaty was signed, but before the Senate's approval, the constitution of the Philippine Republic was proclaimed, on January 21, 1899. The establishment of American sovereignty could only be accomplished through the destruction of the Philippine Republic. Friction had arisen between the two armies when the Filipinos were denied access to Manila after the surrender, and during the months of uncertainty Filipino forces lay encamped beyond the American lines. On the 4th of February a clash of outposts occurred which developed into a general engagement around Manila. This was to prove a very different struggle from that which the Spaniards suppressed so promptly in 1896. The native forces were larger, better organized, and far better equipped than three years earlier. The country, especially in the rainy season, was a difficult one for American troops to operate in. The final defeat and scattering of the organized Filipino armies was accomplished in 1899, but then irregular warfare on the part of small bands harried many of the islands. At one time almost 70,000 American troops were employed and some 550 small garrisons were scattered through the disturbed re-

gions. With the spectacular capture of General Aguinaldo, in March, 1901, the organized struggle for independence may be said to have closed and the suppression of small armed bands, now more bandits than patriots, became a police problem for the civil authorities.

America as an Asiatic Power.—Although other considerations may have entered into the decision, such as the commercial possibilities of the islands and the importance of possessing a naval and trading base off the coast of Asia, it is more reasonable to believe that the acquisition of the Philippines was due to a very simple process of elimination. The United States would not permit Spain to hold the islands; she did not believe that the Filipinos were prepared to maintain a stable government; so there was nothing left to do but accept the responsibility which the "march of events" imposed upon her until the Filipinos were able to govern themselves. It was natural, however, for other people to suspect these motives, no matter how satisfied the Americans might be with them. The fact remained that the United States had become an Asiatic power and had taken her place alongside of Great Britain, France, Russia, the Netherlands, and Germany. And the lands which she held in trust were larger than the three islands of Old Japan and richly endowed with natural resources. Japan, the Asiatic power most interested, felt no alarm at the American annexation. She had the greatest confidence in the honesty of America's motives, for at this time the "traditional friendship" between Japan and the United States was more than an after-dinner toast. Her navy was most correct in its relations with Admiral Dewey, and no trouble was found in the establishment of a depot for supplies at Nagasaki. During the insurrection Count Ito even offered his services to endeavor to convince Aguinaldo of the wisdom of making peace with the Americans. But if such a move were attempted to-day, Japan would certainly entertain the same feelings as would the United States if an Asiatic power proposed to annex a large group of islands off the coast of the Americas. The very fact that the United States held the Philippine Islands gave her added influence in the affairs of

China. Her entrance there came when the "break-up" of China was being generally and casually discussed. She was able, therefore, to bring her influence to bear in the international discussions of 1899, and she had ships and men at hand to take part in the operations against the Boxers in 1900.

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CHAPTER XXIX

PROFITING THROUGH CHINA'S WEAKNESS

After the Sino-Japanese War.—Japan emerged from the war with China with enhanced reputation and prestige. Her forces had been successful on land and sea against a power that had once considered itself the mightiest of empires. On the eve of this war she had gained Great Britain's assent to treaty revision which assured Japan a place among the family of nations. When, in 1896, she concluded the promised commercial treaty with China she demanded extraterritorial rights in the empire, but would not grant equal privileges to Chinese subjects in Japan. There was no inconsistency here. While Japan had entirely altered her systems of law and procedure so that they were comparable to the most advanced in the West, China had modified in no degree the codes and the judicial processes which had caused the Western powers to demand consular jurisdiction for the protection of their nationals. China, on the other hand, had been ignominiously defeated and humiliated by a far smaller power; she had suffered great losses and was burdened with a heavy indemnity. Her ancient prestige was shattered, but she was by no means as impotent as her military disasters led many to assume. Before the war British influence had been supreme in the Far East. At Peking and at Tokyo the advice or demands of the British representatives were heeded with deference. In recent years British policy had favored China as a check to Russia in the north. The foresight of the Rosebery cabinet in revising the Japanese treaty made possible a new orientation in British foreign policy which was to have important results. After the war the coalition of Russia, France, and Germany displaced Great Britain from her leadership in China, and she drew closer to Japan, whose star was rising in the East.

The First Demands upon China.—Although the announced reason for the three-power intervention in favor of China was to safeguard the peace of the Far East, the powers concerned

were fully resolved to make China pay for the help they had given her. France was the first to obtain compensation. While the war with Japan was running its disastrous course the French minister at Peking was negotiating two conventions, one for the delimitation of the boundary of Tongking, and the other a supplementary commercial treaty. After ten months of discussion the French proposals were still not accepted in their entirety. Then came the three-power intervention in April, and the pointed hint that China might well show her gratitude. On May 9th, the day after the Japanese treaty was exchanged at Chefoo, the Tsungli Yamen agreed, without further discussion and as a mark of gratitude, to the French terms. By the boundary convention three pieces of territory passed into French possession, while among other clauses in the commercial treaty was one which granted to French engineers and manufacturers the right to be first approached when China proposed to develop her mines in the provinces of Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung, and permitted the extension into China of the French railways of Annam. The Franco-Chinese conventions were signed on June 20, 1895. They were promptly followed by a request for a railway concession in Kwangsi which was not granted until the following March. The first compensation that Russia asked for was, on the surface, innocent enough. It was merely the right to guarantee a loan of 400,000,000 francs (which would be advanced by a syndicate of French bankers) at the surprisingly low rate of four per cent. Both Great Britain and Germany protested against this transaction, but as France supported Russia the loan agreement was signed on July 6th. One effect was to strengthen the Franco-Russian coöperation, to further which a new financial agency, the Russo-Chinese Bank, was created. Germany, who had joined the two allies so promptly in April, now found herself ignored. She naturally drew closer to Great Britain, and in 1896 and 1898 two Anglo-German loans were advanced to China. But in 1895, when France and Russia were securing their first rewards, Germany knew what she wanted. It was a naval base somewhere along

the coast of China, but the best way to obtain it was still a question.


Russo-Chinese Alliance.—Useful as the political loan of 1895 might prove to be, Russia had more ambitious designs. In 1891 the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway began. The original route lay entirely within the Russian borders and followed the Amur and Ussuri to Vladivostok. But as construction proceeded it was evident that if the line could be built across northern Manchuria, not only would some 343 miles be saved, but many costly bridges avoided. To secure the consent of China to such a plan, which in the past would have been rejected without discussion, devolved upon Sergius Witte, minister of finance, whose department was in charge of this enterprise. It happened that in June, 1896, the Tsar Nicholas II was to be crowned in Moscow. All the powers of the world would send representatives and China especially should seize this opportunity to testify to her gratitude to Russia. A high official was designated, but Russia politely yet firmly suggested that no one but Li Hung-chang could worthily represent the empire. His appointment was the first victory for Witte. At this time Li was in disfavor. He had suffered bitterly because of the unfortunate war with Japan. It was but natural that he should dislike strongly, even hate, the country which had so humiliated him. This made him favorable to a good understanding with Russia, for the two countries were neighbors and both were endangered by Japan's advance. Li became, therefore, the leader of the pro-Russian group in Peking politics. He arrived at St. Petersburg some weeks before the Moscow ceremonial. There, and later at Moscow, he entered into conferences with Witte and Lobanov, the foreign minister. Finally Witte offered China an alliance against Japan, and in order that Russian troops might reach the threatened points the Russians would build a railway across Manchuria. He pointed out that in 1895 the Russians could not come to the aid of China because there was no railway, and he stressed the good services so recently rendered to China by his country. On these terms a secret treaty was signed. It was primarily an alliance to support each

other by all the land and sea forces at their disposal against any aggression by Japan directed against Russian territory in eastern Asia, China, or Korea. During military operations all Chinese ports would be open to Russian vessels. And the right to build the railway across Manchuria would be granted to the Russo-Chinese Bank. The treaty would remain in force for fifteen years after the railway contract was confirmed.¹

The Chinese Eastern Railway.—The news of this alliance was kept a profound secret. If the other Western powers and Japan had learned of it they would have understood better the relations which developed between the two countries. The contract for the construction of the railway, which was known as the Chinese Eastern, was duly signed in Berlin on September 8th (for the Chinese minister to Russia was also accredited to Germany). The road was to be built by the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, a subsidiary of the Russo-Chinese Bank. Aside from usual provisions respecting construction and operation there were these of special significance: the company would have the absolute and exclusive right of administration of its lands; a reduction of one-third of the Chinese import and export duties would be granted on goods moved over the railway; at the end of thirty-six years after the opening of the road China might buy it back, and at the end of eighty years it would pass to China without payment. The railway contract was the substantial reward which Russia obtained for her intervention in 1895. Under it Manchuria was opened to Russian economic and political penetration. It was the first step in the causation which led to the Russo-Japanese War, and although Witte frequently protested his own peaceful intentions, he had forged a weapon which Russian imperialists could use too well.

¹¹ The text of this treaty was first printed in the London *Daily Telegraph*, February 15, 1910. It appears to be a correct English version. Neither Russia nor China acknowledged the existence of this treaty until at the Washington Conference, January 24, 1922, a telegraphic summary of the treaty was submitted by the Chinese delegation.² Cf. MacMurray, *Treaties*, Vol. I, p. 81; Conference on the Limitation of Armament (Senate document), pp. 707-708, (revised edition), p. 1414. The treaty was signed at Moscow on June 3 (May 22, old style).

Germany Leases Kiaochow.—Germany had obtained no reward from China, although more than two years had passed since her friendly intervention. As early as the 'eighties Baron von Richtofen, the learned German geologist, had described Kiaochow as "the best seaport in Northern China." As soon as the collapse of China was demonstrated in the early months of the Sino-Japanese War the kaiser, in November, 1894, suggested to his chancellor that Formosa be seized, after a secret understanding with Japan. A little later Berlin was considering the availability of Kiaochow, the Pescadores, and Chusan. And in April, 1895, the German foreign office had under consideration six points along the coast. When Li Hung-chang visited Berlin in 1896, on his way home from Russia, the kaiser had personally asked for the grant of a naval base, and his foreign minister had urged prompt compliance as a reward for the service rendered by Germany in 1895. The German minister at Peking was instructed to conduct the negotiations there, and he could cite as precedents for meeting the German wishes not only the favors accorded France and Russia, but a recent Burmese boundary convention which gave Britain some territorial compensation. In 1897 the Chinese government was well aware of the risks involved in giving a naval base to one power, when every concession which she gave became the ground for demands by the other powers for compensation. During these months a German squadron, commanded by Rear-Admiral von Tirpitz, examined the coast from Canton to Shanghai, seeking a port which would serve Germany's purpose. When Von Tirpitz surrendered his command to Admiral Dietrichs it was to become minister of the navy at Berlin. France and Russia, we have reason to believe, supported China in her resistance to the German demands, and there seemed to be small prospect of their being attained. Then fate played into the kaiser's hands. On the night of the 1st of November, 1897, a Chinese mob attacked the German mission at Kiachwang, in the remote southwest corner of Shantung. Two German priests of the Congregation of Steyl were murdered by assassins who were probably bandits. Before 1890 France would have acted, but in that year the



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German Catholic missionaries asked for the protection of their own government. On the 10th the news reached Shanghai, and four days later the German squadron entered the bay of Kiaochow, the best harbor in Shantung. Sailors and marines were landed, the fort occupied, and notice served that the Germans would not withdraw until the murders were atoned for. The German demands were presented in Peking on the 22nd. They were not unusual, except for the fifth clause, which was based upon recent French precedent. Germany demanded the erection of an imperial tablet in memory of the murdered priests, an indemnity, the perpetual degradation of the governor, payment of the expenses of occupation, and preference for German engineers in railway construction in Shantung and the working of mines along the railways.¹ Great Britain, informed of these demands, advised China to accept all but the fifth, but if that were conceded she would demand equality of treatment for British subjects and compensation for any violation of treaty rights. China did not yield as promptly as was expected, and in December the kaiser sent out reinforcements of ships and men under his brother Prince Henry, at which time, in a banquet speech, he warned all who might think of interfering with the German program—"Should anyone essay to detract from our just rights or to injure us, then up and at him with your mailed fist." With German reinforcements on the way, and no help at hand from the other powers—for Europe was less inclined to intervene against Germany in 1897 than against Japan in 1895, the Chinese accepted most of the demands. By the middle of January the missionary case was closed. The governor was dismissed; 3,000 taels indemnity was promised for each missionary; the Chinese government would build three churches at a cost of 66,000 taels each, and furnish the sites for two of them, and also contribute 24,000 taels for seven mission buildings in the district where the murder occurred; and a special edict for the protection of missionaries would be issued. Now Germany brought pressure to secure her real desires. Her minister had finally advised the Chinese that the lease of Kiaochow must be granted. At this moment the support

which China had received from France and Russia vanished. Russia, we have reason to believe, was promised the right to lease Kiaochow in 1895, but her hands were now tied because in the summer of 1897 the kaiser, during a visit to the tsar, gained his promise not to oppose a German demand for the lease of that bay. Finally the Chinese government yielded, and the lease was granted as "a special proof of their grateful appreciation of the friendship shown to them by Germany." The treaty was signed on March 6, 1898, and contained two parts; the first, dealing with the lease, was promptly published, while the second, covering the German railway and mining rights, was given out first by China. The bay of Kiaochow, with a tract of land of about 200 square miles, was leased to Germany for ninety-nine years. A neutral zone, thirty miles wide, was established around the bay. The right to construct fortifications and maintain troops was accorded Germany. And it was provided:

Should Germany at some future time express the wish to return Kiaochow Bay to China before the expiration of the lease, China engages to refund to Germany the expenditure she has incurred at Kiaochow, and to cede to Germany a more suitable place. Germany engages at no time to sublet the territory leased from China to another Power.

In the second part, Germany was given the right, through a Sino-German company, to construct two railways in Shantung, from Kiaochow to Tsinan and the frontier, and from Kiaochow *via* Ichow to Tsinan. And the Chinese government agreed

. . . where foreign assistance, in persons, capital or material, may be needed for any purpose whatever within the Province of Shantung, to offer the said work or supplying of materials in the first instance to German manufacturers and merchants engaged in undertakings of the kind in question.

The German action started the "vicious circle of demands upon China." It was not the last, but the most flagrant, use of a missionary outrage for political and commercial profit. Well might Captain Brinkley write: "Certainly Germany's

friends—and they abound in the Far East—hung their heads, and felt that a new stain had been fixed on the escutcheon of Western civilization.”

Russia Leases Port Arthur.—Soon after the Germans occupied Kiaochow a Russian fleet took up winter quarters at Port Arthur and Talien-wan. Muraviev, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, advocated the seizure of one of these places. Witte, who had negotiated the Chinese alliance, opposed the proposal and tried to persuade the kaiser to withdraw from Kiaochow. Finally the tsar accepted the proposal of Muraviev and Russia formally asked for the lease, which China, confronted by the Russian fleet, could not refuse. Witte tells us that he instructed his agent at Peking to pay Li Hung-chang 500,000 rubles, and Chang Yin-huan, 250,000. The former accepted 500,000 taels, and expressed his deep gratitude. The treaty was signed on March 27th, and an additional agreement on May 7th, and they gave Russia a lease for twenty-five years, which might be extended by mutual consent, of Port Arthur, Talien-wan, and adjacent waters, bordered by a neutral zone. The area was about 1,300 square miles. Russia could erect fortifications and naval depots, and construct a branch railway from the main trans-Manchurian line to Talien-wan and Port Arthur. France, of course, supported her ally; Britain could do no more than protest against the lease; but the Japanese, who had won Port Arthur in a fair fight and had been forced out by the three European powers “for the peace of the Far East,” viewed the presence of Russia in these ice-free ports with deep concern.

Great Britain Leases Weihaiwei.—In February, while the Germans were pressing for Kiaochow, a high Chinese official intimated that China was disposed to lease Weihaiwei to Great Britain. The British cabinet was opposed at that time to any alienation of Chinese territory, but as soon as Russia leased Port Arthur she decided to ask for the lease, and ordered the British fleet from Hong Kong to the north. At this time Weihaiwei was occupied by Japanese troops, pending the completion of the Chinese indemnity payments. Great Britain

informed Japan of her intentions, and Japan, anxious to have some power at hand to watch Russia, approved them. On April 2nd the Tsungli Yamen recommended the lease to Great Britain on the same terms as Port Arthur. But Weihaiwei lay in Shantung, to which Germany had now asserted prior claims, so Britain formally assured her that she would not interfere with German interests in Shantung nor construct a railway from Weihaiwei into the interior. A second loan furnished by Anglo-German bankers was now accepted by China, the final indemnity payment was made to Japan, and her troops evacuated Weihaiwei. When the last detachment sailed away, on May 24th, the British flag was raised there and the actual lease agreement was signed July 1st. The area was about 285 square miles, and the usual neutral zone was defined. The term of the lease was "for as long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the possession of Russia." Thus the second naval base captured by Japan had passed into the hands of a European power, but Japan welcomed the presence of Great Britain as an offset to Russia.

France Leases Kwangchow-wan.—France, of course, could not stand aside when naval bases were to be had for the asking.² On April 10th the Tsungli Yamen agreed to lease the bay of Kwangchow to France for ninety-nine years. The area was 195 square miles, including two small islands added in 1898. When the French flag was raised there on the 22nd, the admiral stated that France had assisted China when she had trouble with a foreign foe two years before! The formal treaty was not signed until May 27th. At this time France had a missionary case of her own, for a priest had been murdered in Kwangsi on May 2nd. The reparations, granted on

² A minor circle of demands was put into operation by France and Great Britain in these years. The Tongking boundary agreement with China, of June 20, 1895, yielded some territory to France. Great Britain demanded compensation, and secured a new Burmese boundary treaty, February 4, 1897, which gave her four small areas. France then demanded compensation in respect to water or rail communication with Yunnan as well as a railway in Kwangsi. China agreed in principle to the latter, but tried to reject the Yunnan proposal, only to be told, in March, 1898, that in view of the considerable advantages recently accorded by China to different foreign powers, France would have to have a concession for the Yunnan line. China agreed to this on April 10th, in the note which granted the Kwangchow-wan leasehold.

the 28th, included an indemnity of 100,000 francs, the erection of a chapel, punishment of the local officials, and a railway concession from Nanning to Pakhoi.

Great Britain Leases Kowloon.—As soon as the French railway and lease demands were granted, Great Britain demanded "further assurances" from China. These included the lease of Kowloon, the peninsula on the mainland opposite Hong Kong, the tip of which had been ceded to Great Britain in 1860. The convention was signed on June 9th and covered an area of 376 square miles for the term of ninety-nine years. It should be observed that although the Kowloon convention was signed before the Weihaiwei agreement, the latter demand preceded the former. The Kowloon lease was the last of the "vicious circle" which followed Germany's lead and which was primarily the result of the three-power intervention. If China had realized that instead of the Liaotung peninsula she was to lose (for the leases were looked upon as practically conferring ownership), not only Port Arthur and Talien-wan, but four other ports as well, she might well have become reconciled to allowing the Japanese to retain what they had won on the battle-field and around the council table.

The "Break-up of China."—In these months the world was talking about the "break-up of China." The pitiful weakness of the nation and the success of the many demands made upon her seemed to forecast the political downfall of the old empire. The foreign press and periodicals teemed with discussions of the probable march of events, and an imposing volume by a distinguished British admiral bears the title *The Break-up of China*. In order to be prepared for any eventuality the interested powers began to mark off "spheres of interest" or "influence" for themselves, which may be defined as "a region preëmpted for further exploitation and possibly for political control." The method used was to secure from China a promise never to cede the specified region to any other power, and then, if possible, to secure a recognition of the sphere by the rival powers. In this, as in many other diplomatic maneuvers, France led the way. On March 15, 1897, she secured from China a promise never to cede the island of Hainan to any

other power, or to give a naval station or coal depot there. Great Britain, on February 11, 1898, was promised that China would never cede away the Yangtze valley. France, on April 10th, secured a similar promise respecting Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Yunnan. And Japan, who had taken no part in these aggressions upon China, although there were those who thought a port should be asked for, was content with the promise, on April 26th, that China would not cede Fukien province, which lay opposite Formosa, to any power. Germany already had marked out her sphere in Shantung, for she had the first right to furnish men and materials for railway and mining development, and Russia laid claim to all the region north of the Great Wall, as well as the province of Chihli. The next step was to secure mutual recognition of these spheres. Britain had already promised that she would not interfere with German exploitation in Shantung, and on April 3, 1898, an agreement was signed whereby railway operations in their respective spheres would not be interfered with by capitalists of the other country. In this agreement German capital was given priority in the Yellow River region as well as in Shantung. A similar agreement was entered into by Great Britain with Russia, on April 28, 1899, respecting railways in the Yangtze valley and north of the Great Wall. To further protect herself Russia, on June 1st, secured a promise from China that she would have the first right to build railways north and northeastward from Peking. The so-called "spheres of influence" were, therefore, based upon the flimsiest grounds, and their maintenance depended upon their recognition by China and all the other powers. To attach any weight to a statement that China would not cede or lease the Yangtze valley to any other power was absurd. It meant no more than a statement that the United States had no intention of ceding the Mississippi valley. Yet whenever any foreign country or its nationals proposed to construct a railway in the entire Yangtze region it was denounced as an invasion of the British sphere. The first signs of China's resistance to these many demands—and we have not yet summarized the railway and mining concessions—came with the

refusal, in March 1899, of Italy's request, supported by Great Britain, for the lease of Sanmen Bay, in Chekiang.

The Open-Door.—While the European powers were securing these territorial and commercial concessions the United States had stood aloof, although in April, 1898, a very valuable railway contract had been secured by an American company for a line between Tankow and Canton. Spheres of influence had been proclaimed, and five valuable harbors had passed under European jurisdiction. There was great danger that American commerce would be seriously affected if discriminatory treatment were accorded her nationals in the foreign-controlled regions. A report on conditions in China was drawn up by one of the best-informed members of the American foreign service, W. W. Rockhill, and measures for the protection of American commerce were proposed which met with the approval of the secretary of state, John Hay. On September 6, 1899, instructions were sent to the American ambassadors in England, Germany, and Russia. They were to request the governments to which they were accredited to make declaration:

(1) That it will in no wise interfere with any treaty port or any vested interest within any so-called "sphere of interest" or leased territory it may have in China.

(2) That the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports within such "spheres of interest" (unless they be "free ports"), no matter to what nationality it may belong, and that duties so leviable shall be collected by the Chinese Government.

(3) That it will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of another nationality frequenting any port in such "sphere" than shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality, and no higher railroad charges over lines built, controlled, or operated within its "sphere" on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other nationalities transported through such "sphere" than shall be levied on similar merchandise belonging to its own nationals transported over equal distances.

These three declarations were described by Mr. Hay as an "open-door" policy. It was his first intention to secure the

adhesion of Great Britain, Germany, and Russia, but in November similar instructions were sent to the minister in Japan, and to the ambassadors in Italy and France. In every case a favorable reply was received. Five of the powers expressed their readiness to make such a declaration provided the others would.³ Italy, who had no leased territory or sphere of interest, gave an unconditional assent. The final step was to inform each of the governments that as the condition attached to its acceptance had been complied with, the United States considered its assent final and definitive. The open-door policy, which was brought to the attention of the world in 1899, was by no means a purely American doctrine. Its leading advocates in the Orient had been the British, and during the battle for concessions in China many Englishmen, on the floor of Parliament, had discussed ways of safeguarding the open-door in China. But it was the American secretary of state who took the lead in securing the acceptance by the interested powers of three concrete ways of securing equality of treatment for all who would trade with China. No treaties were negotiated—it is extremely doubtful if such a treaty would have been approved by the United States Senate. The notes exchanged could not be enforced by the usual sanctions of international intercourse. They were simply a statement of policy, enforceable by public opinion. But no power which had subscribed to this policy could afford to treat it lightly. In time, the term open-door was used in a far broader way than Mr. Hay had in mind. The three precise declarations to which the powers subscribed were lost sight of and a general principle or policy took its place in common usage. For this reason it was hard to find a common agreement in terms, and it was necessary, at the Washington conference of 1921-22, to redefine the open-door. But between 1899 and 1922 the definition, so far as any public acceptance went, must be found in the Hay notes.

³ Great Britain reserved the leased territory of Kowloon from the application of the declaration, considering it in reality an extension of her Hong Kong possession. The Russian reply, while approving in general, overlooked the reference to harbor dues and railway rates.

NOTE.—The railway concessions which were secured from China in these years have a special significance. China's need of adequate land transportation had been pointed out for many years. But instead of trying to supply this need immediately, as did the Japanese government, the Chinese officials were, for the most part, doggedly opposed to the innovation. The first railway was built by a British firm between Shanghai and Woosung, about twelve miles, in 1876. But the concession called for a horse railway, and when a Chinese was killed by the locomotive the popular and official opposition was so great that the line and equipment were bought by the authorities and, the next year, shipped over to Formosa to rust in idleness. The next attempt was in 1881, when, under the direction of the progressive Viceroy Li Hung-chang, a locomotive was used instead of mules on a tramway in the Kaiping coal fields. After much opposition the line was extended to the Pehtang river in 1886, and then to Tientsin in 1888, a distance of eighty-one miles. But permission could not be obtained to connect Tientsin with Peking. An extension north to Shanhaikwan (174 miles) was authorized in 1891 and completed in 1894, under a British engineer. Between 1887 and 1893 about fifty miles of railway were built in Formosa under the progressive governor of Fukien. Construction work had begun on a continuation of the line beyond Shanhaikwan into Manchuria when the war with Japan interrupted further progress. Then came the "battle of the concessions" between 1895 and 1899.

The railway concessions which were then demanded by the governments of France, Russia, Germany, and Great Britain, in the name of their capitalists, possessed both economic and political implications which put them in an entirely different class from foreign railway loans or development in a well-ordered nation. On the economic side the foreign countries profited through the return on the capital invested, the purchase of materials and supplies, the employment of their nationals as engineers and officials, the development of national commerce—a reduction in the Chinese customs was granted on goods moving in and out of the country by rail—and through the usual concession to develop mines along the railway right-of-way. On the political side the property rights would give an occasion or excuse for military intervention in time of civil unrest, while the railway, usually connecting or in the neighborhood of a leased port or the frontier, would make the occupation of the country easy. Russia, without specific permission, employed her nationals as railway police, and these proved to be soldiers in police uniforms. The Russian contract also gave her exclusive jurisdiction along the railway zone.

The principal railways which were projected or built in this period were:

1. The Chinese Eastern Railway (Russian), across Manchuria (920 miles) with a branch to Port Arthur (516 miles).
2. Peking-Mukden (British), 524 miles. Under construction to Hsinmintun, about twenty miles from Mukden.
3. Peking-Hankow (Belgian), 755 miles. Advocated by Viceroy Chang Chih-tung and planned as a Chinese undertaking. Russia and France supported a Belgian company, operating largely with French capital, which, in spite of British protests against this invasion of their Yangtze sphere, received the concession in June 1898.
4. Canton-Hankow (American), approximately 700 miles. Concession given to an American company without any political pressure. The Spanish-American War which soon broke out prevented the raising of necessary capital. The line passed into Belgian control but was regained by the Americans. The concession and the construction work were repurchased by China for \$6,750,000 gold.
5. Shantung Railway (German), 256 miles, from Tsingtao to Tsinan.
6. Shanghai-Nanking (British), 195 miles.
7. Yunnan Railway (French), 289 miles.

8. French concessions. Tongking frontier to Lungchow and Nanning, and Nanning to Pakhoi. The extension to Lungchow was the only one to be completed.

9. Tientsin-Pukow (Anglo-German), 629 miles. Preliminary concession in 1898, final loan agreement in 1908, line opened in 1912.

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CHAPTER XXX

REFORM AND REACTION

The Reforms of 1898.—The humiliating experiences which China had endured between 1894 and 1898 made a deep impression upon some of the more thoughtful Chinese. First there had been the defeat by Japan and then the aggressions of the European powers. Something must be done if China was to be saved from the evils of foreign domination. In many quarters the example of Japan was cited, a small and poor country which had reorganized its whole national life and had become strong enough to assert and maintain its independence. The young emperor had assumed the ruling power in February, 1889, on his marriage to his own cousin, daughter of a brother of the Empress Dowager, and the latter presumably retired from political life and amused herself in building the summer palace. In the highest government circles in Peking scarcely veiled strife prevailed between the Northern party, composed of Manchus and northern Chinese, for the most part uninformed and conservative, and the Southern party, led by the former tutor of the emperor, a distinguished scholar of Soochow. The Northern party, led by Li Hung-chang and supported by the Empress Dowager, favored an understanding with Russia, while the Southern party and many of the younger scholars advocated an understanding with Japan, and the introduction of the reforms which had served Japan so well. The young emperor, patriotic and well-intentioned, but weak, leaned upon the advice of his former tutor, Weng Tung-ho, who was at that time a member of both the supreme and the grand councils. On the 9th of June, 1898, the first reform decree was issued which gave orders for the careful investigation of every branch of European learning appropriate to existing needs and the elimination of useless things. This decree was reminiscent of the

Japanese emperor's oath in 1868. The next day members of the imperial clan and even princes of the blood were advised to seek education in Europe. But now the Empress Dowager showed her hand, and under her influence Weng was dismissed from the grand council, but he had already advised the emperor to consult a young Cantonese scholar, Kang Yu-wei.

Influence of Kang Yu-wei.—He was a man of brilliant intellect who had won esteem as a Confucian scholar and then had read widely, although not deeply, about Western culture and institutions. He had even written essays to show that there was no authority in the Sacred Books for the conservative and retrograde policy of the scholars and officials. The emperor therefore summoned Kang to him on June 14th, and after the first interview reform decrees were issued in rapid succession. At this time the Empress Dowager was not hostile to reform so long as the ancient privileges of the Manchus were not interfered with, and some of the highest officials in Peking supported the first proposals of the emperor. Among the notable reforms proposed during these "Hundred Days" was the substitution of papers on practical subjects, which would require some knowledge of the history of other countries and of contemporary politics, for the old "eight-legged" essays in the civil-service examinations; the Manchu troops were to be reformed; colleges and high schools, modeled upon Peking University, were to be founded in every province; naval colleges would be established; a railway and mining bureau was to be set up; foreign works on political economy and natural science would be translated; many lucrative but useless posts were abolished; macadamized roads were to be built in Peking; a national army, drilled in Western style, was to be enrolled for national defense. In all some thirty-seven reform decrees were issued up to September 16th. The emperor was now entirely committed to the plans of Kang Yu-wei and his inexperienced reformers. It was unfortunate that the dynasty, in these critical days, did not have the wise council of Prince Kung, who had died in May, or, in the final days, of Li Hung-chang, who had been dismissed from the Tsungli Yamen on September 7th and sent to Canton.

Coup d'Etat of the Empress Dowager.—Among the progressive officials who might be counted upon by the reformers was Yuan Shih-kai, formerly resident in Korea and now judicial commissioner of Chihli. The emperor summoned Yuan to him and ordered him to take charge of the program for army reform. A few days later Yuan was told by one of the reformers that it was necessary to arrest and imprison the Empress Dowager and execute Jung Lu, the viceroy of Chihli and her most loyal supporter. At a second audience on September 20th the emperor either gave Yuan orders to carry out this program or indicated that he favored it. Yuan hastened to Tientsin and warned his chief, Jung Lu, who was also his "blood brother," of the plot. The viceroy at once proceeded to Peking and informed the Empress Dowager. She summoned all the high officials of the court, Manchu and Chinese, and they begged her to assume the reins of government and bring an end to the visionary reforms of the emperor. Early on the morning of the 22nd the emperor was seized and confined in one of the palace buildings. An edict was then issued, in his name, giving notice that the Empress Dowager had condescended to administer the government. For a time the safety of the emperor was in question, but his life was spared. Kang Yu-wei¹ was warned and escaped, but six of his followers were put to death. The reform edicts were rapidly rescinded, and the sinecures reestablished. Reform, because it had moved too rapidly, was followed by reaction. Yuan Shih-kai was always looked upon as a traitor by the Emperor Kwangshu and held responsible for the failure of the reforms. Ten years later he suffered for his part in this *coup d'état*. A reasonable explanation of his conduct would be that his long years of experience in public life warned him of the futility of the hasty paper-reforms which the inexperienced emperor was attempting. There is no reason to believe that the 1898 reforms could have been carried out even if the emperor had had a free hand. The encouraging thing was that the need

¹ In later years he became a conservative and, after the Republic was proclaimed, a monarchist. He died at Tsingtao in 1927.

of reform had been brought to the attention of Chinese officialdom by means of the imperial decrees.

The Anti-foreign Movement.—While this ill-fated reform movement was running its course in Peking reports from the provinces indicated a widespread hostility to foreigners. It is safe to say that almost all Chinese officials, from high to low, were hostile to the foreigner—they only disagreed as to the best way to handle him. The Japanese defeat and the European demands, during the past four years, had aroused the official class and the scholars and gentry. Among the superstitious peasantry there was great alarm when the new railways, with their tunnels, cuts, and fills, destroyed the favorable *feng-shui* of towns and villages. Graveyards were threatened and the bones of the honored ancestors had to be removed. Because of official corruption the farmers frequently failed to receive the compensation paid out by the foreigners for their lands and burial plots. Hostility to Christianity also blazed anew in these years, partly because, keeping step with the forward policy of their countries, some of the missionaries had interfered more boldly than usual in the protection of their converts. The reactionary policy of the court, after the *coup d'état*, was known and understood by the provincial officials. In March, 1899, Peking dared to refuse a foreign demand when Italy failed to secure the lease of Sanmen Bay.

Conditions in North China.—The general unrest led to assaults upon foreigners and native Christians in such widely separated provinces as Chihli, Szechwan, Kiangsi, Fukien, Yunnan, Kwangsi, Kweichow, and Shantung. But in 1899 conditions became much worse in the northern provinces. The dislike or hatred of foreigners was now keenest here, for it was the scene of the Japanese defeats, of three of the foreign leaseholds, and of all the new railway construction. Shantung was bound to be unfavorably affected, for it was the Holy Land of China, the birthplace of Confucius and Mencius, and the establishment of the Germans there was certain to give great offense, while the English at Weihaiwei, who were building no railways, aroused little feeling. In addition, fam-

ine, that active partner of unrest, prevailed in Shantung, Shansi, and Chihli. For several years the crops had been scanty, and in the winter of 1899-1900 a plague of locusts prevailed. Many a starving man joined the foreigners in order to save his own life rather than to take another where conditions like these the secret societies, which were miles away cover when a strong administration functioned, waku forts, med to come out into the open to take advantage railway and enfeebled dynasty and organize the forces of later the Br

The Boxers.—One of the first of these British organizations to cause trouble was the Plum Blossom Fists, and in 1895 the governor of Shantung tried to quiet them by enrolling their members as militia. Three years later the Great Sword Society, known as an anti-foreign organization, began to attack mission properties in northern Kiangsu and northwestern Shantung. And a little later the Ichochuan, Fists of Public Harmony, were heard of. The ostensible purpose of this society was boxing and gymnastics, and soon the foreigners spoke of the members as "Boxers."² Initiation into the mysteries carried with it invulnerability from wounds. The banners of the society bore the characters "Cherish the dynasty, exterminate the foreigners," much like the cry of the old imperialists in Japan. In the summer and autumn of 1899 the Boxers, at times in combination with the Great Swords, confined their attention to the native Christians, and many villages were raided and looted. Such expeditions met with the approval of many of the famine sufferers. So much popular support did the movement have that few magistrates would exert themselves to protect the native Christians, and when, in October, a military force defeated a Boxer contingent the governor of Shantung recalled the troops and dismissed the local civil officials. This gesture encouraged the Boxers and prevented any active steps toward suppressing them. Conditions in Shantung now alarmed the foreign ministers in Peking and at the instance of the American minister the governor who

² Steiger, pp. 134-135, points out that the official name of the bands was Ihotuan, or "Righteous and Harmonious Band," and as such they might be considered a local militia, organized under the decree of November 5, 1898.

had encouraged the Boxers was recalled and Yuan Shih-kai appointed ~~in~~ ^{as} governor on December 6th. But the mischief had ~~anti-foreign~~ ^{anti-foreign} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ The throne had on three occasions in 1899 ordered ~~was~~ ^{was} ~~running~~ ^{running} to resist foreign aggressions, having in mind the ~~indicated~~ ^{indicated} a and and the German advances beyond Kiaochow, ~~any~~ ^{any} that ~~alm~~ ^{alm} seemed to be at hand a great popular organization ~~stille~~ ^{stille} to the ~~would~~ ^{would} do more than resist aggression; it would drive to handle ~~home~~ ^{home} foreigners from the land. On December 31st ~~hands~~ ^{hands}, during ~~missionary~~ ^{missionary} lost his life, at the hands of the ~~Giss~~ ^{Giss} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~Society~~ ^{Society}, when a British subject was murdered in the interior of Shantung. For this crime two were executed and three imprisoned, but no indemnity was demanded beyond 9,500 taels for memorials.

The Legations Take Alarm.—Soon after the murder of Mr. Brooks an edict for the protection of foreign and native Christians was issued, and in response to demands from the legations whose missionaries were most affected a decree followed in February, 1900, for the suppression of the two troublesome societies. But this brought no relief to the native Christians. The German railway engineers had been driven back to Kiaochow early in February, and the movement had now spread across the border into Chihli and was approaching Tientsin and Peking. By this time some of the highest Manchu and Chinese officials at the court were convinced of the strength of the Boxer movement as a great national uprising against the foreigners, but a few wiser heads prevented any open support for the Boxers. Probably the best informed European in Peking was the French Catholic bishop, Favier, and on May 19th he warned the French representative of the very serious nature of the situation. Only a few days later a party of railway engineers were attacked at Paoting and Fengtai, and on June 1st two English missionaries were slain not far from Paoting. The foreign ministers, now thoroughly alarmed, sent requests for legation guards from the warships off Taku. On May 31st and June 3rd the guards, numbering 450 officers and men, reached Peking for the defense of the British, Russian, French, American, Italian, and Japanese le-

gations. On their presence the safety of the foreigners in Peking was later to depend.

Naval Relief Expedition.—The handful of legation guards could not be expected to defend the foreigners in Peking against any determined assault and there was danger that communication with Tientsin, eighty miles away, might be cut at any time. In the gulf, off the Taku forts, lay warships of all the leading treaty powers. The railway was cut by the Boxers on June 5th, and four days later the British admiral received an urgent call for help from the British minister. He at once went ashore with a landing party, and was joined the next day by parties from the other ships. The little force consisted of about 2,000 sailors and marines, of whom the British furnished more than 900 and the rest were German, Russian, French, American, Japanese, Italian, and Austrian. Ordinarily the run to Peking would take a few hours. Even if the line had to be repaired it was hoped that two days would be sufficient. But the little force found that the destruction was far worse than they had anticipated. On the 12th they reached a point about halfway to Peking, where they met strong opposition. Four days later they decided that they must retire, and on the 18th they were attacked by imperial troops (as a result of the bombardment of the Taku forts on the 17th). On the 19th they abandoned the railway and seized junks on the Pei-ho, and finally, on the 21st, they took refuge in a Chinese arsenal about three miles from Tientsin. Here they found abundant supplies of food and ammunition, and they were able to hold out against superior numbers until they were relieved by a force from Tientsin on the 26th. The Seymour expedition, named from the British admiral who was the senior officer present, lost 62 killed and 238 wounded.

Capture of the Taku Forts.—The foreign concessions at Tientsin, of which there were four, the British, German, French, and Japanese, were protected by 1,700 Russians, who arrived from Port Arthur on the 13th, and by 560 marines and about 200 volunteers. The naval commanders took council and decided that the Taku forts, which guarded the en-

trance to the river, should be turned over to them in order to keep communications open with Tientsin and Peking. On the 16th they delivered an ultimatum for the surrender of the forts and shortly before it expired the Chinese opened fire, about 1 A.M. on the 17th. The forts were then taken with some loss of life. The American admiral, Kempff, refused to take part in this overt act on the ground that he was not authorized to initiate any act of war with a country with which his government was at peace. His conduct was approved by the president, and his belief that such an act would consolidate the anti-foreign element was confirmed at once. That day the Tientsin concessions were attacked, and the very next day imperial troops joined in the assault on Seymour's retiring column, while the bombardment of the forts was the excuse for the general declaration of war which China hurled at the powers on the 20th. In view of the rapid advance of the Boxers and the strong sympathy which prevailed in Peking with this movement, it is doubtful if the attack on the forts did more than precipitate an open clash with the powers. On the 11th Mr. Sugiyama, the chancellor of the Japanese legation, was murdered by a soldier in Peking. On the 13th the Boxers entered the city, setting fire to all foreign buildings outside of the three guarded areas and massacring a number of Chinese Christians. The next day they entered the city of Tientsin, where they destroyed all the mission chapels and the French cathedral, only recently restored after its destruction in 1871. Even if the government had been sincere in its attempts to restore order the situation was now entirely out of hand. Foreign lives could only be protected by foreign arms, which would either beat back the attacking forces or support those Chinese officials who realized the price which would eventually be paid for this madness.

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CHAPTER XXXI

THE BOXER UPRISING

The Siege of the Legations.—The attack upon the Taku forts was all that was needed to encourage the anti-foreign officials to resort to openly hostile measures. They included a number of highly placed Manchu clansmen, including Prince Tuan, whose son had been named heir apparent on January 24th. In Peking the foreigners seemed at their mercy. They had first taken refuge in three quarters, the legation area, the Catholic Pehtang cathedral, and the Methodist mission compound, and since the 8th of June they had been in a state of semi-siege. The incoming of the Boxers provided the means at hand for their extermination, but a few other high officials, including Jung Lu, viceroy of Chihli and commander-in-chief of the Northern army, pleaded for their protection. On the 19th the diplomatic body was informed by the Tsungli Yamen of the demand for the surrender of the Taku forts, and ordered to leave Peking within twenty-four hours, under the protection of Chinese troops. On the 20th Prince Tuan showed the Empress Dowager a forged dispatch from the foreign ministers demanding her immediate abdication, the degradation of the heir apparent, and the restoration of the emperor. This, following upon the capture of the Taku forts on the 17th, infuriated the Old Buddha. "How dare they question my authority!" she is alleged to have cried. "If I can bear this, what must not be borne? The insults of these foreigners pass all bounds. Let us exterminate them before we eat our morning meal." A decree proclaiming war against all foreigners was ordered to be promulgated. That day the ministers asked for an interview with the Tsungli Yamen, and when no reply was received, Baron von Ketteler, the German minister, set out alone for the Yamen. On the way he was murdered by a Manchu bannerman.¹ That afternoon the siege of the lega-

¹ After the siege he was arrested by the Japanese, tried and executed by the Germans.

tions began, and imperial troops joined with the Boxer mob. The missionaries and the Chinese converts had been brought from the Methodist compound into the legation quarter, so only two areas were now defended.

The Besieged Foreigners.—Within the legation area were some 920 foreigners and 1,000 Chinese, and in the adjacent palace of Prince Su were some 2,000 Chinese converts. Across the city Bishop Favier, with thirty priests and forty-three French and Italian sailors, defended the Pehtang cathedral, protecting some 2,000 Chinese Christians. Within the legations were the representatives of eleven nations: the ministers of the United States, Great Britain, Russia, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Japan, and the *chargés* of Germany and Austria-Hungary and nationals of three others—Swiss, Portuguese and Chinese. For their defense there were available some 407 officers and men of eight nations, and all able-bodied civilians were given some work to do. The women helped out in many ways, as nurses, in the commissary, and making sandbags. An American missionary, Mr. Game-well, trained as a civil engineer, planned the defenses. The British minister, Sir Claude MacDonald, trained as a soldier, was chosen for the supreme command. His chief of staff was Mr. Squiers, the American secretary of legation, a West Point graduate. And the American Minister, Mr. Conger, was a Civil War veteran. The story of the defense is a thrilling one, illumined by many acts of bravery and self-sacrifice, and marred, also, by petty exhibitions of jealousy. Many accounts have been written, by different nationals, and each writer naturally gives the most credit to his own countrymen, but there is a very general agreement that in this company of brave men Colonel Shiba, of the Japanese guard, stood out among the bravest of the brave. The British legation, which was the center of the defense, was under fire on forty-three days in the space of fifty-six days. Three brief truces broke the incessant firing of shot and shell. During the early part of the siege the Empress Dowager was eager for the destruction of the foreigners, and she was disappointed when the Boxers and her troops were not successful. But Jung Lu and

others continued to plead for moderate measures. Later she wavered, and at times seemed about to protect the foreigners. The cannonading was stopped, and at times she sent them presents of fruit, eggs and vegetables. Once she allowed a market to be opened so that they might obtain fresh supplies. In spite of the savage attacks from time to time, and the splendid heroism manifested by the little band of defenders, it was evident to the more thoughtful among the besieged that some power was holding back the Chinese just when they were about to strike with overwhelming force. Later it became known that the man who really saved the foreigners was Jung Lu, who had under his control the heavy cannon which could have wiped out the thin barricades. At the risk of his life he refused to turn these guns over to the Boxer leaders, nor would he allow his well-trained troops to participate in the attack. He was denounced by Prince Tuan before the Empress Dowager, but she refused to override her most devoted official. After the relief of the legations, it should be said, Jung Lu was marked out by the foreigners for the severest punishment, but happily he escaped, and when he returned to Peking his services were better appreciated.

The Destruction of Foreigners in the Interior.—China considered herself at war with all the powers, but they did not consider that a state of war existed. Their theory was that a serious rebellion had arisen which the Chinese government was unable to control, and that it was their duty to protect foreign lives and property and also assist the Peking government to restore order. Even when imperial troops joined the Boxers this theory was not modified, although the powers gave warning that all authorities in Peking would be held responsible for any acts of violence committed against the legations. On the 24th, or thereabouts, a decree was issued to slay all foreigners in the interior. Some one in Peking changed the character *sha* (slay) to *pao* (protect) and this enabled some of the threatened missionaries to find refuge. In the interior of the northern provinces, and in a few cases nearer the Yangtze, 232 missionaries and members of their families were put to death, of whom 188 were Protestant and forty-four

Catholic. Appalling as were these crimes against inoffensive foreigners who had devoted their lives to the betterment of China, they were relieved by many acts of devotion, at the risk of life itself, on the part of Chinese Christians in protecting their missionary friends. Happily the Boxer madness did not spread to any extent beyond the northern provinces of Shantung, Chihli, Shansi, and Manchuria. Li Hung-chang, then viceroy at Canton, maintained order and tried in every way to weaken the blow which he knew would fall upon the throne. He was supported by the great viceroys of the Yangtze region, Chang Chih-tung, in charge of Hunan and Hupeh, and Liu Kun-yi, of Kiangsu, Anhwei and Kiangsi, who maintained order in their vast domains. Shanghai, the center of foreign commerce, was not involved in the disturbances.

The International Relief Expedition.—It would take time to mobilize an international force strong enough to force its way to Peking. Russia and Japan had troops near at hand, but the former was engaged in protecting her railway in Manchuria, while international jealousy prevented Japan from sending over an adequate expeditionary force. Great Britain urged Japan to act and even offered financial assistance, but Russia dissented for fear the service would give Japan special privileges. Although the United States had troops at hand in the Philippines, they were then engaged in suppressing the insurrection there. A force of 2,000 regulars was, however, promptly dispatched. Great Britain was engaged in the Boer War, but she sent mainly Indian troops and a well-trained Chinese regiment from Weihaiwei. While these forces were gathering, with some German troops from Kiaochow, the foreign concessions at Tientsin were under constant bombardment until, on July 14th, enough troops were at hand to permit the capture of the native walled city. There the first stories of looting by the foreign troops were heard.

American "Integrity of China" Notes.—Once again the United States took the lead in formulating a policy which would guide the associated powers and eventually safeguard China. On July 3rd a circular note was dispatched to the

American representatives abroad which asserted that the purpose of America was to rescue the legations, protect the lives, property and interests of Americans, and suppress the existing anarchy, but in addition

. . . the policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty or international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.

Favorable responses to this statement were received from all the powers concerned. Although the policy enunciated in this note should have prevented any power from fishing in troubled waters, we shall see that Russia was not inclined to adhere to this self-denying understanding. From this time the two phrases "the open-door" and "the integrity of China" were linked in political manifestoes.

The March to Peking.—After the capture of Tientsin the city was placed under the control of the allied commanders, and a provisional government was soon established. But the forces at hand were not sufficient to advance to Peking. At first it was thought that 40,000 men were necessary for the column, with 20,000 to hold Tientsin and the line of communication. Many weeks would elapse before these numbers were available. On July 4th, John Hay had sent a cipher message to Minister Conger, through the Chinese minister at Washington, and on the 20th a reply had been received: "For one month we have been besieged in British Legation under continued shot and shell from Chinese troops. Quick relief only can prevent general massacre." For fear that this was a fraudulent dispatch, designed to hurry forward the relief expedition before it was strong enough to reach the capital, Mr. Hay sent another cipher, asking Conger to mention, in reply, his sister's name. When the reply came through, Hay was confident that the ministers and their nationals were still alive and that prompt relief could extricate them. The American and British commanders now proposed an immediate

start, and on August 4th the column left Tientsin. It was composed of Japanese (8,000), Russians (4,500), British (3,000), Americans (2,500), and French (800). No Germans were engaged, and almost half of the available Russians were retained at Tientsin. | Additional Japanese overtook the expedition on its advance. The opposition was much more determined than had been anticipated. Ignorant Boxers fought alongside of imperial troops in what they believed to be a patriotic defense of the throne and capital. If better drilled, equipped, and led, these stout northern Chinese would have made a formidable foe. Fortunately it was the dry season, so the advance was only retarded by delays in bringing up supplies by junks. The great heat, which even affected the Japanese and Indian troops, was a serious obstacle, as well as the bad water which caused disease. There was generous rivalry on the march, each detachment trying to win the advanced position. | It was, in truth, the most remarkable military expedition yet recorded, for five powers, representing Europe, America, and Asia, coöperated for a common end, the salvation of lives in jeopardy. If the expedition had been free from loot and the needless destruction of lives and property it might well have seemed like the dawn of the brotherhood of nations. As this was the first time Japanese troops had fought beside their Western comrades in arms, they took special pride in their conduct and won the approval of all observers. |

Relief of the Legations.—| It took the allied force ten days to cover the eighty miles to Peking. | On August 14th the different columns attacked the gates in the Tartar Wall. The first troops to enter were some Rajputs and Sikhs who made a dash for the Water Gate, which led under the wall directly to the legation quarter. That day the legations were relieved. They had lost some 67 killed and 168 wounded, a high percentage for the small force engaged. On the 14th and 15th there was fighting in the Tartar city. The imperial court fled on the 15th, first to Taiyuan, in Shansi, and later to Sian, in Shensi. | For the second time the Empress Dowager had fled from the imperial city before the advancing foreigners, but

this time her personal offense was great and her retainers might well fear for her safety. On the 16th shots were still heard in the northern part of the city, and only then was it realized that the Pehtang cathedral still held out. A force of Japanese, French, and British rushed to the relief and soon drove away the assailants of Bishop Favier and his gallant band. The defense of the Pehtang cathedral was the most heroic incident of the siege in Peking. Unhappily, the fighting was scarcely over before the looting began. Shops were pillaged, the homes of the nobles and the well-to-do, the palaces and the yamens were thoroughly looted and at times wantonly destroyed. With few exceptions all the foreigners, military and civilians, took some part in the loot, either directly or by purchases from the original marauders. The Russians behaved very badly, as did the French disciplinary troops from Indo-China. The Indian soldiers were hard to keep under control. The Americans and British probably behaved least badly, while the Japanese soldiers were subject to strict discipline. An attempt was made to safeguard the priceless treasures in the imperial city, although a formal march-through of the troops occurred on the 28th as an object lesson. The most illustrious offender was the German kaiser. When, later, the French seized and sent home several of the remarkable bronze astronomical instruments which Jesuit scientists had designed for the imperial observatory, the Germans at once followed their lead. But the French government returned the objects, with orders that they be replaced. The kaiser kept his share, and installed them on the lawn of his palace at Potsdam, from which they were taken back to China as one of the terms of the treaty of Versailles in 1919.

Punitive Expeditions.—After the relief of the legations forces were sent into the surrounding country to break up the Boxer bands and punish communities where foreigners had been murdered. In September three such punitive expeditions were sent out and other forces captured the forts at Pehtang and Shanhaikwan. But in October Count von Waldersee arrived as commander-in-chief. Germany had asked for this honor and the powers had agreed because, through the loss

of her minister, she had suffered the most grievous wrong. But Von Waldersee and his German reinforcements, who had taken no part in the fight up to Peking, were eager for further military exploits. Early in that month two French forces had operated out of Tientsin and had rescued some missionaries at Paoting and another town. But a few weeks later a mixed force of German, French, British, and Italian troops were again sent to Paoting (one of the capitals of Chihli). Three high Chinese officials were tried and executed, two temples and a corner of the city wall demolished, a fine of 100,000 taels imposed, and 240,000 taels found in the provincial treasury were confiscated. A garrison was left in the city during the winter, and the retiring troops carried further destruction and levied a fine on an outlying city. The Americans had taken no part in the October expeditions, and one by one the other powers withdrew. Between December 12, 1900, and April 30, 1901, forty-six expeditions were sent out, of which thirty-five consisted of German troops, four of Italian, and the other seven of mixed forces, except one American and one British sent out to meet new disturbances. The punitive expeditions wrought great suffering and, after the first few weeks, served no useful purpose. The conduct of the foreign soldiery caused great resentment among the Chinese. The kaiser had given this injunction to his soldiers as they sailed for China: "When you encounter the enemy you will defeat him. No quarter shall be given, no prisoners shall be taken." And he cited as an example the conduct of the Huns under Attila, a phrase which was to cause the Germans much unhappiness in later years.

Russian Occupation of Manchuria.—The Boxer madness spread north into Manchuria. By the end of June, 1900, the missionaries in the south were driven out, and on July 3rd seven Catholic missionaries were killed in Mukden, and five elsewhere, with many converts. The Russian railway was torn up and construction work stopped. On the 14th some Russian steamers on the Amur were fired upon from Aigun, and the next day Blagovestchensk was bombarded from the Chinese side of the river. The commander there, alarmed at

the presence of many Chinese in the city, ordered them to cross the river at once, and when transport was lacking they were driven into the stream to drown or be slaughtered. Some 4,500 were said to have been slain on that bloody day, a figure which eclipses all the foreign lives lost during the Boxer uprising. The Russians now crossed the Amur and moved south along the railway. Then they spread out, taking town after town beyond the Russian zone. The port of Newchwang was held against a Chinese attack by Russians and Japanese on August 4th, and on September 24th the Russians occupied the Chinese city of Newchwang. On October 2nd they entered Mukden, and then occupied the railway as far as Tientsin. The Chinese administration in Manchuria was wiped out and Russian troops held the country pending the peace negotiations.

Resumption of Friendly Relations.—With China at the mercy of the allies the question of restoring amicable relations became a delicate one. In the early days of the siege Li Hung-chang had been ordered to report at Peking and had been restored to his old post as viceroy at Tientsin. On the 16th of July he left Canton, but remained for almost two months at Shanghai, trying to open informal negotiations with the powers. On August 7th he was appointed peace commissioner by the Empress Dowager, and on the 24th Prince Ching was associated with him. It was not until October 3rd that he set out from Tientsin for Peking. In the meantime a very general demand for vengeance upon the court and the responsible high officials was raised. By some the punishment of the guilty was considered a prerequisite to any negotiations. Among the early popular proposals were the partition of China, but the American note of July 3rd precluded that; the establishment of a new dynasty, but there was no claimant whose mandate would be accepted by the Chinese; and, finally, the imposition of such terms of settlement as would preclude a repetition of similar outrages upon foreigners. All the powers, however, must agree upon the terms, and so before negotiations could progress a general agreement must be arrived at. The German government, in a circular note of

September 18th, demanded, as a preliminary condition for entering into diplomatic negotiations, the surrender of the chief instigators, to be designated by the ministers. The United States, however, preferred to have China punish the malefactors herself. This led to the publication by the Chinese court of a list of nine high officers with a statement of the accusations against them. Germany then tried to have the powers control the punishments to be meted out. France, on October 4th, offered six proposals which formed the basis of the final demands. Between that date and November 24th the ministers at Peking formulated a joint note which would contain the basic demands. But this, in turn, had to be approved by the home governments, and it was not until December 22nd that the note, with minor changes, was signed by the representatives of eleven powers. The demands, which were in turn the basis of the final protocol, were accepted by an edict of December 26th, and by a formal reply to each power on January 16, 1901. On the 5th of February the first meeting between the Chinese peace commissioners and the foreign envoys took place. Then ensued seven months of negotiations. This delay was due to the difficulty of getting eleven powers to agree to all the details of the protocol and frequent references to the home governments were necessary. In addition the powers insisted that all demands in the joint note which were capable of execution should be carried out *before* the protocol was signed. The principal difficulty arose over the amount of the indemnity. Should it be punitive, or only for the actual losses and expenses? The United States, for example, desired a small total of \$200,000,000, with a moderate interest rate on deferred payments of three per cent. Great Britain and Japan desired a somewhat larger total, and Japan wanted interest at five per cent. Russia, Germany and France suggested even a larger sum. Finally, on the basis of a compromise, the amount was fixed at 450,000,000 taels (\$332,900,000), with interest on deferred payments at four per cent. The indemnity was not to be punitive, but was to be based on actual losses and expenditures to July 1, 1901. Finally, the negotiations were delayed because, as we shall

see, Russia was dealing separately with China in respect to Manchuria. Russian policy throughout was to advocate moderate measures which would win the good favor of the court, and result in compensation later. China, who had paid so heavily for the three-power intervention in 1895, should now have been on her guard.

The Boxer Protocol.—The final protocol was signed on September 7, 1901, more than a year after the relief of the legations. It may be termed the "third treaty settlement," for, although not a treaty, it established new relations between the eleven powers and China. The twelve articles may be divided into measures of a punitive nature, measures of a preventative nature, measures for establishing better relations, and an indemnity.² Among the former were:

1. Reparation for the assassination of Baron von Ketteler. Prince Chun had already left China on a mission of apology, and a commemorative monument had been erected.

2. Punishment of the authors of the crimes. Two princes had been exiled, a prince and two high officers had committed suicide, three had been executed, three had suffered posthumous degradation, and five had been restored to rank and honor who had been executed for advising the Empress Dowager against the Boxers, and one had been cashiered pending a judicial decision. Edicts had already been issued for the punishment of ninety-six provincial officials, and in forty-six towns where crimes had been committed the national examinations would be suspended for five years.

3. Reparation for the murder of Mr. Sugiyama. An official had already proceeded to Japan.

4. Expiatory monuments in the desecrated cemeteries. Among the preventative measures were:

5. Prohibition of the importation of arms and ammunition, for two years and longer if necessary.

7. Creation of a legation quarter in Peking with adequate guards.

8. The razing of the Taku forts.

9. Occupation by allied troops of twelve specified places

²The figures refer to the numbers given to the articles in the protocol.

between Peking and Shanhaikwan, for the maintenance of open communications between the capital and the sea.

10. The posting of certain edicts: that death would be inflicted for membership in an anti-foreign society, and edicts proclaiming the punishments already inflicted, the suppression of examinations, and making provincial officials responsible for future disturbances.

In order to improve commercial and political relations:

11. A promise to amend the commercial treaties and to improve the Pei-ho and Whangpu rivers.

12. The Wai-wu Pu (which supplanted the Tsungli Yamen) was to take rank before the other Six Boards, and court ceremonial and audiences were carefully prescribed in an annexed memorandum. And finally:

6. The indemnity was fixed at 450,000,000 taels, with interest at four per cent. The capital sum would be gradually paid off in thirty-nine years, or by December 31, 1940. For meeting this sum, the balance of the maritime customs, the native customs, and the salt tax was set aside. The tariff could be raised to an effective five per cent, in return for which China agreed to aid in the improvement of the rivers mentioned above. No attempt was made to scrutinize the public and private claims submitted by the powers, and the division of the total sum was allotted by the ministers. The United States, which advocated moderate measures, asked for a lump sum of \$25,000,000 or 34,072,500 taels. She was awarded 32,939,055 taels (\$24,440,000) which proved to be twice as much as her actual claims and expenses were later found to be. There is reason to believe that some of the other powers considerably overestimated their actual losses and expenses.

The protocol was accompanied by nineteen annexes, most of them being the texts of imperial edicts which, from time to time, directed the execution of various terms of the final protocol. Never before had a country been compelled to carry out, in advance, all the terms which were possible of immediate performance. Thus the protocol read: "The Chinese Government having thus complied to the satisfaction of the Powers with the conditions laid down in the above-

mentioned note of December 22nd, 1900" the powers agreed to withdraw their troops, with the exception of the legation guards, from Peking on September 17th, and from the province of Chihli, except for the authorized garrisons, on the 22nd.³ The court commenced its return journey from Sian on October 20th, and arrived in Peking on January 6, 1902. Not until August 15th of that year was Tientsin restored to Chinese control, and at that time the Chinese government agreed not to rebuild the Taku forts or the city walls of Tientsin, or construct forts at Chinwangtao or at Shanhaikwan. They also agreed not to station or march Chinese troops within twenty *li* (six and two-third miles) of Tientsin or of the foreign troops stationed there.

Summary.—Some of the immediate results of the Boxer uprising may be suggested here: (1) This manifestation of anti-foreign hatred and misguided patriotism brought to an end the period of exploitation. The "break-up of China" was, for a time at least, set aside as beyond the realm of practical politics. (2) The Empress Dowager learned a bitter lesson, which was brought home with especial force during her months of exile. After her return to Peking she became a supporter of reform measures, and with her powerful influence behind them the attempts of 1902-08 had a vitality which those of 1898 lacked. (3) The Russian occupation of Manchuria during the uprising set in motion a chain of causes which led to the Russo-Japanese war a few years later. (5) The terms of the protocol, especially in the matter of the indemnity, the legation quarter in Peking, and the presence of foreign troops in Chihli, left open sores in the relations between China and the powers which have not yet been healed. }

³ The protocol, not being a treaty, did not have to be ratified by the respective powers, or approved by the United States Senate.

NOTE.—The Boxer indemnity was divided as follows:

	(Taels)	Per cent of the total
Russia	130,371,120	29.
Germany	90,070,515	20.
France	70,878,240	15.75
Great Britain	50,620,545	11.25
Japan	34,793,100	7.7
United States	32,939,055	7.3

Italy	26,617,005	5 9
Belgium	8,484,345	1 9
Austria-Hungary	4,003,920	.9
Netherlands	782,100	.2
Spain	135,315	.1
Portugal	92,250	
Sweden	62,820	
Other claims	149,670	
	<hr/> 450,000,000	<hr/> 100.0

(The tael was then valued at \$0.742 gold)

The United States, in 1908, having paid all claims and retained \$2,000,000 for possible future adjustments, remitted \$10,785,286 of her indemnity. China was still to make the regular payments, but the extra amounts would be as regularly remitted. The Chinese government announced its intention to use the returned indemnity payments for the education of students in the United States. When China entered the World War the payments to Germany and Austria-Hungary ceased, and the other indemnity powers engaged in the war agreed to waive their payments for five years, Russia, however, only agreeing in respect to one-third of her installments. By the peace treaties Germany and Austria-Hungary were forced to relinquish their shares of the indemnity. By this time the favorable results of the American remission of a part of her indemnity were widely recognized. Great Britain, in 1922, decided to remit the balance due her. Such a bill was passed in 1925, but an investigation as to the use to which it should be put delayed immediate action. France, about the same time, would use her balance to rehabilitate a defunct bank in China and for education. Japan followed suit in 1923, and created a fund into which should go the moneys received for the Shantung Railway, mines, and government properties as well as the indemnity balance, and which would be used for cultural purposes. The next year Russia, by treaty, relinquished her remaining share, and the United States waived the balance of \$6,137,332. The Netherlands, in 1925, would use her balance for the improvement of the Yellow River, and Italy, the same year, for education, philanthropy, and public works, the materials for which should be bought in Italy. While China, in every case where the indemnity was remitted, would continue to pay the original amounts, the sums would then be returned to be used for the purposes announced by the respective powers

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CHAPTER XXXII

THE CAUSES OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

Russia's Conduct in Manchuria.—We have already seen how Russia took advantage of the disturbances in Manchuria to send in strong forces, which not only protected the Russian properties but gradually spread out and occupied the principal cities and towns of the three provinces. During these months Russian diplomacy was very friendly to China and the Russian troops were withdrawn from Peking in September, 1900, although the conquest of Manchuria (for so Count Lamsdorv once described it) was actively progressing until the end of the year. The other powers took alarm and on October 16th an Anglo-German agreement was signed, the purpose of which was to uphold the open-door in China, to agree not to take advantage of the present complications to acquire territory, to endeavor to maintain the territorial integrity of China, and to come to a preliminary understanding as to the eventual steps for the protection of their own interests if any power made use of the complications in order to obtain under any form whatever such territorial advantages. The other interested powers were invited to accept the principles of the agreement, and favorable replies were received. The Russian note may well be quoted, as typical of the devious methods of the St. Petersburg foreign office:

The arrangement concluded between Germany and England does not, from our viewpoint, appreciably modify the situation in China.

The first point of this agreement, stipulating that the ports situated on the rivers and on the seacoast of China, wherever the two Governments exercise their influence, *remain* free and open to commerce, may be favorably received by Russia, inasmuch as this stipulation in no way derogates from the *status quo* established in China by the existing Treaties.

The second point is even more responsive to the intentions of Russia, since, from the beginning of the present complications, it has been the first to set up the maintenance of the principle of the in-

tegrity of the Celestial Empire as the fundamental principle of its policy in China.

As to the third point, relative to the eventuality of any derogation from this fundamental principle, the Imperial Government, referring to its Circular of August 12/25th, can only renew the declaration that such an event would compel Russia to modify its attitude in accordance with the circumstances.

The Russian reply, in substance, restricted the open-door to the British and German ports and spheres, and, while repeating her adherence to the integrity of China, left the door open for new engagements which, while leaving China the form, would give to Russia the substance. Any hope that the Anglo-German agreement would curb Russia in Manchuria was dissipated when the German chancellor, on March 15, 1901, stated that the agreement did not apply to Manchuria. Great Britain and Japan, who had adhered to it, denied this limited application.

Russo-Chinese Secret Negotiations.—Russian diplomacy was now functioning according to precedent. Just as in 1858 and 1860 Russia took advantage of Anglo-French pressure on Peking to secure her own ends, so in 1900 and 1901 she counted upon using the Boxer negotiations to facilitate her secret understanding with China. But this time she failed because the Chinese advised the other powers of what was brewing, and some of the latter were now watching Russia's conduct with the greatest care. The various moves in this battle of diplomacy need not be carefully outlined here. It must be remembered that Russia was negotiating on her own account at the same time her minister at Peking was coöperating with the ten other ministers in drawing up the Boxer protocol. While the powers took the position that all matters arising from the Boxer disturbances should be dealt with in the final protocol, Russia maintained that Manchuria lay outside the sphere of their interests. In November an agreement was signed at Port Arthur by Admiral Alexeiev and Tartar General Tseng Chi which called for the disbandment of all Chinese troops in Fengtien, the dismantling of all forts not occupied by the Russians, and the appointment of a Rus-

sian political resident at Mukden, to whom the Tartar general must give all information respecting any important measure. A text of this agreement was given to the *Times* correspondent in Peking, and published in London on January 3, 1901. Both Russia and China denied the existence of this agreement, but Japan, Great Britain, and the United States warned China of the extreme danger of concluding arrangements with one power without the full knowledge and approval of all the powers. Negotiations were now transferred to St. Petersburg, where a new arrangement was arrived at about the first of the year. This called for the restoration of Manchuria to China, but deprived the Chinese of any military forces there, and while giving Russia a veto on any railway construction by China or a foreign power in all the Chinese territories adjoining Russia (as well as on foreign mining concessions there), gave Russia the right to build a railway to the Great Wall in the direction of Peking. The text of this agreement reached the British in Peking on February 27th, and was promptly given publicity. The emperor of China now appealed to Great Britain, the United States, Germany, and Japan to mediate, and in reply China was warned not to enter into a separate agreement. If the powers had adopted a different course and warned Russia not to continue her selfish demands upon China, the outcome might have been very different. Russia, in the presence of the slight support given China by the powers, now modified her terms, and about March 10th was willing to allow China a limited number of troops in Manchuria and would limit the veto on railway and mining concessions to Manchuria solely. It was reported that the modified convention must be signed by March 27th. Again an appeal was made to the other powers to intervene at least for an extension of time. Japan and Great Britain had asked Russia for a text of the proposed agreement, but they had been refused, nor would Russia permit the question to be discussed by the assembled ministers in Peking. A brief extension, to April 1st, was then granted, and when China failed to sign the convention the matter was temporarily dropped. In August Russia again pressed for a favorable

reply. The signing of the Boxer protocol on September 7th seemed to give Russia a free hand in Manchuria. She now drafted a new convention, in October, the terms of which were disclosed by Prince Ching to the American minister in December. Under this Russia would evacuate Manchuria in three years, China might employ an agreed number of troops there, but no cannon, and the consent of Russia must first be obtained before subjects of any other nationality were allowed to build railways or bridges in South Manchuria. China asked for evacuation within one year, and Russia, in January, 1902, offered a two-year term, but as compensation an agreement that the Russo-Chinese Bank should first be called upon for financial help in developing the industries of Manchuria. Again Great Britain, Japan, and the United States protested to China against the new proposals, but their objections had little weight because Great Britain, at that time, was engaged in the Boer War, the United States could hardly be expected to engage in a war in Manchuria to protect the integrity of China and the open-door, while Japan, who alone had a vital interest at stake, could not think lightly of a war with the greatest power of Europe.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance.—It was the Anglo-Japanese alliance which gave Japan the support necessary for a challenge to Russia. Ever since the three-power intervention against Japan in 1895 far-sighted Japanese had advocated an alliance with Great Britain, the traditional foe of Russia. But Britain prided herself on her isolation. She stood apart from the Triple Alliance and the Dual Alliance on the continent. In the Far East there were Englishmen who felt that Britain should work with Japan, now that China had proven powerless to resist the Russian advance. Such an alliance was suggested by Joseph Chamberlain to Minister Kato in March, 1898. At this time there were suggestions of a British, German, Japanese understanding, with, if possible, the adhesion of the United States. In 1900 Baron Hayashi became the Japanese minister at London, and he was already an advocate of a British alliance. During the Boxer complications and after, it was found that Great Britain, the United States, and

Japan had a common policy in the Orient. They advocated the integrity of China and the open-door, but the United States, because of her traditional policy, could not be expected to enter into any alliance to support these principles. Russia, on the other hand, sought her own ends in Manchuria. She would not respect the administrative integrity of China nor the open-door, because she could not compete with the maritime powers. The Peking relief expedition also impressed the British with the military efficiency of Japan, which had been disclosed in the earlier war with China. In March or April, 1901, the German *chargé* at London discussed with Hayashi a triple alliance, which would include Great Britain. Hayashi was authorized to sound the British government. The tentative discussions were long drawn out, but Germany was soon dropped as an original member. Early in November Lord Lansdowne handed Hayashi the first draft of the proposed treaty. Japan now hesitated because Ito was then in St. Petersburg, and the result of his discussions was awaited. Ito, it appears, did not oppose a British alliance, but did feel that the Korean question would have to be settled with Russia alone. He was the leader of the group which favored an understanding with Russia and peace, rather than a disagreement and war. An alliance with Great Britain, he believed, might lead to war with Russia. But although he was prepared to offer Russia a free hand in Manchuria he could not get a recognition of Japan's full liberty of action in Korea. His mission, therefore, failed in its purpose, although the matter was not closed. Japan now had to come to a decision, whether to proceed with the British or the Russian understanding. On December 17th a council was held before the throne, where the advocates of each policy presented their views. The emperor decided in favor of the British alliance, and ordered the Russian negotiations brought to a close. The final terms of the treaty were then drafted, the alliance was signed on January 30, 1902, and publicly announced on February 11th. The terms of the first alliance, for it was revised and renewed in 1905 and 1911, were very simple, but their significance was great. The two powers recognized the inde-

pendence of China and Korea and declared themselves uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either country. The special interests of Great Britain were announced as being principally in China, while Japan, who possessed interests in China, was especially interested, politically, commercially, and industrially, in Korea.

If either Great Britain or Japan, in the defense of their respective interests as above described, should become involved in war with another Power, the other High Contracting Party will maintain a strict neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent other Powers from joining in hostilities against its ally.

Should another power enter the war, the other would come to the assistance of its ally, conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it. The alliance was to remain in force for five years. This was the first of the understandings which Great Britain entered into before the World War. In 1904 she came to a good understanding with France, and in 1907 with Russia. Germany was not invited to enter the Anglo-Japanese alliance because in 1901 Germany had stated that she was not interested in Manchuria, and in 1902 her relations with Great Britain were strained because of German naval policy and the Boer War. While the alliance should have made for peace, by warning Russia that Japan could count upon support if Russia crowded her too far, it also made for war, because it gave Japan the support she so much needed. Russia was, for a time, stunned by this alliance between her rivals. But in March a Franco-Russian declaration was issued which stated that they would discuss the means of protecting their interests in case the aggressive actions of third powers or new troubles threatened the integrity of China.

Russo-Chinese Evacuation Convention.—One of the first results of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was the modification of the Russian terms so that China, at last, was willing to sign an evacuation convention. On April 8, 1902, Russia agreed to evacuate Manchuria within eighteen months. Three zones were outlined and her troops would be withdrawn from each

one in six-month periods. Withdrawal would be complete by October 8, 1903. The first zone, between the Great Wall and the Liao River, was evacuated according to schedule by October 8, 1902, but the troops, instead of being withdrawn to Siberia or Russia, were sent to Port Arthur or massed in the second zone. In the next period there was practically no compliance, except to remove the troops from the city of Mukden, but forces were now moved toward the Korean frontier. Russia then refused to carry out the evacuation unless further guaranties and concessions were granted by China. Her proposals of April 18, 1903, would have given her a virtual protectorate over Manchuria and Mongolia. China refused to accept these demands, so the second period passed without the fulfillment of the Russian pledges.

Influence of Russian Concessionaires.—By this time the Russian councils were in hopeless confusion and the tsar had passed under the influence of a group which advocated a policy completely at variance with that of his responsible ministers, Witte, Lamsdorv and Kuropatkin. This group was composed of Bezobrazov, a retired captain of cavalry, his cousin Rear-Admiral Abaza, and others who planned to advance Russia's interests in the Far East by means of industrial exploitation, which would be a screen for actual occupation. They had secured possession of a concession given by Korea, in 1896, to a Russian for cutting timber on the Yalu and Tumen rivers, on the northern border of Korea. In 1898 they had interested the tsar in the enterprise, but little progress was made at that time. By November, 1902, this group, now supported by Plehve, minister of the interior, who was hostile to Witte, completely won over the tsar. Bezobrazov was sent to the Far East, with 2,000,000 rubles at his disposal, to initiate the program. Lumbering began on the Korean side of the Yalu, a short-time concession was obtained for similar operations on the Manchurian side, and an attempt was made to secure a concession for a railway from Seoul to the Yalu. At St. Petersburg the leading ministers were hostile to these enterprises, but with the tsar's support they were extended rapidly. In May, 1903, Russian soldiers, in civilian dress,

were present at Yongampo, a Korean port near the mouth of the Yalu. This seemed to presage the occupation of the Yalu region. Bezobrazov was now appointed a secretary of state, which gave him access to his sovereign. In the later negotiations with Japan this influential group, spoken of as the "Koreans," opposed any attempt to relinquish Korea to Japanese influence.

Russo-Japanese Rivalries in Korea.—Although Russia's conduct in Manchuria was to precipitate a crisis in Russo-Japanese relations, the real source of trouble was in Korea. Japan had fought a war with China in order to maintain the independence of Korea. She then believed that the way was clear for the measures of reform which she had advocated. Within a year she found her place, as the protector and adviser of the state, taken by Russia. And Russia was the European power whose advance to the East had alarmed Japanese publicists even before the days of Perry. When Count Inouye represented Japan at Seoul, in 1895, his influence was great and many reform measures were inaugurated. But under his successor less moderate measures were used, and a group of Korean reformers and low-class Japanese plotted to get rid of the queen, who had for years been the leader of the anti-reform, anti-Japanese forces. This was accomplished by a brutal murder on October 8, 1895, in which the Japanese minister was certainly guilty of encouraging the ruffians. The king was now in the hands of the pro-Japanese Koreans, and reform edicts were rapidly issued. But when, in February, 1896, a force of marines arrived at the Russian legation, presumably to protect it from Korean rebels, the king promptly fled there. For over a year the king of Korea and his chosen ministers lived in the limited quarters of the Russian legation. Japanese influence had been entirely destroyed. Japanese officers were dismissed from the Korean army and Russians employed, and lumber concessions, on the Tumen and Yalu, were given to a Russian merchant. Japan now tried to arrive at an understanding with Russia. At the same time that Li Hung-chang was negotiating his famous alliance and railway concession with Witte and Lobanov, Field-Marshal Marquis

Yamagata, also a representative at the coronation of the tsar, was trying to arrive at an agreement concerning Korea. The best he could obtain was a colorless agreement in which both powers would counsel the Korean government to establish a sound financial system, and both would render aid in the matter of loans if needed. They also agreed to withdraw from participation in the organization of a police and military force there. When, two years later, Russia occupied and leased Port Arthur, although there was great popular disapproval in Japan, the more thoughtful statesmen hoped that by turning her energies to the development of Manchuria Russia would withdraw from Korean affairs. But Russia's naval officers were eager to secure a base in the ice-free waters of Korea. At this time Japan was prepared to declare her willingness to consider Manchuria as being entirely outside the sphere of Japanese interests, provided Russia would make the same declaration in regard to Korea, but this Russia was not willing to do. Rosen, at Tokyo, urged his government to accept this offer as a means of preserving peace. But all that could be done was to negotiate the Nishi-Rosen convention, of April 25, 1898, in which both powers recognized the independence of Korea and engaged to abstain from all direct interference in the internal affairs of that country. Neither would lend military or financial advisers to Korea without the consent of the other, and Russia promised not to interfere with the development of the commercial and industrial relations between Japan and Korea. The Russian military and financial advisers were withdrawn from Seoul, but Russian influence persisted there. And in 1899 and 1900 she was busy trying to secure land for a naval base at Masampo, near Fusan, directly opposite the coast of Japan, while the renewal of her activities along the Yalu in the winter and spring of 1902-03 have already been mentioned, as well as the failure of Ito's attempt to settle the Korean problem at St. Petersburg in the autumn of 1902.

Russo-Japanese Negotiations.—By the summer of 1903 Russia had failed to withdraw her troops from the second zone in Manchuria and was pressing China for additional guaran-

ties. In Korea an attempt had been made to secure a lease of the port of Yongampo, which met with such resistance from Japan that the Korean government refused to approve it. While Russian policy was vacillating and dominated by men of little political experience, that of Japan was well defined. She could not see Russia in control of Korea, and in China her policy was to support the integrity of the empire and the open-door. On the 23rd of June, 1903, a conference was held before the throne in Tokyo, to which were summoned the five Elder Statesmen and the four leading cabinet officers. The principles upon which direct negotiations with Russia should be opened were there formulated. The purpose was to remove, if possible, the grounds of future strife. A dispatch was then sent to Kurino, Japanese minister at St. Petersburg, on July 28th, stating that Japan would be glad to enter with the Russian government upon an examination of the condition of affairs in the Far East where their interests met with a view to the definition of their respective interests. Japan had already dispatched her proposals to Kurino, but they could not be presented until Russia had replied favorably and Lamsdorff would grant an interview. It was not, therefore, until August 12th that the Japanese note, in English, was placed in Lamsdorff's hands. It should be mentioned at this point that long delays attended the Russian side of the discussions. The Japanese proposal as a basis of an understanding was very simple and might easily have been accepted by Russia in its entirety:

1. Mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Korean Empires and to maintain the principles of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in those countries.

2. Reciprocal recognition of Japan's preponderating interests in Korea and Russia's special interests in railway enterprises in Manchuria, and of the right of Japan to take in Korea and of Russia to take in Manchuria such measures as may be necessary for the protection of their respective interests as above defined, subject, however, to the provisions of Article 1 of this Agreement.

3. Reciprocal undertaking on the part of Russia and Japan not

to impede development of those industrial and commercial activities of Japan in Korea and of Russia in Manchuria, which are not inconsistent with the stipulations of Article 1 of this Agreement.

Additional engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the eventual extension of the Korean Railway into Southern Manchuria so as to connect with the East China and Shanhaikwan-Newchwang lines.

4. Reciprocal engagement that in case it is found necessary to send troops by Japan to Korea, or by Russia to Manchuria, for the purpose either of protecting the interests mentioned in Article 2 of this Agreement, or of suppressing insurrection or disorder calculated to create international complications, the troops so sent are in no case to exceed the actual number required and are to be forthwith recalled as soon as their missions are accomplished.

5. Recognition on the part of Russia of the exclusive right of Japan to give advice and assistance in the interest of reform and good government in Korea, including necessary military assistance.

6. This Agreement to supplant all previous arrangements between Japan and Russia respecting Korea.

If Russia had accepted these terms she would have had a free hand in Manchuria so long as she respected the integrity of China and the open-door, while Japan, whose vital interests were far greater, would have covenanted not to impair Korean sovereignty or the open-door in Korea. On the very day that the Japanese note was delivered an imperial decree appointed Admiral Alexeiev Viceroy of the Far East, with administrative and military power over the entire Russian territory east of Lake Baikal and power to conduct diplomatic negotiations with China, Japan, and Korea. Alexeiev had supported the plans of Bezobrazov, and from this time Witte considered a disastrous war inevitable. On the 30th Witte was removed from the ministry of finance to the presidency of the council of ministers. Alexeiev was at this time governor of the Kwantung peninsula (Port Arthur), and his new diplomatic powers would cause every Russian note to pass through his hands. For this reason Russia asked to have the negotiations transferred to Tokyo, which would further delay proceedings, for Baron Rosen could only transmit the dispatches he received, no matter how urgently the Japanese foreign minister

might press for prompt replies. Seven and a half weeks passed before the Russian reply was presented at Tokyo on October 3rd. In brief, it removed China and Manchuria from the field of discussion. Russia would only discuss Korean affairs, nor would she agree to the open-door even there. In addition a neutral zone must be erected in Korea, north of the 39th parallel, in which neither of the powers should introduce troops. Five days later the final evacuation of Manchuria should have occurred, but not a Russian soldier was removed. Negotiations then proceeded in Tokyo on the basis of the Russian counter-proposal, and on October 30th the Japanese proposed certain definite amendments. Again Japan insisted upon the independence and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Korean empires, but she accepted certain modifications in her original proposals, including a neutral zone of fifty kilometers on each side of the Korean frontier. The Russian reply was delayed for forty days (December 11th) and again China was withdrawn from the discussion, but the independence and integrity of Korea was to be mutually pledged. Russia again insisted on a neutral zone in Korea, but consented to allow the connection of the Korean and Chinese railways. Japan replied on the 21st, and Russia on January 6, 1904, still holding out for a neutral zone in Korea. Japan replied on the 13th, in which she was willing to recognize that Manchuria and its littoral was outside of her sphere of interest, provided Russia would promise to respect the integrity of China in Manchuria. Although Japan kept pressing for an early reply, no satisfaction could be secured. The last Russian note was sent to Alexeiev, at Port Arthur, on February 4th, but did not reach Rosen, in Tokyo, until after diplomatic intercourse had ceased. It, however, did not contain an agreement to recognize the integrity of China, although the neutral zone in Korea was dropped. On February 3rd and 4th two impressive councils were held before the throne in Tokyo. Japan had now determined to act. She would, alone, face the aggressive power with whom negotiations had proven useless. On the 5th two notes were sent to Kurino which were to be presented to Lamsdorv. One announced the termination of the present

futile negotiations, and the other the severance of diplomatic relations. The first note clearly set forth the views of his government:

The Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan regard the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of Korea as essential to their own repose and safety, and they are consequently unable to view with indifference any action tending to render the position of Korea insecure.

The successive rejections by the Imperial Russian Government by means of inadmissible amendments of Japan's proposals respecting Korea, the adoption of which the Imperial Government regarded as indispensable to assure the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire and to safeguard Japan's preponderating interests in the Peninsula, coupled with the successive refusals of the Imperial Russian Government to enter into engagements to respect China's territorial integrity in Manchuria which is seriously threatened by their continued occupation of the province, notwithstanding their treaty engagements with China and their repeated assurances to other powers possessing interests in those regions, have made it necessary for the Imperial Government seriously to consider what measures of self-defense they are called upon to take.

Japan had repeatedly tried to come to an understanding with Russia. All she asked was a free hand in Korea, which would not interfere with the treaty rights of Russia there, but with a mutual pledge to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the country and the open-door; and the enjoyment of her treaty rights in Manchuria, under a similar engagement. That no strong power should control Korea had been a basic policy of Japan since the beginning of the Meiji era. Russia had wantonly tried to establish herself in Korea, where she had neither economic nor political necessity to excuse her, and she had as wantonly occupied Manchuria and broken her plighted word to China. The strongest vindications of Japan's conduct may be found in the memoirs of such Russians as Witte, Rosen, and Iswolsky. Russia's bad faith was now notorious and had cost her the distrust of many of the great powers, including Great Britain, the United States, France, and Germany. The last named, for cynical reasons,

urged Russia on to disaster in the East, and then encouraged Japan to oppose her. France, the ally of Russia, would not come to her aid outside of Europe and followed with alarm the progress of this reckless war. The Tsar, badly advised, never for a moment believed that Japan would oppose his will, and so the conciliatory measures which Witte, Lamsdorv, Iswolsky, and Rosen advocated were never tried. There should be no difficulty in assessing the "war-guilt" for the Russo-Japanese war.

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CHAPTER XXXIII

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, 1904-1905

The Opening of Hostilities.—The Russians, who had never believed that Japan would dare to resort to hostilities, were taken completely by surprise by the cessation of diplomatic relations on February 6th. The next day they appealed to Great Britain to mediate, and offered to yield all the points in dispute, but it was then too late. In view of the devious methods of Russian diplomacy at that time, it is very doubtful if Japan would have considered such an offer in good faith. Neither at Port Arthur nor in St. Petersburg was there any appreciation of the real danger. The Japanese moved swiftly. As soon as relations were severed troops were on their way to Korea, where, off Chemulpo, the first shot of the war was fired, on the 8th, by a Russian cruiser at the Japanese convoy. That night, about midnight, the Japanese launched a torpedo attack upon the Russian fleet at Port Arthur, which crippled two battleships and a cruiser, and early the next morning the forts were bombarded by Admiral Togo's fleet. That day Rear-Admiral Uriu, at Chemulpo, notified the commander of the two Russian cruisers there that they must leave the port or he would come in and attack them. Although the other naval commanders advised the Russians not to go out to certain destruction, as the port was neutral, the Russians gallantly put out, and both of their ships were destroyed. As a matter of fact, the neutrality of Korea was effective only so far as she was able and willing to defend it, and she had no force able to control the actions of belligerents who took refuge in her ports. The surprise attack on Port Arthur, which preceded the formal declaration of war, while much criticized at the time, was later found to be in keeping with precedent. The cessation of diplomatic relations may result in immediate hostilities, and even the United States, where the power to declare war resides in the president and Congress, engaged in hostilities against Mexico and Spain before

the formal resolution could be taken. Both Japan and Russia declared war on August 10, 1904, the Russians laying stress on the attack at Port Arthur. The next day the United States declared neutrality, and China followed on the 12th. The Chinese treaty of alliance with Russia, of 1896, was ignored, and Japan, apparently, was not aware of its existence. There were some who felt that China should have joined Japan in this war to force the Russians out of Manchuria and preserve the integrity of China. Her military services would have been inconsiderable, but the gesture might have modified Japan's attitude toward Manchuria in later years.

The Belligerents.—On the Russian side this was not a "people's war." Few Russians could understand why a war should be waged to gain more square miles in Manchuria when so much of the home provinces and Siberia cried out for development. The money poured into the Manchurian railways and the building of Port Arthur, Dalny, and the railway towns had prevented much needed development at home. This opposition to the imperialistic schemes of the government fired the liberals and radicals to revolt, and not only were many of the regiments at the front permeated with unrest, but before the war was over the first signs of revolution appeared at home. The General Staff, always thinking in terms of a European war, held the first-class troops on the German front, and sent reservists and Siberian troops to Manchuria. The former, ignorant of the issues at stake, generally peasants and artisans drawn from their homes and fields, were eager to have the whole wretched business brought to a close. Although many Russians fought with splendid bravery, the morale of the forces as a whole was low. Toward the end of the war two first-class army corps were sent to Manchuria. The ignorance of the General Staff was also appalling. Military and naval officers had only contempt for the Japanese forces. The military *attaché* at Tokyo reported that a strong cavalry regiment equipped with artillery could defeat any Japanese force. The constant preparations which the Japanese had been making since 1898, when the Russian menace was most clearly brought home to them, seem to have escaped

his attention. Even the plans for fortifying Port Arthur were not completed when the war broke. In addition, the official classes, civil and military, were shot through with ignorance, inefficiency, and corruption. Supplies for the army were often of bad quality and pilfering on a large scale was rife. But the fundamental weakness of the Russian army lay in the ignorance of the soldiers. Probably eighty to ninety per cent of the rank and file were illiterate. They could obey orders, but when their officers were killed or missing they rarely could take the initiative themselves.¹

In Japan, on the other hand, this was a "people's war." Japan had feared the advance of Russia ever since the dawn of the Meiji era. She could not see the Russians continue their march into the Korean peninsula and Manchuria. Kept informed by the widely circulated press of the threatening moves of the Russians, the people demanded war, if it could not be avoided, rather than the sacrifice of what they considered to be the legitimate interests of the empire. No ministry could have yielded to Russia in the face of such popular support. Both the military and naval services had been preparing for years in view of a possible decision by arms. The intelligence service not only kept informed of Russia's naval and military movements, but Japanese disguised as Chinese were well aware of conditions throughout all Manchuria. The war, moreover, was to be fought in a terrain where many of the higher officers had already campaigned against China. The Japanese transportation and commissary services were efficient, even when they were called upon to move troops and supplies over sea and rebuild the Russian railway to carry their narrow-gauge rolling stock. The medical services gave the world a demonstration of preventive efficiency, by safeguarding the troops to an unusual degree from disease. And the humane treatment of the Russian prisoners won the approval of all who observed the careful arrangements which were made. But above all, the Japanese army was a literate army. By this time eighty to ninety per cent of the enlisted

¹ Many of these criticisms were not valid in 1914 when Russia entered a war against her ancient rival, Germany.

men were able to read and write. The best troops she possessed, the active army, were rushed to the fray, and reservists soon followed. Japanese conscription produced an army which was a cross section of the people, so when the officers fell there were non-commissioned officers and even privates who were able to step into the vacant places. The schoolmasters of Japan, toiling unnoticed ever since 1871, shared with the military leaders the glory of the final victory.

The Trans-Siberian Railway.—The effectiveness of the Russian operations would depend largely upon the Trans-Siberian Railway. Commenced in 1891, it had been completed as a single-track line, with a branch from Harbin to Port Arthur, in 1902. When the war began it was scarcely fit for heavy transportation, for trains could only pass on sidings. The line around Lake Baikal was not completed until the summer of 1905, and until that time trains were ferried across the lake or, in winter, sent forward on tracks laid on the ice. In charge of railway operations was Prince Khilkof, who had studied railway methods in the United States. He was able to dispatch nine trains a day from Moscow, and at the close of the war the Russian army was stronger in personnel and equipment than at the beginning. One reason for Japan's breaking off relations was the fact that further delay would give the Russians time to improve their railway communications.

The Sphere of Hostilities.—The war between Japan and Russia was not to be fought on the territory of either country. Except for a Japanese force which landed in Sakhalin in 1905, neither country was invaded. Chinese territory was to be the battleground. The Chinese inhabitants were to suffer grievously because China, in 1896, thanks to Li Hung-chang, had opened up Manchuria to Russian penetration, and had not been strong enough, after 1900, to compel her to withdraw her troops. Germany proposed, and the United States took the initiative, that the belligerents limit the area of fighting as much as possible, and respect the neutrality and administrative integrity of China. Russia insisted that all Manchuria be a war zone, while Japan was willing to respect the neutral-

ity and administrative entity of China outside the regions occupied by Russia. The precedents established in 1904-05, which met with no condemnation at the time, were followed carefully by Japan in 1914 when she again took steps to expel another power from a fortified base in China.

The Japanese Plan of Operations.—As Russian forces were already stationed in Manchuria and massed on the frontier of Korea, it was incumbent upon Japan to take the offensive. The Russians need only await the attack. The Japanese plan called for four major operations: (1) Drive the Russians out of Korea; (2) Capture Port Arthur, the Russian naval base; (3) Destroy the Russian fleet (until this was done sea transport was unsafe); (4) Defeat the Russian Grand Army in Manchuria. Steps were promptly taken to accomplish the first three of these designs, the fourth had to await their execution.

Military Operations.—It is not our purpose to describe in any detail the military and naval operations of the war. On February 8-9 a Japanese division was landed at Chemulpo, and Seoul was at once occupied. While this has often been cited as an instance of Japan's ability to strike quickly in a foreign war, it should be observed that there were no Russian troops to oppose their landing. Three months were to elapse before the first Japanese landed at Liaotung. A second army was dispatched to Genzan, on the northeast coast of Korea, and these forces coöperated against the Russians in northern Korea. By the 1st of May the first army (Kuroki) had crossed the Yalu. On the 6th the second army (Oku) began to disembark on the Liaotung peninsula, at the border of the Russian leased territory. This called for a sea voyage of 600 miles from Shimonoseki to Liaotung. A fourth army (Nodzu) then landed further to the east, at the border of the neutral zone. It was the duty of the second army to cut the line between Port Arthur and Manchuria and drive the Russians back to their fortress. This was done at the battle of Nanshan, the first great engagement of the war, on the 26th. Four days later the third army (Nogi) landed and took the place of the second army, which turned north to coöperate with the first

and fourth against the Russians in Manchuria. On the one hand the Russians were forced steadily back, through the mountainous country on the Yalu frontier, and also from the outer defenses of Port Arthur. The siege of the latter fortress began on July 31st. Not until August 19 did Nogi attempt to take the forts by assault, and then the first of six great battles occurred, each one taking a terrible toll of Japanese lives as their soldiers advanced against the strong Russian defenses. By the end of August the combined Japanese armies faced the Russian Grand Army under Kuropatkin to the south of Mukden. The Russians by now had received strong reinforcements and held intrenched positions defended by more men than the Japanese could muster. In comparison with the forces engaged in the World War the numbers were small. Kuropatkin could dispose of 158,000 men and Oyama of 125,000. The battle of Liaoyang, which followed, raged from August 23rd to September 3rd and resulted in a Japanese victory, but Kuropatkin was able to withdraw his forces without complete disaster. In October he made his only attack, at the Sho-ho, where on October 9-17 the Japanese held firm. Both armies then went into winter quarters. Just at this time the Russian Baltic fleet set out for the Far East, and when some of its ships fired in panic into an English fishing fleet in the North Sea off the Dogger Bank, there was, for a moment, the prospect that Britain would join her ally. In spite of the bitter cold of the Manchurian winter the attack on Port Arthur continued. The Japanese must take this fortress in order to destroy the fleet which was sheltered there and deprive the Baltic fleet of a base. The Russians, for the same reasons, must hold it valiantly, and in addition its surrender would release Nogi's army for use in Manchuria. The general assaults delivered in October and November brought the Japanese slowly nearer their goal. On December 5th they took the 203 Metre hill and from this high point they could train their guns on the battleships in the harbor. Six warships were promptly destroyed. The Russian cause seemed hopeless, and on January 2nd General Stoessel surrendered at Port Arthur to Nogi. The Japanese had accomplished the second

of their objectives. In February operations were resumed in Manchuria, and between the 23rd and the 10th of March the greatest battle of the war was fought near Mukden. By this time the Japanese had organized a fifth army of reservists, and Nogi's army was also at hand. For the first time the Japanese outnumbered the Russians, with 400,000 men against 325,000. A desperate battle was waged, for Oyama hoped that with his superior numbers he could outflank the Russians and gain a complete victory. But Kuropatkin realized the meaning of the attack on his right and began a retirement which was successfully carried out until his lines reformed at Tiehling, seventy miles north of Mukden. General Kuropatkin now asked to be relieved of his command, and General Linievitch succeeded; but Kuropatkin showed his fine qualities by accepting command of the first army under his former subordinate. The Baltic fleet, which had proceeded in part through Suez and partly around Africa, and which had received help from both the Germans and the French, now approached the shores of Japan. The Russian ships were in bad condition and ill prepared to meet strong opposition. The Japanese, equipped with wireless, soon located them and prepared for the final struggle. It took place near the island of Tsushima, on May 27-28, and resulted in a complete victory. Only one of the Russian ships reached Vladivostok; the others were sunk, captured, or interned in neutral ports. Admiral Togo lost three torpedo-boats only. The destruction of the Baltic fleet, as well as of the ships at Port Arthur, gave Japan control of the sea. The prosecution of the war would have entailed only greater loss of life and accomplished no good purpose. In Russia the revolutionary movements threatened the dynasty, while Japan had strained her resources to the breaking-point. In April and May both sides had been feeling out the other as to possible peace terms, and on May 31st, Komura, minister of foreign affairs, suggested to President Roosevelt that he invite the two belligerents to consider terms of peace. The president approached the tsar, and with his approval sent out formal invitations on June 8th, which were promptly accepted. Russia suggested Paris as the meeting-

place, Japan named Chefoo, Roosevelt proposed The Hague, but when Russia now suggested Washington, Japan agreed. The meeting-place was finally fixed at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, because of the summer heat at Washington.

Russo-Japanese Negotiations.—The tsar at first named Nelidov, ambassador at Paris, as his representative, and when he pleaded ill health, Muraviev, at Rome, was named, who also declined on the same plea. The appointment of Witte indicated that a real effort at an understanding would be attempted. Baron Rosen, at Washington, had already been named as second plenipotentiary. Japan appointed Komura, with Baron Takahira, also at Washington, although Witte would much have preferred Ito, the old champion of a good understanding with Russia. The peace envoys, who were received by Roosevelt at his summer home, proceeded to Portsmouth and began their conferences on August 9th. Japan, as the victor, presented her demands at the second session. They included the recognition by Russia of Japan's paramount political, military, and economical interests in Korea; the evacuation of Manchuria by both parties; the transfer to Japan of the Russian lease of Liaotung and the railway south of Harbin; the cession of the island of Sakhalin; an indemnity to cover the actual cost of the war; the limitation of Russian naval strength in the Far East; the surrender of all Russian vessels interned in neutral ports because of battle injuries; and fishing rights for Japanese subjects along the coasts of Russia's possessions in the East. Witte had been instructed not to cede an inch or pay a kopek in indemnities. In addition he protested against the limitation upon Russian naval strength, the surrender of interned warships, and the fishery rights. On one occasion he remarked, "There are no victors, hence no defeated." Japan then proposed that 1,200,000,000 yen, which would cover the cost of the war, be paid for the surrender of northern Sakhalin, which the Japanese had occupied in 1905. When the discussions had reached an impasse, President Roosevelt intervened and warned Japan not to prolong the war for a monetary consideration alone. He also urged the tsar to moderate his demands, and requested the

kaiser to use his influence with his imperial cousin. Witte was finally instructed to break off negotiations on the 28th if Japan would not eliminate the objectionable terms and when the conference took place, the next day, Komura agreed to give up the indemnity and accept the cession of southern Sakhalin and payment for the net cost of maintaining the Russian prisoners in Japan.²

The Treaty of Portsmouth.—The treaty which brought this costly war to an end was remarkable because, as it was based on negotiation and formulated a compromise, it left much fewer occasions for discord than those treaties which in the past, and in the future, were imposed by a victor upon a vanquished power. Rarely has a great war resulted in such prompt resumption of friendly relations. Japan secured her most vital terms, the recognition of her political, military, and economical interests in Korea and the evacuation of Manchuria. She won the lease of Port Arthur and the Russian railway south of Changchun, with China's consent to be first obtained. The cession of southern Sakhalin, the fishing rights, and the payment of the expenses of the Russian prisoners made up the other important terms. In respect to Manchuria, both parties agreed to evacuate the territory, and Russia declared that she possessed no territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions there in impairment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of the open-door. Both powers engaged not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries which China might take for the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria, and they engaged to exploit their respective railways there exclusively for commercial and industrial purposes and in no wise for strategic ends. By a supplementary agreement the evacuation of Manchuria was to be completed within eighteen months after the treaty of peace went into operation, but both reserved the right to maintain railway guards to a maximum of not more than fifteen for each kilometer. In this way the Russian use of railway guards which, so far as can be ascertained, was based on no agreement with China,

2 This amount was later fixed at about \$20,000,000.

was incorporated in a treaty between Russia and Japan. A later evacuation agreement arranged that the Russian railway would be turned over to Japan by August 1, 1906, and all the troops withdrawn from Manchuria by April 15, 1907.

Some Results of the Russo-Japanese War.—The victory of Japan stimulated a new spirit throughout Asia. For the first time in 450 years an Asiatic power had defeated and turned back the advance of a great European nation. The example of Japan encouraged the national forces in the subject Asiatic states, such as India, and to a less degree the East Indies and even the Philippines, and it gave hope to the liberal and progressive elements in the independent states. The great reforms in China followed close on the victory of Japan, and the Turkish and Persian constitutions show its influence. Until the eve of the war Japan had followed a policy of non-aggression and straightforward diplomacy in the Far East. She had kept her treaty pledges with unquestioned fidelity, and her advisers in diplomatic matters had been, for more than a quarter of a century, Americans. Mr. Denison was associated with Komura at Portsmouth just as he had been with Ito and Mutsu at Shimonoseki. But after the war she apparently came to the conclusion that she must play the game in Far Eastern politics as her European rivals were playing it. In the next ten years she followed Western precedents which brought down upon her the distrust and ill will not only of China and the European powers, but of many of the other Asiatic peoples. Japan, who in 1905 seemed to be the champion of Asia against European aggression, was feared as an exponent of as selfish a policy as ever Europe had attempted. To be sure, Japan could always defend her conduct by pointing out the vital interests which she had in Korea and China, so near at hand, whereas Europe had only indirect interests in those regions—the safety of no European state would be endangered if Korea passed under foreign control or China was divided among the powers or the open-door closed there. The fact remains that after 1905 Japan shared with Russia the unenviable reputation of being a disturber of the peace of the

Far East. And, finally, the Portsmouth negotiations marked the beginning of a new attitude toward Japan in the United States. In part this was due to the deliberate policy of Witte to win the good will of the American people and their very influential press. His *Memoirs* describe how he set about doing this and how well he succeeded. But the success of Japan against Russia stimulated a host of publicists to predict the course of Japanese aggressions. Articles appeared in the United States, Great Britain, France, the British dominions around the Pacific, and in China, which declared that the defeat of Russia was but the first step in the expulsion of all European and American interests from the Far East. Japan, it was alleged, would attack the French in Indo-China, the Americans in the Philippines, the Australians and New Zealanders and even the Canadians, the Dutch would be forced out of their East Indian possessions, and, finally, having organized the man power of China and developed her great natural resources, she would impose her will upon Europe itself. Of course these were silly stories. Emerging from a terrible war in which she had lost heavily through wounds and disease, burdened with a staggering debt for which her only assets lay in the Russian railway, Japan sought peace, and many years of peace, for recuperation. The war scares, of course, were never combined in a single article, that would have clearly demonstrated their fantastic nature; but by pointing out each threatened region as the first object of Japan's attack the people all around the Pacific were soon on edge and ready to believe almost anything which was said about the Japanese. Just at this time, in 1906, the first evidence of an anti-Japanese agitation appeared in California, and the "schoolboy" controversy of that year³ inserted the first harsh note in relations which had been unusually friendly and mutually sympathetic. In the dispute with Russia, which preceded the war, Japan could count upon the good will of the United States and Great Britain at least. After the war the United States became increasingly suspicious until such a dangerous state of mind was created in both countries that

³ See p. 513.

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only the frank discussions at the Washington conference in
1921-22 could dissipate the unfriendly clouds.

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CHAPTER XXXIV

JAPAN AND KOREA

After the Russo-Japanese War.—There were four major topics of interest in the years immediately following the war between Russia and Japan: (1) The development of Japan's control in Korea; (2) the international rivalries which arose in Manchuria; (3) the new reform movement in China; and (4) the post-bellum economic and political readjustments in Japan. Each of these topics will now be considered in order, but care must be taken to correlate events which were in progress contemporaneously.

Japanese Interests in Korea.—Although Russia's conduct in both Korea and Manchuria brought on the war with Japan, the latter country was far more concerned with Korea than with the Manchurian aspects of Russia's advance. If Russia would promise to respect the integrity of China and recognize Japan's special interests in Korea, Japan was quite ready to give her a free hand in the development of her railway and economic interests in Manchuria. Korea had been of vital importance to Japan since the first days of Meiji. Her interests there were based upon the following considerations: (1) The proximity of Korea, less than 50 miles from the nearest Japanese territory and only 120 miles from Shimonoseki. (2) The continued maladministration of Korea, which was, in 1905, without doubt the worst governed state in Asia. (3) The necessity of preventing any strong power from controlling or taking possession of Korea. This necessity will be appreciated by Englishmen who found in Belgium a *casus belli* in the World War, and by Americans whose Senate, in 1912, passed the following resolution:

When any harbor or other place in the American continents is so situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications or the safety of the United States, the government of the United States could not see, without grave concern, the possession of such harbor or other place by any

corporation or association which has such relations to another government not American as to give that government practical power of control for naval or military purposes.¹

(4) The necessity of having access to Korea for supplies of food and raw materials and as a market for Japanese manufactures. Japan, until 1905, had repeatedly asserted her policy as seeking the independence and reform of Korea. Because China refused to recognize this independence and persistently blocked the efforts of Japan for reform, a war between Japan and China resulted. This war won from China a recognition of Korean independence, but scarcely had Japan begun her efforts for reform than her influence was destroyed, after the murder of the Korean queen, and the influence of Russia became supreme. A second war resulted, this time to drive out a far more dangerous rival than China had been. And having entered upon two wars because of the inability of Korea to defend herself, Japan very properly insisted that this should not happen again. She intended to take such measures that her influence in Korea should be supreme, but she still proclaimed her policies of independence, reform, and the open-door.²

Development of Japanese Control.—A Japanese expeditionary force landed at Chemulpo on the night of February 8-9, 1904, and proceeded at once to Seoul. On the 24th a protocol was signed between the two countries which established a modified protectorate of Japan in Korea.⁽¹⁾ Korea was to place full confidence in the government of Japan and adopt the advice of the latter in regard to the improvement of the administration.⁽²⁾ Japan, on the other hand, would assure the safety and repose of the imperial house of Korea.⁽³⁾ She also definitely guaranteed the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean empire, and in case it was endangered by a third power or by internal disturbances she would take such necessary measures as the circumstances required, in which

¹ While this resolution, introduced by Senator Lodge, was passed 51 to 4, it was not accepted by President Taft.

² The relations between France and Annam and between Japan and Korea testify to the moderation of the latter power.

Korea would give her full facilities. For this purpose Japan might occupy necessary strategical places. And the two governments promised not to conclude with a third power any arrangement contrary to the principles of the present protocol without mutual consent. This protocol was followed by an agreement signed on August 19th and 22nd, in which Korea agreed to engage a Japanese subject as financial adviser and a foreigner as diplomatic adviser, both to be recommended by the Japanese government. Korea would consult Japan before concluding treaties and conventions with foreign powers, and also in dealing with other important diplomatic affairs, such as grants of concessions to or contracts with foreigners. Under this agreement Mr. Megata, a Japanese graduate of Harvard University, and Mr. Durham White Stevens, an American, were appointed by the Korean government. The third step came in November, 1905. The way was prepared by the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, August 12th, and the Treaty of Portsmouth, September 5th. In the former the recognition of the independence of Korea was eliminated and the paramount political, military, and economic interests of Japan in Korea recognized, together with the right to take such measures of guidance, control, and protection as Japan might deem necessary to safeguard and advance these interests so long as the open-door was not interfered with. Similar provisions were found in the Treaty of Portsmouth; although no definite reference was made to the open-door in Korea, Russian subjects were to be placed on the same footing as those of the most-favored nation. The new convention was negotiated by Marquis Ito and, after no little difficulty, was signed on November 17th. It granted Japan control of the foreign relations of Korea and provided for the appointment of a Japanese resident general. Japan again undertook to maintain the welfare and dignity of the imperial house of Korea, and the agreement was to serve "until the moment arrives when it is recognized that Korea has attained national strength." In the explanation issued by the Japanese government on the 22nd the following reasons for the establishment of a complete protectorate were advanced:

The relations of propinquity have made it necessary for Japan to take and exercise, for reasons closely connected with her own safety and repose, a paramount interest and influence in the political and military affairs of Korea. The measures hitherto taken have been purely advisory, but the experience of recent years has demonstrated the insufficiency of measures of guidance alone.

The United States, as well as Great Britain and Russia, had come to a realization of the practical necessity of Japan's course, and orders were at once sent to Seoul to close the American legation there. An attempt to appeal directly to President Roosevelt against this agreement, which it was alleged was obtained under duress, met with no support, for the Korean government had actually signed the treaties which placed the country under Japanese control.

The Constructive Services of Marquis Ito, Resident General.—Japan sent her ablest and most experienced administrator to deal with her most difficult problem. Marquis Ito, a maker of New Japan, framer of the constitution, four times prime minister, and veteran diplomat, was then sixty-four years of age and surely entitled to an easier post than resident general in Korea. But he believed that through advice Korea could be brought in time to a position of strength and independence. He was opposed to annexation, although many high-placed Japanese were confident that such was the only solution of the Korean problem. He arrived in Seoul in February, 1906, and a list of proposed reforms was promptly drawn up. These included reconstruction of roads, waterworks, extension of the educational system, hospitals, police reorganization, purification of the imperial court, reform of local administration, mining administration and reform, protection of emigrants, and encouragement of productive industries. All these measures of reform were carefully investigated and some advance was made, but Ito and his staff of Japanese experts soon ran into difficulties. Reform did not proceed as rapidly as they had hoped. In fact, a dual government existed under the protectorate. The emperor still acted through his Korean ministers and the provincial governors. The Japanese directors associated with the Korean ministers, and the provincial

secretaries and chief police inspectors could give advice, but they could not compel its execution. The Korean officials, very naturally, resented Japanese interference and whenever they dared to do so blocked the reform measures. Within two years the protectorate had proven a failure in practice. At that time the emperor secretly sent three Koreans accompanied by an American to The Hague Peace Conference to appeal to the world against the conduct of Japan in Korea. This ill-advised act, for which the emperor promptly disavowed all responsibility, aroused great resentment in Japan. Annexation seemed about to be declared, but Ito was authorized to discuss the matter with the Korean cabinet, and the latter agreed that only the abdication of the emperor could save Korea from worse punishment. This was arranged on the early morning of July 19th, and the crown prince succeeded to the throne.

Japan Assumes Control of the Internal Administration.—Five days later Japan assumed direction of the internal administration of Korea. The agreement of July 24, 1907, placed the resident general in a position of real authority. Korea promised to follow his guidance in effecting administrative reforms. A distinction would be made between the administration of justice and ordinary administration. His consent was necessary for all laws and important administrative measures. The appointment and dismissal of high officials would be at his pleasure, and no foreigner could be engaged without his consent. The appointment of a financial and diplomatic adviser was canceled.³ For two years an attempt was made to secure reorganization reforms through this agreement. Ito remained in Korea, and much was accomplished, but his powers were, after all, negative rather than positive. He could give advice, and he could veto undesirable legislation, but he could not carry out his measures in the face of sullen opposition. He had consistently opposed annexation, but by July, 1909, he had come to the conclusion that complete control of the administration could alone guarantee consistent progress. He therefore retired from the residency general and Viscount

³ Mr. Stevens was later assassinated by Koreans in San Francisco in 1908.

Sone succeeded. Steps were now being taken to prepare for annexation in the very near future. In October Ito went to Harbin, to meet the Russian minister of finance in an attempt to secure a better understanding between the two rivals in Manchuria. On the railway station there the great Japanese statesman and the real friend of Korea was shot down by a Korean fanatic. In Japan the greatest sorrow and indignation prevailed. Many believed that the annexation of Korea which followed after a few months was due to this crime. As a matter of fact, the step was delayed in order that Japan might not seem to have acted in anger.

The Annexation of Korea.—The final process took the form of a treaty negotiated by Viscount Terauchi, who was both Japanese minister of war and resident general in Korea, and the Korean ministry on August 22, 1910. Under it the emperor of Korea ceded his rights of sovereignty to the emperor of Japan. The latter accepted the cession, and promised to accord appropriate titles to the royal family and peerage and monetary grants to the Koreans deserving of such recognition. Japan promised to afford full protection for the persons and property of Koreans obeying the laws and to promote their welfare, while she would employ in the public service those Koreans who accepted the new régime loyally and were duly qualified for such duties.⁴ In a subsequent declaration to the powers Japan announced that the Korean treaties would no longer exist and that the Japanese treaties would be applied in Korea as far as possible. Extraterritoriality was at an end, but the existing tariff and the coasting trade would continue for ten years. The present ports would remain open, but Shin-wiju would be substituted for Masampo. Japan has been frequently condemned for proceeding to the annexation of Korea after her early pledges to respect the independence of the country. From the Korean point of view the step was a pathetic one, especially when we remember that the abdicated emperor had come to the throne before the Meiji Em-

⁴ The Japanese restored the ancient name of Chosen, and place names were now Anglicized according to the Japanese pronunciation—i.e., Seoul became Keijo, Pyeng-yang became Heijo, Chemulpo became Jinsen, etc.

peror of Japan, and in the lifetime of these two monarchs Korea had fallen into the abyss of political annihilation while Japan had risen to become a great power. But for her conduct Japan could not only plead national self-interest, but also the precedents of other powers. Austria-Hungary, in 1908, had torn up a basic European treaty when she annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina. And President McKinley, in instructing his peace commissioners to demand the cession of the Philippine Islands, had, twelve years earlier, announced that "the march of events rules and overrules human actions." The relinquishment of sovereignty by the emperor of Korea was not much different from the relinquishment of sovereignty over the Filipino people by the king of Spain. In comparison with the conduct of France in Indo-China Japan's course in Korea was marked by long moderation. The opponents of imperialism everywhere will condemn Japan's conduct in Korea, but one who would assess such conduct in comparison with that of other powers must be moderate in his censure.

After the Annexation.—From the point of view of material progress the nine years after annexation were marked by great advances. The foreign trade of Korea, an indication of the progress of the country, increased from 58,698,599 yen in 1910 to 450,658,807 yen in 1921. No region in the whole Far East showed such material progress. Even the Philippines showed in those years a smaller increase, of from \$29,518,072 to \$175,951,159. Roads, railways, industrial undertakings, irrigation works, harbor improvements, hospitals, sanitation, schools—in all these activities the progress was great. These improvements were stimulated by Japan, who advanced many millions of dollars which were charged against the home budget. But in other respects Japan did not consider certain vital interests of the Koreans. It was true that among the Japanese residents were many of an unruly type who took advantage of the inexperience and helplessness of the Koreans. It was also true that the Japanese, with their long years of isolation, were peculiarly unprepared to deal with other peoples. Many of the Japanese reforms, while desirable in themselves, were unpopular with the Koreans, who did not

understand or appreciate their wisdom. After the annexation these measures could be forced through with little consideration for Korean dissatisfaction. In addition the Japanese made little attempt to associate the Koreans with the new régime. Korean officials were, of course, employed in all the lesser posts and in some of the higher provincial and central offices, but representative institutions, which had been in operation in Japan since 1879, were not introduced even in the local divisions. Although the old nobles and higher officials were, in the main, a worthless lot, it would have been possible to have encouraged the younger men who had received the new education or had studied in Japan and abroad. The Koreans would have been unworthy of any sympathy if they had not resented the new régime and hoped for a restoration of their national independence. In these aspirations they received much encouragement from foreign missionaries, not always directly but from the examples which they set before them. These missionaries had lost political prestige with the abolition of extraterritoriality, for they could not exert the same pressure upon Japanese officials as they formerly could upon the Koreans. It was also true that their very position among the Korean people with whom they worked depended upon sympathy with their political aspirations. A missionary who supported the Japanese could count upon little influence with his Korean converts. For these reasons the young Koreans who dreamed of independence made use of Christian organizations, especially the young people's societies, as centers for their political propaganda. The Japanese were well aware of this, and the missionaries had to take steps to free these societies from any political implications. These facts must be borne in mind when Japan was forced to meet an unexpected challenge to her authority in Korea in 1919.

The Independence Movement.—The old emperor, then known as Prince Yi, senior, died on January 21, 1919. Although there was little in his career as a ruler which should have won for him the devotion of his people, yet he was a symbol of the independence which Korea had once enjoyed. On the day of his funeral, March 1st, a well-organized move-

ment demanding independence was launched. The talk of "self-determination" which was then in the air encouraged the Korean leaders. In spite of the reputed efficiency of the Japanese secret police, they had worked without observation. The movement at first was a passive one, but when the crowds refused to break up the police used harsh measures, which led to blows in defense. The unrest spread into some of the provinces and troops were sent in to restore order. These in turn acted with much severity when some Japanese had lost their lives. The whole peninsula seethed with unrest. When the police began to arrest the leaders of the independence movement, among the first forty-eight were twenty-one Christians, nineteen followers of a new Korean sect, and only eight who belonged to neither group. These arrests, coupled with the destruction of some Christian churches, caused the critics of Japan, of whom there were many at that time, to assert that she was trying to wipe out the Christian religion in Korea. Nothing could have been further from the truth. It was a fact that among the political leaders were many Christians, including some native pastors, and the arrests and reprisals fell heavily upon the Christian community. But the Japanese government had no intention of going back to the old days of religious intolerance. The Japanese public were at first stunned by this demonstration of widespread discontent with their administration. They had believed that all was well in Korea because of the material progress which had been constantly reported. When, on investigation, it became evident that the recent administration had ignored the justifiable sentiments of the Koreans, drastic changes were at once instituted. In place of the soldier who had been governor general, Admiral Baron Saito was sent to the peninsula, and it was provided that a civilian might be appointed to this post. The unpopular gendarmerie was abolished, and an ordinary police force, under the control of the provincial governors, established. Unpopular regulations, such as those which prohibited burials in private burying-grounds and the slaughtering of animals except in public abattoirs, were rescinded. The principle of representation was introduced in the election of

municipal and village councils, at first in twelve municipalities and twenty-four villages. More attention was to be paid to public education, and the ancient culture of the land would be better respected. In 1911 the enrollment in modern public and private schools was 110,789, and in 1923 it reached 493,594. The wise administration of Baron Saito and his fellow officials removed many of the irritating features of the previous administration. The unrest of 1919 was soon quieted, although Korean leaders abroad, chiefly in China and Siberia, continued to work for independence. The real problem for Japan is to so govern Korea that a strong and contented people will dwell there. Whether as an autonomous part of the empire or as an independent state, Korea must be a friend of Japan if the best interests of the two countries are to be served. On the other hand, the problem before the Korean spokesmen is to prepare themselves for real leadership. The educational opportunities which Japan and the missionaries have provided, ranging from the kindergarten to the university, offer the opportunity. No country could afford to educate a people whom it plans to keep in submission. Just as the United States has refused to withdraw from the Philippines before the Filipinos are prepared to govern themselves and maintain their independence, so Japan will insist upon retaining control of Korea, for the Russian danger is far greater in 1927 than it was in 1910. Liberal Japanese opinion envisages a Korea enjoying all the political rights of the Japanese subjects, but remaining within the empire. A wise and sympathetic administration can make this a reality. An embittered Korea would prove to be a real menace to the peace of Japan and the Far East.

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CHAPTER XXXV

INTERNATIONAL RIVALRIES IN MANCHURIA

Japan's Policy in Manchuria.—By the Treaty of Portsmouth Japan secured the Russian rights and interests in South Manchuria, subject, of course, to China's approval of the transfer of the Liaotung lease and the railway concession. Japan had consistently advocated the integrity of China and the open-door. She had bitterly criticized Russia's conduct in Manchuria. It was hardly to be expected that she would take advantage of the acquired Russian rights to act much as Russia had done. There is one convincing proof that Japan had not planned, before the war, to assume a position of special influence in Manchuria; that is to say, she did not fight to expel Russia for her own advantage. In October, 1905, Prince Katsura, the prime minister, signed a memorandum preliminary to the sale of the Japanese portion of the Manchurian railway to a syndicate to be organized by Mr. E. H. Harriman, the great American railway operator. Mr. Harriman planned to secure the Japanese and Russian railways in Manchuria, as well as trackage rights over the Trans-Siberian line, and thus link up a round-the-world railway and steamship service. The syndicate was to share equally with the Japanese government in the ownership of the railway and its appurtenances and in the operation of mines. The willingness of the Japanese government to share these economic advantages with an American-financed syndicate indicates that it had not made plans to use the railway to advance Japanese interests exclusively in Manchuria. But when Baron Komura returned from Portsmouth he opposed the plan. He pointed out that China would have to agree to the transfer to Japan before any arrangement could be entered into, and he showed most convincingly that the railway was the only financial asset which Japan secured from Russia which would help to pay off the staggering costs of the war. In Japan the Portsmouth Treaty had been received with great popular dissatis-

faction. The people and the journalists had not realized how near to exhaustion the empire had been, and they condemned Komura and President Roosevelt for the failure to secure an indemnity. The government, on second thought, accepted Komura's proposal, and decided to retain the railway and use it as an agency for developing Japan's economic interests in Manchuria. This decision laid the foundation of her policy in that region. She would protect the integrity of China but she would foster her own commercial and economic interests. While Japan was to have a free hand in Korea, she found in Manchuria well-established foreign rivals who scrutinized her conduct with growing suspicion.

Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peking.—Baron Komura, again accompanied by Mr. Denison, proceeded to Peking to arrange for China's approval of the transfer to Japan of Russia's interests in South Manchuria. In the negotiations with Yuan Shih-kai two very different points of view were presented. The Japanese believed that China should be grateful to them for evicting Russia from Manchuria, at considerable loss of life and money. They believed, at the very least, that China should grant to Japan the same privileges which she had previously given to Russia. These economic concessions, if honestly carried out, involved no violation of the open-door or of the integrity of China. But the Chinese looked at the matter in quite a different light. They were very grateful to Japan for all that she had done, but they suggested that she also withdraw from Manchuria. From that time to this the two countries have never been able to match minds respecting Manchuria. The Japanese have felt that they had earned a special position there because of their expenditure of blood and money. The Chinese have never been able to agree to this. Concerning the actual negotiations which took place at Peking we know very little. The treaty which was signed on December 22, 1905, contained only three articles, but an additional agreement signed at the same time contained twelve, and secret protocols, of which an authorized version has never been printed, contained sixteen. The treaty proper was a very simple one, and it merely provided that China assented to the

was incorporated in a treaty between Russia and Japan. A later evacuation agreement arranged that the Russian railway would be turned over to Japan by August 1, 1906, and all the troops withdrawn from Manchuria by April 15, 1907.

Some Results of the Russo-Japanese War.—The victory of Japan stimulated a new spirit throughout Asia. For the first time in 450 years an Asiatic power had defeated and turned back the advance of a great European nation. The example of Japan encouraged the national forces in the subject Asiatic states, such as India, and to a less degree the East Indies and even the Philippines, and it gave hope to the liberal and progressive elements in the independent states. The great reforms in China followed close on the victory of Japan, and the Turkish and Persian constitutions show its influence. Until the eve of the war Japan had followed a policy of non-aggression and straightforward diplomacy in the Far East. She had kept her treaty pledges with unquestioned fidelity, and her advisers in diplomatic matters had been, for more than a quarter of a century, Americans. Mr. Denison was associated with Komura at Portsmouth just as he had been with Ito and Mutsu at Shimonoseki. But after the war she apparently came to the conclusion that she must play the game in Far Eastern politics as her European rivals were playing it. In the next ten years she followed Western precedents which brought down upon her the distrust and ill will not only of China and the European powers, but of many of the other Asiatic peoples. Japan, who in 1905 seemed to be the champion of Asia against European aggression, was feared as an exponent of as selfish a policy as ever Europe had attempted. To be sure, Japan could always defend her conduct by pointing out the vital interests which she had in Korea and China, so near at hand, whereas Europe had only indirect interests in those regions—the safety of no European state would be endangered if Korea passed under foreign control or China was divided among the powers or the open-door closed there. The fact remains that after 1905 Japan shared with Russia the unenviable reputation of being a disturber of the peace of the

Far East. And, finally, the Portsmouth negotiations marked the beginning of a new attitude toward Japan in the United States. In part this was due to the deliberate policy of Witte to win the good will of the American people and their very influential press. His *Memoirs* describe how he set about doing this and how well he succeeded. But the success of Japan against Russia stimulated a host of publicists to predict the course of Japanese aggressions. Articles appeared in the United States, Great Britain, France, the British dominions around the Pacific, and in China, which declared that the defeat of Russia was but the first step in the expulsion of all European and American interests from the Far East. Japan, it was alleged, would attack the French in Indo-China, the Americans in the Philippines, the Australians and New Zealanders and even the Canadians, the Dutch would be forced out of their East Indian possessions, and, finally, having organized the man power of China and developed her great natural resources, she would impose her will upon Europe itself. Of course these were silly stories. Emerging from a terrible war in which she had lost heavily through wounds and disease, burdened with a staggering debt for which her only assets lay in the Russian railway, Japan sought peace, and many years of peace, for recuperation. The war scares, of course, were never combined in a single article, that would have clearly demonstrated their fantastic nature; but by pointing out each threatened region as the first object of Japan's attack the people all around the Pacific were soon on edge and ready to believe almost anything which was said about the Japanese. Just at this time, in 1906, the first evidence of an anti-Japanese agitation appeared in California, and the "schoolboy" controversy of that year³ inserted the first harsh note in relations which had been unusually friendly and mutually sympathetic. In the dispute with Russia, which preceded the war, Japan could count upon the good will of the United States and Great Britain at least. After the war the United States became increasingly suspicious until such a dangerous state of mind was created in both countries that

³ See p. 513.

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only the frank discussions at the Washington conference in
1921-22 could dissipate the unfriendly clouds.

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CHAPTER XXXIV

JAPAN AND KOREA

After the Russo-Japanese War.—There were four major topics of interest in the years immediately following the war between Russia and Japan: (1) The development of Japan's control in Korea; (2) the international rivalries which arose in Manchuria; (3) the new reform movement in China; and (4) the post-bellum economic and political readjustments in Japan. Each of these topics will now be considered in order, but care must be taken to correlate events which were in progress contemporaneously.

Japanese Interests in Korea.—Although Russia's conduct in both Korea and Manchuria brought on the war with Japan, the latter country was far more concerned with Korea than with the Manchurian aspects of Russia's advance. If Russia would promise to respect the integrity of China and recognize Japan's special interests in Korea, Japan was quite ready to give her a free hand in the development of her railway and economic interests in Manchuria. Korea had been of vital importance to Japan since the first days of Meiji. Her interests there were based upon the following considerations: (1) The proximity of Korea, less than 50 miles from the nearest Japanese territory and only 120 miles from Shimonoseki. (2) The continued maladministration of Korea, which was, in 1905, without doubt the worst governed state in Asia. (3) The necessity of preventing any strong power from controlling or taking possession of Korea. This necessity will be appreciated by Englishmen who found in Belgium a *casus belli* in the World War, and by Americans whose Senate, in 1912, passed the following resolution:

When any harbor or other place in the American continents is so situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications or the safety of the United States, the government of the United States could not see, without grave concern, the possession of such harbor or other place by any

corporation or association which has such relations to another government not American as to give that government practical power of control for naval or military purposes.¹

(4) The necessity of having access to Korea for supplies of food and raw materials and as a market for Japanese manufactures. Japan, until 1905, had repeatedly asserted her policy as seeking the independence and reform of Korea. Because China refused to recognize this independence and persistently blocked the efforts of Japan for reform, a war between Japan and China resulted. This war won from China a recognition of Korean independence, but scarcely had Japan begun her efforts for reform than her influence was destroyed, after the murder of the Korean queen, and the influence of Russia became supreme. A second war resulted, this time to drive out a far more dangerous rival than China had been. And having entered upon two wars because of the inability of Korea to defend herself, Japan very properly insisted that this should not happen again. She intended to take such measures that her influence in Korea should be supreme, but she still proclaimed her policies of independence, reform, and the open-door.²

Development of Japanese Control.—A Japanese expeditionary force landed at Chemulpo on the night of February 8-9, 1904, and proceeded at once to Seoul. On the 24th a protocol was signed between the two countries which established a modified protectorate of Japan in Korea. Korea was to place full confidence in the government of Japan and adopt the advice of the latter in regard to the improvement of the administration. Japan, on the other hand, would assure the safety and repose of the imperial house of Korea. She also definitely guaranteed the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean empire, and in case it was endangered by a third power or by internal disturbances she would take such necessary measures as the circumstances required, in which

¹ While this resolution, introduced by Senator Lodge, was passed 51 to 4, it was not accepted by President Taft.

² The relations between France and Annam and between Japan and Korea testify to the moderation of the latter power.

Korea would give her full facilities. For this purpose Japan might occupy necessary strategical places. And the two governments promised not to conclude with a third power any arrangement contrary to the principles of the present protocol without mutual consent. This protocol was followed by an agreement signed on August 19th and 22nd, in which Korea agreed to engage a Japanese subject as financial adviser and a foreigner as diplomatic adviser, both to be recommended by the Japanese government. Korea would consult Japan before concluding treaties and conventions with foreign powers, and also in dealing with other important diplomatic affairs, such as grants of concessions to or contracts with foreigners. Under this agreement Mr. Megata, a Japanese graduate of Harvard University, and Mr. Durham White Stevens, an American, were appointed by the Korean government. The third step came in November, 1905. The way was prepared by the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, August 12th, and the Treaty of Portsmouth, September 5th. In the former the recognition of the independence of Korea was eliminated and the paramount political, military, and economic interests of Japan in Korea recognized, together with the right to take such measures of guidance, control, and protection as Japan might deem necessary to safeguard and advance these interests so long as the open-door was not interfered with. Similar provisions were found in the Treaty of Portsmouth; although no definite reference was made to the open-door in Korea, Russian subjects were to be placed on the same footing as those of the most-favored nation. The new convention was negotiated by Marquis Ito and, after no little difficulty, was signed on November 17th. It granted Japan control of the foreign relations of Korea and provided for the appointment of a Japanese resident general. Japan again undertook to maintain the welfare and dignity of the imperial house of Korea, and the agreement was to serve "until the moment arrives when it is recognized that Korea has attained national strength." In the explanation issued by the Japanese government on the 22nd the following reasons for the establishment of a complete protectorate were advanced:

The relations of propinquity have made it necessary for Japan to take and exercise, for reasons closely connected with her own safety and repose, a paramount interest and influence in the political and military affairs of Korea. The measures hitherto taken have been purely advisory, but the experience of recent years has demonstrated the insufficiency of measures of guidance alone.

The United States, as well as Great Britain and Russia, had come to a realization of the practical necessity of Japan's course, and orders were at once sent to Seoul to close the American legation there. An attempt to appeal directly to President Roosevelt against this agreement, which it was alleged was obtained under duress, met with no support, for the Korean government had actually signed the treaties which placed the country under Japanese control.

The Constructive Services of Marquis Ito, Resident General.—Japan sent her ablest and most experienced administrator to deal with her most difficult problem. Marquis Ito, a maker of New Japan, framer of the constitution, four times prime minister, and veteran diplomat, was then sixty-four years of age and surely entitled to an easier post than resident general in Korea. But he believed that through advice Korea could be brought in time to a position of strength and independence. He was opposed to annexation, although many high-placed Japanese were confident that such was the only solution of the Korean problem. He arrived in Seoul in February, 1906, and a list of proposed reforms was promptly drawn up. These included reconstruction of roads, waterworks, extension of the educational system, hospitals, police reorganization, purification of the imperial court, reform of local administration, mining administration and reform, protection of emigrants, and encouragement of productive industries. All these measures of reform were carefully investigated and some advance was made, but Ito and his staff of Japanese experts soon ran into difficulties. Reform did not proceed as rapidly as they had hoped. In fact, a dual government existed under the protectorate. The emperor still acted through his Korean ministers and the provincial governors. The Japanese directors associated with the Korean ministers, and the provincial

secretaries and chief police inspectors could give advice, but they could not compel its execution. The Korean officials, very naturally, resented Japanese interference and whenever they dared to do so blocked the reform measures. Within two years the protectorate had proven a failure in practice. At that time the emperor secretly sent three Koreans accompanied by an American to The Hague Peace Conference to appeal to the world against the conduct of Japan in Korea. This ill-advised act, for which the emperor promptly disavowed all responsibility, aroused great resentment in Japan. Annexation seemed about to be declared, but Ito was authorized to discuss the matter with the Korean cabinet, and the latter agreed that only the abdication of the emperor could save Korea from worse punishment. This was arranged on the early morning of July 19th, and the crown prince succeeded to the throne.

Japan Assumes Control of the Internal Administration.—Five days later Japan assumed direction of the internal administration of Korea. The agreement of July 24, 1907, placed the resident general in a position of real authority. Korea promised to follow his guidance in effecting administrative reforms. A distinction would be made between the administration of justice and ordinary administration. His consent was necessary for all laws and important administrative measures. The appointment and dismissal of high officials would be at his pleasure, and no foreigner could be engaged without his consent. The appointment of a financial and diplomatic adviser was canceled.³ For two years an attempt was made to secure reorganization reforms through this agreement. Ito remained in Korea, and much was accomplished, but his powers were, after all, negative rather than positive. He could give advice, and he could veto undesirable legislation, but he could not carry out his measures in the face of sullen opposition. He had consistently opposed annexation, but by July, 1909, he had come to the conclusion that complete control of the administration could alone guarantee consistent progress. He therefore retired from the residency general and Viscount

³ Mr. Stevens was later assassinated by Koreans in San Francisco in 1908.

Sone succeeded. Steps were now being taken to prepare for annexation in the very near future. In October Ito went to Harbin, to meet the Russian minister of finance in an attempt to secure a better understanding between the two rivals in Manchuria. On the railway station there the great Japanese statesman and the real friend of Korea was shot down by a Korean fanatic. In Japan the greatest sorrow and indignation prevailed. Many believed that the annexation of Korea which followed after a few months was due to this crime. As a matter of fact, the step was delayed in order that Japan might not seem to have acted in anger.

The Annexation of Korea.—The final process took the form of a treaty negotiated by Viscount Terauchi, who was both Japanese minister of war and resident general in Korea, and the Korean ministry on August 22, 1910. Under it the emperor of Korea ceded his rights of sovereignty to the emperor of Japan. The latter accepted the cession, and promised to accord appropriate titles to the royal family and peerage and monetary grants to the Koreans deserving of such recognition. Japan promised to afford full protection for the persons and property of Koreans obeying the laws and to promote their welfare, while she would employ in the public service those Koreans who accepted the new régime loyally and were duly qualified for such duties.⁴ In a subsequent declaration to the powers Japan announced that the Korean treaties would no longer exist and that the Japanese treaties would be applied in Korea as far as possible. Extraterritoriality was at an end, but the existing tariff and the coasting trade would continue for ten years. The present ports would remain open, but Shin-wiju would be substituted for Masampo. Japan has been frequently condemned for proceeding to the annexation of Korea after her early pledges to respect the independence of the country. From the Korean point of view the step was a pathetic one, especially when we remember that the abdicated emperor had come to the throne before the Meiji Em-

⁴ The Japanese restored the ancient name of Chosen, and place names were now Anglicized according to the Japanese pronunciation—i.e., Seoul became Keijo, Pyeng-yang became Heijo, Chemulpo became Jinsen, etc.

peror of Japan, and in the lifetime of these two monarchs Korea had fallen into the abyss of political annihilation while Japan had risen to become a great power. But for her conduct Japan could not only plead national self-interest, but also the precedents of other powers. Austria-Hungary, in 1908, had torn up a basic European treaty when she annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina. And President McKinley, in instructing his peace commissioners to demand the cession of the Philippine Islands, had, twelve years earlier, announced that "the march of events rules and overrules human actions." The relinquishment of sovereignty by the emperor of Korea was not much different from the relinquishment of sovereignty over the Filipino people by the king of Spain. In comparison with the conduct of France in Indo-China Japan's course in Korea was marked by long moderation. The opponents of imperialism everywhere will condemn Japan's conduct in Korea, but one who would assess such conduct in comparison with that of other powers must be moderate in his censure.

After the Annexation.—From the point of view of material progress the nine years after annexation were marked by great advances. The foreign trade of Korea, an indication of the progress of the country, increased from 58,698,599 yen in 1910 to 450,658,807 yen in 1921. No region in the whole Far East showed such material progress. Even the Philippines showed in those years a smaller increase, of from \$29,518,072 to \$175,951,159. Roads, railways, industrial undertakings, irrigation works, harbor improvements, hospitals, sanitation, schools—in all these activities the progress was great. These improvements were stimulated by Japan, who advanced many millions of dollars which were charged against the home budget. But in other respects Japan did not consider certain vital interests of the Koreans. It was true that among the Japanese residents were many of an unruly type who took advantage of the inexperience and helplessness of the Koreans. It was also true that the Japanese, with their long years of isolation, were peculiarly unprepared to deal with other peoples. Many of the Japanese reforms, while desirable in themselves, were unpopular with the Koreans, who did not

understand or appreciate their wisdom. After the annexation these measures could be forced through with little consideration for Korean dissatisfaction. In addition the Japanese made little attempt to associate the Koreans with the new régime. Korean officials were, of course, employed in all the lesser posts and in some of the higher provincial and central offices, but representative institutions, which had been in operation in Japan since 1879, were not introduced even in the local divisions. Although the old nobles and higher officials were, in the main, a worthless lot, it would have been possible to have encouraged the younger men who had received the new education or had studied in Japan and abroad. The Koreans would have been unworthy of any sympathy if they had not resented the new régime and hoped for a restoration of their national independence. In these aspirations they received much encouragement from foreign missionaries, not always directly but from the examples which they set before them. These missionaries had lost political prestige with the abolition of extraterritoriality, for they could not exert the same pressure upon Japanese officials as they formerly could upon the Koreans. It was also true that their very position among the Korean people with whom they worked depended upon sympathy with their political aspirations. A missionary who supported the Japanese could count upon little influence with his Korean converts. For these reasons the young Koreans who dreamed of independence made use of Christian organizations, especially the young people's societies, as centers for their political propaganda. The Japanese were well aware of this, and the missionaries had to take steps to free these societies from any political implications. These facts must be borne in mind when Japan was forced to meet an unexpected challenge to her authority in Korea in 1919.

The Independence Movement.—The old emperor, then known as Prince Yi, senior, died on January 21, 1919. Although there was little in his career as a ruler which should have won for him the devotion of his people, yet he was a symbol of the independence which Korea had once enjoyed. On the day of his funeral, March 1st, a well-organized move-

ment demanding independence was launched. The talk of "self-determination" which was then in the air encouraged the Korean leaders. In spite of the reputed efficiency of the Japanese secret police, they had worked without observation. The movement at first was a passive one, but when the crowds refused to break up the police used harsh measures, which led to blows in defense. The unrest spread into some of the provinces and troops were sent in to restore order. These in turn acted with much severity when some Japanese had lost their lives. The whole peninsula seethed with unrest. When the police began to arrest the leaders of the independence movement, among the first forty-eight were twenty-one Christians, nineteen followers of a new Korean sect, and only eight who belonged to neither group. These arrests, coupled with the destruction of some Christian churches, caused the critics of Japan, of whom there were many at that time, to assert that she was trying to wipe out the Christian religion in Korea. Nothing could have been further from the truth. It was a fact that among the political leaders were many Christians, including some native pastors, and the arrests and reprisals fell heavily upon the Christian community. But the Japanese government had no intention of going back to the old days of religious intolerance. The Japanese public were at first stunned by this demonstration of widespread discontent with their administration. They had believed that all was well in Korea because of the material progress which had been constantly reported. When, on investigation, it became evident that the recent administration had ignored the justifiable sentiments of the Koreans, drastic changes were at once instituted. In place of the soldier who had been governor general, Admiral Baron Saito was sent to the peninsula, and it was provided that a civilian might be appointed to this post. The unpopular gendarmerie was abolished, and an ordinary police force, under the control of the provincial governors, established. Unpopular regulations, such as those which prohibited burials in private burying-grounds and the slaughtering of animals except in public abattoirs, were rescinded. The principle of representation was introduced in the election of

municipal and village councils, at first in twelve municipalities and twenty-four villages. More attention was to be paid to public education, and the ancient culture of the land would be better respected. In 1911 the enrollment in modern public and private schools was 110,789, and in 1923 it reached 493,594. The wise administration of Baron Saito and his fellow officials removed many of the irritating features of the previous administration. The unrest of 1919 was soon quieted, although Korean leaders abroad, chiefly in China and Siberia, continued to work for independence. The real problem for Japan is to so govern Korea that a strong and contented people will dwell there. Whether as an autonomous part of the empire or as an independent state, Korea must be a friend of Japan if the best interests of the two countries are to be served. On the other hand, the problem before the Korean spokesmen is to prepare themselves for real leadership. The educational opportunities which Japan and the missionaries have provided, ranging from the kindergarten to the university, offer the opportunity. No country could afford to educate a people whom it plans to keep in submission. Just as the United States has refused to withdraw from the Philippines before the Filipinos are prepared to govern themselves and maintain their independence, so Japan will insist upon retaining control of Korea, for the Russian danger is far greater in 1927 than it was in 1910. Liberal Japanese opinion envisages a Korea enjoying all the political rights of the Japanese subjects, but remaining within the empire. A wise and sympathetic administration can make this a reality. An embittered Korea would prove to be a real menace to the peace of Japan and the Far East.

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CHAPTER XXXV

INTERNATIONAL RIVALRIES IN MANCHURIA

Japan's Policy in Manchuria.—By the Treaty of Portsmouth Japan secured the Russian rights and interests in South Manchuria, subject, of course, to China's approval of the transfer of the Liaotung lease and the railway concession. Japan had consistently advocated the integrity of China and the open-door. She had bitterly criticized Russia's conduct in Manchuria. It was hardly to be expected that she would take advantage of the acquired Russian rights to act much as Russia had done. There is one convincing proof that Japan had not planned, before the war, to assume a position of special influence in Manchuria; that is to say, she did not fight to expel Russia for her own advantage. In October, 1905, Prince Katsura, the prime minister, signed a memorandum preliminary to the sale of the Japanese portion of the Manchurian railway to a syndicate to be organized by Mr. E. H. Harriman, the great American railway operator. Mr. Harri-man planned to secure the Japanese and Russian railways in Manchuria, as well as trackage rights over the Trans-Siberian line, and thus link up a round-the-world railway and steamship service. The syndicate was to share equally with the Japanese government in the ownership of the railway and its appurtenances and in the operation of mines. The willingness of the Japanese government to share these economic advantages with an American-financed syndicate indicates that it had not made plans to use the railway to advance Japanese interests exclusively in Manchuria. But when Baron Komura returned from Portsmouth he opposed the plan. He pointed out that China would have to agree to the transfer to Japan before any arrangement could be entered into, and he showed most convincingly that the railway was the only financial asset which Japan secured from Russia which would help to pay off the staggering costs of the war. In Japan the Portsmouth Treaty had been received with great popular dissatis-

faction. The people and the journalists had not realized how near to exhaustion the empire had been, and they condemned Komura and President Roosevelt for the failure to secure an indemnity. The government, on second thought, accepted Komura's proposal, and decided to retain the railway and use it as an agency for developing Japan's economic interests in Manchuria. This decision laid the foundation of her policy in that region. She would protect the integrity of China but she would foster her own commercial and economic interests. While Japan was to have a free hand in Korea, she found in Manchuria well-established foreign rivals who scrutinized her conduct with growing suspicion.

Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peking.—Baron Komura, again accompanied by Mr. Denison, proceeded to Peking to arrange for China's approval of the transfer to Japan of Russia's interests in South Manchuria. In the negotiations with Yuan Shih-kai two very different points of view were presented. The Japanese believed that China should be grateful to them for evicting Russia from Manchuria, at considerable loss of life and money. They believed, at the very least, that China should grant to Japan the same privileges which she had previously given to Russia. These economic concessions, if honestly carried out, involved no violation of the open-door or of the integrity of China. But the Chinese looked at the matter in quite a different light. They were very grateful to Japan for all that she had done, but they suggested that she also withdraw from Manchuria. From that time to this the two countries have never been able to match minds respecting Manchuria. The Japanese have felt that they had earned a special position there because of their expenditure of blood and money. The Chinese have never been able to agree to this. Concerning the actual negotiations which took place at Peking we know very little. The treaty which was signed on December 22, 1905, contained only three articles, but an additional agreement signed at the same time contained twelve, and secret protocols, of which an authorized version has never been printed, contained sixteen. The treaty proper was a very simple one, and it merely provided that China assented to the

transfer of the Russian lease and railway to Japan and the latter agreed to conform to the original agreements between China and Russia, "so far as circumstances permit." In the additional articles Japan secured some terms which would strengthen her position in Manchuria. Sixteen new treaty ports would be opened; Japan could rebuild the military railway between Antung and Mukden; the reconstruction must take place within three years and the concession would then run for fifteen; a joint stock company composed of Chinese and Japanese capitalists would be organized to work the forests along the Yalu. The secret protocols, which were made known by Japan to both Great Britain and the United States shortly afterward, gave Japan additional advantages. China would build a railway from Changchun to Kirin, using joint capital. She would buy from Japan, and reconstruct, the military line from Hsinmintun to Mukden, again using joint capital. China promised never to construct a railway main line in the neighborhood of and parallel to the South Manchuria Railway, or any branch line prejudicial to its interests. And in respect to mines, telegraph lines, and cables, and the reparation for public or private property destroyed or used by the Japanese during the occupation, arrangements would be decided upon later. The Treaty of Peking, with the additional agreement and the secret protocols, in conjunction with the Treaty of Portsmouth, laid the foundation of Japan's rights in Manchuria.

China Takes Alarm.—Ever since the Manchus conquered China they had looked upon the three eastern provinces as belonging to their own people and closed to settlement by the Chinese. We have already seen how their failure to populate the country north of the Amur and east of the Ussuri left these regions at the mercy of the Russians in the middle of the nineteenth century. Even at that late date Chinese immigration was forbidden by Manchu edict, but, as was the fate of many imperial edicts, it was not obeyed. It was not until the 'seventies that the two southern provinces, Fengtien and Kirin, were opened to their Chinese subjects, and the northern one, Helungkiang, was by law closed until after 1900. If the

Peking government had been at all foresighted it would have taken steps after 1895, when Manchuria became the center of Russian activity, to encourage Chinese immigration from Shantung and Chihli, and to build up an efficient political organization. But nothing was done until after the Russo-Japanese War, when two foreign countries possessed great interests in the region. After an investigation, the Manchurian administration was reorganized in 1907 and a viceroy and three governors appointed. The viceroy was Hsu Shih-chang, a Chinese who had long held office under the Manchus, a distinguished classical scholar but quite unfitted for the heavy responsibilities which were placed upon him. He later became president of China in 1918. Of the governors the most capable was Tang Shao-yi, of Fengtien, an American-educated Chinese and later a trusted supporter of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Steps were now taken to encourage the immigration of Chinese settlers. Railways were planned, including one from Mukden *via* Hailungcheng to Yenchi, on the Tumen. An attempt was made, as we shall see, to circumscribe the Japanese interests and to enlist foreign capital in the development of Manchuria. One of these proposals was to secure an American loan for reorganization and development. A preliminary contract for a \$20,000,000 loan was signed in 1908; this was merged in a larger loan which was to be undertaken by the four-power consortium in 1911, but the Chinese revolution of 1912 rendered it ineffective. After the revolution Manchuria passed under the control of the soldier Chang Tso-lin who, supported by the income of these prosperous provinces, became the great war-lord of the north and eventually the dictator at Peking. During these years the migration of laborers from Shantung was an annual phenomenon. Three or four hundred thousand came over every year, most of them as seasonal laborers in the bean fields, but many of them also took up land and settled there. By 1927, due to the continued civil strife in China proper, the number had probably reached 800,000. It is this immigration of Chinese which will free Manchuria from any danger of foreign political control, for the country will in time possess a great Chinese population.

The Open-Door in Manchuria.—A very abnormal situation now prevailed in the three eastern provinces. Japan and Russia had railway concessions in South and North Manchuria, respectively, and Japan also enjoyed the lease of Port Arthur. The Russian sphere of influence was much larger than that of Japan. Japan considered the province of Feng-tien (Mukden) and half that of Kirin as within her sphere. This was about 125,000 square miles, while the balance, about 160,000 square miles, lay within the Russian sphere. In South Manchuria, where the Japanese were established, lay the old treaty port of Newchwang, where British merchants and a few other foreigners had been established for almost fifty years.¹ Although the Russians carried on their former operations in North Manchuria, they were rarely subjected to foreign scrutiny. The Japanese, however, were constantly under inspection. When their trade with Manchuria began to increase with great rapidity, while the hopes of British and American merchants failed to be realized, the latter would not accept the simplest explanation—that Japan was near at hand, that she had an adequate merchant marine, that she was the largest buyer of Manchurian products, notably bean cake and bean oil,² and that she had an able and painstaking commercial organization. Instead, the success of the Japanese merchants could only be explained through some violation of the open-door principle. In 1906 and 1907 frequent charges were made by journalists of this or that form of violation. The Japanese government repeatedly protested that it had not and would not interfere with the principle of equal opportunity for the merchants of all nations. As a matter of fact, not only did the Japanese need no discriminations in their favor, but the best interests of Japan would have been served by the introduction of foreign capital. The more goods that were imported the greater would be the traffic receipts of the South Manchuria Railway, while any improvement in the economic life of Manchuria would result in increased pur-

¹ By 1911 the trade of Dairen (Dalny) surpassed that of Newchwang.

² In 1907, when the charges were most rife, Japan purchased almost half the beans and almost all the bean cake exported from Manchuria.

chases of Japanese goods, which could be laid down in Manchuria much cheaper than goods imported from Europe or the United States. Japan, of course, would not welcome foreign-controlled railways which might affect her military or commercial interests. The most pertinent charge of violating the principle of the open-door was made by the United States (but Great Britain would not join her) in 1914, when the South Manchuria Railway offered a low rate on sea and rail shipments from Japan. This applied to all goods originating there, but it was in principle a violation of the 1899 open-door definition, which forbade cheaper railway rates—although these rates might be enjoyed by non-Japanese exporters from Japan. It is safe to say that, aside from this violation in principle, the charges that Japan had failed to respect the open-door in Manchuria fall to the ground.³ Mainly in order to reply to these charges, Japan exchanged notes with the United States on November 30, 1908. These are known as the Root-Takahira notes. In brief, they defined the policy of both governments to be the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Pacific and the defense of the open-door in China. Each agreed to respect the territorial possessions of the other, and to support by all pacific means at their disposal the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in that empire. Should any event occur threatening the *status quo* as above described or the principle of equal opportunity as above defined, it remained for the two governments to communicate with each other in order to arrive at an understanding as to what measures they might consider it useful to take.

³ The situation in Manchuria has been paralleled in China proper. The report of the Maritime Customs for 1926 states, in respect to the trade of Shanghai: "Most people are well aware of the steady growth of Japanese trade, but it may not be so generally known how rapid this advance has been. The special advantages which Japanese manufacturers and merchants enjoy are obvious. Cheapness of labor, proximity to China, and greater intimacy with the customs of the people with whom they deal are all factors which enable them to offer very formidable competition. . . . But there are other reasons as well to account for their success. Not least of these is the painstaking energy shown by Japanese manufacturers in adapting their products to the needs of the consumers. . . . The method of the merchants is to do without dealers and middlemen as far as possible and to make direct sales."


This was not, of course, a treaty, nor did it do more than bind the executive officers of the two countries for the time being. But it enabled Japan to renew her old pledges, and the American administration, in exchanging notes, testified to its belief in the good faith of Japan. Earlier in the year Japan had exchanged notes of similar import with both France and Russia.

Railway Politics.—It was very natural for China, and many of her foreign friends, to fear that Manchuria would pass under the control of Japan and Russia. Unable to prevent this herself, China tried to interest the other powers in Manchuria in order to checkmate the two rivals installed there. She first gave a British firm, in 1907, the concession for a short railway, forty-seven miles long, from Hsinmintun to Fakumen, but it looked to an eventual extension to Tsitsihar, 400 miles farther. Japan at once protested against this concession as being a violation of the secret protocols, for it would be "in the neighborhood of and parallel to" the South Manchuria Railway.⁴ The British government supported Japan against its own capitalists, and on the further ground that it had promised Russia, in 1898, never to seek a railway concession north of the Great Wall. The next move was a more ambitious one, and would enlist both British and American capital. Mr. Harriman had not abandoned his dream of a round-the-world transportation system. Willard Straight, the representative of the American banking group, secured at Mukden a preliminary concession, on October 2, 1909, for a railway from Chinchow, on the gulf of Chihli, to Aigun, on the Amur. The road, about 700 miles long, would be built by British contractors. Such a railway would bisect both the Japanese and Russian spheres and would seriously affect the earning power of their two railways. But we now know that this was primarily a political rather than an economic concession and that its main purpose was to bring the Japanese to terms: if they would not sell the South Manchuria Railway, then the competing line would be built. The death of Mr.

⁴ This clause was invoked by Japan in 1927 in the case of the Takushan-Payantala and Hailungcheng-Kirin lines which China was undertaking.

Harriman, shortly before the preliminary contract was signed, brought to an end this great project.

The Knox Neutralization Proposal.—At this point the American secretary of state, Mr. Knox, made a proposal designed to remove the international rivalries in Manchuria. It was that the powers pledged to the open-door, namely, the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and Japan, advance money to China so that she could buy back the Japanese and Russian railways, or else finance the Chinchow-Aigun line. The roads would then be operated by an international board of management. The purpose of this plan was excellent, but it was confronted by insuperable sentimental and practical considerations. Its author did not appreciate the importance which both Japan and Russia attached to these railways, nor had he worked out the financial aspects of the plan which he proposed. None of the European powers would support Mr. Knox in his plan, although they expressed approval of the principle. But Russia and Japan, evidently after an exchange of views, presented firm opposition. They had already, in 1907, agreed upon the territorial division of their respective spheres. Japan had purchased her railway with the blood of her soldiers during the Russian war. If the railway was a profitable holding, then she believed that she should enjoy it, rather than share it with the capitalists of Europe and America. So she replied that she saw no reason for setting aside the treaties of Portsmouth and Peking. She asserted that she was respecting the integrity of China and observing the principle of the open-door and that there was no reason why the railways in Manchuria should be internationalized and not in other parts of China—*e.g.*, the German railway in Shantung and the French railways in Yunnan and Kwangsi. She also raised doubts as to the advantages or benefits of an international instead of a national régime, pointing out that economy and efficiency would be obliged to yield to political exigencies while the divided responsibility would inevitably mean an absence of due responsibility, to the serious disadvantage of the public and the detriment of the service. The Russian reply stressed the fact that the Chinese



MANCHURIA—RECENT RAILWAYS

Eastern Railway was an integral part of the Trans-Siberian and as such could not be transferred to international control without the sacrifice of vital interests. While the Japanese government expressed its willingness to take part in financing the Chinchow-Aigun concession, Russia reserved her reply until she could consider the matter in all its phases. The neutralization proposal failed to receive any support. While it should have been evident that both Japan and Russia would have dissented to any plan of this nature, the fact that the proposal was made in such vague terms, without any attempt to estimate the financial obligations involved, and that in the first approach to Russia no reference was made to the alternative Chinchow-Aigun project, helped to bring about its prompt and definitive rejection. While the neutralization of the Manchurian railways would have eliminated the special interests of Japan and Russia, the international aspects of the financial arrangements and operation might have produced even greater difficulties. The American proposal had, however, two immediate effects. It brought Japan and Russia closer together in a treaty, July 4, 1910, in which they agreed to maintain the *status quo* in Manchuria and to communicate with each other in case of any menace. And it seemed to verify the suspicion, which had arisen in Japan, that the United States was trying to deprive her of the advantages won in the Russian war. From this time until 1921 the most serious menace to American-Japanese peace was found in the conflict of policies in China rather than in any question arising from the treatment of Japanese immigrants in the United States.

Sino-Japanese Controversies.—China and Japan were soon at odds in Manchuria. The vague terms of the additional articles of the Peking Treaty and the secret protocols accounted for this very easily. China desired a strict construction of the agreements; Japan, believing herself entitled to some consideration, expected a liberal construction. Chinese officials received support from foreigners who did not want to see the Japanese too strongly intrenched in Manchuria. The evacuation of the three provinces was to be completed by both the Japanese and Russian armies by April 15, 1907, with the

exception of the railway guards, and Japan had promised to withdraw those as soon as China could protect foreign lives and property and Russia would agree to do the same. At first it seemed as if evacuation would be delayed, but as a matter of fact the Japanese troops were withdrawn before the time limit. It was alleged, however, that during the military occupation the Japanese interfered with the Chinese local administration. Other difficulties arose respecting the Japanese telegraph lines, the military telephones, the cables and mails. The vague terms of the 1905 agreements had to be defined more carefully, and diplomatic discussions were almost constantly going on, resulting in a series of new agreements. On April 15, 1907, the Hsinmintun-Mukden and the Changchun-Kirin railway contracts were revised, and on May 30th an agreement relating to the Dairen customs office was reached. On May 14, 1908, the Sino-Japanese Lumber Company was created to operate on the Yalu, and on October 12th an agreement was made respecting the Japanese cable between Kwantung and Chefoo and the telegraph lines in Manchuria. This was followed on November 2nd by two supplementary agreements respecting the cable and telegraph lines, and on the 12th in the matter of the 1907 railway loans. The next year several important disputes came to a head, concerning the Antung-Mukden Railway, the boundary between Manchuria and Korea, and the right to work the coal mines at Fushun and Yentai. Of these the most serious was the railway controversy. During the Russo-Japanese War the Japanese had built a military railway from Antung, on the Yalu, to Mukden. It was 188 miles long, and military necessity had caused it to be hurriedly completed. The gauge was two feet six inches, there were no tunnels and few cuts or fills, and in fact the line seemed to hang on the sides of the rugged mountains. On such a line it took two days to make a trip which should have required only a few hours, for no night travel was possible. In the additional agreement at Peking Japan was given the right to reconstruct this line, and the work was to be completed within three years. Japan desired to turn the road into an adequate commercial undertaking (not forgetting the

strategic value, of course), and this meant a new survey, a broad gauge, and adequate tunnels, bridges, cuts, and fills. The Chinese later insisted that the road might be improved but not rebuilt, and the local officials refused to approve the new right of way. Therefore the Japanese could not complete the work within the stipulated three years, and the Chinese held that the concession expired in December, 1908. Japan then insisted that the time be extended, as the delay was due to the conduct of the local officials. China refused this request and offered to refer the matter to The Hague, which would have meant a long delay. When diplomacy failed, Japan resorted to an ultimatum and China promptly yielded. On August 19, 1909, a new agreement was signed which permitted the Japanese to proceed with a broad-gauge line. When it was completed the two days' journey was reduced to eight hours, and although this line may have important strategic value in the future, it has, for the past seventeen years, been of great value in furthering the commercial development of Manchuria. On September 4th two agreements were signed, one permitting the Japanese government to work the coal mines at Fushun and Yentai, while Sino-Japanese companies would operate those along the Antung-Mukden Railway, and the other fixed the Tumen River as the boundary between Manchuria and Korea. The Koreans residing within the Chinese territory in dispute would be subject to Chinese jurisdiction, but a Japanese consular officer or official might attend trials and could ask for a new trial if he so desired. These agreements removed most of the occasions for Sino-Japanese friction in Manchuria, and although on the face of the agreements Japan gained substantial benefits, the agreements in most cases were based upon a compromise and both sides receded from their original contentions.

Railway Loan Contracts.—The next agreement came on October 5, 1913. Japanese capitalists received loan concessions for three railways in Manchuria: Ssupingkai *via* Chengchiatun to Taonan, Kaiyuan to Hailungcheng, and Changchun to Taonan, and the right to supply the money, should China need foreign aid, for railways from Taonan to Jehol, and

Hailungcheng to Kirin.⁵ These concessions were evidently made as reparation for the murder of some Japanese at Nanking when the city was retaken by the Northerners during the rebellion of that year. Such loan contracts *per se* would have been equally beneficial to China and Japan. China needed railways and could not finance them herself. Japan and other powers sought railway loan agreements because they would give some assurance that the lines would be properly and promptly built. Such railways in Manchuria would not only benefit the entire region with its Chinese population, but would increase the earnings of the Japanese railway system and develop the business transacted by Japanese and other nationals there. If China could provide a strong and efficient administration in Manchuria these loans would have no more political implications than the vast British investments in American railways and industries. Because of Japanese loans and construction operations Manchuria to-day is better supplied with railways than any other part of China.

Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1915.—By 1915, therefore, Japan was deeply interested in the development of South Manchuria and her nationals were contributing much to the progress of that rich region. She held the lease of Liaotung, 1,300 square miles, which would expire on March 27, 1923. She had developed a splendid port at Dairen, which had been commenced by the Russians as Dalny, which soon became the second port in China in its total commerce. She also owned the South Manchuria Railway, which was operated by a private company under government control, and this company also operated the Antung-Mukden line. The mileage of these roads was respectively 437 and 188 miles. The company also took over the mining concessions obtained from Russia and China and developed a great coal mine at Fushun. The Japanese railway guards, supported by a division stationed at Liaoyang, kept the railway zone free from robbers and bandits. Peace prevailed and Manchuria became the most prosperous region of China. The good transportation service,

⁵ The actual loan agreement for the Ssupingkai-Chengchiatun line was made in 1915, and the others in 1918.

by land and sea, furnished a market for Manchurian beans, and as the Chinese farmers and tradesmen became more prosperous they were able to buy foreign goods in increasing quantities. Japan was quite satisfied with exploiting the economic resources of Manchuria. Political control, beyond a certain amount of influence, would occasion more harm than good. So when, in 1915, Japan made her ill-fated demands upon China she was more concerned with strengthening her position in Manchuria than even in the Shantung and other matters. The "twenty-one demands" will be dealt with in another place; here it is only necessary to remark that in the final treaty relative to South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia the following provisions are found: (1) The lease of Port Arthur and the South Manchuria and Antung-Mukden railway concessions were extended to ninety-nine years. (2) Japanese subjects might lease land in South Manchuria for erecting buildings for trade and manufacture or for farming purposes.⁶ (3) Japanese subjects might reside and travel in South Manchuria and engage in any kind of business and manufacture. (4) Joint Chinese and Japanese agricultural enterprises might be allowed in Eastern Inner Mongolia. (5) Japanese subjects referred to in articles 2, 3, and 4, must register their passports with the local officials and submit to the police law and ordinances and taxation of China. In civil and criminal cases where a Japanese was defendant the Japanese consul would decide; and the Chinese official where a Chinese was defendant. In either case an officer might be deputed to attend the proceedings. Mixed civil cases relating to land would be tried by delegates of both nations jointly in accordance with Chinese law and local usage. Japan furthermore promised to waive extraterritoriality when the judicial system of Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia was completely reformed. (6) China would open suitable places in Eastern Inner Mongolia for the trade and residence of foreigners. (7) China would speedily revise the Kirin-Changchun Railway loan agreement on the basis of other foreign

⁶ No Japanese leases have been granted, as China has not put into operation the necessary ordinances.

railway agreements, and if, in the future, more advantageous terms were given to foreigners the agreement would again be revised. (8) All existing treaties between China and Japan respecting Manchuria should remain in force except as otherwise provided in this treaty. At the same time notes were exchanged to the following effect: The lease of Port Arthur and Dalny shall expire in 1997, of the South Manchuria Railway in 2002, without the right to cancel the latter in thirty-six years, and of the Antung-Mukden Railway in 2007; the places to be opened for trade and residence in Eastern Inner Mongolia would be selected by China after consultation with the Japanese minister; nine areas in South Manchuria were designated in which the Japanese might open coal and iron mines; if China desired funds for railway construction in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia she would first consult Japan, and also if a loan was to be made on the taxes of those regions; if foreign advisers or instructors were employed in South Manchuria on political, financial, military, or police matters, China would first employ Japanese; a land lease was defined as running up to thirty years, and unconditionally renewable; and China would consult the Japanese consul before enforcing the police laws and ordinances and taxation mentioned in article 5.

As we shall see later, the original demands of Japan respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia were greatly modified before the treaty was finally signed. Nor is it correct to say that Japan secured this treaty by means of an ultimatum. Most of the articles were accepted by China before the ultimatum was delivered. Its purpose was simply to secure a few, and in reality, minor points and to prevent the reopening of matters which had already been agreed upon. The extension of the lease and railway concessions was agreed to early in the discussions (on March 9, 1915), and the right to lease land (after Japan had withdrawn the request for the ownership of land in South Manchuria and leasehold privileges in Eastern Inner Mongolia) was also accepted in the early conferences by the Chinese. China very properly wished to limit the residence and movement of Japanese as long

as extraterritoriality was in force. Finally, it should be pointed out, in seeking the extension of the lease of Port Arthur and Dalny to ninety-nine years, Japan wished to place her tenure on the same terms as the Germans at Kiaochow, the French at Kwangchow, and the British at Kowloon. Later, when the Chinese government took the position that the 1915 treaties lacked validity because they were obtained under duress (like most of China's foreign treaties), although it did not go to the extreme of positively denouncing them, it requested Japan to withdraw from Liaotung in 1923 at the expiration of the original Russian lease. This proposal was not even considered by the Japanese. It should also be remembered that all the rights given Japanese subjects by the 1915 treaty were available to the nationals of the other treaty powers under the most-favored-nation clause. They were, however, of little use to them because so few of their nationals were resident in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. The Chinese, on the other hand, by failing to take the necessary administrative measures were able to prevent the Japanese from using their privileges of leasing land and engaging in general business and manufacturing enterprises. As a matter of fact, the terms of the treaty were more extensive than their actual operation has been in many cases. In 1920 Japan threw open South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia to the financial operations of the second consortium, with the exception of the completed railroads and four loan contracts for feeders of the South Manchuria Railway, and in 1922, at Washington, she renounced her preferred position in the matter of advisers.

Later Railway Contracts.—In 1918, under circumstances to be described later, China agreed to enter into preliminary loan contracts for three of the railway concessions granted to Japan in 1913, and for two new lines, from Changchun to Taonan, and from the Jehol-Taonan line to the coast. Although 20,000,000 yen were advanced to China at that time, no construction work was started. In 1925 the South Manchuria Railway advanced the money and undertook the construction of a Chinese railway from Kirin to Tunhua, which will be

continued to the Korean border. An important railway, which enters the Russian sphere, was completed in 1926 by the same company, with Japanese capital, running from Taonan almost to Tsitsihar, and work on a Chinese railway from Mukden to Hailungcheng was under way. Several other Chinese railway projects were being surveyed.

Russia in North Manchuria.—In these years the activities of the Russians in North Manchuria received little attention. In 1907 Japan and Russia signed an agreement whose terms were much like those of the Franco-Japanese pact and the Root-Takahira exchange of notes, but at the same time a secret treaty was negotiated which drew a line between the respective spheres of Russia and Japan in Manchuria, approximating the course of the Nonni as it flowed east, and Japan recognized Russia's special interests in Mongolia. This division of interests was confirmed in a secret treaty in 1910, at the time of the public treaty which has been referred to, each agreeing to seek no privileges or concessions in the other's sphere. A third secret agreement, in 1912, confirmed the preceding ones and on the part of Russia recognized that Japan had certain special interests in Eastern Inner Mongolia, east of a line running north, approximately, from Peking. This paved the way for the Japanese demands upon China respecting Eastern Inner Mongolia in 1915. In March, 1916, the Chinese government gave to the Russo-Asiatic Bank a concession for a railway from Harbin to Aigun *via* Mergen, with a branch line from Mergen to Tsitsihar, but in view of the World War no use could be made of this grant. On July 3rd of that year Japan and Russia signed an agreement that neither would be a party to any arrangement or political combination against the other, and would confer should their territorial rights or special interests in the Far East be menaced. A secret treaty at the same time was designed to assure coöperation in case any third power attempted to dominate China. Should war be made upon either of the parties the other would come to its aid and not conclude peace without mutual consent. If, as was alleged, this secret treaty was aimed at the United States, the negotiators and their

governments were sadly lacking in imagination, for the prospect that the United States would declare war upon either Russia or Japan in order to secure the political domination of China was too remote to be considered by practical diplomats. Remembering that in 1916 Japan and Russia were allies in the war against the Central Powers, such a treaty was not as sinister as might otherwise have been the case, and, as the Russian negotiator Sazonov said, it was very evidently aimed at Germany. After the collapse of the tsarist government the Chinese Eastern Railway continued to function as a practically independent organization. China proceeded to take more interest in its management, and in 1920 an agreement was signed on behalf of the Russo-Asiatic Bank under which it would appoint five directors and the Chinese government four, as well as the president, who would have a casting vote. The Soviet government had, in 1919, offered to relinquish the railway to China, but it soon abandoned this altruistic position, and in 1924, according to the Sino-Russian agreement in May, the railway passed into the possession of Soviet Russia, which was a complete change of status from its control by the Russo-Chinese (later Russo-Asiatic) Bank. Although Soviet Russia promptly recognized the independence of Manchuria in September following and made arrangements for the operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway, including a reduction of the eighty years' concession to sixty years, her relations with Chang Tso-lin, the Manchurian warlord, have been strained. She views with alarm the extension of Chinese railways, built by Japanese engineers with Japanese capital, which compete with her line for the trade of North Manchuria. The old railway rivalries are still active, and especially the struggle to secure traffic over the Russian line to Vladivostok and over the Japanese line to Dairen.

The Present Situation.—Manchuria is to-day one of the danger spots of the Far East. Japan and Russia still watch each other suspiciously, and any advance of the Russians will meet with Japanese opposition. The Chinese war-lord, Chang Tso-lin, while maintaining a fair measure of independence, has been far more sympathetic to Japan than to Russia. The

Japanese railways, and the prosperity which they have made possible, have enabled him to become a dominant figure in Chinese politics. Japan, while announcing a policy of moderation and non-intervention in Chinese politics, looks upon South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia as regions of paramount interest to her, and she will not tolerate, if she can possibly prevent it, the spread of the turmoil which has in recent years prevailed in China proper. Only real statesmanship on the part of China, Japan, and Russia can save Manchuria from being for a third time the battle-field of contending armies.

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CHAPTER XXXVI

REFORM IN CHINA, 1901-1911

The Reform Movement.—After the terrible lessons of the Boxer uprising the Empress Dowager believed that China must reorganize her government and all its activities. But great changes did not come until Japan had demonstrated her efficiency in the war with Russia. Then, very promptly, the Chinese government issued sweeping edicts for reform in administration, education, army organization, for the preparation of a constitution, and for representative institutions. Japan was looked upon as a model, and the pro-Russian party was pushed into the background. Tens of thousands of young men flocked from China to Japan to attend the schools, technical institutions, and universities. At one time it was reported that 40,000 Chinese students were resident in Japan. The reform decrees were not carried out as thoroughly as had been planned. This was what might have been expected. With the rarest exceptions the officials had all been trained in the old ways; they did not understand or appreciate the necessity for the drastic reforms. A few enlightened viceroys and governors worked for progress in their provinces, but others stubbornly opposed the changes. There could be no uniform progress as was possible in a centralized state like Japan after the fall of feudalism. The old-style officials were, and still are, an influence holding China back. In 1905 the old educational system was abolished. In that year the students began to look forward rather than backward, but the new system was not able to function adequately, so that there are still comparatively few young men who have had a Western type of education in the past twenty years, and most of them are still young and inexperienced. A later development placed power in the hands of ignorant generals, and their pernicious influence has not yet been shaken off.

Political Reforms.—Before the court returned to Peking a government council was created for the purpose of examining

reports and memorials dealing with reforms. In 1905 it was reorganized and known as the committee of ministers, and was then composed of the grand secretaries, the assistant grand secretaries, and the president of the supreme council. The next year the seven old boards were reorganized and new boards created. At first eleven boards were provided for, and no distinction was to be made between Chinese and Manchu members. The purpose of this reform was to increase centralization, and the boards were to concern themselves with imperial matters and not merely with checking up on the administration in the provinces. Everything of general importance, such as education, finance, military affairs, police, and justice, was to be subordinated to the boards or ministries in Peking. This was a fundamental change in the old decentralized system and was bound to meet with much local opposition. The provincial administration was also reorganized, and nine viceroys and fourteen governors were placed in charge of the twenty-two provinces. In only one case, Kiangsu, was both a viceroy and a governor appointed to the same province. At the same time new posts were created—a provincial commissioner for foreign affairs and a commissioner for education. These, with the former provincial officials, were also to take part in the local administration. Provincial centralization was to be inaugurated; education, the police, and the administration of justice were to be removed from the control of the local officials. The employment of specially trained officials was proposed, in place of the old system under which a scholar-official was considered competent to serve in any capacity. Constitution-making was also in progress. A committee was appointed to investigate the matter in 1905. Following the Japanese example, a special commission was sent to the United States and Europe to study the political systems there. But the members were less able or willing to profit from their investigations than were Ito and his associates. They returned in August, 1906, and recommended to the throne that steps be taken for the introduction of representative government. On the 1st of September an edict promised the people a constitution when they were ripe for it. In the meantime the necessity

for reforms in public education, the financial system, the army, and the establishment of a police force was stressed. A new committee was appointed to study the question of constitutional government, and when it tried to agree upon a suitable date for its introduction the votes differed from two years to twenty. A draft constitution which they prepared was based almost entirely upon the constitution of Japan. The throne adopted a conservative view and on August 27, 1907, issued an edict promising a constitution in 1917. A nine years' program of constitutional preparation was now outlined, which indicated exactly what should be accomplished in each of the intervening years. In 1914-15, for example, one per cent of the population should be able to read and write; in 1915-16 two per cent; and in 1916-17 five per cent. In comparison we should remember that the Japanese constitution was promulgated after a well-organized system of public instruction had created a literate electorate. The nine years' program could not have been carried out in any case, and although the period was later shortened, the overthrow of the monarchy in 1912 brought to an end this attempt at systematic progress.

✓ Educational Reforms.—The greatest of all the many changes which occurred in these years was in the realm of education. Before the court left Sian the Empress Dowager had issued edicts announcing her intention to have the officials, nobles, and people study modern subjects. In August, 1901, the famous "eight-legged" essay was abolished, as the emperor had attempted to do in 1898. Two years later a committee on educational affairs was appointed, under the presidency of the learned Viceroy Chang Chih-tung, and early in the next year they submitted a complete scheme of education. This was accepted and an edict issued the same day, January 13, 1904, for its inauguration. The system was again based primarily upon that of Japan, but it provided for only the most elementary education of girls. On the memorial of Yuan Shih-kai, in 1905, an edict was issued on September 2nd for the abolition of the old-style examinations. In its place a system of examinations based upon modern subjects was in operation between 1906 and 1911, and then the ancient civil-service ex-

aminations were altogether abandoned. Modern schools, based upon the edict of 1904, were rapidly organized in all the provinces, but again the work proceeded best where the viceroys were enlightened. At this time the model province was Chihli, where Yuan Shih-kai was viceroy. By 1906 he could boast an educational system from the kindergarten to the university, with middle and high schools and several technical institutions. At that time there were enrolled in Chihli 86,000 students, and Yuan Shih-kai could also boast that he had an equal number of troops in his modern army. A great impetus to educational progress was given when the United States, in 1908, returned \$10,784,507 of the Boxer indemnity. This money, remitted at regular intervals, was used to support a model high school and college at Peking for the preparation of students who would complete their education in the United States. At Taiyuan a memorial university was established with the money paid for the massacre of the missionaries there in 1900. In the next few years remarkable progress was recorded in public education. The establishment of an adequate educational system for a country as vast and as densely peopled as China would require ample funds for equipment and adequate provision for the training of teachers. Internal peace was a first requisite, and when civil strife raised its head the educational program suffered accordingly.

The Fight Against Opium.—If the educational reforms were the most important the fight against opium was the most surprising and spectacular of the movements inaugurated between 1905 and 1911. After the legalization of the opium import trade in 1858 the home production of opium greatly increased. Before China could rid herself of this evil she must stop domestic production and secure the permission of the treaty powers to exclude foreign opium. Early in the twentieth century the opium evil was the subject of considerable attention. In 1904 the Philippine opium commission published an exhaustive report, which was translated into Chinese. The British House of Commons, in May, 1906, declared the Indian opium trade to be morally indefensible and requested the government to take such steps as might be necessary to

bring it to a speedy close. This resolution reflected the views of the Liberal party, which was then in power, but it was received with alarm by the Indian government, which derived a valuable revenue from the production of export opium. Encouraged by this evidence of sympathy in Great Britain, where the greatest opposition was expected against any measure to curtail or abolish opium imports into China, a large number of missionaries sent up a memorial to the Chinese government in August of that year, and many other memorials were received from Chinese reformers and officials, all praying that some steps be taken to combat the opium evil. The immediate result was an edict, of September 20th, which ordered the abolition of opium-smoking within ten years. The government council was also instructed to consider measures looking toward the future strict prohibition of opium-smoking and of the cultivation of the poppy throughout the empire. Within two months a series of regulations was drawn up, and issued on November 21st. They called for the restriction of the cultivation of the drug, the area of which must be reduced one-ninth each year until it was brought to a close. Smokers must obtain licenses, except in the case of persons over sixty years of age, and the amount they consumed must be reduced each year.¹ Persons who did not eventually give up the vice would be punished; officials would be dismissed, graduates lose their diplomas, and the common people would have their names posted. Opium dens must be closed within three months, and opium shops gradually abolished. Officials must give up the habit, or receive permission from the throne to give it up within a fixed time; in the case of most officials six months was the maximum, while teachers, scholars, and officers of the army and navy would be granted only three months' grace. And, finally, negotiations on the subject of the import trade would be prosecuted with Great Britain.² This program evinced commendable wisdom and moderation. Instead of placing all the blame upon the foreign traders, the first responsibility was fixed upon the Chinese cultivators of the

¹ It was remarked at the time that the Empress Dowager was over sixty.

² More elaborate regulations were promulgated in May, 1908.

poppy and the users of the drug. When China had cleared herself of her own responsibility she could expect, as of right, the sympathetic coöperation of the interested foreign governments. To be sure, there were many doubting foreigners who scoffed at the idea of the Chinese ever giving up the opium habit, but a great surprise was in store for them. The government of India, willing to coöperate with any efforts of China to free herself from the opium evil, agreed in December, 1907, to curtail the amount of opium shipped from India to China, by 5,100 chests (one-tenth of the total) annually. This would begin on January 1, 1908, and continue for three years, provided China reduced her domestic production in the same degree. China's efforts received foreign recognition and support when, in February, 1909, an international opium commission convened at Shanghai.³ Here thirteen powers were represented, and although their resolutions had no binding force and were merely referred to their respective governments, they condemned the evil. The next forward step came on May 8, 1911, when an Anglo-Chinese agreement was signed. This continued the arrangement made with the Indian government in 1907, so that the trade might be extinguished by 1917. But it went even further and provided that if the cultivation and importation of native opium ceased in any province no Indian opium would be sent there, and if, throughout China, production ceased before seven years, the importation of Indian opium would immediately stop. In order to carry out the terms of this treaty British consular officers traveled through many of the Chinese provinces, and their reports as to the reduction of cultivation and use were most encouraging. By September, 1911, the importation of Indian opium into Manchuria, Shansi, and Szechwan could be prohibited. On the first of the next year China herself was able to prohibit the importation of Turkish and Persian opium, for these countries had no treaty relations with her. And in 1913, so great had been the effectiveness of China's domestic battle against the evil, that the export of opium from India to China came

³ International conferences on opium have been held in 1911, 1913, 1914, and 1924.

to an end. The battle against opium was waged by official action and, more effectively, by public opinion. Poppy fields were rooted out and opium shops and dens closed and their equipment destroyed. But public opinion was organized by the propaganda of the Anti-Opium League of China, whose members by written appeals and public addresses aroused strong opposition to a habit which involved such physical, moral, and economic harm. At Foochow a grandson of the famous Commissioner Lin, who had destroyed the opium at Canton in 1839, led the movement. When piles of confiscated opium, pipes, and paraphernalia were burned the event became a public festival, and habitual users of opium were subjected to ridicule which, involving a "loss of face," hurt more than a jail sentence. Between 1906 and 1912 China had shown her capacity to carry forward a great moral reform. Unhappily, the political chaos which followed the revolution destroyed the effectiveness of the anti-opium movement, until China became a greater producer and user of the drug than ever before.⁴ But this relapse should not blind us to the fact that, given favorable conditions, Chinese public opinion can be molded and brought to bear upon so difficult a problem as a social custom or habit.

Army Reorganization.—The defeat inflicted upon China by the allies in 1900 inspired a decree the next year for the reorganization of the army. Yuan Shih-kai was the only viceroy to take any effective steps to bring this about, and between 1903 and 1906 he formed six divisions of troops, 80,000 men, well armed, equipped, and disciplined. The Japanese victories over Russia aroused new interest in army reform and a comprehensive decree was issued in 1906, and revised the next year. Enlistment would be voluntary at first, but conscription was probably planned for the future. Three years in the active army, and three and four years, respectively, in the first and second reserves, were the periods of service. Thirty-six divisions were authorized, the infantry consisting of two brigades, formed of two regiments each, and each regiment of

⁴ The Nationalist government at Nanking in 1927 established an opium monopoly.

three battalions, or 432 battalions in all. In addition, cavalry and artillery regiments and battalions of engineers and transport troops were included, the total peace standing being about 450,000. Military schools, arsenals, shops, and factories were to be established, a general staff created, and officers were to be sent abroad for instruction. Foreign military observers rated the Chinese soldier high, because of his physique, his courage when well led, his obedience, and his ability to withstand hardships. But the army program progressed with no more uniformity than the other reforms. The national army was still organized by provinces and supported by provincial revenues, and while some provinces soon raised one or even two divisions, others could do no more than form a mixed brigade. By the end of August, 1911, on the eve of the revolution, the National army (Luchun) was composed of 240,815 men, organized in fifteen partially complete divisions, sixteen brigades, and one brigade of imperial guards. In addition, provincial troops to the number of 277,000 were enrolled, and most of these were organized and drilled in Western fashion. Acting under the orders of the local viceroy or governor, it was planned to use them as a constabulary when the National army attained full strength. And although the old banner men found no place in the new military organization, there were still some 55,000 of the Green Standards retained among the forces in seven provinces. The development of a modern army, like the organization of a public-school system and all the other reforms of the nine years' program, called for the expenditure of vast sums from the central and provincial treasuries. Therefore financial reform should have been one of the fundamental problems to be dealt with. What was needed was an honest and efficient system of assessing and collecting the taxes, a budget system, and a reform of the hopelessly confused currency. These measures were enumerated among the proposed reforms, but so great was the opposition of interested officials and bankers that no progress could be made.

The Reform Movement and Foreign Relations.—In these years the cry which first arose in 1898 of "China for the Chi-

nese" was again voiced. Just as in Japan the eagerness to attain national recognition inspired the great reforms of Meiji, so in China the reform movement was considered a prelude to the restoration of the privileges formerly conceded to foreigners. These were enumerated by Chinese publicists as the abolition of extraterritoriality, the abolition of residential concessions, the recovery of all territorial leases, railway concessions and mining rights, and the restoration of tariff autonomy. It should be observed that during this period, when Peking directed the reforms, the stress was laid upon internal reorganization. But among the student class were those who preached the gospel of "rights recovery". At a later period the emphasis was to be laid on the abolition of foreign privileges, the "unequal treaties," as a prelude to internal reform.

The Death of the Empress Dowager.—There is no question that any success of the new reform movement, in contrast with that of 1898, was largely due to the dominant personality of the Empress Dowager and her sincere advocacy of reform as the only way of safeguarding the dynasty and China. Her influence inspired enlightened viceroys, such as Yuan Shih-kai, to push the innovations as rapidly as possible. In November, 1908, both the emperor, who had for years been only the nominal ruler, and the Empress Dowager were taken seriously ill. The latter had only recently celebrated her seventy-third birthday. On the 13th she was able to mount the dragon throne and discuss the naming of an heir to the emperor. Again she imposed her will upon her councilors, even against the advice of Prince Ching and Yuan Shih-kai. She insisted that the heir should be Puyi, the infant son of Prince Chun, a child of less than three years. Prince Chun, the younger brother of the emperor, had married a daughter of Jung Lu, the Manchu official who had been the most loyal servant and friend of the Empress Dowager, and it was her wish that the grandson of Jung Lu should ascend the imperial throne. The next day the emperor died, and an edict appeared which named Puyi as emperor, and as heir by adoption of Tungchih, who had died childless in 1875. He was also to perform joint

sacrifices at the shrine of Kuanghsu. The Empress Dowager then drafted her valedictory decree, and on the 15th died. Thus passed away the masterful woman who had dominated the politics of Peking ever since 1862.

The Reform Movement Weakens.—Prince Chun, the regent, might well be expected to carry on the program of the late empress, for he had been the first Manchu prince to travel abroad, having visited Germany in 1901 to make amends for the murder of Von Ketteler. But he was young, inexperienced, and weak. He also shared with his brother, the late emperor, a bitter grievance against Yuan Shih-kai, who had betrayed his emperor in 1898. For a time the very life of Yuan seemed to be in jeopardy, but on January 2, 1909, he was dismissed from his offices, on the ground of incapacity because of an affection of the leg. Without the strong support of the Empress Dowager and Yuan Shih-kai Chinese officialdom lacked the stimulus to carry on the reforms. However, some progress was recorded. In 1907 an edict had forecast the appointment of provincial assemblies, much as the Japanese prefectural assemblies had preceded the imperial Diet. But there were several Chinese provinces in which the entire island empire of Japan could have been placed. The next year the principle of indirect election was adopted with suffrage based upon either property, education, or former official service. Qualifications of a similar nature had been introduced by the American government in the Philippines. The new provincial assemblies met in October, 1909. Later decrees provided for municipal and village councils, and prefectural, department, and district councils. For these bodies a taxpaying qualification was adopted, and in every case the suffrage was limited to males twenty-five years of age. Indirect rather than direct election was the rule. By 1909 China had made provision for an elaborate system of local councils, but there were grave doubts as to the ability of the voters and their representatives to exercise these privileges. The next step was the summoning of a national assembly. This was convened at Peking in October, 1910, and its members were partly appointed and partly elected by the provincial assemblies. When the two

hundred members assembled, their inexperience and linguistic differences hampered their work. They promptly concerned themselves with the financial situation and with the summoning of a real elected parliament. The throne then promised to summon such an assembly in 1913, and a revised program of reforms was promulgated which would complete the undertakings in 1914 instead of 1917. In spite of the fact that half the members were appointed, the assembly engaged in heated controversies with the cabinet (which had been reorganized earlier in the year and now consisted of a prime minister and ten ministers of state), and it even petitioned the throne in favor of cutting off the queues, which met with no favor among the ruling Manchus. In January, 1911, the first session was dissolved. The second session was to assemble on the eve of the revolution.

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CHAPTER XXXVII

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CHINESE REPUBLIC

General Causes of the Revolution.—The reform movement in China during the past six years had so encouraged the friends of China that they thought the peaceful development of the empire was assured. The new education would prepare the people for political responsibilities, constitutional reform would substitute a limited monarchy for the former absolute Manchu régime, financial reforms would improve trade and industry and, while lessening the burdens on the people, would increase the revenues of the state, and while military and naval expansion was to be regretted it would free China from any foreign aggression and maintain internal peace. It was felt then, as now, that the peace of eastern Asia, and perhaps of the whole world, was dependent upon a strong and resolute China. Doubts, however, were expressed as to the sincerity of the Manchu court in its reform measures, and these increased after the strong Empress Dowager was succeeded by the weak prince regent. So much depended upon the personal attitude of the local officials that the movements could not advance uniformly. And among the most advanced reformers, the revolutionists, was the strong conviction that no genuine reform could be attained as long as an alien dynasty remained in power. However, it was very generally hoped that the reform movement would be one of the evolution rather than revolution. Those who knew China best were prepared for long delays, until the old-style and generally ignorant officials could be replaced by men with modern training. The revolution came with a suddenness for which few if any of the foreigners in China were prepared.

✓ **The Progressive Movement.**—Among the leaders of the moderate progressives were most of the returned scholars, the bulk of them having studied in Japan, and others in the United States and Europe. Some of these men held radical views, but most of them supported the Manchu reform program. In

addition were many young men, and some women, who had been trained in the missionary schools, which had furnished the only modern education before the new public schools were established in 1904. The products of the American missionary schools were usually sympathetic with republican institutions, and as a whole the students of the Protestant schools were keenly interested in political reforms. They led in the demand for a constitutional government, and the self-governing bodies which were created gave some of them a chance to participate in active politics. Among the outstanding leaders of the constitutionalists were Kang Yu-wei, who had directed the ill-fated 1898 reforms, and Liang Chih-chiao.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the Revolutionists.—The leader of the radical or revolutionary groups was a Cantonese, Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Born near Canton in 1866, he had been educated in missionary schools and was a professed Christian. As early as 1895 he had taken part in a revolutionary attempt to capture Canton, and he had fled from China with a price on his head. Seized in London by agents of the Chinese legation there, he had only been released through the demands of the British government. After the Boxer uprising he tried to organize another rebellion in Canton, and in the following years he traveled widely in the neighboring Asiatic countries, Hawaii, the United States, and Europe, organizing the Chinese abroad and securing financial help from them for a revolutionary movement. While resident in Japan in 1901 he formed the Tungmenghui (Alliance Society), which became the leading revolutionary organization in China, and his agents brought about a general coöperation among the other secret societies which were working to overthrow the dynasty. By 1911 the revolutionists possessed an organization whose effectiveness was promptly demonstrated.

Unrest in the Provinces.—In April, 1911, the revolutionists showed their hand at Canton, where the Tartar general was slain and the viceroy attacked. In the summer a serious movement arose in the Yangtze region for which the Tungmenghui was not directly to blame. The attempts to bring about greater centralization in the administration had been applied

to the Chinese railways, and in May, 1911, a loan of about \$30,000,000 was obtained from a four-power syndicate, representing certain banking groups in the United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany, mainly for the purpose of building railways in Hupeh and Hunan which would complete the Wuchang-Canton line and also extend westward into Szechwan. Some work had already been done on these lines under provincial charters, and much money had been invested. The local shareholders resented the conversion of these properties into national railways, and they soon aroused popular opposition against the general policy. Protests were sent to Peking from Szechwan, Hunan, Hupeh, and Kwangtung, and Chengtu, the capital of Szechwan, became the center of the opposition. On August 24th every shop in Chengtu was closed, an ominous sign, and when the viceroy attempted to arrest some of the stockholders and agitators a clash with the mob resulted. The trouble quickly spread through this great province, and troops were dispatched from Wuchang to strengthen the local forces. In these months also the lower Yangtze region was suffering from floods of appalling magnitude. Famine conditions prevailed, and thousands of desperate men were at hand to join in any tumult which would give them a chance to seize the food they craved.

The Revolution.—Taking advantage of the popular unrest and the withdrawal of some of the troops from Wuchang, the revolutionaries planned an attack there. On the 9th of October a bomb exploded in one of their workshops in the Russian concession at Hankow, on the opposite side of the Yangtze. A vigorous search by Russian and Chinese police resulted in the arrest of thirty-two suspects, of whom four were promptly beheaded, and the discovery of evidence of the revolutionary plot. The other leaders decided that they must strike promptly, and the next day attempted to take the viceroy's yamen at Wuchang, but here they were repulsed. About the same time some soldiers tried to steal a cannon, and for this they were promptly shot. This aroused many of the soldiers, who had already been tampered with by the agitators, and that night most of the troops mutinied and in

combination with the revolutionists captured the yamen and other public buildings.¹ The viceroy and the commander of the troops fled for their lives to a Chinese warship in the river, and by the 11th Wuchang, capital of the great provinces of Hunan and Hupeh, was in the hands of the rebels. General Li Yuan-hung, second in command of the imperial troops, now accepted the leadership of the revolutionary army. Hankow and Hanyang, with its great arsenal and ironworks, fell into the hands of the revolutionists.

Peking Takes Alarm.—Although the first reaction to the news from Wuchang tended to belittle the uprising, as not unlike a hundred others which had occurred since the Manchus conquered China, the authorities in Peking realized its threatening significance. The throne at once recalled Yuan Shih-kai from his retirement in Honan and appointed him viceroy of the revolted provinces. Yuan, who had by no means forgotten his summary dismissal some two years earlier, used the alleged reason, his ill health and leg affection, as an excuse for declining the post. Finally, when his terms as to the control of troops and funds were agreed to, he accepted the appointment, but he did not proceed to the front. With each day the revolutionary cause gained strength throughout central and south China. A potent battle cry was at hand, "Down with the Manchus." And no Chinese dared voice the opposing slogan of "Support the Manchus." It was a simple matter for the radical leaders to hold the Manchus responsible for all the ills which had befallen China without recalling that the Manchus at most numbered less than one per cent of the total population, while Chinese officials held all the lower and most of the higher posts in the administration. Time was to vindicate the Manchus, for the overthrow of the alien dynasty by no means brought about a Utopia. At Peking the National Assembly met for its second session, on October 22nd, and at once demanded the punishment of the viceroys at Wuchang and Chengtu and the minister of communications, who were held responsible for the outbreak. Eight days later, following an ancient custom, a penitential edict was issued in the name

¹ October 10th is celebrated as the natal day of the republic.

of the child emperor, who was then less than six years old. It is not without interest even at this time:

I have reigned for three years and have always acted conscientiously in the interests of the people, but I have not employed men properly, not having political skill. I have employed too many nobles in political positions, which contravenes Constitutionalism. On railway matters some one whom I trusted fooled me, and thus public opinion was opposed. When I urge reform the officials and gentry seize the opportunity to embezzle. When old laws are abolished high officials serve their own ends. Much of the people's money has been taken, but nothing to benefit the people has been achieved. On several occasions Edicts have promulgated laws, but none of them have been obeyed. People are grumbling, yet I do not know; disasters loom ahead, but I do not see.

The Szechwan trouble first occurred; the Wuchang rebellion followed; now alarming reports come from Shensi and Honan. In Canton and Kiangsi riots appear. The whole Empire is seething. The minds of the people are perturbed. The spirits of our nine late Emperors are unable properly to enjoy sacrifices, while it is feared the people will suffer grievously.

All these are my own fault, and hereby I announce to the world that I swear to reform, and with our soldiers and people, to carry out the Constitution faithfully, modifying legislation, developing the interests of the people, and abolishing their hardships—all in accordance with the wishes and interests of the people. Old laws that are unsuitable will be abolished. The union of Manchus and Chinese, mentioned by the late Emperor, I shall carry out. The Hupeh and Hunan grievances, though precipitated by the soldiers, were caused by Jui-cheng. I only blame myself because I mistakenly appreciated and trusted him.

However, now finances and diplomacy have reached bedrock. Even if we all unite, I still fear falling, but if the Empire's subjects do not regard and do not honor Fate and are easily misled by out-laws, then the future of China is unthinkable. I am most anxious day and night. My only hope is that my subjects will thoroughly understand.

On the same day an edict promised to appoint a responsible cabinet, in which no member of the imperial house would hold office. Yuan Shih-kai was then appointed prime minister, and the assembly exercised its new authority by electing him to

the same post on November 8th. He shortly afterward arrived in Peking and formed a cabinet on the 15th.

The Revolution in the Provinces.—While the remaining days of October were marked by uncertainty, and the strong Northern forces had retaken Hankow on the 29th, the revolution swept over the south in November. City after city and province after province declared its independence. Nanchang, Hangchow, Shanghai, Soochow, Ningpo, Canton, and Foochow joined the movement in the first eleven days of November. Anhwei declared its independence, to be followed by Yunnan and Kweichow, local risings occurred in Hunan, Shensi, and other places. Except for a few instances where Manchu quarters were raided by mobs there was surprisingly little loss of life. Nanking, the old southern capital, was held by Chang Hsun, a Chinese general who was to gain unenviable prominence in the first years of the republic. He suppressed with great vigor an attempted mutiny of his troops, and he held out against military and naval attacks from November 25th until December 2nd, when he escaped to the north and the revolutionists entered the city and sacked the Manchu quarter. In Peking the throne, on November 26th, swore to preserve the constitution as outlined in nineteen articles presented by the National Assembly.

Peace Conference.—The capture of Hanyang by Northern troops on November 27th, and of Nanking by the southerners on December 2nd, were the last important operations of the revolution. A three days' truce was arranged at Wuchang on December 3rd, and this was renewed and then extended for fifteen days and finally put into operation along the entire Yangtze. At this time Yuan Shih-kai expressed the opinion that a constitutional monarchy under the Manchus would meet with general approval. Although his efficient Northern troops could apparently defeat any force which the revolutionists could muster against them, it was also evident that the spread of the movement would have made it necessary to engage in a long and costly civil war before it could, if it were possible, be stamped out. The Manchus showed their eagerness to satisfy Chinese opinion when the prince regent resigned

his office, and an edict was issued permitting subjects to cut off their queues and introducing the Western calendar. Yuan Shih-kai, who was now actually in control in Peking, appointed Tang Shao-yi to represent him at a peace conference at Shanghai. The southern delegate was Wu Ting-fang, former minister at Washington. The sessions lasted from December 18th until the 31st, but nothing was accomplished, probably because Yuan would not agree to leave the form of government to a national convention so organized that its decision in favor of a republic might be predicted in advance.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen President.—While the peace conference was in session at Shanghai Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the leading spirit of the revolutionary movement, arrived there from Europe on December 25th. He had, therefore, taken no part in the operations which had destroyed the imperial power south of the Yangtze, nor had he been involved in the rivalry which had already arisen between the leaders at Wuchang and Shanghai. At Nanking a national council had assembled. The members were in some cases appointed by provincial assemblies, in other cases by the local officials or group which had taken over power, and there were some who apparently were self-appointed. But they assumed a representative capacity, and on December 28th elected Dr. Sun Yat-sen president of the republic. This action accounted, in large part, for the failure of the peace negotiations. In the south a republic had been proclaimed, while in Peking Yuan Shih-kai was the real head of the imperial government. During the next month Yuan was engaged in bringing the Manchu rulers, (for the young empress dowager was associated with the boy emperor) to agree to abdicate, and in negotiations with Nanking as to the treatment to be accorded the Manchus and as to the eventual form of government. Neither matter was a simple one. In Peking some die-hard Manchu princes delayed a decision, while at Nanking Yuan was accused of bad faith. About the 15th of January Dr. Sun offered to step aside in Yuan's favor, if he would proclaim his absolute support of republicanism, and he made his position clear in a dispatch to Dr. Wu Ting-fang on the 22nd. When almost all the imperial gen-

erals in the north memorialized in favor of abdication, on the 28th, the Manchu cause was irretrievably lost.

Abdication of the Empress Dowager and Emperor.—After some further negotiations as to the treatment of the Manchus, three edicts of abdication were issued on February 12th. The first announced the abdication of the empress dowager and the emperor and instructed Yuan Shih-kai to organize a provisional republican government. The second summarized the agreed terms respecting the imperial family and the non-Chinese subjects, and the third explained the reasons for abdication and gave instructions for the maintenance of order during the interim. The terms of abdication provided that the emperor should retain his title and be accorded the respect due to a foreign sovereign, an annuity of 4,000,000 taels would be granted him, his private property would be respected, a palace assigned to him, and the mausoleum of the late emperor would be completed at the cost of the republic. The imperial clansmen, and the Manchus, Mongols, Mohammedans, and Tibetans were guaranteed their private property, their titles, and full equality with the Chinese.

Yuan Shih-kai President.—The Nanking council did not welcome the establishment of a republic under Yuan Shih-kai by imperial mandate. The latter proclaimed the republic, but at the same time notified Nanking of his loyalty to the new political system. Therefore, on the 14th, Dr. Sun presented his resignation to the National Council, and the next day Yuan Shih-kai was elected president. Nanking was selected as the capital, and on the 20th General Li Yuan-hung was chosen vice-president. Yuan, however, was unwilling to leave Peking, for his main support lay in the north. When a delegation of republican leaders proceeded there to confer with him the mutiny of a division near Peking drove them for refuge to the legation quarter, and other mutinies at Tientsin, Paoting, and Mukden made the presence of Yuan in the north seem imperative. The mutinies, it should be said, were in the nature of direct levies for their overdue pay, and after a few rich shops and pawnshops had been looted the troops returned peacefully to their barracks. The example

was, however, a threatening one and was often followed in later years. On March 10th a provisional constitution was proclaimed at Nanking which presumably remained in force until the permanent constitution was proclaimed on October 10, 1923, and on the same day Yuan was inaugurated in Peking.

Notable Features of the Revolution.—Bearing in mind the failure of the terrible Taiping rebellion, which raged for fourteen years and carried devastation over so many provinces, we should examine the reasons for the rapid success of the 1911-12 revolution. First we will find that the movement was organized in a way which had not been possible earlier. There were trained leaders, few to be sure, but enough to direct the movement. These were in the main the products of modern education, gained abroad, in the mission schools, and in the recently established public schools. A nucleus of these had been trained in revolutionary methods as members of the Tungmenghui and other secret societies. In addition, the modern postal service, the telegraphs, and the railroads furthered their organization. These leaders were able to count upon a new spirit of coöperation and a rising sense of nationalism, which had been stimulated by the "rights recovery" agitation of the last few years. The actual fighting affected a very small area, and was over within three months. This may be explained by the fact that whereas in France and Russia, at the time of their revolutions, there were many loyalists, in China, outside of the northern provinces, there were almost none. Imperial troops fraternized with the revolutionists and in many cases accepted service under their flag. China was also spared the evils of foreign intervention, which drove the French and Russians to such drastic reprisals in 1794 and 1919. The good order which prevailed during the months of uncertainty was another surprising feature. This was due to the self-governing capacity of the Chinese. The villages had always been governed by their local elders; the withdrawal of the nearest imperial representatives affected them not at all. In the larger towns, where imperial appointees resided, the local guilds or a revolutionary group took

over power. In the provinces the central revolutionary body appointed the leading officials. Except for the few instances where Manchu residential quarters were attacked and looted, the only disturbances outside of the war zone were occasioned by the looting of unpaid troops in the north and by robber bands who took advantage of the breakdown in the administration to pillage on a large scale. This was especially true in the famine-stricken region between the two contending armies. Although the revolution broke out only a little more than ten years after the allied forces had evacuated Peking, and many foreigners feared that the disorders accompanying an overthrow of government would cover attacks upon foreigners and Chinese Christians, the event proved very different. Foreigners were protected in life and property, except for destruction which accompanied the actual fighting. Many missionaries were withdrawn from the interior but only four foreigners lost their lives, and these were due to accidental causes or bandit outrages. The Chinese Christians were protected, and no manifestation of the old anti-foreign, anti-Christian Boxer spirit was found. In fact, a convenient place for refuge was often a Christian mission or a Y. M. C. A. hall. The fact that so many of the new leaders were products of the mission schools gave their old teachers a position of influence never held before. Western friends were appealed to for advice, and it was natural for the missionaries to look with great sympathy upon a movement in which their protégés played such a prominent rôle. And the period was one of the great religious tolerance. The provisional constitution guaranteed freedom of religion to the citizens. Dr. Sun Yat-sen was a Christian, and Yuan Shih-kai and Li Yuan-hung were favorable to missionary work, and, at the request of the president, April 27th was set apart as a day of prayer for the welfare of China in all Christian churches.

Problems Confronting the Republic.—The new republic faced appalling difficulties, which were scarcely realized at the time. The makers had at hand no sound material with which to build. First of all was the dense illiteracy and the political

inexperience of the people. At the establishment of the republic a most optimistic estimate would have placed the percentage of literacy at five per cent. Now republican institutions are the most difficult of all political systems to function adequately, and the first requisite is an enlightened citizenship, not merely able to read, but also able to form independent judgments upon what they hear and read. It soon became evident that only a change in name was possible, that the Chinese republic would be governed much as the old empire had been. In addition there was the vast extent of the domain, even when the outlying dominions were overlooked, the inadequate means of communication, the sectional differences and rivalries which could only subside as better communications bound the country more closely together, the inadequate fiscal system which brought to Peking insufficient funds and yet imposed heavy burdens upon the people, and, finally, the dangers of foreign complications, for the old imperialism had not disappeared and there were foreign powers which were not averse to fishing in troubled waters. All these problems could be resolved in time, but it would take no little time. It was unfortunate that the Western peoples, and especially the Americans, accepted the name "republic" as connoting a form of government such as prevailed in the West. They therefore expected too much of the first republic in Asia, and then became impatient when their own estimates were not realized. Words play an important part in the formulation of opinions, and the "Republic of China" was assured of sympathy while the "Empire of Japan" was as certain to be looked upon with distrust by all believers in democracy.

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CHAPTER XXXVIII

THE FAR EAST IN THE WORLD WAR

Japan Enters the World War.—Leaving for the present a study of the early years of the Chinese republic we will consider the next event of international importance, the World War and its repercussions in the Far East. At first thought one might expect the nations of eastern Asia to be immune from a catastrophe which arose out of European rivalries and found its immediate cause in a dispute between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. The former country declared war on July 28, 1914. Germany declared war upon Russia on August 1st, and on France on the 3rd. The British ultimatum to Germany expired at midnight on August 4th, and war was declared as of 11 A.M. of the 5th. With Britain drawn into the war Japan at once became involved through the Anglo-Japanese alliance. It will be remembered that this alliance was first negotiated in 1902, revised and renewed in 1905, and again revised in 1911. The purpose of the last revision was to relieve either party of the necessity of entering a war against a country with which it possessed a treaty of general arbitration. Such a treaty had been negotiated between the United States and Great Britain (but it later failed of approval by the United States Senate). So confident was Japan that she would not become embroiled with the United States in defense of her interests *in the Far East* that she was quite willing to accept a modification in the terms of the alliance which would, it was then believed, deprive her of the assistance of Great Britain in such a war with the United States. It might be added that the exact terms of the alliance were constantly misstated, especially in the American press, to the effect that Britain would have to aid Japan in *any* war, such as one which might arise over the treatment of Japanese emigrants in the United States. This was not provided for in the treaty. On August 7th, the British ambassador in Tokyo made a formal request that Japan join Great Britain in the

European war. This caused the Japanese government to consider whether the general peace of eastern Asia and the special interests of Great Britain there were in jeopardy. The presence of a fortified German naval base at Tsingtao, and of German commerce-destroyers already operating in Eastern waters caused Japan to reply, on the 9th, that she was prepared to accept the obligations of the alliance. A discussion then took place, among the Japanese naval and military authorities and presumably with the British representatives, as to the nature of Japan's participation. The usual conference was held before the throne, on the 15th, attended by the Elder Statesmen, the cabinet, and the chiefs of the general staff and the naval board, and that evening an ultimatum was dispatched to Germany.

The Japanese Ultimatum.—The ultimatum was in the nature of "advice," which recalls Germany's "advice" to Japan in 1895:

Considering it highly important and necessary, in the present situation, to take measures to remove all causes of disturbance to the peace of the Far East and to safeguard the general interests contemplated by the Agreement of Alliance between Japan and Great Britain, in order to secure a firm and enduring peace in eastern Asia, the establishment of which is the aim of the said Agreement, the Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believe it their duty to give advice to the Imperial German Government to carry out the following two propositions: (1) Withdraw their men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds from the Japanese and Chinese waters, and disarm at once all that cannot be so withdrawn; (2) Deliver up to the Japanese authorities, by September 15th, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiaochow with a view to eventual restoration of the same to China.

This "advice" must be unconditionally accepted by August 23rd. Meanwhile German reservists were hurrying to Tsingtao from China, Japan, and near-by places, and, when the German government refused to reply to the ultimatum, war was declared on its expiration.

The International Situation.—At the beginning of the World War there was much uncertainty in the neutral countries as

to the causes of the conflict and the responsibility resting upon the two parties. This was true in the United States, while in Japan, far removed from Europe, there was even less knowledge of the issues. Opinions differed as to the justice of the cause of the warring powers. Among the better-informed people in Japan, including the naval leaders, the political liberals, and many of the business community, the majority supported the aims of Great Britain, France, and Russia. But in the higher scholastic circles there were some who had studied in Germany and the army had for long looked to Germany as a model, so that many of the higher officers counted upon an easy victory for the splendid German fighting machine. The government, as distinguished from the popular groups, could have no uncertainty. Japan had her treaty of alliance with Great Britain, the very corner-stone of her foreign policy since 1902. She had not the slightest intention of abrogating this treaty and proving herself false to her ally in time of need. She also had an *entente* with France, signed in 1907, and a firm understanding with Russia based upon an *entente* in 1907 and treaties in 1910 and 1912. With Germany she had no *entente* of any kind, while she remembered Germany's inexcusable interference in 1895 for which she was compensated by China with the lease of a naval base on the coast, only a few hundred miles from Japan. Yet in spite of these strong treaty obligations there were irresponsible writers who frequently alleged that Japan was about to abandon her allies and throw in her lot with Germany. Such conduct, in addition to being dishonorable in the extreme—and the Japanese have rather high standards of honor—would have been stupid as well, for Japan would have been exposed to the reprisals of the maritime powers while Germany was beleaguered behind her intrenchments. On the 19th of October, 1914, Japan became by treaty one of the four allies in the war, to be joined the next year by Italy.


✓ **The War in the Far East.**—Japan's contribution to the allied cause would consist of (1) the capture of the German naval base at Tsingtao; (2) the capture of German islands in the Pacific which might be used as bases; (3) operations against

the German naval vessels and commerce-destroyers in the Pacific and Indian oceans. In all these operations she worked in harmonious coöperation with the British forces.

The Capture of Tsingtao.—Tsingtao lies 566 miles from Shimonoseki in Japan. There the Germans had established a naval base, well protected by a double line of forts. But the garrison consisted of only about 4,500 men, many of them reservists. On the very day that war was declared, August 23rd, a naval bombardment began, but a land force would be needed to force a capitulation. The precedents for what followed were all laid down during the Russo-Japanese War, and at that time were considered to be quite regular and proper. Again a European power at war with Japan possessed a fortified base on the coast of China. To attempt to land troops within the leased territory would be suicidal. So, as in 1904, Chinese territory had become involved in the hostilities. At that time the two belligerents acted without thought of China, and it was only the request of the United States which brought from Japan a statement that she would confine her operations to regions occupied by Russian forces, while Russia insisted upon a free hand in all Manchuria. But in 1914 Japan notified China of her plans against Tsingtao as early as August 20th, and the day after the Japanese landed at Lungkow, from which they might march overland against Tsingtao, the Chinese proclaimed a war zone, on September 3rd. Unlike the Germans, who smashed their way through Belgium in spite of heroic resistance, the Japanese advanced across Shantung with the permission of China. As soon as the outlying German troops were driven back within their defenses the Japanese began to land troops within fifteen miles of Tsingtao, on the 14th, and the British began to land their detachment on the 24th. During the investment of Tsingtao the Japanese sent a force to take possession of the German railway which ran to Tsinan, 256 miles away. For this the Japanese were much criticized, but it is extremely doubtful if any allied commander, in any war zone, would have permitted a German-owned and operated railway to exist behind his lines. The operations against Tsingtao were conducted cautiously, for

the fate of the fortress was beyond doubt and a needless loss of life was to be avoided. The final advance began on the last day of October, and on November 7th the forts were assaulted early in the morning, and the city surrendered at 7 A.M. For a second time the Japanese had been compelled to spend blood and treasure to capture a European fortress erected on the coast of China. The German prisoners of war were treated with great generosity, and even a hostile critic remarks that "the siege of Tsingtao will always stand out as remarkably free from hatred." But while it was a fairly simple thing to capture Tsingtao, the disposition of the German leasehold and interests became one of the most widely discussed problems of the peace settlement—the famous Shantung controversy.

Naval Operations.—While the siege of Tsingtao was progressing, Japanese naval units captured the German islands north of the equator, the Australasian forces taking those south of the line. The Marshall Islands were occupied on October 6th and the Caroline group a week or so later. One of these islands was Yap, which later figured in a Japanese-American discussion because of the cable station there. The Japanese also swept the Pacific and Indian oceans in coöperation with the British until all the German naval forces there were destroyed. They sent ships to convoy some of the first contingents of Australian and New Zealand troops to the Suez Canal. This mission of the Japanese navy in Australasian waters was very different from what the war-scare propagandists had earlier portrayed. Up to this time Japan believed that her full duty under the alliance could be met in the Far East. She refused to consider unofficial attempts made by France to have her send an expeditionary force to the Balkans or the Western front. The difficulties of transport and maintenance would have been insuperable in view of the long voyage from Japan to the Mediterranean. Japanese industries worked at full blast to supply Russia with munitions and stores, and Japan presented her ally with three warships which she had captured in 1905. But in 1917, when the Germans launched their campaign of ruthless submarine warfare, in which Japanese merchant ships were destroyed, she agreed



to send three destroyer divisions to the Mediterranean, where they performed useful service until the end of the war conveying allied troopships and merchantmen through those submarine-infested waters.

Lansing-Ishii Notes.—The entrance of the United States into the war was soon to turn the tide on the western front and eventually bring victory to the allied and associated powers. Very promptly missions were sent to Washington by the European associates to arrange for closer coöperation, and especially for men, money, and supplies. Japan, which needed none of these things, sent a mission headed by Viscount Ishii who had recently been minister of foreign affairs. The purpose of his discussions with Secretary Lansing was to secure an agreement which would quiet the German-directed anti-Japanese propaganda in the United States. The growing distrust of Japan since 1905, heightened by difficulties respecting the treatment of Japanese in the Western states, and by Japan's aggressive policy in China, had provided a well-tilled soil for the seeds of suspicion. An exchange of notes took place between the two representatives on November 2, 1917. In brief, both countries pledged anew their support of the independence and territorial integrity of China and of the principle of the open-door. In fact they even went further and said:

Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed to the acquisition by any government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China.

This was, on the part of Japan, a full acceptance of American policy toward China, and as such it merely renewed and extended the views exchanged in the Root-Takahira notes of 1908. One paragraph of the new notes, however, was to be taken out of its context and given a prominence far beyond its due. It read:

The Governments of the United States and Japan recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries,

and, consequently, the government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous.

Even if this comprised the entire note, without the strong affirmations which immediately followed, it would simply be a statement of the existing facts. Japan did have special interests in China represented by her resident population there, which exceeded any other foreign group, by her invested capital, and the various economic privileges granted her by Chinese treaties. If anyone had denied that the United States had special interests in the two Americas and "particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous" the persons who most criticized this recognition of Japan's interest in China would have taken most offense. It was not known at the time that two years earlier, on March 13, 1915, Secretary of State Bryan in a dispatch to the Japanese ambassador used these words: "The United States frankly recognizes that territorial contiguity creates special relations between Japan and these districts," by which he had in mind Shantung, South Manchuria, and Eastern Inner Mongolia. Viscount Ishii simply asked to have this statement transferred from an unprinted official dispatch to a public exchange of notes. In China, however, the paragraph was interpreted to mean that the United States would give Japan a free hand in those regions, again in spite of the clear and precise undertakings to the contrary, and the notes became the occasion for much criticism of the United States. It may be added here that, as a result of the Washington conference, the notes were abrogated on March 30, 1923, and the principles of the four-power pact were to take their place.

✓ **China Enters the War.**—China had no treaty obligation to enter the war as did Japan. There was little reason, if any, why she should be drawn into the conflict. While Europe was engaged in this gigantic struggle she would be free from political pressure and her goods would find a ready market. Here, apparently, was China's chance to work out her own destiny free, at least, from European interference. In the early days of the war there is little doubt that the bulk of

informed Chinese were more sympathetic with Germany than with her foes. This was very natural. The first three allies had done little to win China's affection, and when Japan joined them this only alienated the Chinese the more. The Germans, while they had behaved very badly at Kiaochow in 1897 and the next few years, had since 1905 changed their policy to one of friendliness to China. German merchants throughout the country were well liked and their trade was growing rapidly at the expense, mainly, of the British. If, as has been alleged, Yuan Shih-kai offered to join the British and Japanese against Tsingtao in August, 1914, the official record is not available nor would such a move on his part have reflected the general sentiment in Peking. A year later, when the attempt to make him emperor was gaining headway, he offered to join the allies, but as China could bring no real assistance to their cause, and as the gesture was primarily made in order to win their support for his monarchical designs, the offer was refused. Then came the failure of the imperial plan, and Yuan's death followed in June, 1916. During these months, which were marked by a serious rebellion in the southwest and south, China had no intention of entering the World War. Early in 1917 the strained relations between the United States and Germany came to a head when ruthless submarine warfare was proclaimed. The United States on February 3rd severed diplomatic relations with Germany and sent a statement to *all* neutral powers asking them to join in this move. This request was laid before the Chinese government on the 4th, and warmly pressed by the American minister, Dr. Reinsch. The ministers of the allies supported the American proposal, and Japan, who had not favored China's participation in the war, agreed in a secret understanding with France, on March 1st, to use her influence to have China break with Germany. The allies, it should be pointed out, were anxious to have China break relations, but not to declare war. The former would permit China to seize the interned German merchant ships, which would then be available for allied use, as well as to drive out the German minister, consuls, and nationals from China. Finally, after much discussion, the

Chinese National Assembly, on March 10th-11th, voted to sever relations, and this was done by a note to Germany on March 14th, some five weeks after the American request. By this time the Chinese government was anxious to enter the war, if the United States would be her ally and her strong support at the resulting peace conference. On the very day that relations with Germany were broken the foreign minister, Dr. Wu Ting-fang, began to bargain with the allies as to what they would grant China if she entered the war. He asked for a suspension of the Boxer indemnity payments for ten years, an increase in tariff rates, and the removal of foreign troops from Peking and along the railway in North China. The United States, on April 6th, declared war upon Germany. Under the circumstances it would be expected that China would promptly follow her lead. But the situation was complicated by internal politics. All parties were agreed as to the desirability of entering the war, but their motives differed. There was nowhere any bitter hatred of the Germans or a sense of any special wrongs, except the loss of some Chinese lives by a submarine attack. But the military leaders saw in the war a chance to secure money and supplies from abroad, which would strengthen their hold upon China, while the parliamentarians wished to be associated with the United States at the peace conference. Parliament, therefore, refused to pass a declaration of war as long as General Tuan Chi-jui was premier. Such a bill was submitted on May 7th, but parliament replied that the cabinet must be reorganized before it would act. The prospect of war, which in most countries quiets political strife, only fanned its flames in Peking. The generals, who really controlled the provinces, advised President Li Yuan-hung to dissolve the National Assembly. This he had no legal right to do. On May 23rd he dismissed the premier, which caused more protests from the generals. On June 6th the United States sent a message urging the maintenance of domestic peace, and stating that whether China entered the war or not was a minor matter compared with the resumption of Chinese political entity and the progress of national development. This dispatch answers the oft-re-

peated statement that the United States urged China to enter the war. She did not. Her urging ceased officially, although the American minister exceeded his instructions, when China accepted her advice and broke off relations with Germany on March 14th. The American note, as might be expected, could not quiet the political strife. The president then invited an old-time general, Chang Hsun, military governor of Anhwei, to mediate between the generals and parliament. On his advice the president illegally dissolved parliament on June 13th. This promptly caused the revolt of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Yunnan provinces, and China has been divided into two or more governments ever since that day. The next move of General Chang Hsun was to bring up his troops to Peking and, on July 1st, proclaim the restoration of the Manchu emperor. The city was soon ablaze with dragon flags, and President Li fled for refuge to the Japanese legation. But the other generals could not see one of their number in control of the situation, so, led by the deposed premier, Tuan Chi-jui, they advanced upon the capital. The republic was restored on the 8th and Peking taken on the 12th. Chang Hsun in turn fled to the Netherlands legation, but the boy emperor was not punished for his innocent participation in this *coup d'état*. President Li, however, refused to resume the presidential duties and another general, Feng Kuo-cheng, then acting as vice-president, succeeded him. With parliament out of the way, and the military party in complete control, war was declared on Germany on August 14th by presidential proclamation, another violation of the provisional constitution. All treaties with Germany were, by this act, declared abrogated. In return for entering the war the treaty powers who were associated in the struggle agreed to postpone the Boxer payments due them for five years (but Russia would only do so for one-third of her amount), as well as to raise the customs duties to an effective five per cent. Of course China could take no part in the military or naval operations of the war because she was involved in a North *versus* South war of her own. The Peking government, controlled by the militarists, was able to borrow money freely to equip armies, which were

used to support the generals against their domestic foes. The worst period of modern Chinese politics began with the dissolution of parliament in 1917 and continued through the next year. In 1918 Japan entered into a military alliance with China, but its purpose was to permit Japan to use North Manchuria as a base of operations against Soviet Russia. However, many thousands of Chinese did render useful service to the allies. These were Chinese coolies, recruited, transported, and paid by Great Britain and France, who served behind the western front and when the Germans broke through in 1918 fought manfully in self-defense.

Siam Enters the War.—There were few regions in all Asia which did not become involved in the World War. All the vast possessions of Russia, Great Britain, and France, and the smaller holdings of the United States and Portugal, were drawn in with their masters. Japan and China followed by their own act. But before China finally took this step the kingdom of Siam had declared war on July 22, 1917. This was directly due to the example of the United States, but it was desired by the European allies in order to secure interned German ships and wipe out propaganda bases of the Germans. Some Siamese officers visited the western front, but no military operations were attempted. Siam entered the war without guaranties or compensation.

The Siberian Expedition.—Early in 1918 the war took a new turn which involved the Far East as never before. The Russian revolution of March, 1917, had disorganized, but by no means destroyed, the efficiency of the Russian resistance to Germany. But the triumph of the Bolsheviks in November pointed to a separate peace with Germany, which was signed at Brest-Litovsk on March 3, 1918. The eastern front, which had divided the armies of Germany and Austria-Hungary, now disappeared and a united onslaught on the western front was bound to follow. In those days when the situation in Russia was little known there was fear among the allies that the Germans would make use of Russian resources for their own needs, that they would arm the German and Austrian prisoners in Siberia and seize the vast accumulation of munitions

and supplies at Vladivostok, and even an alliance between Bolshevik Russia and Germany was considered possible. Japan was most vitally interested in any Russo-German combination in the Far East. The British and French, we have reason to believe, urged her to go in and restore the eastern front. This would have been a mad enterprise, with only the Trans-Siberian Railway as a line of communications and a hostile population interposed. On April 5th, after a national had been killed there, a landing party of Japanese occupied Vladivostok, and British and American sailors soon joined them. Thus this valuable seaport, the terminus of the Trans-Siberian, with all the munitions there, was safe from German control. During these months a large number of Czecho-Slovak troops, who had deserted from the Austrians to fight under the Russian flag for the independence of their country, were trying to make their way across Siberia so that they might be brought around to the western front. Intervention in their favor was now advocated, and after much discussion the United States proposed a program. The associated powers were to help the Czecho-Slovaks to escape from the Bolsheviks and others who were trying to stop their eastward advance, and they were to steady any efforts toward self-government which the Russians themselves might make. The powers, including the United States and Japan, pledged themselves to respect the territorial integrity of Russia and to abstain from all interference in her internal politics, and they promised to withdraw their troops as soon as these objects were achieved. An international expeditionary force was now created, the understanding being that each power would contribute 8,000 men. The United States sent two regiments, possibly 8,000 men, the Canadians 5,000, the British a battalion, the Italians a battalion, the French only some officers. But the Japanese, who had most at stake, sent in troops to make up for the deficiency in the other units. These troops were not all sent into Siberia, but many were concentrated in North Manchuria near the frontier. Whereas in 1900 the allied expeditionary force which marched to Peking worked in harmony, with generous rivalry, the force in Siberia in

1918-20 was soon involved in dissensions which at times assumed a serious aspect. The Japanese military authorities, who had always thought of Russia as the traditional land foe of Japan, may have considered this a splendid opportunity to strengthen the position of Japan in eastern Siberia. Certainly the Japanese and the Americans soon disagreed in policy, because the Japanese believed the Bolsheviks, who had made peace with Germany, were real enemies of the allies, while the Americans wished to refrain from any interference in the domestic politics of Russia. The several forces moved to the west and restored railway communications as far as Lake Baikal. The Czecho-Slovaks were rescued, and the last detachment sailed from Valdivostok in September, 1920. But at the beginning of that year the American government believed its purpose had been accomplished, and withdrew its troops. Japan was left alone to stem the red menace, as she called it. But in Japan there was great criticism of the cost and political dangers involved in this intervention, and a way out was afforded her by the Washington conference. In October, 1922, all her troops were withdrawn from the Russian mainland and as soon as a treaty could be negotiated with Russia, in 1925, the troops who occupied northern Sakhalin, pending reparation for the massacre of 350 Japanese at Nikolaievsk in March, 1920, were ordered home. Between 1918 and 1922 the Japanese annexation of eastern Siberia was considered, by certain publicists, as a matter of course, but instead Japan kept her plighted word.

✓ **The Peace Conference.**—The World War finally closed when an armistice was granted to Germany on November 11, 1918. The next step must be the negotiation of the terms of peace. Japan sent her representatives to Versailles with all the assurance which one of the four allies should possess. She would refrain from any interference with purely European questions, but in the Far East she believed she was entitled to consideration. Aside from a fair share of any indemnity which might be imposed upon Germany she desired, following the precedent of the Russo-Japanese War, the transfer to herself of the German rights in Shantung and the possession of the islands

occupied by her naval forces. She had protected herself, so she thought, by securing in advance the consent of her allies to support her claims. This was obtained in the secret understandings of February and March, 1917, with Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy. Japan had done this because she knew that her European allies had, in 1915, made agreements as to the disposition of the German spoils in Europe, and did not wish to be ignored when the Far East was under discussion. With China also, in 1915 and 1918, she had entered into agreements, the first of which gave China's approval in advance to any decision the conference might arrive at concerning the German rights, and the second, after China entered the war, was an additional recognition of Japan's position in Shantung. Japan also hoped to secure the adoption of the principle of "just treatment" of all the nationals of the proposed League of Nations in the member states. China, on the other hand, sought justice at Versailles. She could hardly urge her rights or her rewards because she had taken no part in the defeat of the Central Powers. Her case must be argued on a lofty moral plane. Her first desire was to secure a revision of her existing treaty obligations, such as extraterritoriality, a conventional tariff, the Boxer indemnity, withdrawal of foreign troops, police, posts, and such. This was the first time China officially voiced her dissatisfaction with the "unequal treaties." But she was soon advised that the purpose of the peace conference was to formulate terms with Germany, and not to consider the special problems of any of the belligerent powers. In addition she sought the direct restitution to her of the German interests which the Japanese had acquired in 1914. On January 27, 1919, Japan presented her claim for the German interests in Shantung and the islands. The next day China presented her case. Aside from the general desirability of securing these German interests, her plea stressed the fact that China's declaration of war abrogated all existing treaties with Germany, so the Germans possessed no rights or interests in Shantung which might be transferred to the Japanese. On the 29th it was decided that the German

colonies must be transferred to the associated powers, which would intrust them to different states as mandatories. Japan therefore lost one of her desiderata, although she was later given a mandate for the German islands north of the equator. On February 13th Japan presented her amendment to the covenant of the League of Nations in the following form:

The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree to accord, as soon as possible, to all aliens, nationals of states, members of the League equal and just treatment in every respect, making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account of their race or nationality.

From this time the Japanese claim to the German interests and their appeal for racial equality were linked in the discussions. China presented a written brief in support of her claims in February, which was published and widely circulated and has since become the most frequently cited source of information for this controversy. While consideration of the Shantung matter was postponed the Japanese, on April 11th, presented a compromise amendment on the subject of racial equality which called for "equality of nations and just treatment of their nationals." Although a majority of the committee supported the amendment, it was rejected on the ground that it required unanimity. Japan had, therefore, lost a second of her desiderata. She was, therefore, in no mood to compromise on the Shantung rights. Her reply to China was presented on April 22nd and has never been published, although most of the text may be found in a study of the Versailles conference.¹ While expressing strong dissent from some of China's supporting statements, the Japanese pointed out that they had taken the German interests by right of conquest; that China, in 1915, had agreed to accept the decision of the peace conference; that in 1918 China had recognized anew Japan's position in Shantung; that Japan had promised to restore the leasehold to China; and closed by saying: "The impression derived from the examination of the Chinese Memorandum is that Japan must bear the burden of all sacri-

¹ Gallagher, *America's Aims and Asia's Aspirations*,

fices, whilst China reaps all the benefits.”² In spite of the confusion in thought which existed at the time we should remember that Japan had promised to restore to China the only Chinese possession which Germany had deprived her of, namely, the lease of Kiaochow and sovereign rights therein. But there was no good reason why China should obtain, without any compensation or sacrifice, the German properties, the railway, the mines, the harbor improvements, and the public buildings which had been built in Shantung at the expense of Germany. In spite of Japanese protests the draft of the Covenant of the League of Nations was adopted, without the racial equality amendment, on April 28th. Two days later the Council of Three (President Wilson, Premier Lloyd George, and Premier Clemenceau) decided in favor of Japan’s claim to the German interests in Shantung. President Wilson and the other American commissioners had used their influence to secure a decision in favor of China, but Lloyd George and Clemenceau felt bound by the agreements of 1917, the Japanese obligations under which had already been carried out. China refused to sign the peace treaty and the Shantung controversy was left as one of the troublesome after-maths of the conference.

Far East in the Treaty of Versailles.—Under the treaty signed on June 28th Japan received the German rights in Shantung. These consisted of the Kiaochow leasehold, which she had already promised to return to China, the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway (256 miles), which she had promised to turn into a Sino-Japanese enterprise, three mines, and all the German public property. Later she was awarded a mandate for the Marshall and Caroline islands. With all the other powers she was to receive payment for actual damages (against which the value of the German properties in Shantung were credited) and a share of German tonnage in place of tonnage destroyed. China received relief from further payments of the Boxer indemnity to Germany, possession of the German

² China, in 1918, gave Japan two new railway loan concessions in Shantung on which an advance of 20,000,000 yen was made, and Japan agreed in the event that the German interests were awarded to her to turn the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway into a joint Sino-Japanese enterprise.

concessions at Hankow and Tientsin and all public property there except the consulates, freedom from German extraterritoriality, and the restoration of the astronomical instruments taken from Peking in 1900. As China refused to sign the treaty and made peace by presidential proclamation on September 15, 1919, these terms were incorporated in the Sino-German commercial treaty of May 20, 1921. By signing the treaty of peace with Austria-Hungary, September 10, 1919, China obtained similar advantages and also became a member of the League of Nations. Siam, in conclusion, signed the Versailles Treaty and secured all German public property except the legation and consulates, and relief from German extraterritoriality; and similar terms were made with Austria-Hungary.

Summary.—The Shantung articles of the Versailles Treaty proved to be one of the principal objections to its approval raised in the United States Senate. No feature of the treaty outside of the Covenant of the League of Nations received such attention there.³ In China the disappointment was bitter, and a formidable boycott against Japanese goods was at once set in operation. Japan sought to open negotiations with China for the restoration of the leasehold and even offered to improve the original terms on which it would be based, but China refused to discuss the matter. The Shantung controversy was a rankling sore in the relations between China and Japan, and between Japan and many Western nationals, until it was settled during the Washington conference in 1922. While it may be said that the decision of the peace conference was in accord with former precedents—and with the general spirit which prevailed at the time—it would have been better, as a purely practical proposition quite aside from any question of sentiment, if Japan had sought to placate her neighbor and had accepted the advice of the American commissioners. But we can also understand why the Japanese delegates, who had been defeated in respect to the German islands and the racial equality clause, were unwilling to re-

³ Certain members of the Senate erroneously believed that the treaty would transfer to Japan "the great province of Shantung," and therefore the United States should not be a partner in such an iniquity.

turn empty-handed when their European associates were securing so many desirable advantages.

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CHAPTER XXXIX

INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS AND ADJUSTMENTS

Japan Since the Russian War.—The war with Russia ended with Japan recognized as one of the great powers, certainly the strongest in Asia, and any question of this recognition was to be removed at the close of the World War. But she also emerged from the struggle burdened with a heavy war debt and faced with new responsibilities on the continent. The war debt caused a continuance of the heavy war taxes, while the people and the industrialists demanded a reduction in taxation, which could only come with a curtailment of expenditure. For the next twenty years financial questions vied with suffrage extension as the most important domestic political questions of the hour. The military leaders believed that the army and navy should be improved and enlarged in order to defend Japan's new interests on the continent. Before the Russo-Japanese War the army had consisted of thirteen divisions; after the war it was increased to nineteen, and the military leaders planned an extension up to twenty-five divisions. But every time the necessary funds for a gradual enlargement were asked for, the Diet refused to appropriate a single yen. It was not until Japan became engaged in the World War, in 1915, that two additional divisions were provided. This struggle between the military and the political leaders should modify many of the current estimates of Japan's military policies. In the same way the program for naval expansion, though more popular with the people, was only partly carried out. If, in these years, a general movement for the reduction of armaments had been suggested, Japan would have given it whole-souled approval. In 1911 the treaties negotiated in 1894 would expire and Japan now desired to secure absolute tariff autonomy. The American treaty, however, ran a year longer than the others, but Washington showed its friendliness by negotiating the first

of the new treaties, which was signed on February 21, 1911. This in turn would continue for twelve years and might then be denounced. Japan secured the principle of tariff autonomy, but negotiated reciprocal conventional tariffs with several of the European nations. In the case of Great Britain, which was a free-trade country, the reciprocity consisted in her promise not to levy an import duty on Japanese goods in return for a low tariff on various British products.

The Meiji Emperor.—On the 30th of July, 1912, the great Emperor Meiji died in his palace at Tokyo. His reign covered the whole period of Japan's rise from a dual government and feudal weakness to an assured position among the nations of the world. A wise ruler who rarely, if ever, imposed his will upon his trusted advisers, he won and held the unquestioned devotion and loyalty of his subjects. His son Yoshihito, who took as his reign name Taisho (Great Righteousness) succeeded him.

Political Crises.—After the death of the Meiji Emperor the politics of Japan became greatly confused, and six ministries rose and fell in the next nine years. In November, 1912, the Saionji cabinet resigned because it would not support the army demand for two new divisions. In the following February the Katsura ministry came to a rapid close because of popular indignation against a ministry which had no party support. Admiral Yamamoto, who succeeded, resigned in March, 1914, because of great public resentment at the discovery that some naval officers had accepted bribes. Count Okuma, the old progressive, under whose administration the wretched "twenty-one demands" were made upon China, retired in October, 1916, largely because of criticism of this very policy. Field-Marshal Viscount Terauchi held office for two years and retired in September, 1918, because of the rice riots a few months earlier. His successor, Mr. Hara, the first civilian to hold this high office, had the firm support of the majority party, the Seiyukai, and seemed assured of a long term when an assassin's knife brought him down in November, 1921, on the eve of the Washington conference.

China, from the Revolution to the World War.—On the very day that Yuan Shih-kai was inaugurated provisional president of the republic at Peking, March 10, 1912, the revolutionary assembly at Nanking adopted a provisional constitution. This provided for a National Council which was to serve until the National Assembly was convened. This body met at Peking on April 29th, with seventy-six of the 126 members present. In August the laws for the election and organization of the National Assembly were promulgated, and elections for the House of Representatives took place in the following January. The suffrage was conferred upon males aged twenty-one, who paid a small direct tax or possessed a certain amount of property or a higher education. The new Assembly met on April 8, 1913. Its membership was unwieldy, with a Senate of 274 members and a House of Representatives of 596. In addition, the lack of political experience of the members and the language differences presented serious difficulties. The lower house was dominated by young men, members of the radical Kuomintang party, and they also made up almost half of the Senate. It was their firm intention to place the political power in the hands of the legislature, and to retire the president to a position like that in the French republic. A trained administrator like Yuan Shih-kai could hardly accept such an interpretation of his powers. Thus friction promptly developed between Yuan and the radical leaders, and little constructive legislation was even attempted. Yuan's attempt to negotiate a five-power loan for £25,000,000 met with bitter opposition, and was finally completed without parliamentary approval. Yuan had also been trying to strengthen his control of the provinces. On March 21st an outstanding leader of the Kuomintang was assassinated at Shanghai, and his followers always believed that in some way Yuan was responsible for this political crime. In June and July he removed hostile military governors from the provinces of Kiangsi, Anhwei, and Kwangtung, and replaced them with generals upon whom he could rely. The immediate result was an armed rebellion against the president, which was led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Huang Hsing, the old revolutionary leaders, and whose battle

cry was, "Punish Yuan Shih-kai." Conservative Chinese and men of property opposed this attempt to overthrow Yuan, who was recognized as an able administrator, so, whereas the revolution in 1911 swept over the provinces, the attempt in 1913 was soon confined to Nanking. In August Dr. Sun and Huang fled to Japan, and Nanking was captured by General Chang Hsun, the very general who had capitulated there in 1911. The city was thoroughly looted for three days, during which three Japanese were killed and much property of their nationals destroyed. In reparation the Chinese government gave to Japan the railway loan contracts in Manchuria which have been mentioned. Yuan now had the upper hand, and the sections of the permanent constitution which dealt with the election of the president and vice-president were hurriedly passed by the Assembly. Yuan Shih-kai was elected president and General Li Yuan-hung, vice-president, and on October 10th, the second anniversary of the Wuchang rising, they were inaugurated. Yuan then unseated the members of the Kuomintang on charges of treason, on November 4th, and dissolved the remnant of the National Assembly on January 11, 1914. The next month the provincial assemblies were dissolved, and all traces of representative institutions vanished. Yuan now ruled as the autocratic head of a nominal republic, supported by a council of state of seventy members all nominated by him.

Sino-Japanese Negotiations.—We have already discussed the part played by Japan in the World War. By November the Japanese were in possession of the German leased territory of Kiaochow and of the German railway and mines in Shantung. Japan then decided to take advantage of the preoccupation of the European powers in the World War to strengthen her position in China, and presented the ill-famed "twenty-one demands." In the past, because of the weakness of China, these powers had been able to gain valuable advantages for themselves. Japan had twice been compelled to wage war with European powers who possessed naval bases in China. She very naturally wished to prevent a recurrence of such a situation, and the time was considered favorable for

strengthening her position in Manchuria and Shantung and, to a less extent, in other parts of China. We are well aware that she had many precedents for her action. Great Britain and France during the Taiping rebellion, and Russia during the same rebellion, the second European war, and the Boxer uprising, had demanded and obtained valuable territorial or commercial concessions. During the Chinese revolution Russia had intervened to secure the "independence" of Mongolia and Great Britain to break Chinese control of Tibet. But two wrongs never make a right. The Japanese should never have followed the bad precedents of European diplomacy, but we can understand why they were amazed to find that the European powers and America denounced her for doing exactly what Europe had so often done in the past. And the Chinese resented the Japanese demands as they had never opposed those of Europe. This was due to the easier spread of news in China, the newspapers, telegraphs, and mails, so that the reports of what Japan was doing promptly reached the educated classes in all parts of the country. In comparison with the past conduct of Russia, France, Germany, and Great Britain the demands were no worse, although more comprehensive, than previous ones. They did not affect the integrity of China, and although they violated the principle of "equal opportunity," they did not contravene the three articles of the open-door notes of 1899. But they were most unwise, from the point of view of Japan's own permanent welfare. No advantage gained from such concessions could offset the bitter hostility which they created among the Chinese and throughout the world. The whole episode was one of the most unfortunate in modern Japanese diplomacy. Perhaps it may be explained as a part of the selfishness which accompanied the early stages of the World War before President Wilson raised the issues to a nobler plane. Very promptly many Japanese realized the error which had been committed, and since that time Japan has been trying to repair the damage wrought in 1915. As so often happens, foreign relations became involved in domestic politics. The ministry in Japan in 1914 was headed by Count Okuma, the old progressive, but his sup-

porters were in a minority in the Diet. There is reason to believe that his political advisers favored making strong demands upon China, at this time when Europe could not intervene, which would secure popular support in the next election—just as Lord Palmerston did in 1856 on the eve of the second Chinese war. The first instructions to Minister Hioki were given on December 3, 1914. The Japanese House of Representatives was dissolved on the 25th, and an excuse for presenting the demands came when China, on January 7th, withdrew her war-zone proclamation, which would have forced the Japanese to retire within the German leasehold. This act caused much resentment in Japan, for the war with Germany was by no means over, and at the time of the Russian war the belligerents retained their armies in Manchuria until eighteen months after the peace treaty. So on January 18, 1915, the "twenty-one demands" were presented directly to President Yuan Shih-kai.

✓ **The Twenty-one Demands.**—In making these demands Japan desired three things especially: (1) To strengthen her position in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia; (2) To secure possession of the German economic rights in Shantung; (3) To obtain mining and railway concessions in Central China. A fifth group of the demands, consisting of seven articles, were defined as "desires." These contained the most objectionable of the demands and they seem to have been added in order to give them up at a later date and through this concession make it easy for China to agree to the essential demands. This is a favorite device in diplomacy. In South Manchuria the lease of Port Arthur would expire, under the terms of the Russian treaty, in March, 1923. Japan wished to have it extended to ninety-nine years, on the same terms as Kowloon, Kiaochow, and Kwangchow. She also wished her railway concessions extended to the same term, without the right of purchase by China at the end of thirty-six years. And she wished to open South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia to Japanese industrial and agricultural enterprises. In regard to Shantung she was guided by her experience after the Russian war. China then had to con-

sent to the transfer of the Russian lease and railway to Japan, which she did in the Treaty of Peking. But relations between Japan and China were so strained in 1914 that Japan was afraid China might not consent to the transfer of the German rights if she were approached at the end of the war. She therefore desired to obtain China's consent in advance. Japan desired, moreover, to control the great iron mines in Central China from which she was securing much-needed ore, and she also wanted the right to build three railways in the Yangtze valley, which was then considered to be the British sphere of influence.

The Negotiations.—It is hardly necessary to give the text of the demands here because, with the exception of certain of the treaty provisions relating to Manchuria which have already been discussed, they have lost their effect. The resentment which they caused, and its effect upon Sino-Japanese relations, are the really significant feature of the episode. Some of the demands were granted at the first discussion, and others soon afterward, until China had agreed to fifteen of the twenty-one demands in principle or in detail. The election in Japan, on March 25, 1915, resulted in a great victory for Count Okuma, and from that moment Japan relaxed her pressure. On April 26th she presented a revised list of demands, which, through the division of some of the earlier ones, now numbered twenty-four, and she postponed all of the fifth group except one article which related to loans in Fukien province, long considered a Japanese sphere of influence. At this time Japan offered as a *quid pro quo* to restore the leasehold of Kiaochow to China, on condition that it be opened as a commercial port, that a Japanese settlement be established there in an area to be designated by Japan, and an international settlement if the powers so desired. To this China made counter proposals on May 1st, which not only refused to accept some of the Japanese terms, but also served to reopen some points which had already been agreed upon. Japan, therefore, on May 7th, delivered an ultimatum which gave China twenty-seven hours in which to accept the revised demands with certain minor modifications or "the Imperial

Government will take such independent action as they may deem necessary to meet the situation.”¹ Since that time May 7th has been observed as a Day of Humiliation in China! The Yuan administration, advised that Japan had reinforced her troops in Manchuria and Shantung, believed that it must yield, and accepted the demands the next day. On the 25th the treaties were signed and thirteen notes were exchanged dealing with parts of the demands and the Japanese promise to restore Kiaochow. The treaty respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia has already been discussed. The second treaty, respecting the province of Shantung, contained these terms: (1) The Chinese Government engage to recognize all matters that may be agreed upon between the Japanese Government and the German Government respecting the disposition of all the rights, interests and concessions, which, in virtue of treaties or otherwise, Germany possesses *vis-à-vis* China in relation to the Province of Shantung. (2) China would give Japanese capitalists the right to finance a railway from Chefoo or Lungkow to the Kiaochow-Tsinan line, if she decided to build it and the Germans surrendered their right to provide capital for the Chefoo-Weihsien line; (3) China agreed to open as early as possible suitable cities and towns in Shantung for the residence and trade of foreigners. Among the notes exchanged was one in which China promised never to lease or alienate, under any designation whatever, to any foreign power any territory within or along the coast of Shantung,² and another which provided that the Japanese minister would be consulted when China was about to open the new treaty towns in Shantung. The third group of the original demands was met by an exchange of notes: China agreed to approve any future agreement between Japanese capitalists and the Han-Yeh-Ping (Iron) Company,

¹ Baron Kato, the Japanese minister of foreign affairs, later stated that the ultimatum was issued at the request of Yuan Shih-kai, so that he might escape popular indignation if he yielded voluntarily. If this was the case, then Yuan scored heavily at the expense of the Japanese. Most of the desired points had been agreed upon before the ultimatum was signed, and its main purpose was to bring the long-drawn-out negotiations to a close.

² In 1895 Japan tried, without success, to incorporate such a clause in her recession of Port Arthur.

and not to confiscate it, to nationalize it without the consent of the Japanese capitalists, or to permit it to contract any foreign loan other than Japanese. The fourth group, which, as originally made, called for an agreement to the effect that "the Chinese Government engage not to cede or lease any harbor or bay or any island along the coast of China" was modified to permit China to make such a declaration on her own initiative. And of the objectionable fifth group only one point was covered in an exchange of notes: China declared that she had given no permission to foreign nations to construct, on the coast of Fukien province, dock-yards, coaling stations for military use, naval bases, or to set up other military establishments; nor did she entertain an intention of borrowing foreign capital for the purpose of setting up the above-mentioned establishments.³

The Aftermath of the Twenty-one Demands.—The final treaties and notes, as we have seen, contained great modifications in the original demands, and even some changes from the revised demands, but this is not generally recognized. The United States government, which had been kept informed of the negotiations by its representatives at Peking and Tokyo, and the Chinese and Japanese representatives in Washington, had pointed out certain features of the original demands which would conflict with American treaty rights, and in every respect these were modified by Japan. On May 11th, after having been advised of the Japanese ultimatum to China, Secretary of State Bryan dispatched the following note for presentation to the ministers of foreign affairs of Japan and China, *mutatis mutandis*:

In view of the circumstances of the negotiations which have taken place and which are now pending between the Government of Japan and the Government of China, and of the agreements which have been reached as a result thereof, the Government of the United

³ This was no small modification of the original demand that Japan should first be consulted if China needed foreign capital to work mines, build railways, and construct harbor-works (including dock-yards) in the province of Fukien. Japan's demand arose from the fact that in 1900 the United States government had considered establishing a coaling station at Samsah inlet, north of Foochow, and it had recently been reported that the Bethlehem Steel Company was negotiating a contract to improve the Foochow harbor.

States has the honor to notify the Imperial Japanese Government that it cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the Governments of Japan and China, impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the open door policy.

There is no information available, however, that a specific protest was ever lodged against any of the treaty terms. In China there was great popular indignation, which soon reacted upon Japan. The very next month Mr. Hara, who was later to become prime minister, introduced the following resolution in the House of Representatives:

Resolved: That the negotiations carried on with China by the present Government have been inappropriate in every respect; that they are detrimental to the amicable relationship between the two countries, and provocative of suspicions on the part of the Powers; that they have the effect of lowering the prestige of the Japanese Empire; and that, while far from capable of establishing the foundation of peace in the Far East, they will form the source of future trouble.

While there was no little political animus behind this resolution—for Hara was the leader of the opposition party—it was supported by 130 members and it reflected a very widespread opinion in Japan which helped to bring about the downfall of the Okuma ministry. It was a correct statement of the case in any event. The Terauchi ministry tried to win Chinese favor by financial support to the Peking government, which took the form of the Nishihara loans from the name of the financial agent. Among these were advances for railway loan contracts in Manchuria, which have been mentioned, and an equal amount for two railway loan contracts in Shantung, from Tsinan to Shunteh, and from Kaomi to Hsuchow, thus enlarging Japan's interests in the province. At the same time notes were exchanged for the withdrawal of Japanese troops along the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway, except for contingents at the two terminals, and the creation of a Chinese police force in their place, with some Japanese officers; for the withdrawal

of the civil administration which Japan had set up along the railway; and for the conversion of the railway into a joint Sino-Japanese undertaking when its ownership was finally determined at the end of the war. This exchange of notes tactically strengthened Japan's case at Versailles, for it was made after the treaty of 1915 and China's declaration of war upon Germany in 1917. At Versailles, as we have seen, the Chinese denied the validity of the 1915 and 1918 treaty and agreement, but the treaty of peace transferred the German rights in Shantung to Japan. In spite of the several attempts of Japan to bring China to negotiate the details of the restoration to her of the leased territory nothing could be accomplished, and the Shantung affair remained an irritating problem in the Far East when the Washington conference was convened.

✓ **The Washington Conference.**—By the summer of 1921 the desirability of limiting military and naval armament had been seriously considered, for the United States and other powers were engaged in completing extensive naval programs. This led to the invitation of President Harding to the principal naval powers to send delegates to consider the question and, on the initiative of Great Britain, the scope of the conference was broadened to include questions relating to the Far East. The invitation to participate in a conference on the limitation of armament, in connection with which Pacific and Far Eastern questions would also be discussed, was transmitted to Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan on August 11th. At the same time China (which had one of the largest bodies of troops then in existence) was invited to participate in the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern questions, and a similar invitation was transmitted to Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal on October 4th. Japan at first feared that her policies and interests in China would be subjected to hostile scrutiny, but she soon decided to take part in the conference. The sessions opened on November 11th. With the first object of the conference, which resulted in a five-power treaty for the limitation of naval armament, we are not here concerned. As a result of the full and frank discussions, which paid more

attention to the concrete facts than did the negotiators at Versailles, many of the clouds of misunderstanding which had settled over the Pacific were for a time at least dissipated. The Chinese delegates, who made a gallant fight in spite of the political dissensions which prevailed in their own land, again presented the desires of China to gain relief from the "unequal treaties," and their aspirations met with a sympathetic hearing. In addition to the limitation of naval armament treaty and one relating to the use of submarines and noxious gases in warfare, four general treaties were signed relating to the Pacific and the Far East, and two specific ones, one between China and Japan respecting Shantung, and one between the United States and Japan respecting the island of Yap.

Treaty Relating to the Pacific.—The first was a four-power treaty between the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan relating to insular possessions and insular dominions in the Pacific. The contracting parties pledged themselves to respect their existing insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean and, in case of any controversy arising among them out of any Pacific question which cannot be solved by diplomacy, to invite the other parties to a joint conference, to which the whole subject should be referred for consideration and adjustment. If their rights were threatened by a third power they would communicate with one another fully and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately. This treaty would remain in force for ten years, and continue in force subject to termination on twelve months' notice. As soon as it was ratified the Anglo-Japanese alliance would be terminated. A supplementary treaty defined the Japanese insular possessions as including only the southern portion of Sakhalin, Formosa, the Pescadores, and the islands under their mandate.

Treaty Relating to China.—The second treaty was signed by the nine powers and related to principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China. In the first article the contracting powers, other than China, agreed:

(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China; (2) to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government; (3) to use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China; (4) to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimicable to the security of such States.

The powers further agreed not to enter into any treaty, agreement, arrangement, or understanding which would impair the principles stated above. In the third article the open-door was more carefully defined—the first definition to be given to it since the notes of 1899:

With a view to applying more effectively the principles of the Open Door or equality of opportunity in China for the trade and industry of all nations, the Contracting Powers other than China, agree they will not seek, nor support their respective nationals in seeking:

(a) any arrangement which might purport to establish in favour of their interests any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in any designated region of China;

(b) any such monopoly or preference as would deprive the nationals of any other Power of the right of undertaking any legitimate trade or industry in China, or of participating with the Chinese Government, or with any local authority, in any category of public enterprise, or which by reason of its scope, duration or geographical extent is calculated to frustrate the practical principle of equal opportunity.

It is understood that the foregoing stipulations of this Article are not to be so construed as to prohibit the acquisition of such properties or rights as may be necessary to the conduct of a particular commercial, industrial, or financial undertaking or to the encouragement of invention and research.

China undertakes to be guided by the principles stated in the foregoing stipulations of this Article in dealing with applications for

economic rights and privileges from Governments and nationals of all foreign countries, whether parties to the present Treaty or not.

In addition to its careful definition of the open-door this article is of significance because it contained a pledge on the part of China to keep the door open. Up to this time the powers had repeatedly asserted their support of this doctrine, but China herself had given no guaranties that she would even try to protect herself. The fourth article pledged the powers not to support any agreement by their respective nationals designed to create spheres of influence or to provide for the enjoyment of mutually exclusive opportunities in designated parts of Chinese territory. China, in the fifth article, agreed that she would not exercise or permit unfair discrimination on her railways, and the other powers assumed a similar obligation in respect to their railways in China. They furthermore agreed to respect the rights of China as a neutral in time of war and she declared that she would observe the obligations of neutrality. Provision was made for a full and frank communication between the contracting powers when any situation might arise involving the application of the present treaty. Other powers were to be invited to adhere to the treaty.

Treaty Relating to the Chinese Customs Tariff.—This also was a nine-power treaty, and called for a tariff revision commission which would meet at Shanghai at the earliest possible date for the purpose of revising the rates of duty to an effective five per cent. A special conference would also be convened to prepare the way for the speedy abolition of *likin* and with a view to the levying of the surtaxes mentioned in the British, American, and Japanese treaties with China of 1902-03. The surtax was to be fixed at two and one-half per cent on ordinary articles and up to five per cent on luxuries. A further revision of the existing tariff would be made at the end of four years to fix the duties at the *ad valorem* rates provided by the special conference, and periodical revisions of the customs schedule of duties would take place every seven years. Equality of treatment would be granted for all

the contracting powers in all matters relating to customs duties. Uniformity in duties at all the land and maritime frontiers was recognized, although the special conference was authorized to make equitable adjustments in cases where a customs privilege was granted in return for some local economic advantage. Finally, all powers having treaties with China providing for a five per cent tariff, and whose governments were at present recognized by the signatory powers (which eliminated Russia), would be invited to adhere to this treaty and take part in the two tariff conferences.

The Shantung Treaty.—When the Washington conference convened, the most troublesome question in the Far East was that between China and Japan respecting Shantung. Thanks to the efforts of Mr. Hughes and Mr. Balfour, the Chinese delegates were persuaded to enter into negotiations with the Japanese on this matter, and an agreement was soon arrived at and signed on February 4, 1922. It provided for the restoration to China of the former German leased territory of Kiaochow and for the transfer to China without compensation of all public properties which the Germans possessed and which the Japanese purchased or constructed, except that a fair proportion of the expenses incurred by Japan should be refunded. An exception was made in the case of the Japanese consulate and certain properties, such as public schools, shrines, and cemeteries which would be left in possession of the Japanese community. The Japanese troops and gendarmes would be withdrawn gradually, and the last would leave at least within thirty days of the transfer of Kiaochow. The customs house at Tsingtao would be made an integral part of the Chinese maritime customs. The German railway would be transferred to China, but Japan would be reimbursed in the amount of its assessed valuation at the time of the occupation, plus the amount expended for permanent improvements or additions, with a suitable allowance for depreciation. Chinese government treasury notes, secured on the properties and revenues of the railway and running for fifteen years, would be delivered in payment, but they might be redeemed at the end of five years or at any time thereafter upon

six months' notice. Until they were redeemed a Japanese subject would be traffic manager and another joint chief accountant with a Chinese colleague. The two concessions for the extension of the railway, namely the Tsingtao-Shunteh and the Kaomi-Hsuchow lines, would be thrown open to the common activity of an international financial group. The three mines which Germany possessed would be turned over to a company in which the Japanese capital should not exceed the Chinese. Japan waived her right to an exclusively Japanese settlement or an international settlement in Kiaochow, and China agreed to open the entire territory to foreign residence and trade. The rights lawfully acquired by foreign nationals there during the German régime or the Japanese occupation would be respected, and all questions as to their status or validity would be adjusted by a joint commission. The Japanese interests in the salt industry in Kiaochow would be purchased by the Chinese government for fair compensation, and the export of salt to Japan permitted on reasonable terms. The German cables between Tsingtao and Chefoo and between Tsingtao and Shanghai were vested in China, except for such part as was used to lay a cable between Tsingtao and Sasebo, in Japan, and the Japanese wireless stations at Tsingtao and Tsinan would be transferred to China for a fair compensation. In an annex Japan declared that she renounced all preferential rights with respect to foreign assistance in persons, capital, and material stipulated in the treaty between China and Germany, and she would also throw open to the international financial consortium her option for financing the Chefoo-Weihsien Railway. Four other annexes dealt with details of the treaty, and six "Agreed Terms of Understanding Recorded in the Minutes" clarified any other points which might have occasioned difficulties. In this way the Shantung question was happily settled. China had failed to carry her point for the restoration to her of all the German properties without compensation, and Japan had offered reasonable terms on which the transfer might be made. As we shall see, China obtained the properties, and Japan has yet to receive the promised payments.

The Foreign Leaseholds.—During the conference the validity of the 1915 treaties was questioned by China, especially in the matter of the extension of the lease of Port Arthur. Japan refused to discuss this matter, but voluntarily announced that she would relinquish her preferential railway rights in Manchuria, along the lines agreed upon with the international consortium in 1920; she would waive her preferential rights concerning the engagement by China of Japanese advisers or instructors in political, financial, military, or police matters in South Manchuria; and she would withdraw the reservation made in 1915 that the fifth group of the "twenty-one demands" would be postponed for future negotiation. The Chinese delegation, however, insisted upon their former stand, but the conference refrained from passing judgment upon the validity of the treaties. It should also be recorded that Mr. Balfour announced that Great Britain proposed to hand back Weihaiwei to China, and Mr. Viviani, on the part of France, agreed to join in the collective restitution of territories leased to various powers by China. Five years have passed, and an agreement for the restitution of Weihaiwei has not been arrived at between China and Great Britain. The French offer meant nothing, under the existing circumstances, for Great Britain would not for a moment consider the restitution of Kowloon. The only foreign leasehold to be restored to China was Kiaochow, surrendered by Japan.

Resolutions Relating to China.—In addition to the formal treaties the Washington conference adopted certain resolutions relating to China. One called for a board of reference for Far Eastern affairs, the detailed plans for which would be formulated and laid before the powers by the special tariff conference. A second expressed the sympathy of the members for China's aspirations to gain relief from extraterritoriality and provided for a commission to inquire into "the present practice of extraterritorial jurisdiction in China, and into the laws and the judicial systems and the methods of judicial administration in China," with a view to reporting their findings and recommendations. A third expressed the agreement of the powers to withdraw their postal agencies from China

as soon as an efficient Chinese postal system was maintained. The fourth announced their intention to withdraw their armed forces from China "whenever China shall assure the protection of the lives and property of foreigners in China," and authorized their representatives at Peking to associate themselves with three Chinese representatives, whenever the Chinese government should so request, for an inquiry into the situation. The fifth was concerned with foreign radio stations in China. The sixth recorded the hope that China would effect the unification of railways under Chinese control. The seventh expressed "the earnest hope" that China would take immediate and effective steps to reduce her military forces and expenditures. The eighth called for the deposition with the secretary general of the conference of all treaties, exchange of notes, or other international engagements made with China or in relation to China which they deemed to be in force or upon which they might desire to rely. In addition all contracts between their nationals and any political authority in China were to be so deposited. The ninth called for the better management of the Chinese Eastern Railway. And the tenth reserved the right of the powers to insist upon the responsibility of China for the performance or non-performance of the obligations toward the stockholders, bondholders and creditors of this railway.

After the Washington Conference.—The Washington treaties called for supplementary action in certain particulars. The Shantung treaty was the first to be executed. An agreement for the withdrawal of the Japanese troops along the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway was signed at Peking on March 28th. A Sino-Japanese commission then assembled there to negotiate the detailed arrangements for the settlement of outstanding questions relative to Shantung. This commission agreed upon two treaties, one of a general nature and the other respecting the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway, the former being signed on December 1st and the latter on the 5th. Many of these details are of little permanent interest. It was provided that the Kiaochow leasehold would be transferred on December 10, 1922, and the Japanese troops would all be

withdrawn within twenty days. The public properties to be retained by Japan were specified. For the other public properties and the salt interests China was to pay 16,000,000 yen, of which 2,000,000 would be paid in gold within one month of the transfer, and 14,000,000 in treasury notes. These notes bore six per cent interest and were redeemable within fifteen years. For the German mines 5,000,000 yen would be paid, and for the German railway, 40,000,000 yen in treasury notes. When the time came for the Japanese to withdraw their garrison the bandits of the outlying region prepared to descend upon the city. The Chinese were forced to ask the Japanese to supply them with arms for their newly organized police, and these had to be sent from Japan. The transfer took place, however, at the appointed time on December 10, 1922.

Troops, Post Offices and Tariff.—Japan promptly withdrew a battalion of troops which had been stationed at Hankow, and, of course, her garrison at Tsingtao and the troops along the railway. All the foreign post offices in China proper were closed in November and December 1922. At this time the British had twelve, the French thirteen, the Americans one, and the Japanese sixty-six. But Japan insisted upon maintaining her postal agencies in the South Manchuria Railway zone. The tariff revision commission, which was to meet at Shanghai, did not depend upon the ratification of the tariff treaty, so it assembled very promptly, in March, 1922, with thirteen powers and China represented. The schedule of the revised tariff was adopted on September 25th and, after some delay on the part of Italy, came into effect on January 17, 1923. But the special conference which was to prepare the way for the speedy abolition of *likin* and levy surtaxes in the interim was delayed because of the refusal of France to ratify the treaty. This was due to her controversy with China as to whether the Boxer indemnity payments should be made in gold or paper francs. When this was settled as France desired, on April 12, 1925, she and Italy ratified the treaty and the conference was convened on the invitation of China on October 26th. The nine signatory powers, together with Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Spain as adhering powers, were

represented. The conference was in session for nine months, under the most unfavorable conditions. A civil war was in progress in north China. In April the provisional chief executive fled from Peking and no head of the state existed. The Chinese delegates retired, one by one, from the meetings. Finally, on July 3rd the delegates offered to proceed with the discussion as soon as Chinese delegates were designated, and although a new group was appointed by the cabinet (which acted as the executive) on the 14th, it was decided on the 24th to postpone further discussions until after the warm season. In the meantime the Kuominchun and Kuomintang parties, which were opposed to the Peking government, announced their opposition to any renewal of the conference deliberations. The only positive action that was taken, and this had no validity until a treaty could be negotiated, was in the form of a resolution, on November 19th, as follows:

The contracting powers other than China hereby recognize China's right to enjoy tariff autonomy; agree to remove the tariff restrictions which are contained in existing treaties between themselves respectively and China; and consent to the going into effect of the Chinese National Tariff law on January 1st, 1929.

The Government of the Republic of China declares that *likin* shall be abolished simultaneously with the enforcement of the Chinese National Tariff law; and further declares that the abolition of *likin* shall be effectively carried out by the first day of the first month of the eighteenth year of the Republic of China. (January 1, 1929.)

In spite of the failure of the special conference, the warring factions proceeded to levy and collect a surtax equal to the Washington proposals, and other unauthorized duties.

Extraterritoriality.—As early as 1902 Great Britain, in her commercial treaty of that year, agreed to relinquish her extraterritorial rights "when she is satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws, the arrangement for their administration, and other conditions warrant her in so doing." The United States and Japan, in 1903, made a similar proposal, and Sweden, in 1908, was prepared to relinquish her extraterritorial rights as soon as the other treaty powers would agree to do so. China's duty to herself, as well as to the powers, consisted in setting

her judicial system in order, just as Japan had done, so as to safeguard her own citizens and secure relief from a treaty obligation which impaired her sovereignty. But little was done. Codes were eventually prepared, but proper courts and trained and honest judges were few indeed. The Washington conference provided for a commission of investigation, which should have met three months after the close of the conference, or by May 3, 1922, but China asked for a postponement because of the internal strife which prevailed, and other powers later suggested delay. Finally China invited the commission to meet in Peking in December, 1925, but fighting around the capital delayed the arrival of some of the members, so that the first meeting took place on January 12, 1926. Between then and May 5th seventeen meetings were held in Peking, and then the delegates visited certain of the provinces to study the actual administration of justice, and on September 16th the report was adopted, the Chinese members subscribing only to the recommendations, but not to all the statements concerning the existing conditions. The report considered the present practice of extraterritoriality in China, the laws and judicial system of the country, and the administration of justice, and the recommendations pointed out certain steps which would be necessary before the powers would be warranted in relinquishing extraterritoriality. The first of these recommendations read:

The administration of justice with respect to the civilian population in China must be entrusted to a judiciary which shall be effectively protected against any unwarranted interference by the executive or other branches of the Government, whether civil or military.

Pending the complete performance of the several recommendations it proposed that extraterritoriality might be abolished in accordance with a progressive scheme to be agreed upon. In this connection it must be remembered that the nationals of Germany and Austria-Hungary lost their extraterritorial rights when China declared war upon their countries. Russia was deprived of her rights in 1920 and agreed to renounce them

in 1924, and Bolivia and Persia have agreed not to claim them. A further step was taken in September, 1926, when the "mixed court" at Shanghai, which had been under foreign control since 1911, was returned to the Chinese, while the foreign consuls could appoint delegates to attend the sessions, but not participate in the decisions. In spite of the desires and demands of the Chinese government and its nationals it is extremely doubtful if the powers will yield the protection of extraterritoriality until a great reform and improvement has taken place in the judicial system and administration in China.

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CHAPTER XL

RECENT POLITICS

Japan.—After the assassination of Premier Hara, on November 4, 1921, Baron Takahashi, who succeeded to the leadership of the Seiyukai Party, was appointed in his place. But internal dissensions within the party brought about the downfall of the cabinet in June of the following year and Admiral Baron Tomosaburo Kato, who had led the Japanese delegation at the Washington conference, formed a ministry. Admiral Kato, a naval officer, had been associated with no political party but he was assured the support of the Seiyukai majority. Unhappily, his death on August 24, 1923, brought to a close the services of a very able group of men. The next week the terrible earthquake and fire of September 1st devastated Tokyo, Yokohama, and the surrounding region and destroyed 83,776 lives. In this crisis the good will of the world was made manifest and the generous outpouring of relief from the United States made a profound impression. The Japanese on their part gave a notable demonstration of an unconquerable people and plunged at once into the task of reconstruction. On the day after the earthquake the cabinet of Admiral Yamamoto was organized. A Satsuma man, this was his second ministry, and again it was a no-party group. It lasted for only a few months, for when an attempt to assassinate the prince regent was made on December 27th the cabinet assumed responsibility for failing to prevent this crime and resigned. After several days, instructions were issued to Viscount Kiyoura, then president of the privy council, to organize a ministry. Its membership consisted entirely of peers, except for the military and naval members, and such was the popular disapproval of such a ministry that it felt compelled to resign in June. Viscount Taka-akira Kato, the leader of the Kenseikai party was then summoned to form a cabinet. He was well known as an ambassador to Great Britain and as the foreign minister when the "twenty-one

demands" were presented. His support came from the Kenseikai and Seiyukai parties, but this did not last long and the Seiyukai joined the opposition. On his death, in January 1926, the new leader of the Kenseikai, Mr. Wakatsuki, the second civilian to become premier, succeeded. This ministry fell in April of the next year when the privy council refused to approve a financial measure advocated by the cabinet. On April 18th, General Baron Tanaka, once an able minister of war, a member of the Choshu clan, and now leader of the Seiyukai, took office. Since November, 1921, a regency existed under the crown prince, Hirohito, for the emperor was unable to exercise his governmental duties. It was a fortunate event that just before assuming these responsibilities the crown prince had visited Great Britain and Europe. His princess was the granddaughter of Prince Shimazu of Satsuma, who had taken so prominent a part in the imperial restoration in 1868. On the 25th of December, 1926, Emperor Yoshihito died, and the prince regent succeeded, inaugurating the Showa period, which may be translated "peace through justice."

China Since 1915.—To trace the political history of China since 1915 is a difficult and thankless task. We have seen that Yuan Shih-kai stood forth as an absolute autocrat in January, 1914. In order to maintain his position he placed trusted generals in control of the provinces and these military governors, later and better known as tuchuns, soon organized personal armies which, when the strong hand of Yuan was removed, were to degenerate into instruments to serve the ambitions of their masters. However, there were many who believed that the autocratic rule of an experienced administrator like Yuan would serve China better than the political bickerings of the inexperienced politicians. Among them were the leaders of a movement for the restoration of the monarchy. By the autumn of 1915 the movement had gained such headway that delegates were elected to decide on the form of government. Thanks to the care taken in their selection, the vote, on November 5th, stood 1997 to 50 in favor of a monarchy. After first declining the shining prize, Yuan accepted the throne on December 11th, the monarchy was

proclaimed, and the inaugural ceremony set for February 9, 1916. But the republican idea was by no means as dead as Yuan's advisers had believed. In December the standard of revolt was raised in far-distant Yunnan and the rapid spread of the movement warned Yuan to go no further. On February 23rd he postponed indefinitely the establishment of the monarchy. By that time he was a broken man, physically and mentally, his prestige had been destroyed, and the acclaimed savior of the country was now denounced as a traitor to the republic. His death, on June 6th, intervened to spare him the ignominy of resignation or worse. Thus passed from the stage the "strong man" of China, and no one since his time has been able to wield the power he possessed. His successor, General Li Yuan-hung, a leader in the revolution, was undoubtedly patriotic and well-meaning, but certainly not a strong man. Honest and eager for reform, in sympathy with parliament but not associated with the Kuomintang Party, he restored the Nanking constitution and reassembled the parliament dissolved by Yuan in 1914. The term of the members of the House of Representatives had expired, but it was decided not to reckon the years when Yuan ruled without them. But the members had not learned wisdom during their exile, and political strife raged anew in Peking. We have already decribed the quarrel between the parliament and Premier Tuan Chi-jui, the dissolution of the parliament, the Manchu restoration, and the refusal of President Li to resume his official duties. His place was taken by the vice-president, General Feng Kuo-chang, and the militarists were now in supreme control. Tuan Chi-jui resumed his post as premier, and the southern provinces declared their independence. A council was now constituted to draft laws for the election of a new parliament, and the body which met at Peking, in August 1918, was very different in temper from the old body. It was soon known as the "Tuchuns' Parliament." About this time a quorum of the old parliament was gathered together at Canton, which claimed to be the only legitimate parliament in China. The Constitutionalist (southerners) now claimed to control five provinces, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Yun-

nan, Kweichow, and Szechwan. The original term of Yuan Shih-kai being about to expire, the Tuchuns' Parliament elected an old scholar and official, Hsu Shih-chang, as president. An estimable gentleman, he possessed few, if any, qualifications for this difficult post. These were the days when the northern militarists, known as the "Anfu Club," accepted large sums of Japanese money in return for concessions of many kinds. In the provinces the generals were strengthening their forces, diverting the public revenues from Peking for their own uses, and bringing the central government to a position of bankruptcy and powerlessness. During these years intermittent fighting was carried on between northern and southern generals.

The Rivalry of the Tuchuns.—By the end of 1919 it was estimated that the enrolled armies of the several generals numbered about 1,300,000. It was only a question of time when these forces would be used to win control of a larger part of China, or of all China, for their masters. The first clash came in the summer of 1920, when Chang Tso-lin, of Manchuria, and Tsao Kun, of Chihli, joined forces to overthrow Tuan Chi-jui and his Anfu Club. In this they succeeded and Wu Pei-fu, one of Tsao Kun's generals, made a name for himself as an able soldier. But there could not be two war-lords, so in 1922 Wu Pei-fu took the field, defeated Chang Tso-lin and drove his troops behind the Great Wall, forced President Hsu to resign, and recalled President Li from his refuge in the foreign concessions at Tientsin. Under what color of law President Li, who had been elected as vice-president for a five-year term in 1913, and who had resigned in 1917, could now assume office only a Chinese lawyer could explain. The new president, now supported by Wu Pei-fu, who refused to accept any political preferment, recalled the very parliament which he had restored in 1916 and dissolved in 1917. But in June, 1923, Feng Yu-hsiang, the so-called Christian general, and a subordinate of Tsao Kun, forced President Li to flee again to Tientsin. After a few months in which a "regency cabinet" acted as executive, the parliament, whose members brazenly accepted the bribes of Tsao

Kun's supporters, elected the Chihli war-lord to the presidency. The purchased election of Tsao Kun was a shocking thing even in a land where official corruption was taken as a matter of course, especially as the old republican politicians had eagerly grasped the proffered banknotes. On October 10th, the twelfth anniversary of the Wuchang rising, Tsao Kun was inaugurated and the permanent constitution proclaimed. This compact was to prove no more effective than the provisional constitution of 1912. In Manchuria Chang Tso-lin had been biding his time. His opportunity came when a local war broke out in September, 1924, between the tuchuns of Kiangsu and Chekiang provinces, the latter of whom was the only Anfu governor still in office. Chang created a diversion in his favor by invading Chihli and Wu Pei-fu took the field against him. Wu's campaign was meeting with success when, to the amazement of all observers, General Feng Yu-hsiang hurried back from the front, seized Peking, and denounced his superior, Wu Pei-fu. This defection brought about the collapse of Wu's operations and he retired from the field, proceeding by sea to the Yangtze, where for a time he was a general without an army. One of the first of Feng's acts was to confiscate the possessions of the Manchu emperor and force him to flee to Tientsin, thus violating the pledges of the revolutionary government in 1912. President Tsao Kun was forced to resign, and was imprisoned pending trial for the gross corruption which marked his election. Chang Tso-lin and Feng Yu-hsiang were now joint masters of Peking. In November they selected Tuan Chi-jui as "chief executive," for there was no parliament present to go through the form of a presidential election. By this time it may be observed that each of the outstanding tuchuns had, at one time or another, fought as allies or opponents of all the other tuchuns. No better evidence of the unprincipled selfishness of these struggles need be cited. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who was then president of the southern republic, had promised to support Chang by launching an invasion of the north. This was a partnership which can only be explained on the ground of political expediency. He now proceeded to Peking to partici-

pate in the political reorganization. He was a sick man, and on March 12, 1925, he passed away in the American hospital there. Chang Tso-lin had extended his control beyond the Yangtze, as far as Shanghai. The to-be-expected combination was now organized against him, consisting of Sun Chuang-fang, of Chekiang, Wu Pei-fu, who had regained some support along the upper Yangtze, and Chang's ostensible ally, the Christian General Feng Yu-hsiang. The first blow was struck by Sun Chuan-fang in October, when he forced the Manchurian garrison out of Shanghai and drove them across the Yangtze. By the middle of November he had advanced to the borders of Shantung. Chang withdrew his forces before this attack, for he knew serious business was in store for him nearer home. At the end of November one of his generals in Manchuria revolted, under an agreement with Feng Yu-hsiang, and for a time Chang's cause was in jeopardy; but he was able to defeat the rebels and execute their leader. In the meantime Feng threw his forces against Chang's general in Tientsin and was able to take the city just as the rebellion in Manchuria was quelled. The next move in this fantastic struggle was for Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin, so recently bitter foes, to unite against Feng Yu-hsiang. Wu Pei-fu advanced north from the Yangtze and Chang attacked from the northeast. Soon after this campaign began Feng resigned his command and withdrew to Moscow, but his subordinates held Peking until April 16th and made an obstinate resistance in the rough country to the northwest. In April the chief executive, Tuan Chi-jui, was forced out of office at the demand of Wu Pei-fu, and from that time until Chang Tso-lin assumed the office of generalissimo, on June 18, 1927, China possessed no head of the state of any kind. By this time the attention of the northern commanders was diverted to a new threat from the south.

The Curse of Militarism.—No useful purpose would be served by considering in any detail the incessant warfare which has wracked China since 1917. In addition to the major campaigns which have been outlined, fighting has prevailed between the north and the south (or rather, between northern

and southern generals), within the southern provinces, and in all the other provinces, at one time or another. A large province like Szechwan might have a dozen petty generals striving for power when a strong master had been overthrown. The sufferings of the Chinese people at the hands of these war-lords and their half-bandit soldiery cannot even be estimated. Nothing that the foreigners have ever done in China could be compared for a moment with the havoc wrought in just a few years by the Chinese themselves. In addition to the damage done during the actual fighting the people have been subjected to constant looting and military exactions. The civil strife has broken down the political administration in large parts of the country and bandits have plied their nefarious trade as never before. If the armies number 1,300,000 men, and that is as good an estimate as any, the cost of maintaining these disturbers of the peace would bankrupt a country even more financially sound than China. To pay for these troops, when they are paid, the local revenues have been absorbed, including the railway receipts, and funds which should have been remitted to Peking for national uses have been expended on provincial armies. Naturally, funds for civil administration, for education, for public works, and all the improvements so much needed in China, have been reduced to a minimum. The wisdom of the Japanese in keeping out of war until their reforms were instituted stands out in marked contrast. Education, which is the basic need of China, has advanced but little because of the diversion of funds. Railways, of which China stands in great need, have been crippled and rendered almost useless for commerce because of the hordes of soldiers who must be moved up and down the lines. Rolling stock, bridges, equipment of all kinds, have been destroyed or damaged, and funds are not at hand to provide replacements and improvements. When the Japanese withdrew their guards from the Tsingtao-Tsinan line, in Shantung, the only railway in China proper which had been spared the damage wrought by the militarists was left at their mercy. To-day only the railways in Manchuria operate with adequate equipment and are able to serve the needs of the civil population.

And the warring tuchuns have been responsible for the return of the opium evil, for the easily obtained revenues from this traffic have filled their war chests. The major superficial evil in China in recent years has been unbridled militarism, and yet few Chinese have been willing to recognize this self-evident fact. It has always been much easier to organize a procession to abuse the foreigners than to take up arms against the real foes of China.

Progress in the Face of Difficulties.—In spite of the constant civil strife since 1917 there have been many signs of progress in the war-torn land. Education, which we must always recognize as the corner-stone of any sound advance, has made some progress, but the curtailment of funds and the constant interruption in school work has produced results far short of what had been hoped for. In 1923 there were 6,417,321 pupils enrolled in public elementary schools, out of a school population of about 60,000,000. The middle schools enrolled over 100,000, and there were seventy-eight national and provincial institutions of higher education, as well as forty-five private and missionary institutions. The missionary schools enrolled some 560,000 students, but their work was almost wiped out during the civil wars of 1926-27. The problem of organizing adequate public schools for so vast a number of people would tax the resources of China even if peace and a greater measure of prosperity than ever before attained could prevail. For some years after 1912 an effort was made to introduce an alphabet in place of the characters, using thirty-nine or forty symbols, but this scheme which was first hailed as a great reform soon proved unworkable. This was followed by the "literary revolution" led by the American-trained scholar Dr. Hu Shih, designed to substitute the spoken language, the *pai-hua*, for the difficult written language. This has been a very encouraging development. About 1923 another American-educated student, Y. C. James Yen, started the Mass Education movement which aimed at reaching the illiterates and instructing them in the use of the most commonly used 1,000 characters. Acquaintance with these characters would make the possessor literate in a certain de-

gree, but not prepared to use any but the simplest reading matter. In connection with the development of education we should note the increasing participation of the student class in political affairs. The first notable demonstration came early in 1919, when, in opposition to the Japanese demands at Versailles, they led an attack upon certain cabinet members who were believed to be Japanophiles. From this time the students played an increasingly prominent part in organizing public opinion to bring pressure to bear upon their own government and upon foreign governments by means of boycotts and strikes. While any manifestation of public spirit in China was to be welcomed, too great influence on the part of immature students, boys and girls, was bound to be of uncertain value. The inherent capacity of the Chinese to make the best of their present lot was made evident by the steady increase in foreign trade, in spite of wars which hampered the movement of goods in this or that region. In 1910, the last year before the revolution, the total foreign trade of China was valued at 870,975,238 taels; in 1924 at 1,831,778,103 taels. This showed an increase, roughly, for the value of the tael varied from time to time, of a little more than 100 per cent. If a comparison is made between 1905 and 1924 the increase would be somewhat more than two and one-half times, but when compared with the increase of fifteen times in Korea, under Japanese control and administration, some idea may be gained of the effect of civil wars and governmental breakdown upon the development of China's foreign commerce.

The Nationalist Movement.—We have seen that in 1917 some of the far southern provinces declared their independence of Peking, and the next year a quorum of the old parliament assembled there and organized the Constitutionalist government. Desultory fighting occurred between north and south in Hunan, Szechwan, Kiangsi, Fukien, and Hupeh. In February, 1919, a peace conference was held at Shanghai, which came to naught, and the next year Dr. Sun and his associates were driven out of Canton by the Kwangsi faction, which misruled the city until the end of the year. Dr.

Sun and his fellow republicans took refuge in the foreign settlements at Shanghai until, in December, they were able to return when General Chen Chiung-ming drove out the Kwangsi Party. In April of 1921 Dr. Sun Yat-sen was elected "President of the Chinese Republic." But in June of the next year General Chen turned against him, presumably because Sun had planned an invasion of the north where he was to coöperate with Chang Tso-lin against Wu Pei-fu. Chen's control lasted, however, only until January, 1923, when he, in turn, was driven out by a combination of Kwangsi and Yunnan troops, and Dr. Sun could return again in February. He was now able to hire the Yunnanese mercenaries to turn against their Kwangsi brothers. About the same time a Russian, Borodin, arrived in Canton and soon acquired great influence with Dr. Sun and his associates. Russia was now in high favor with the southerners, or Nationalists, as they were then called. Soviet Russia had made friendly advances to China and had offered to surrender all the advantages gained from the tsarist treaties. In 1924 a new treaty was negotiated with Peking, which, however, fell far short of the earlier promises and merely gave up extraterritoriality, which the Russians had already lost, the balance of the Boxer indemnity, and promised eventually to restore Mongolia to China, which has not yet taken place. A more important change in the relations between the two countries came with the transfer of the ownership of the Chinese Eastern Railway to Russia, whereas before Russia had simply been a bondholder who had supplied funds for a private Sino-Russian company. However, Russia was acclaimed as a real friend of China, in glowing contrast to the so-called imperialist powers, Great Britain, France, Japan, and the United States. Other Russians, civilians and military officers, were taken into the Nationalist employ, and General Galen became the military adviser of the government. Even the Chinese communists, who had retained their identity, were now incorporated in the Kuomintang party, which controlled the Nationalist administration. Thanks to Russian instruction, the Chinese made more effective use than ever before of the weapon of

propaganda and industrial strife. Canton, it is true, had tasted the power of the general strike in 1922, when a seamen's strike at Hong Kong crippled the commerce of that British port.

The Three Principles of a People.—About this time Dr. Sun delivered a series of lectures in which he discussed the Three Principles of a People. These may be defined as Nationalism, Democracy, and the People's Well-being, or Socialism. While the ideas of Dr. Sun were not stated with positive clearness, the three slogans—Nationalism, Democracy, and Socialism—could be repeated by every Chinese. They became the battle-cry of the Nationalist cause, and every Chinese leader was classified according to his announced allegiance to this program. The importance of such a program cannot be overlooked. It raised the Nationalist cause out of the mire of personal ambition which had brought about the incessant wars of the tuchuns, and for the first time it introduced principles into the struggle. It should not be imagined that even with these principles the Kuomintang would be able to introduce democratic government. This would depend upon the general education and ability to form sound judgments of the whole people. But it was hoped that the Kuomintang party could establish a civil or party dictatorship which would take the place of the military dictatorship of the past. We shall see that the old strife was soon renewed, for even in a party one faction must rule and the others must submit or be expelled. With the overthrow of Tsao Kun and Wu Pei-fu in the autumn of 1924, Dr. Sun proceeded to Peking to confer with Chang Tso-lin and Feng Yu-hsiang, the outstanding militarists, and there he died on March 12, 1925.

Anti-foreign Demonstrations.—In the summer of 1925 a renewal of anti-foreign or, as the Chinese described it, anti-imperialist, resentment was due to a number of unfortunate incidents. At Shanghai, on May 30th, some police fired into a body of rioters while defending a police station and twelve were killed and seventeen injured. Although the settlement at Shanghai, except the French concession, is under international control, the British dominated the municipal council (of which the chairman at the time was an American) as well as most

of the higher administrative positions, and the police inspector who gave the order to fire was an Englishman, so for these reasons the responsibility for these deaths was fastened upon Britain. A great wave of anti-British feeling spread over China, in which for a time the Japanese were included, and on the 23rd, while a Chinese procession was marching along the waterfront across the creek from Shameen, the foreign settlement at Canton, some troops fired across at the foreigners and the fire was returned with deadly effect. Forty-four Chinese were killed, of whom four were students and twenty-four armed cadets. This fanned the flames of anti-foreign resentment, and a boycott was promptly declared against Hong Kong which lasted for more than a year. The old Chinese desires were now voiced as never before—the abolition of the unequal treaties with their control of the Chinese tariff, extraterritoriality and other impairments of sovereignty; the restoration of all foreign leaseholds and residential settlements; and, in fact, the return to China of all economic and political privileges.

The Nationalist Advance to the Yangtze.—Dr. Sun had several times attempted to invade the north, without success. But in 1926, thanks to the efficient propaganda which now preceded the movement and the general hope that the Nationalists would force the abolition of the “unequal treaties,” a new invasion met with an unexpected success. General Chiang Kai-shek, with General Galen as his military adviser, supported by well-organized troops whose officers had been trained in the Russian-directed military academy at Whampoa, left Canton on July 28th for the front. The usual civil strife laid Hunan open to his advance, and Changsha, the capital, promptly fell into his hands. General Wu Pei-fu, who was in control of the central Yangtze, was then engaged in the north, and when he returned to the new front it was too late. Treachery gave the Nationalists control of Hanyang, and Wuchang, after a siege, surrendered on October 10th, the fifteenth anniversary of the revolutionary rising there in 1911. The Nationalist troops then advanced down the Yangtze, while others operated along the coast. General Sun Chuan-fang,

who had attained prominence in 1925 and now ruled the five provinces of Fukien, Chekiang, Kiangsu, Anhwei, and Kiangsi, tried to remain neutral, but he was soon placed on the defensive, and province after province fell into the invaders' hands. Shanghai was taken and finally Nanking fell on March 24, 1927, at which time six foreigners were killed and much foreign property looted and destroyed. Only a barrage laid down by American and British gunboats saved a group of foreigners who were then under attack.

The Nationalists and Foreigners.—While the Nationalists were advancing to the Yangtze another incident complicated foreign relations. Two British merchant steamers had been seized by General Yang Sen, a local militarist, on the upper Yangtze and held at Wanhsien. No matter how true his complaints against their commanders might have been, his act was one of military high-handedness. A British naval force proceeded from Hankow to rescue the detained officers, and during the attempt a general engagement occurred in which the Chinese batteries on the shore were destroyed and some loss of life and property occurred. The Wanhsien incident fanned the flames of anti-British resentment, especially in the upper Yangtze. After the Nationalist occupation of Hankow the British settlement was soon overrun, its defenders retiring without opposition, and this also occurred at Kiu-kiang, where the customary looting took place. The British government, which on December 18, 1926, issued a memorandum expressing sympathy with the Chinese aspirations and readiness to negotiate on treaty revision and all outstanding questions as soon as the Chinese themselves had constituted a government with authority to negotiate, now entered into direct relations with the Hankow authorities and agreed to restore the British concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang to the Chinese, an agreement to this effect being signed on February 19, 1927. Similar negotiations respecting the concession at Tientsin were instituted with the Peking government. The British government also expressed its willingness to apply the Chinese civil and commercial codes and the revised penal code, as soon as it was promulgated and enforced, in its con-

sular courts in China. But it also hurried out military and naval forces to defend the foreign settlement at Shanghai, and in this it was joined by the United States, Japan, France, Italy, and, to a small extent, by other treaty powers. Shanghai, therefore, was spared the fate of other foreign settlements in China which fell within the war zone. Largely, but not entirely, due to Russian influence, the Nationalist advance was at first marked by attacks upon mission properties, churches, and schools, the expulsion of foreign missionaries, and the oppression of many of their converts. The Nanking affair resulted in a demand by the legations of Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy for the protection of foreigners, apologies and reparations, but the internal complications in the Nationalist government prevented any compliance.

Dissension Among the Nationalists.—General Chiang Kai-shek had shown his marked disapproval of the Russians and their communist allies before the drive to the north, but he had decided to uphold the unity of the party at least until that was accomplished. When, however, the lower Yangtze region fell into his hands he announced the establishment of a government at Nanking which supported the three principles of Dr. Sun and was unalterably opposed to the communist government at Hankow. However, before either of these Nationalist factions could destroy the other they must first deal with Chang Tso-lin and his northern militarists. By this time Feng Yu-hsiang had returned from Moscow and resumed his command in the northwest. Both Nationalist groups bid for his support, although each realized that he was an uncertain quantity to tie to. Chang Tso-lin assumed the new office of generalissimo in June, 1927, and thus united the northern generals in a closer union, and he never failed to point out the superior position which foreigners enjoyed in the north in contrast to their imperiled position in the south. His strong antipathy to Soviet Russia, whose control of the Chinese Eastern Railway left him exposed on the northeast, led him to raid the buildings connected with the Russian embassy in Peking, where valuable documents were found which proved

the interference of the Russians in Chinese affairs, especially in the supply of money, arms, and advisers to Feng Yu-hsiang and the Nationalists. The first drive against the north of General Chiang Kai-shek met with some success and almost reached the borders of Shantung, although a rebellion of one of the northern generals near Tsingtao was promptly suppressed. This wave was followed by a surprising advance led by General Sun Chuang-fang (once the foe of Chang Tso-lin, but now his ally) which brought the northerners to the Yangtze. In August General Chiang Kai-shek suddenly resigned his direction of the Nanking government. This was presumably due to the desire to bring about a reconciliation with Hankow, which had taken the first steps by expelling the Russians and the communists, but it was also due to the failure of his northern invasion. Steps were then taken to unite the civil administrations at Hankow and Nanking, and a combined ministry was set up at the latter city. At this point we must leave our survey of the tangled politics of China.

Summary.—It should be evident from the survey of conditions in China since the revolution that the fundamental causes of the sufferings which have been endured by the people have been due to domestic rather than foreign causes. By placing the responsibility upon the foreigners the political leaders have diverted attention from their own incapacity and misdeeds. With the removal of a recognized central authority, the Manchu dynasty, and the attempt to set up an unworkable republic, political anarchy was bound to result. The selfish strivings for place and power on the part of the warlords have brought unspeakable evil to China. With the aspirations of the Chinese people, as voiced by the Nationalist leaders, the foreign governments, without exception, have had much sympathy. Notable in its manifestations of sympathy and its active advocacy of non-interference in Chinese affairs has been the government of Japan, which learned a bitter lesson in 1915-19. But the political turmoil in China has tied the hand of the foreign powers, whose policies, repeatedly enunciated, have called for the protection of foreign lives and

property and the solution of diplomatic questions when a government able to speak for China and to make and keep commitments has been set up. That this will take many years seems to be a reasonable estimate. There need be no question that all the powers are eager to do anything, within reason, to win and hold the goodwill of the Chinese people. On this depends the development of their commerce and their missionary and cultural enterprises. But the withdrawal of foreign protection, at a time when the Chinese people themselves are subjected to grievous oppression, would serve no good purpose. If China, after 1911, had made even a reasonable advance in political unity and good order, along the lines which Japan followed between 1868 and 1894, there is not the slightest reason to doubt that the powers would have revised all the unequal treaties much sooner than they did in the case of Japan. But it cannot be pointed out too clearly that China has a certain responsibility resting upon her to establish such conditions that not only foreign lives and property, but Chinese lives and property, will be safeguarded. It will require more than political slogans and political demands to bring this about. In the meantime the foreign powers should abstain from any interference in the political affairs of China, no matter how great the inducement may appear, and confine their efforts to the protection of their legitimate interests and the lives of their nationals, while standing ready to meet every advance in good government with a progressive relinquishment of their treaty privileges.

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CHAPTER XLI

THE UNITED STATES AND THE PHILIPPINES

The Schurman Commission.—The city of Manila capitulated to the American forces on August 13, 1898. The next day a government of military occupation was announced and steps were promptly taken to restore a civil government in Manila and Cavite. In October the civil courts, as they existed under Spain, were permitted to resume their functions, subject to American supervision. In January, 1899, before the Treaty of Paris had been approved by the Senate, President McKinley appointed a commission to visit the Philippine Islands and there investigate and then report their recommendations. This was a very proper step because the amount of correct information concerning the Philippines which was available in the United States was very small. The president of Cornell University, Dr. Schurman, was designated as president, and associated with him were Charles Denby, formerly minister to China, Dean C. Worcester, an American scientist who had traveled extensively in the archipelago, and the commanders of the military and naval forces at Manila, Major-General Elwell S. Otis and Rear-Admiral George Dewey. When the civilian members of the commission reached the islands, in March and April, the insurrection against American control had commenced. The members were convinced that "the Tagalog rebellion was due to the ambitions of a few and the misunderstanding of the many," and it tried to make clear the liberal policy which animated the American government. It also held daily sessions for the acquisition of information concerning the islands, and Filipinos, Chinese, European and American residents presented their views on all manner of questions. The preliminary report of the commission was completed in November, 1899, and the final report in January, 1900. This was published in four volumes (1900-01) and proved to be the most comprehensive statement of exist-

ing conditions, and their historical background, which was available in the English language.

The Taft Commission.—Under the military government the beginnings of a civil administration had been laid. Courts were in operation, revenues were collected, public instruction had been provided for, and a better system of municipal organization erected in the pacified districts. Acting upon the report of the Schurman Commission, the president decided to divide the powers which were exercised by the military governor, under the war powers of the president, and erect a legislative body composed of civilians. This was the Taft Commission, composed of William H. Taft, then a Federal Circuit judge and later to become president of the United States and chief justice of the Supreme Court; Dean C. Worcester, Luke E. Wright, Henry C. Ide, and Bernard Moses. Judge Taft was designated as president. The instructions given to this commission were prepared by Secretary of War Elihu Root and proved to be a very able statement of the American policy. The commission was first of all to devote its attention to the establishment of municipal governments in which the people would be afforded the opportunity to manage their local affairs to the fullest extent of which they were capable. Then the organization of larger administrative divisions would be taken up, and they were to report to the secretary of war when they thought the central administration could be intrusted to civil control, and recommend the form of government to be established. After September 1, 1900, they were to exercise the legislative power, with the approval of the president, while the military governor remained chief executive, subject to the rules and orders enacted by the commission. In the distribution of powers the presumption was always to be in the favor of the smaller community, and the central government would have only such supervision over local government as was necessary for faithful and efficient administration.

The government which they are establishing is designed not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philip-

pine Islands, and the measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of just and effective government.

The instructions enumerated certain great principles of government and imposed them upon every division and branch of the government of the Philippines. These were, in short, the guaranties provided in the "bill of rights" in the American Constitution, with the exception of trial by jury and the right to bear arms. Education was to be extended, and emphasis was very properly laid upon primary education, in the language of the people, but English was to be made the common medium of communication. And the uncivilized tribes were to be permitted to retain their tribal organization and government like the North American Indians. The Taft Commission, which reached Manila on June 3, 1900, spent the next three months in a further investigation of conditions, and on September 1st took up its legislative duties. Its first act was an appropriation of 2,000,000 pesos for the construction and repair of highways and bridges, a confirmation of Kipling's statement that "transportation is civilization." The Philippine Commission, to whose membership some Filipinos were soon added, remained the sole central legislative body until 1907, when an Assembly was established as a lower house.

Civil Government Established.—At the next session of Congress a bill for the establishment of civil government failed to secure passage, but an amendment to the army appropriation bill, which was almost identical to measures taken in the case of Louisiana and Florida, authorized the president to establish temporary civil government. This gave a congressional sanction to the Philippine administration, which up to this time was based upon the war powers of the president. Mr. Taft was now appointed civil governor, and inaugurated on July 4, 1901, although the military governor retained his former powers in hostile districts or where civil provincial governments had not been provided. Provincial and municipal governments had been organized in February and the following months of 1901, in which the qualified voters were

allowed to elect many of their local officials. The suffrage was enjoyed by males over twenty-one years of age who had held office under Spain, or possessed a small property qualification, or could read and write English or Spanish. Suitable modifications were made for the government of the pagan and Mohammedan Filipinos and for the capital city of Manila.

The Act of 1902.—The first comprehensive act of Congress dealing with the government of the Philippines was approved on July 1, 1902, but even it was entitled a temporary measure. It ratified and confirmed the acts of the previous government, gave congressional sanction to the establishment of the American bill of rights—omitting the right to bear arms and trial by jury, authorized the taking of a census and the establishment of a legislative assembly two years after it was completed—if peace still prevailed, permitted the Assembly to select two resident commissioners who might have seats in the House of Representatives, and laid down certain rules respecting the disposal of public lands and franchises. All laws passed by the Philippine government would be reported to Congress, which reserved the right to annul the same. The office of military governor was now terminated by order of the secretary of war, but the title of civil governor was not altered to governor-general until February 1905.

The Philippine Assembly.—On September 8, 1902, the Philippine Commission certified that the insurrection had ceased. The president then ordered a census to be taken, which was carried out in most of the provinces on March 2, 1903. Two years were required for the preparation of the returns, then two years of peace must intervene, so it was not until March, 1907, that the commission could certify to this effect and the president issue the necessary proclamation directing that a general election be held. The first election took place on July 30, 1907, and the Philippine Assembly convened on October 16th. The suffrage qualification was that of the municipal electors, and the basis of representation was approximately one member for every 90,000 inhabitants. The Assembly contained eighty-one members, and all were Filipinos. This body shared the legislative power with the Philip-

pine Commission, which at this time contained five American and four Filipino members, but the latter body retained legislative control over the non-Christian provinces. The governor-general possessed no veto, and the only check on legislation was found in the power of Congress to nullify it. One protection for the administration was found in the provision that in case an appropriation bill failed of passage the last one would remain in force, which we have already observed in the Japanese constitution. This provision had to be put into operation on several occasions when the Assembly refused to accept the appropriations desired by the executive.

The Act of 1916.—We have not referred to the political issues which arose in the United States over the questions of imperialism and the retention of the Philippines. In 1900, when this was a campaign issue, the American voters supported the McKinley administration, but it could hardly be urged that they did so simply because they indorsed its Philippine policy. From time to time Republican leaders expressed their belief and hope that the time would come when Philippine independence might be achieved. And their Democratic opponents differed from them only in the time element, as to when a stable government had been attained. With the victory of the Democratic party in 1912 the Filipino political leaders counted upon the realization of their dreams. President Wilson, who was later to enunciate the ideal of "self-determination," promptly removed all the experienced American members of the commission and replaced them with capable but entirely uninformed members, who were now outnumbered by Filipino appointees. The new governor-general, Francis Burton Harrison, who arrived in Manila in October, 1913, proceeded to carry out the message of the president to the Filipino people that "every step we will take will be taken with a view to the ultimate independence of the islands, and as a preparation for that independence." A process of Filipinization of the civil service was rapidly carried out which reduced the number of Americans to a dangerous minimum and directly resulted in many serious blunders by their inexperienced successors. In 1916 the Democratic ma-

jority in Congress passed an act which was to take the place of the Act of 1902. It has commonly been spoken of as the "Jones Act" from the name of the chairman of the committee on insular affairs in the House. The important governmental features of the new act were these: (1) The governor-general may veto any legislation and any particular item or items of an appropriation bill; (2) the president must approve (or disapprove within six months) all acts relating to the public domain, timber and mining, tariff, immigration, currency, and coinage; (3) a Senate was to be elected which would take the place of the Philippine Commission as the upper house of the legislature; (4) the suffrage qualifications were modified to include those who could read and write a native language; (5) aside from the governor-general, vice-governor, and members of the Supreme Court, who were to be appointed by the president with the approval of the United States Senate, and the auditor and deputy auditor whom the president might himself appoint, all other officers were to be appointed by the governor-general with the advice of the Philippine Senate. This provision proved to be a serious limitation upon the powers of the governor-general, who was held responsible for the conduct of the administration and yet might, and often did, fail to secure the approval of his appointees, for purely political reasons. In the new Senate and House of Representatives (which replaced the Philippine Assembly) there were to be members appointed by the governor-general to represent the non-Christian Filipinos. Under the Act of 1916, as interpreted by a sympathetic administration in Washington and Manila, the Filipinos practically governed themselves, with very slight American supervision and control. All the municipal officials, almost all the provincial officials, the entire legislature, the heads of five out of six departments, almost all of the provincial and local judges, and a minority of the Supreme Court were natives of the islands. An extra-constitutional body known as the council of state was created by executive order in 1918, which was composed of the governor-general, the speaker of the House and the president of the Senate, and the heads of the six executive departments. While

presumably designed to bring about harmony between the executive and legislative departments, it also looked toward the creation of a system of responsible ministries which could only hold office with the approval of the legislature. With the return to power of the Republican party in 1921, Major-General Leonard Wood, an experienced administrator, replaced Governor-General Harrison. The task which confronted him was one of restoring the financial stability of the government, correcting the mistakes and delinquencies of recent administrators, and bringing the political system into harmony with the expressed terms of the 1916 act. In these efforts he met with strong opposition on the part of political leaders whose influence would have been greatly curtailed, but he received valuable support from General Aguinaldo and the former soldiers of the revolutionary army. The death of General Wood, in August, 1927, deprived the American administration of its ablest colonial executive.

Law and Order.—We have seen that the old courts were restored soon after the military occupation began. A code of criminal procedure was promulgated in April, 1900, which, with some modifications, remains in force. This was followed by a code of civil procedure in September 1901, and an administrative code in 1917. A system of courts, from those of the justices of the peace in the municipality, through the courts of first instance in the provinces, to the supreme court in Manila, was organized. Appeals from the latter in certain cases lie to the Supreme Court of the United States. In this system the weakest link has been in the minor courts, where adequately trained and qualified judges have not been easy to find. At first the restoration of order during the insurrection was assumed by the American military forces, but as soon as the larger organized bands were broken up a civil force was created. This was the Philippine Constabulary, a well-armed and disciplined, highly organized body of native police under, at first, a considerable number of American commissioned officers. This force, supporting the municipal police, was soon able to restore order in the disturbed regions, although it has not infrequently been called upon to deal with discontented

Moros in the southern islands. In time a considerable number of native officers were appointed and promoted to the highest ranks.

Public Education.—The instructions to the Taft Commission stressed the importance of primary education. During the military régime about 1,200 schools were opened, and this friendly activity served to convince many of the natives of the good intentions of the new rulers. A comprehensive educational law was enacted in June, 1901, which made English the medium of instruction, and soon almost a thousand young American teachers were on their way to the islands to help introduce the new system. Great attention was paid to public instruction by the Philippine Commission, and the later legislature could always be counted upon to support this program. But, as elsewhere, a school system was found to be a costly undertaking and, in view of the insufficiency of the Philippine revenues, the plan for universal education could not be carried out. Emphasis was placed upon primary education, but high schools, technical schools and a university were in time established, and in the lower schools considerable attention was paid to vocational training for both boys and girls. In 1925 the average monthly enrollment in the public school was 1,073,297, or about thirty-eight per cent of the school population. If the 72,515 scholars in the private schools were included, the percentage would be raised to forty. In comparison with conditions in other parts of the East this is a creditable record, but it falls far short of the ninety-eight per cent reported in Japan.

Public Health.—At the time of the American occupation of the islands the conditions of sanitation and public health were extremely bad. The military government improved conditions greatly in Manila and the civil authorities organized a comprehensive campaign designed to secure better living conditions, such as water supply and sewers, to reduce the appalling infant mortality, to eradicate preventable disease, such as small-pox, and to free the islands from epidemics, such as cholera and plague. In all these particulars much success was

achieved, especially in the reduction of small-pox and the elimination of the bubonic plague, in 1906, although it returned for a brief period in 1912. But constant vigilance was demanded and carelessness in following up the first vaccination campaign caused an increase in small-pox cases in the later years of the Harrison administration. Of almost as much importance to the Filipino peasants was the campaign to control and if possible eliminate the diseases which swept off their most important work animal, the carabao or water-buffalo. In all these activities much service was rendered by the bureau of science which was founded immediately after the civil government was organized. In its laboratories the different serums and vaccines were prepared, and other divisions investigated the natural resources of the archipelago. Within a few years the Philippine bureau of science shared with the Dutch scientific stations in Java the reputation of being the most efficient and useful colonial scientific institutions in the Far East.

Transportation.—On the material side attention was at once paid to the need of transportation. Roads were built to take the place of the Spanish highways which had fallen into a sad condition during the four years of strife, and others extended far beyond the Spanish building operations. But it was soon found that, in the Philippines, it was not enough to build a road; some provision must be made for its maintenance. Such a system was adopted, based upon European practices, with satisfactory results. In addition to appropriations from the insular treasury the provinces were encouraged to levy taxes for road-building and maintenance. Within a few years well-constructed roads and permanent bridges were found in every province, and at the end of 1925 there were 3,300 miles of first-class road, well graded and surfaced, thoroughly drained, and constantly maintained. The value of such roads, and the 3,100 miles of second- and third-class roads, in facilitating the movements of people and goods can hardly be overestimated. During the Spanish régime a single railway line, operated by a British company, ran from Manila to Dagupan, 122 miles

north. Instead of taking over this road and operating it as an insular undertaking, the American administration preferred to encourage private enterprise, and in 1906 the Manila Railroad Company received a concession for some 418 miles of railway in Luzon, and the Philippine Railway Company for 100 miles in Panay, 100 in Negros, and 95 in Cebu. In the latter case the government guaranteed interest on the bonds issued, and in 1909 a similar guaranty was given for an additional mileage to be built in Luzon by the Manila Railroad Company. The latter system, when completed, and including the Dagupan line and its branches, would have totaled 815 miles. These concessions have not been completed. The Philippine Railway Company abandoned its Negros franchise, and built only 72 miles in Panay and 59 in Cebu. The total mileage of the Manila Railroad Company in 1925 was 659 miles. In January, 1917, the Manila Railroad Company was purchased by the insular government, but the financial returns proved to be such that the withdrawal of the government from operation, if not from ownership, was announced as being under consideration.

Commerce.—The commercial development of the islands has been healthy, but by no means as great as might have been expected. The total foreign commerce in 1899 was reckoned at \$27,750,000, of which the United States enjoyed about seventeen per cent. In 1925 it had reached \$268,610,000, and the share of the United States was sixty-six per cent. But between 1899 and 1924 the foreign trade of Korea increased from less than \$10,000,000 to almost \$320,000,000, a much more impressive advance, and similar figures would be found in the case of Formosa. The principal exports of the Philippines are now sugar, hemp, oils, copra, and tobacco. Possessing many natural resources, especially for the development of tropical agriculture, and with access, free from customs duties, to the rich markets of the United States, the commercial development of the islands has been retarded by uncertainty as to their future status. This has been reflected in the relatively small revenues of the archipelago. In 1925 the ordinary

income was a little over \$42,000,000. Korea, in 1924-25, budgeted at \$51,000,000, and Formosa, about one-eighth the size of the Philippines with a population of less than 4,000,000, also had an ordinary revenue of more than \$41,000,000. Korea, as in former years, received in addition to the ordinary revenue mentioned above an outright grant from the imperial treasury of over \$7,500,000. The great improvements in Korea since 1905 have been furthered by grants from the Japanese treasury, while in the Philippines, aside from expenditures for naval and military defense, the only services which have received American financial support have been the coast and geodetic survey and the quarantine service. In this respect the colonial methods of the two most recent governing powers in the Far East stand in contrast. Baron Saito, governor-general of Korea, has defined the colonial policy of Japan as follows: "The economic development of the country must come first. Education and the raising of the standards of the people will follow. Afterward political development will be possible." The American policy stressed education and political participation, but the independence which was to be the goal cannot be maintained without the economic development which will support a self-governing state.

The Movement for Independence.—For the past twenty years the question of Philippine independence has been discussed, the leadership in the agitation having been taken by the Nacionalista party, which secured control of the Philippine Assembly at the first election. In spite of the recognized benefits enjoyed under American rule the politically minded Filipinos are almost unanimous in praying for independence. We have seen that the ideal of eventual independence has been accepted by American statesmen of both political parties. The strongest recognition of this ideal may be found in the preamble of the Act of 1916 which states:

Whereas it is, as it has always been, the purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their independence . . . as soon as a stable government can be established therein. . . .

But although the governor-general reported in 1919 that a stable government actually existed in the islands, and President Wilson so reported to Congress, adding "it is now our liberty and our duty to keep our promise to the people of those islands by granting them the independence which they so honorably covet," no action was taken. Later, in April, 1927, President Coolidge vetoed a bill passed by the Philippine Legislature providing for a plebiscite on the question of Philippine independence. In brief it may be said that four solutions of the Philippine problem confront the American people: (1) A frank statement that the islands will be held permanently by the United States. Few Americans, outside of the islands, support such a policy, and those who do so usually dwell upon the importance of possessing a domain from which tropical products can be obtained, or upon the necessity of holding a base near the shores of China. Such a statement would undoubtedly further the immediate commercial and industrial development of the islands—but its future effects are less assuring. (2) Continue the present policy of control pending internal development. This is supported by those who believe that the Filipino people are not yet prepared, by education and political experience, to carry on an independent government; that the islands are not yet developed enough to bring in an adequate revenue; and that a Philippine republic could not support the necessary defense forces without consuming so large a proportion of income that the civil branches would seriously suffer. They further believe that it would be far better for the Filipinos to enjoy the protection of the United States and access to her markets during the years of preparation. (3) A grant of autonomy under American or international guaranty. This would not meet any of the objections to immediate independence raised above, and it would involve the United States in responsibilities without the means of protecting her own interests. If the Filipinos are prepared to set up an independent government they should be granted independence and be prepared to maintain it. But if they are not prepared to meet their international obligations, then the United States would be ill advised to assume their

protection, without the customary attributes of a protectorate. (4) Independence. This is supported by two groups of Americans—those who believe that the Filipinos are ready to govern themselves with reasonable wisdom and ability, and those who are anxious to have the United States withdraw from the islands, no matter what the outcome, so far as the people are concerned, may be. In reply to the first group it might be said that, although no one can predict what the Filipinos would do with their independence until they had a chance to use it, the world contains so many examples of people who have tried to carry on republican governments without the necessary education and experience that it would be unfortunate, to say the least, if the United States added one more to the list. Of the four proposals, the most reasonable is that which advocates American control for a term of years. It would be very helpful if the leaders of the Philippine people would accept such a plan in good faith. If they do not, and if the independence agitation passes from words to deeds, it would be a most regrettable thing if the United States should maintain its sovereignty by force in the islands. The vague statement in the 1916 preamble might be defined and enacted to fix minimum conditions of education and economic development which could be easily tested. For years Manila has asserted “we have set up a stable government,” and Washington has replied “not according to our interpretation of the term.” If an agreement could be reached in this respect, and if Congress would do more than exhort the Filipinos to march forward, but would follow the example of Japan and appropriate a few million dollars every year for public education, internal improvements, or other useful things, a better spirit of coöperation might develop in the islands.

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CHAPTER XLII

ORIENTALS IN THE UNITED STATES

Oriental Emigration.—In order to round out a survey of the relations between the peoples of the West and those of the Far East some attention should be paid to the movement into Western lands of Far Eastern peoples, to the treatment they have received, and the probable effects of this treatment upon the attitude of their fellow countrymen toward the Western nations. Such an examination would require far too much space for a study of this kind. The Chinese have been ready emigrants, in spite of social and political hindrances, and they are to be found in large numbers as, for the most part, peaceful and contented residents in the British, French, Dutch, Russian, Japanese, and American possessions which surround China. They have also ventured far overseas, at first during the coolie trade, but later as free emigrants. In the United States, Canada, Australia, and South Africa, as earlier in the Philippines and Java, their presence has occasioned repressive measures, both illegal and legal. At a far later date, after the removal of the seclusion laws, Japanese emigrants began to go overseas, to the United States, to Hawaii, and later to Korea, Manchuria, and South America. But at most the emigration has not been large, and in June, 1924, the total number of Japanese residing abroad was listed at 594,681. Instead, therefore, of attempting to survey the whole field of Oriental emigration we must be content with a brief outline of the problem in the United States.

Chinese Immigration.—Chinese emigration to the United States began as soon as the news of the discovery of gold in California reached Hong Kong, in the spring of 1848. A few pioneers started at once, several hundred followed in 1849 and several thousand in 1850. With few exceptions the early Chinese immigrants were free adventurers, and not contract coolies like those who were sent to Cuba, the West Indies, and Peru. By the end of 1852 it was estimated that 25,000 Chinese

were in California. At first these honest, peaceful, and industrious laborers were well received. Some worked in the placer mines, but others found that a surer reward came from doing the necessary things which the Western miners could not be bothered about. However, their reception was not entirely cordial, and soon objections were raised to their presence in a "white man's land." These objections were economic—cheap labor, low standard of living, coolies or "slaves"; social—they were "unassimilable"; moral—their vices, such as opium-smoking, were different from those of the Western gold-diggers; and political—if their entrance was not checked they would soon overrun and control the entire Pacific coast. These objections, urged with increasing intensity, led to crimes of violence and to municipal and state legislation of a discriminatory nature. In 1855, for example, thirty-two Chinese were murdered in California, which happened to be the exact number of American missionaries slain during the Boxer uprising. In 1862 this number was increased to eighty-eight. In fact, the Chinese, in this period, were subject to frequent attacks on their lives and property. It may be said that only once did the United States pay an indemnity for any of these losses, and this was offered as an act of grace and not of right when \$147,748.74 was paid on account of the massacre at Rock Springs, Wyoming, in 1884, when twenty-eight Chinese were killed and property worth that amount destroyed. When we remember the heavy indemnities exacted from Eastern countries for attacks upon foreigners, notably the Richardson indemnity in Japan, we can understand the effect these one-sided standards had upon Chinese officials. The United States was able to reply in every case that the individual state was responsible for disorders within its limits—and China could only reply that it had no dealings with states, but only with the United States. In Japan the four powers did not hesitate to deal directly with Choshu, and Britain obtained direct reparation from Satsuma. However, the western states, and especially California, were seeking the prohibition of Chinese immigration, and as they possessed no power to bring this

about they tried, through repressive legislation, to discourage the immigrants from trying to enter.

Chinese Exclusion.—The legislative history of Chinese exclusion can be briefly summarized. In 1868 the Burlingame Treaty recognized the right of voluntary emigration, but the increasing agitation against the Chinese on the coast soon subjected this national policy to criticism. In 1878 President Hayes vetoed a bill which would have meant the practical exclusion of Chinese, and thus have been a treaty violation. Instead, a commission of three members was sent to China to negotiate a treaty which would replace that of 1868. This was obtained in 1880, and gave the United States the right to regulate, limit, or suspend Chinese immigration—but not to prohibit it. It may be observed that the Peking government at this time was not especially concerned with the welfare of the Cantonese emigrants who made up the bulk of the Chinese in the United States. In these years we observe the influence of domestic politics upon foreign relations. California was a doubtful state in presidential elections, and both of the national parties sought to win her favor. When it was evident that California was more interested in Chinese exclusion than any other matter the Republican and Democratic parties sought to obtain credit for legislation which would please her. The two most drastic anti-Chinese statutes were passed on the eve of presidential elections, in 1888 and 1892, and each party was responsible for one of them. Before this, however, in 1882 President Arthur vetoed a bill for the suspension of Chinese immigration for twenty years, as a practical violation of the treaty, but accepted an amended act fixing a ten-year term, which might be considered only a suspension of immigration. In that year, 1882, the exclusion of Chinese laborers became a national policy. By a separate act the naturalization of Chinese was forbidden, and as early as 1849 they had been denied the rights of citizens in California. A more drastic exclusion law was passed in 1888, and a third in 1892. Two years later a new treaty was negotiated which gave the United States the right to prohibit absolutely the immigration of laborers for ten years; laborers who re-

turned to China might reënter the United States if they had there a lawful wife, child, or parent, or property or debts to the amount of one thousand dollars. Non-laborers, such as officials, merchants, travelers, and students would be admitted on certificates issued by their government and viséed by the American representative at the port of departure. Without further treaty sanction, the Act of 1888, as modified, was renewed in 1902 and applied to American insular possessions, and in 1904 the act was made perpetual. In addition, the Chinese were affected by the Western land laws and other discriminatory legislation which denied rights to "aliens ineligible to citizenship."

Chinese Exclusion in Operation.—If the federal government had recognized at once that mass immigration from any country, and especially from a country of widely differing economic and cultural standards, was undesirable and could have anticipated the 1924 Immigration Act—without any discrimination—the question of Chinese, and later of Japanese, immigration could have been settled, for a considerable period at least, without the discreditable incidents which marred its course. In 1880, on the eve of exclusion, the Chinese in California numbered 75,132 out of a total population of 864,696, or almost nine per cent. After exclusion was put into operation, and in spite of some smuggling and some illegal entries, the Chinese population steadily decreased. In 1920 there were 28,812 out of a total population of 3,426,861 in California, and only 61,639 in the United States. While the Chinese government very properly protested against the American exclusion laws, which were in fact a breach of treaty, a more irritating question arose through the administration of the laws. Without any doubt Chinese immigrants, of the privileged classes, were subjected to unnecessary and at times unpardonable treatment at the western ports of the United States. The treatment accorded Chinese nationals was the principal cause of the boycott of American goods in south China in 1905, and it will always occasion resentment until Chinese immigrants and travelers are treated exactly the same as Europeans. A very hopeful effect of exclusion was found in the rapid dying out

of the old, and at times unreasonable, hostility to the Chinese. When an attempt to arouse hatred on the ground that they were a political, economic, or moral menace became too absurd to meet with any support, the Americans began to look upon the Chinese as ordinary human beings and soon found that they possessed some very commendable traits. The Chinese may now be considered well liked in California, although any attempt to alter the exclusion laws would meet with immediate opposition.

Japanese Immigration.—In the case of the Japanese who came to California a different situation was presented. Objection to their presence was not voiced until after Japan had become a recognized power and when the federal authorities were convinced of the unwisdom of repeating the mistakes of the anti-Chinese agitation. Some Japanese reached California as early as the Americans did (and there is no reason to doubt that others were blown across the Pacific from time to time in the earlier years). But it was not until the seclusion laws were repealed that Japanese began to visit the United States. The first comers were almost all travelers and students, then a few began to reside permanently. In 1870 there were only 55 enumerated in the United States, and in 1880 only 148. In 1885 a migration of Japanese laborers to Hawaii began which was later to complicate the problem in the United States. Down to 1905 it may be said that no hostility to the Japanese was manifest in California, and at that time they were compared very favorably to the Chinese, against whom so many false charges had been uttered. But early in 1905 the Japanese became the object of organized opposition, and later in this year American sympathy with Japan was to be weakened by the chorus of criticism which arose after the Portsmouth Treaty. At the time of the San Francisco earthquake and fire, in April, 1906, Japan contributed for relief a sum which was more than half the total sent by all the rest of the foreign countries, so the effect produced by the "school children" incident in October was especially unfortunate. This incident was, in fact, an attempt to segregate Japanese school children in San Francisco and place them in an Oriental school. But

it was not solely an administrative measure, because at this time there was much hostility to Japan in the local press, the labor element was demanding exclusion, and some isolated assaults upon Japanese had occurred. The federal government, under instructions of President Roosevelt, moved to prevent any treaty violation and he himself arranged a compromise which he felt would provide "a maximum of efficiency with a minimum of friction." The obnoxious school ordinance was rescinded, and Japan agreed to coöperate in a joint control of immigration, which was soon known as the "gentlemen's agreement." Although its exact terms were never published, we know quite accurately what was agreed upon in 1907. Japan on her part would issue passports for her nationals about to visit the United States; she would give them only to officials, merchants, travelers, and students, but not to laborers. But laborers once resident in the United States might return, and their parents, wives, or children might join them. By 1908 Japanese immigration was restricted almost as completely as Chinese—and in the case of laborers quite as completely. Two differences may be observed—Chinese immigration was controlled by American law, Japanese immigration by joint action. It would have been desirable if Chinese immigration could have been placed upon a passport basis, but there were insuperable difficulties in the Chinese administration at home. But the Japanese government possessed so well-organized and efficient an administration that during the life of the "gentlemen's agreement" few, if any, Japanese secured passports which their status did not warrant. In fact, so extremely cautious were the Japanese authorities not to give the slightest occasion for criticism that students, who would have been welcomed in the United States, had the greatest difficulty in securing passports. The second difference, which was to defeat the arrangement, was that Japanese laborers might bring in their parents, wives, and children, while Chinese laborers did not have this privilege. The Japanese provision was correct from the point of view of social welfare, for the presence of groups of male immigrants has always been considered undesirable. But when the "gentlemen's agreement" went into

operation in 1908 the bulk of the Japanese in California were single men, laborers, at the very prime of life. After that time no laborers were admitted, but as soon as the resident laborers improved their status so that they could take wives and support families they at once sent home for suitable companions—for there were few Japanese women then resident in California. According to Japanese law a marriage can be contracted *in absentia*, and as photographs were usually exchanged before the final arrangements were made, these women, who were legally married to Japanese residents of California, became known as “picture brides,” which carried a connotation very different from the legal fact. After 1907 an increasing number of these brides came to California. As they were young women, married to young men, the effect upon Japanese births may be understood. In fact the Japanese birth-rate (the percentage of births to population) for perfectly understandable reasons, rose rapidly above the normal birth-rate, and reached its peak in 1917. The actual number of Japanese births reached its peak in 1921, and has since declined. These phenomena were well understood by careful students of the problem, who pointed out that as soon as the unmarried males obtained wives, and as soon as the immigrant group of 1907 had passed beyond the years of greatest parenthood, the Japanese birth-rate would approach the normal rate and in time the increase in births would be almost entirely in families of native-born Japanese, who are by law citizens and not aliens. But the statistics which showed 10,151 Japanese in California in 1900, 41,356 in 1910, and 71,952 in 1920, seemed on their very face to demonstrate the failure of the “gentlemen’s agreement.” It was not realized that a large part of this increase was represented by American citizens, born in the United States.

Discriminatory Legislation.—Attempts to secure a federal exclusion law against Japanese immigrants were unavailing. California then pursued the course which had secured results in the case of the Chinese and attempted to discourage Japanese settlement. This took the form of the alien land law of 1913 which denied to “aliens ineligible to citizenship” the

right to own agricultural land or to lease it for more than three years. At that time Japanese were reported as owning only 12,726 acres of land, but they worked a much larger acreage under lease or crop contracts. In spite of Japanese protests it was demonstrated that this law occasioned no treaty violation, although its purpose was evident. In 1920 the law was made more stringent. At this time an interesting political situation prevailed in the state and an attempt to pass such a law failed. Its advocates, therefore, placed the measure upon the ballot as an initiative measure, and after a heated discussion in the press the proposal was carried by a strong majority, which, however, did not equal half of the registered voters. Under this act the right to lease land was denied, and to avoid any question a legislative enactment in 1923 forbade the use of cropping contracts. These laws were held to be constitutional by state and federal courts, and similar legislation was enacted in several of the other states. The only recourse of the Japanese seemed to lie in a judicial interpretation of their right to naturalization (the Chinese, as we have seen, were denied this right by express legislation). The American naturalization law granted the privilege to free white persons, and to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent. In an earlier period Japanese had been naturalized by the courts, but after an unfavorable decision was handed down in a lower federal court the practice was stopped. After considerable delay a case involving the right of a Japanese to citizenship was argued in the Supreme Court and in 1922 a decision was handed down which declared Japanese, and later, Hindus, ineligible to citizenship. It should be observed that except during political campaigns the dangers of Japanese immigration did not seem to be much discussed even in California.

Japanese Exclusion.—After the World War the whole question of immigration and naturalization came up for discussion. A general immigration act was passed in 1921 which introduced the quota system in restricting immigration from Europe. In 1923 a new bill was under discussion. The chairman of the committee in the House was a representative from the state

of Washington, and to him the exclusion of Japanese was a vital matter. It was now proposed to substitute legislative control of Japanese immigration for the "gentlemen's agreement," and in spite of the efforts of the secretary of state and of the president such a measure was finally carried in 1924. With the exception of the former privileged classes, no "alien ineligible to citizenship" might enter the United States. If the Japanese and Chinese had been granted a quota, like the European nations, which was two per cent of the foreign-born individuals of each nationality residing in the continental United States in 1890, the total would only have been the minimum allowance of 100 in the case of the Japanese and less than 2000 in the case of the Chinese. In order to avoid so petty an immigration Congress passed a measure which caused great resentment in Japan and will, as the Chinese understand the situation better, create equal bitterness in China. The Japanese spokesmen have repeatedly asserted that they did not question the right of the United States to regulate immigration as she saw fit, but they resented the abrupt abrogation of a diplomatic agreement which had been carried out meticulously by Japan, and the substitution of a statute which was designed to set up a discrimination against Orientals in contrast to Europeans. Although the solution of the problem of Japanese immigration has been loudly proclaimed in many quarters of the United States, the student of international relations must feel that the settlement has, at most, been only a temporary one. Discrimination begets discrimination, and it is not at all inconceivable that the time may come when the United States will be as eager to escape discrimination in China and Japan as the latter countries have endeavored to escape it in the United States. As in the case of the Chinese, the passage of the exclusion act has brought about a general cessation of the constant outcries against the Japanese. They are now freed from political and economic controversies and are being judged upon their merits. Even at the height of the anti-Japanese agitation there were few personal affronts, and none of the outrages which marred the history of California in the days of the anti-Chinese agitation. Aside from certain

political and economic discriminations the Japanese and Chinese have been protected in all their rights and privileges, and, with rare exceptions, they have lived on good terms with their neighbors. It may be said that the Americans who had the most intimate relations with them and knew them best took little stock in the complaints and allegations of people to whom the Japanese and Chinese were merely names.

International Reactions.—The discriminations against Chinese and Japanese in the United States have, of course, reacted upon the attitude of their fellow nationals toward the United States. This has been most evident in Japan, where the people are widely informed, but it also may be noted among the Chinese leaders, especially of the student class. There is always a question as to the point at which domestic policy must overrule foreign policy. But there can be no question that needless affronts to foreign countries are not only inadvisable, but even dangerous. President Roosevelt's policy was a sound one, to secure the maximum of efficiency with the minimum of friction, but the treatment of Orientals in the United States has too frequently resulted in just the opposite—in the maximum of friction with the minimum of efficiency. It would not strain the resources of able statesmen to draft an arrangement which would protect every legitimate American interest and yet remove all the irritating features of the existing national and state legislation affecting Orientals.

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